THH149

I have to agree with BFC on this stuff. Plus mixing the fictional (CMBS) and the non-fictional (Russo- Ukrainian War or RUW) after two weeks of history, wont given an accurate read on how the whole war turned out. CMBS doesnt need to adjust for factors outside its artificial scope, ie an invasion by a competent invader. But, if one wanted to use CMBS to recreate the RUW then thats up to the player and BFC have made some suggestions on how that may be achieved. Now if we had a CM RUW 2022+ released in like the year 2030, then that would be a different story.

A bit of vid from the Russian side, said to be of the Sparta battalion, separatists from Donest/Luhansk regions, but interesting to see a controller of a drone provide situational awareness, including the tablet and flight controls following a junior officer around.

When is Rasputitsa - when the land becomes a sea of mud - in Ukraine? March and April? Well things are going to slow down considerably in a week or two and become a plodding advance, along the sealed roads.

Seems like the answer is that Russia drank their own cool aid and assumed the Ukrainian forces were a deck of cards stacked out in the east and it would fall in a few days. They've been fighting therefore with both hands tied behind their backs and just tried to kick the door in. They've had greater success in the South But, they're now spending time re-organising their Battalion Tactical Groups BTGs and about to unleash more of their full power and both continue to isolate cities and achieve control of the borders.

Why aren't the Russians doing thunder runs? This video from Modern War Institute explains why from 25.00 ...

A few questions about what we're seeing on the vids about the wrecked vehicles etc etc, is it fair to say: - the Russians use Tigr's as recon/special forces moving in advance of the main body of a BTG say as the advance guard or forward security element, so where we see Tigr's is where we see the FEBA? - the wrecked BMPs and tanks on main roads indicate where the advance guard or main body elements has been but has since passed through? - are the Ukrainians being bypassed extensively, but they remain able to raid supply convoys while withdrawing to more defensible positions before being cut off or encircled by advancing forces? - where are the Ukrainian tanks? and are there any left? Is that why they're recieving from abroad so many infantry launched ATGMs/AT weapons? - is the current March 1st Russian pause a tactical pause in US terms? - How does the Rus speed of advance - 50 km a day - compare to first few days of Iraq war? - the Russians seem like they've mastered pincer movements at the strategic to operational levels eg crimea to mariupol, crimea to Odessa, Odessa to Kyiv, Beloruss to Kyiv, Kyiv to Odessa, Mariupol to Dnepr, Russian to Kharkiv, Kharkiv to Dnepr?

That rooftop cage armour may but probably wont help against Javelins. The rooftop screen may help against the UK NLAWs, 'cos their overflight weapons, but I guess we need more information about performance in the field. Other options come to mind: shooting at every bush within 2kms, or artillery along tree lines while your tanks advance, or ensuring your thermal sights have good observation of the terrain in front while other vehciles with thermals scan their front. 1 Javelin per squad means you only need to take out 3-4 shooters per platoon, so hey easy, just avoid the Bradleys and Abrams while your doing that!

I had that with the text, solved by using the graphics card on the intel laptop (not the integrated graphics) and my gamer buddy has it but has been unable to fix it on his AMD PC. I may have had to fiddle with the nvidia settings to get it working to, like select the graphics card etc.

Russian or Ukrainian? Russian, right? Thats a bad use of choppers, seem not to expect AAA.

I would've done it for free!

Yom Kippur is a must do in CW - its the first conflict that started the era of modern warfare!

I lke the idea of the US applying AirLand Battle as soon as they work out that Active Defense aint working that well. As the vid explains, US doctrine is not meant to be taken as the only way to win, and if a commander has a better way then they are able to apply that (but the results need to show it works i guess or else its a transfer to the mexican front for that guy).

Don't drive into Kill Zones! Another good mission is Killing Time at Kirtorf, where the US had set up a kill zone, so you need to work out a way to avoid that. Its could also be called "what happens after your forces take the ridges in training scenarios 1 and 2". Russian training scenarios emphasise: 1. spot 'em ie the enemy (ie US) 2. bomb 'em with artillery 3. Snipe 'em with ATGMs etc 4. Blast 'em when safe with advancing massed tank fire 5. Shoot 'em with infantry once they unloaded behind the tanks and advance onto the objective 6. Run over 'em as all your vehicles reset for the next objective! But sometimes, like in Czechmate, you have to fight for critical terrain from which to spot the enemy, so you've got to be agile/flexible in applying lessons 1-6.

An excellent review of the prospects of US winning with Active Defense doctrine and why they moved to AirLand Battle. The presenter notes in no uncertain terms that after a 100+ wargames by V Corps, General Starry concludes they never win using Active Defense.

Sadly I know I use them wrong as a recce unit, figuring its better to lose a 2 man team than a half squad. Remember the Soviets are always attacking so defending is defeatism

I recall that in Soviet Training Scenario 1, the Soviets were encouraged to add significant smoke after their artillery barrage before the tanks began their advance over the open field. It works well, unless there are gaps. That scenario is a symphony that's well worth playing twice: once with the suggested Soviet method, and a second time using whatever approach you would have done playing US, or your usual style of play.

I agree with you on this, not only the game encourages the Soviet players to very carefully read the terrain and manage the totality of their combined arms assets (to get the necessary 3:1 to 6:1 plus force ratios) but I've seen US sources from the era praise the Soviets on how they read the terrain and use it to their advantage.

Yep, we need "Taiwan 2024 Hard Power" after the landing by Chinese forces on the island, and "Black Sea 2024 After Diplomacy Fails" where we can act out a russian blitzkreig

Can't everyone by this time see through a BMP3's smoke? Its no issue I guess for the Krizantema given its radar guided but the defending vehicles could. Or is there a difference (or no difference) between pop smoke and smoke generated after being lazed? mmm, questions, questions!

Russians really need to take the high ground against the US, as well as having a great, responsive artillery arm to neutralize woods lines filled with Dragons or Javelins, thats where more drones help. And then manage exposure to one 'section' of the battlefield at a time, whether thats a field or valley is up to the situation.

Most of the content is on Wikipedia, just needs to be updated a little for a CM focus, but gathering together the content under one place under a CM banner, so maybe a list on Wikipedia would be a start and then a little editing of the pages to support a CM reader. Wouldnt it be great to have the time and knowledge to do that?

Agree with the sentiments here - don't try cold war defensive methods on the attack and don't try attacking methods on the defense - things go wrong. To emphasise the maneuver orientation of the Soviets, scenario designers should strongly consider an exit objective. About Zaloga, I heard that his stuff (Osprey?) was heavily biased, are they any good?

I understand it all, the above references I was using refer to 1984 docs arising from the debate and critique about the Active Defense doctrine, and why it moved to AirLand Battle. I'm not suggesting any changes per se in CMCW, just encouraging scenario designers to consider a broader Cold War experience if they so desire. I'm not saying the training scenarios are wrong, or unrealistic.

I agree totally is ripe for CMCW scenario designers to exploit, so they neednt stick entirely with the Training Scenario mass assault format. I reckon that gives a nice wide spread of possible situations for CMCW to explore, which I think endorses the power of the module. So, perhaps if I squint a bit to ignore a lot of the detail, it might be the the UH ME is not so unfathomable, that is the idea the the US reacts quickly and somehow finds some reserves to feel out the 'south' axis. Anyway, thanks Dom for responding so eloquently. Best THH

In the critique of the Active Defense doctrine, the US are meant to maneveur its forces to reduce the force ratios of expected soviet attacks, eg from 6:1 down to 3:1 or better so the US defender could apply more of the advantages of the defenders edge in firepower, terrain etc. The idea was the some parts of US battle front was left thinly held and forces transferred to the likely venues of a Soviet massed assault. Could such gaps be safely managed? Now one of the critiques of the Active Defense doctrine was that it relied on seemingly outdated Soviet concepts of a mass assault, ignoring intelligence on how the Soviets were training and expected the Soviets to ignore experience of the 1973 Arab Isreali War that the US themselves were updating their doctrine to incorporate. "If the revised doctrine of 1976 was to prove vulnerable on any point, it was one based on a scenario that mayalready have ceased to be realistic by1976: the classic massed armor break-through as the assumed Soviet opera-tional maneuver. Since the manual's tactical descriptions proceeded in reac-tion to this type of penetration, the issue was of no small importance. The doctrinal manual depicted an attack by the enemy on very narrow fronts ingreat depth, with massed firepower in the breakthrough sector. Warsaw Pact forces might throw as many as 600 tanks against a U.S. division in the leading echelon, followed shortly by 600 more. "This doctrine . . . is deeply ingrained in the Soviet Army and if weshould go to war in Europe, those are exactly the tactics we would face."17 By 1976,, "a major shift in tactical operational concepts" had occurred.l8 The Soviets' concern since 1973 about antitank guided missiles had pro-duced a strong awareness of the vulner-ability of their BMP infantry fighting vehicle-the indispensable support ele-ment to the tactics of the rapid and deep classic armor breakthrough. The consequent revival in recent Soviet exercises of another operational maneuver-the concept of multi-pronged attacks by BMP regi-ments reinforced with armor across the entire battlefront seeking holes and weakspots. In training, the Soviets were spending quadruple the time practicing the multi-prong attacks and meeting engagements as they were rehearsing conventional frontal break-throughs. Though many combat sup-port, logistical and leadership problems were evident in the new maneuver,there was no doubt, about a "tactical revolution" in Soviet militarydoctrine.l9 "Severe ramifications fall from FM 100-5 having built its edifice on but oneof the possible Soviet operational maneuvers."22 So what I'm suggesting is not so much whether its right or wrong, but as an avenue for scenario designers to consider the possibilities of BMP or BTR battalions reinforced with tank companies to attempt breakthrough against thinly held US lines or positions, say with US receiving late game reinforcements (or not as the US intended to operated without tactical reserves) attempting to close the gap before more soviet follow on forces appear. This approach would stand in contrast to the Soviet training scenarios and similar scenarios. What thoughts could there be from scenario designers on these concepts and could BFC pick them up and issue them as a Battlepack?