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Megalon Jones

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  1. Thanks
    Megalon Jones reacted to NPye in Battle of Berlin Mod   
    Download my mod here
     
    https://www.thefewgoodmen.com/cm-mod-warehouse/combat-mission-red-thunder/cmrt-scenery/cmrt-battle-for-berlin/
  2. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to acrashb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for the correction.  Having said that, Bing was off and I did not scroll down in the second link far enough to notice that the GDP headline number inexplicably excluded the United States.  If we take the 18.4 T and add it to the US' 21.4 T we get 39.8 T USD in NATO vs. 1.6 T USD in Russia's GDP, for a 25-fold ratio.  Happily,  this correction strengthens my assertion that Russia's lack of action on obvious needs is / was driven not by a peaceful political culture but by economic reality as further degraded by corruption.  If the average NATO country spends 2% of GDP on armed forces (it doesn't) then Russia would have had to spend ~50% of GDP on armed forces to keep up, and that's plainly a) not what they do and b) completely unsustainable without a massive lend-lease program headed their way. 
     
  3. Upvote
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from DavidFields in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    You’re a bit off on your calculations.  The US does north of $20 trillion in GDP by itself.  Once you end up with that many zeros the whole things does tend to get arbitrary and academic.
  4. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from paxromana in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    US V Corps has been reactivated and is heading for a permanent HQ to Poland.
  5. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from acrashb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    US V Corps has been reactivated and is heading for a permanent HQ to Poland.
  6. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from Taranis in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    US V Corps has been reactivated and is heading for a permanent HQ to Poland.
  7. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    US V Corps has been reactivated and is heading for a permanent HQ to Poland.
  8. Like
    Megalon Jones reacted to Machor in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Intelligently contrarian article by David Johnson on WOTR - I will underline some parts for the sake of promoting discussion with TLDR folks:
    "WOULD WE DO BETTER? HUBRIS AND VALIDATION IN UKRAINE"
    https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/would-we-do-better-hubris-and-validation-in-ukraine/
    First, a warning about Ukraine's control of the information sphere in the West:
    "The Russians have, however, conducted several successful river crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River to position forces for offensive operations against Izyum. These crossings enabled the Russians to posture forces for offensive operations in the region south of the river.
    These crossings, as well as other successful Russian operations, receive scant media attention. Nor do Ukrainian failures figure prominently in reporting from the war. This is likely the result of a sophisticated all-media Ukrainian information campaign, reinforced by positive stories from journalists whose access is carefully managed by the Ukrainian government. This control of information is reinforced by their military’s excellent operational security. Indeed, it was the Ukrainian government that distributed the video of the botched Siverskyi Donets River crossing."
    Sizzling take on how Western militaries' prioritization of force protection [See all the folks bragging about protecting their pixeltruppen above 🙂 ] may well be counter-productive in a near-peer conflict like the war in Ukraine:
    "Western militaries are also conditioned by what Jeffrey Record calls “casualty phobia.” He traces this phenomenon to the Vietnam War, but notes that its modern implications were manifested in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. His thesis is that U.S. policymakers and senior military officers believe that the “use of force in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice even operational effectiveness for the sake of casualty avoidance” and that in the war against Serbia, “force protection was accorded priority over mission accomplishment.” To support this conclusion, Record cites then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton to support this conclusion: “The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.”
    Consequently, Western militaries have focused heavily on force protection. This was possible because of the discretionary nature of most operations—the types of operations most serving military members have experienced almost exclusively during their careers. There also is an ever-present concern behind most operational decisions that the perceived public aversion to casualties could unhinge policy. This is not to say that the irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brutal and deadly. They certainly were at the soldier, squad, platoon, and company levels. That said, operations rarely involved the employment of battalion or larger formations in combined arms operations.
    In over 20 years of war in Afghanistan, not a single platoon position was lost in combat. Casualty levels were extraordinarily low by even Vietnam War standards and medical attention was prompt and comprehensive. Finally, combat was deadly only at the ground level; aircraft largely operated with impunity outside the range of limited adversary air defenses. Aviation losses were in low-altitude operations and almost exclusively helicopters.
    The war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated the high human costs of large-scale, high-intensity warfare. Russian casualties at the Siverskyi Donets River and in other battles show that these are wars where company, battalion, and even larger formations can be annihilated in the blink of an eye, resulting in large numbers of soldiers killed in action and wounded, as well as significant materiel losses.
    Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity.
    Changing the mindset from “force protection” to “force preservation” borders on heresy in current Western military culture. In Ukraine, Russia is learning the necessity of force preservation the hard way — in the unforgiving crucible of combat. A reasonable question is whether or not Western governments have prepared themselves, much less their citizens, for a conflict that could result in thousands of deaths and many more casualties in just a few weeks. Would this butcher’s bill awaken the passion of the people described in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War trinity, even in countries with volunteer militaries? Could this level of casualties challenge, if not unhinge, policy?
    The fact that the Russians are reconstituting units from fresh troops and remnants of units decimated in combat is the reality of protracted, high-intensity combat. Our own history from World War II shows the potential cost of peer warfare. The 1st Infantry Division, in 443 days of total combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, suffered 20,659 casualties. This figure is greater than the authorized strength of 15,000 for a World War II U.S. infantry division.
    Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the levée en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level. The Russians and Ukrainians both have systems in place to conscript their citizens; the practice has been abandoned, along with its supporting infrastructure, in most Western countries. Perhaps this is a case of prudent preparation, rather than an act of desperation?"
    He's with @The_Capt in arguing that there's nowhere to hide with modern ISR:
    "While many aspects of the Ukraine war echo past major wars, such as World War II and, to a lesser degree, the Korean War, there are several new dimensions. One in particular, likely explains the Siverskyi Donets River crossing debacle: ubiquitous surveillance of the battlefield. The Ukrainians reported that they had discovered the Russian crossing operation via aerial reconnaissance. The potential sources of this information are much more diverse and numerous now than in even the most recent conflicts. They include a wide variety of drones, commercially available satellite imagery, intelligence from Western sources, and other means.
    This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.
    This new reality renders those criticizing the Russians not only wrong but dangerous. They are clinging to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they persist in the view that Russian incompetence is mostly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers, led by corrupt and incompetent leaders, gives them a comfortable answer that does not invalidate their expertise or current practices."
    And he follows up with a knock-out punch:
    "The U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s looked to the World War II Wehrmacht for lessons about how to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win. After all, the Germans had actually fought the Red Army. Former Nazi officers, such as Gen. Hermann Balck and Gen. Friedrich von Mellenthin, explained their system and its importance during conferences and meetings with U.S. officers and officials. Americanized versions of German professional military education practices, officer professionalism, and encouraging subordinate initiative through Auftragstactik, which became U.S. mission command, were adopted in the U.S. Army as best practices. But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today.
    Furthermore, a revisionist history, not unlike that of the Lost Cause narrative about the Confederate defeat in the U.S. Civil War, was peddled by the Germans. Robert Cittino wrote that they
    described the Soviet army as a faceless and mindless horde, with the officers terrorizing their men into obedience and dictator Josef Stalin terrorizing the officers. It had no finesse. Its idea of the military art was to smash everything in its path through numbers, brute force, and sheer size.
    Thus, just like the Union Army, “‘quantity had triumphed over quality.’ The better army lost, in other words, and the elite force vanished beneath the superior numbers of the herd.”
    These perceptions shaped U.S. views about Russian forces during the Cold War and, despite being disproven in the 1990s, are echoed in assessments today. As retired Army colonel and diplomat Joel Rayburn said in an interview with the New Yorker, “A bad army was ordered to do something stupid.” While officers are now promoted based on patronage, this is not all that dissimilar from the requirement for political reliability in the Russian military in World War II. What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare."
    In his conclusion, he questions the widespread notion that the Ukrainian military is doing well because it had been 'Westernized':
    "These views are dangerous in Western assessments of the Ukrainian military. Currently, the prevailing narrative is that the Ukrainian edge is that they have evolved into a modern Western military, trained for over a decade in Western methods. They are professionals. Therefore, they will prevail. Just as we would. Again, nothing to learn here.
    However, the actual evidence is unclear; the assessments of the prowess of Ukraine’s military may be wishful thinking and hubris. The title of a Wall Street Journal article epitomizes this view, saying it all came down to “years of NATO training.”
    One should recall that Western initiatives to reform the Ukrainian military did not even begin until after the 2014 Russian invasion. Although they have progressed, many of the senior officers were raised in the Soviet system. When I visited the National Defense University in Kyiv in 1996 on an exchange visit as the director of academic affairs at our National University, all of the senior leaders were former Soviet officers. Some were also Russian citizens who chose to stay in Ukraine because there was nothing in Russia to go home to after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    Consequently, a deeply entrenched Soviet-style bureaucracy and training model permeated the Ukrainian military. Thus, their rehabilitation is fundamentally a bottom-to-top institution rebuilding and culture-changing endeavor that will take time. In particular, initiatives to create a merit-based and proficient officer and noncommissioned officer corps are decades-long efforts that are just taking root at the lower- and mid-levels of the Ukrainian military. Consequently, many of the tactics above the small unit look more Russian than American, as does most of the equipment.
    An indication that there is some way to go beyond the NATO training is that there is little evidence that the Ukrainians are executing joint and combined arms offensive operations. This capability will be important if the transition from the defense and attempt offensive operations to restore territory lost to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine also appears to be ceding ground in the Donbas to a slow, grinding Russian advance.
    Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition.
    Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches.
    As it did for Russia, it could happen to us, and we need to fully understand what “it” is."
  9. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to MikeyD in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I've seen some publications give up reporting altogether because 'Washington beltway punditry' is of zero utility to this story and that's all they've got.
  10. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to JonS in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    It's not fact, and it's not propaganda. It's a best (good and credible) effort to log a highly confusing and foggy event.
    Edit: afaict, oryx estimate is deliberately conservative. Ie, the real total is definitely higher
  11. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to Hapless in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Another Reddit link: https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/upz9f6/mz21_9m22s_fired_from_a_bm21_landing_on_the/
    Russians firing incendiary cluster munitions on Azovstal. Not sure how effective that's going to be at setting things on fire in a steel works, but it certainly looks unpleasant.

    The main reason for linking it though is that you get to see the individual submunitions falling and it looks remarkably similiar to the cluster munitions in CMCW, what with the orange/red projectiles: obviously Battlefront nailed it!
  12. Thanks
    Megalon Jones reacted to danfrodo in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    whoa, a visit from youtube MegaStar Megalon Jones!  I am your biggest fan!  😃
  13. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to SeinfeldRules in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Egyptians in 1973 over the Suez Canal
  14. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from Sandokan in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Dude.  Seriously.
     
  15. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from Raptor341 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Dude.  Seriously.
     
  16. Upvote
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from kraze in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Dude.  Seriously.
     
  17. Upvote
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from Artkin in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Dude.  Seriously.
     
  18. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from BamaMatt in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Dude.  Seriously.
     
  19. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to MikeyD in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    The notion that Russian forces were kept in the dark for OPSEC is funny. I'm some nobody who was sitting at his home computer on the far side of the world noticing the Russian buildup and recognizing without a doubt that Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine right after the winter Olympics was over. You'd have to be blind not to have seen it coming.
  20. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to Huba in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Actually that might be the reason for this whole circus - giving the internal audience impression that war is expanding, we are going into WW3, etc. so it's easier to swallow the need for mobilization. Additionally it puts a bit of pressure on Ukraine/ West, even if marginal. 
  21. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to Rooks And Kings in NPS - CMCW Urgent Fury   
  22. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to Rooks And Kings in Combat Mission: Ukraine Gone Hot - Black Sea 2.0   
    Luck. Determination. Networking. It really is luck of the draw. I was fortunate enough to have some skills they needed at the time for marketing the organization specifically and not just taking the copy and running. I still have a pretty good relationship with the people involved and might be developing their campaign this year. The easiest way I would suggest is looking up UK Fight Club and going down that rabbithole. 
  23. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to Valkyrie Yukikaze in Valkyrie's Russian & Ukraine Soldiers: my personal merging of infantry mod from Oleksandr's work, Blimey's work, Billy_sp's work, and Kieme's work.   
    I will release the Infantry parts in the near future when I finish them this month or early next month. Since I'm currently in university exam period; I can only do this in a slow pace. After finish the infantry (War 2022 version); I will working on vehicle marking and some details. 
     
  24. Upvote
    Megalon Jones reacted to FogForever in pitbull's Russian Mods   
    Nice mod.  I noticed your vehicles have the Russian tank symbol mods as well.   Is that your mod or someone elses?  Do you have a link?
  25. Like
    Megalon Jones got a reaction from BarendJanNL in Combat Mission: Ukraine Gone Hot - Black Sea 2.0   
    Ok.  Now the real question:  How does one get his hands on a copy?
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