GloriousRuse

More relevant to the discussion - the GPV 2027 (or 2020 for the time frame represented) procurement plan is a good guide is what is actually being built once you get away from the RT. Long story short, at the CM level the Russians are almost certainly over-equipped in game, even by state targets. The ground forces only get 14% of the budget, and even then a lot of that is being channeled into long range artillery , VDV rapid-deployment initiatives, and operational level systems - all of which might shape a scenario, but aren't immediately applicable to the CM map. The Russian tanker is far more likely to ride to war in an upgraded T-72B3, or even one of the T-80s hastily re-modernized to cover the Armata production gaps, than he is to be in a T-90M. Likewise for IFVs. Given scaling back of BMP-3 production and the BMP-3 Dragoon lines only expanding in 2019, the odds are pretty even that the Russian rifleman is still riding a BMP-2, and will be well until the late 2020s and beyond given the decision to package upgrade many of those rather than pursue more BMP-3s. On top of which, an increased on upgrading the BMD and developing newer models - the VDV's utility for operation in the near abroad has bumped them back up the food chain - means that many of these programs will likely be lower on the docket, as will attempts to salvage the Armata series combat vehicle production programs. And then we have ATGMs. Mass equipping with Kornets has also proven impractical, and the bulk of Russian ATGMs are older systems. Basically, what most Russian battalions have in CM already represents a pinnacle force of which there would be few - a bit like finding a force of big cats in the WWII version of the game. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-05-10-russia-state-armament-programme-connolly-boulegue-final.pdf

The decision was actually born out of analyzing the Donbass. They found that armored battle taxis like BTRs had an unfortunate habit of ending up in situations they weren't "supposed" to be in, and when that happened the guy with a cannon won. Sometimes this was command ineptitude. A lot of time it was the reality that both sides are trying to kill each other very hard, and that is going to create situations where "APCs that aren't IFVs" are suddenly in direct combat. They also verified that light automatic cannon, even in limited quantities could strip the infantry off an armored attack by killing their APC/IFV rides. On the defense it wouldn't stop the dismounted squads from fighting locally, on a macro-tactical level it was pretty effective at blunting breakthroughs. On the attack, this meant that "APC" style units could be stopped up cheaply unless they had cannons of their own. Hence "lets put a cannon on two strykers in each platoon." Design side, it was an upgrade in firepower without sacrificing mobility or armor. Organizationally, there was already a personnel cost to keeping a gunner up. Now the gunner just mans a 30mm. Training wise, expenses go up. As to why not buy a whole bunch of LAVs or foreign models for license production? Well, maybe with foresight. In what the US had though, they had already bought nine brigades worth of these vehicles. Far cheaper to drop on 30mm conversion kits than to change out a fleet that is roughly the size of the entire UK and Canadian army's mech inventory.

Somewhat. To be clearer, it is less a "the US had this brilliant idea for deep shooting", which we see hinted at in the 30s by Soviet theorists, and then talked about in the 70s and 80s again, as it is "the US managed to put together the joint communications package, appropriate staff officers, right authorities, and tied it all to correct technology to make the day to day execution of it in quick turn arounds a reality" as opposed to having a substantially longer delay limited by either technological - or organizational - issues.

Russian artillery has gone in a very interesting direction, organizationally. On the higher (read, division to corps equivalent) end, they've basically copied the US concept of a JAGIC cell - a dedicated hunting element who's job it is to use special purpose forces, drones, electronic detection and so forth to direct massive firepower onto prime targets via rockets and missiles, usually armed with cluster munitions and thermobarics. Depending on who's observations you take as accurate, the response time from detection to shooting is from 10-20 minutes. That is accomplished by directly linking the observer (manned or otherwise) to a command group of artillery types who in turn have direct links (both in terms of communications and organization authorities) to the biggest shooters. Then they flatten the area with a truly prodigious amount indirect fire - think on the scale of 70-80k submunitions dispersed over square kilometers. This is where the famous strike that caught two Ukranian BNs in their assembly areas came out of. But it is well outside the scope of Combat Mission. Scenario wise, fires like that happened before the Russian player/commander ever got into the fight. Its why he only has to fight one company with a little bit of Blue artillery today, it isn't something he has on call. If he tried to get it on call, it would be a process of 45 minutes or more just to snake through the system according to the unclass US estimates. And it would probably be disapproved because once in a major powers shooting war, every time a major asset fires the other side is trying to eradicate it and both sides are pinging like mad with counterbattery radar. So your Russian player is unlikely to benefit from this largesse "in scenario." As you go down to the BTG level, a BTG is usually plussed up with a lot of division equivalent support and retains its own internal artillery, lots of it. In general, a first class BTG will have two or three organic battalions of artillery depending on spending postures for the district,, and possibly a battalion of rockets, and then another three to six battalions pushed to it in support. This is a copious amount of artillery by western standards. However, the reality of coordinating that much artillery weighs heavily on Russian HQs at this level. Rather than serve as acentrla processing authority for lower units (more below), the BTG forms its own fire plans or directly hunts and shoots using BTG level sensors and scouts. Ukranians report receiving fire in "as little as ten to fifteen minutes" after being observed, that is usually from what most western analysts think are BTG HQ controlled observation platforms that have direct links back to the BTG HQ. This one is impossible to actually build in Combat Mission, because those UAVs and special observers are often sending information directly back to the BTG, who decides to shoot or begins a conversation with the battalion level element - meaning"the player" would only receive the benefit of these fast reaction times if he lost a great deal of his own autonomous control of the UAVs and observers present. Unfortunately, this is not within the scope of the game engine, but it does suggest that anything 152mm and higher would be at least a ten minute delay since that is how fast direct sensor-shooter link is processing Russian fires in optimal situations these days. And finally we are at the "player" level of a battalion commander or lower. Russian attempts to emulate the western call for fire system, where ground commanders call up to a coordinating HQ who then divvies out fire in according to priority, has not been nearly as successful as their direct data-link has. See the part where the poor Russian artillery officers are trying to keep a hold of up nine battalions of guns and rockets moving around, shooting, and getting resupplied. Basically, the BN commander has a much long lag time in this situation than his western equivalent. Exact numbers are unknown, but it remains substantially higher than western formations, so likely in the twenty plus minute range for CM purposes. Since that is pretty unacceptable, the Russians use artillery at this level as either pre-planned fire or as direct attachments to the ground unit. When attached, as a poster previously noted, the attached battery actually sends it own special officer(s) forward to coordinate the fire serving as the link between the guns and line units. Which leads to a dilemma - the guy actually making this happen is basically trying to execute a pre-determined fire plan that the battalion commander told him to do. In CM terms, turn one prepped fires or preplanned targets. Or he is waiting for a sufficiently high authority to tell him to shift off that plan - which is NOT a squad leader or lieutenant making an on the fly call ala a western force. Most people think it is a company commander minimum (though he can delegate that authority) and then only for guns assigned to him, not the force as a whole. Meaning that attempts to use the artillery in a "see it, smash it" manner get substantially delayed by command authorities...unless you drive right up and use direct fire, hence the Russian preference for that as a quick reaction doctrinally. In a weird way, it is actually faster for Russians to deliver high level artillery than low level because of these dynamics. Which means, if anything, CM is probably being too generous in the response times available to the player.