Zeleban

You need to think more bigly

 
https://www.boringcompany.com/prufrock

Something like this might be worth half a look, particularly given that a lot of southern Ukraine has relatively soft soil. If you could shove a MICLIC charge underneath the minefield without being noticed you might be able to open several parallel breaches with the element of surprise. The manufactures are quoting boring rates of one to two meters per minute. it would possible to do a full five hundred meters in one or two episodes of bad weather, then trigger the charges when things were more optimal for operations. Yes you would get the the bleep shelled/droned out of you if the Russians noticed. But the tech more or less exists. It seems like it would at least be worth a few training range experiments. I think you could buy about a hundred of these for the cost of one Abrams based breaching vehicle.
If nothing else you could irritate the Russians by setting up fake attempts, and counter batterying whatever they used to shoot at them.

The absence of foreign brands in Russia is precisely aimed at putting pressure on residents of large Russian cities. Residents of the rest of Russia, even before the start of the war, were not interested in popular Western brands.
Rich residents of large cities should have felt that Russia was being punished for its aggressive behavior and put pressure on. Instead, Moscow residents do not consider themselves European outcasts at all; just like in the good old days, they buy expensive Western goods in boutiques in the center of Moscow.

Pekka Kallioniemi is one of the most ardent supporters of Ukraine, why would he spread false information? Western firms are gradually returning to Russia. Without even waiting for the end of the war. Many on this forum argued that Western businesses would never return to Russia due to reputational risks, as well as fear of their business being confiscated by the Russian government. However, we see today that many companies have returned to the Russian market in one way or another. If a Western firm trades with Russia, it loses nothing, and vice versa, if a Western firm refuses to do business in Russia, it loses millions.

This is true. Residents of the rest of Russia hate residents of large Russian cities (especially residents of Moscow). Since they sell resources from all over Russia to the west, but the lion's share of the proceeds remains in Moscow. In turn, Muscovites despise the inhabitants of the rest of Russia, considering them stupid losers
Contradictions and mutual hostility between Moscow and other major cities of Russia on the one hand and the rest of Russia can become one of the “levers” for destabilizing and subsequent dismantling of the Russian Federation. Of course, if the world community finally decides that the last empire of our time has no place in the future.

Assuming you meant aviation industry, one need only look at that prior to the war to see that not much has changed. 😏
Pekka Kallioniemi's comment about "absolutely every brand" was clearly hyperbole, I took it to mean many brands, if not most, are readily available.
I can't accept the assertion that sanctions are effective until I see bread lines and Muscovites eating their young.

This is true. Residents of the rest of Russia hate residents of large Russian cities (especially residents of Moscow). Since they sell resources from all over Russia to the west, but the lion's share of the proceeds remains in Moscow. In turn, Muscovites despise the inhabitants of the rest of Russia, considering them stupid losers
Contradictions and mutual hostility between Moscow and other major cities of Russia on the one hand and the rest of Russia can become one of the “levers” for destabilizing and subsequent dismantling of the Russian Federation. Of course, if the world community finally decides that the last empire of our time has no place in the future.

Pekka Kallioniemi is one of the most ardent supporters of Ukraine, why would he spread false information? Western firms are gradually returning to Russia. Without even waiting for the end of the war. Many on this forum argued that Western businesses would never return to Russia due to reputational risks, as well as fear of their business being confiscated by the Russian government. However, we see today that many companies have returned to the Russian market in one way or another. If a Western firm trades with Russia, it loses nothing, and vice versa, if a Western firm refuses to do business in Russia, it loses millions.

Much worse. Many new Ukrainian officers are so-called "jackets" - this is the name regular Soviet officers gave to reserve officers - ordinary citizens who graduated from a civilian higher educational institution with a military department at that university. For example, at the law school where my friend studied there may be an artillery department that trained artillery platoon commanders. The preparation was very minimal (a friend told me that they had an 85 mm D-44 cannon as a training tool).
Before the war, institutes with a military department were super popular, because they made it possible to avoid conscription. You calmly graduated from university, after which you automatically became a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Then no one thought that war would happen and that he would have to become a real officer.
The disparaging nickname “jackets” was given to these people by real regular officers of the Soviet army. Because these so-called officers came to military training in civilian clothes. They didn't even have military uniforms. Due to their extremely poor training and virtual uselessness, the attitude towards such officers was very dismissive (we are not members of the same family).
Today, such officers command platoons and even companies in the Ukrainian (and also in Russian) army. To be fair, I can say that not all “jackets” are bad officers. Just like not all regular officers are “good” officers. Everything depends heavily on a person’s motivation and desire for self-development.

no, I am not ready to provide a link to a document that indicates the direct number of Ukrainian military personnel who are currently performing their duties in the war. I can only say, referring to recent speeches by the President and the Minister of Defense, that the total number of Ukrainian military personnel is more than 1,100,000 people. While the number of people directly performing their military duty on the front line is about 450,000 people.
 
For example, the TOTAL composition of the French armed forces as of 2022 is 203,250

no, I am not ready to provide a link to a document that indicates the direct number of Ukrainian military personnel who are currently performing their duties in the war. I can only say, referring to recent speeches by the President and the Minister of Defense, that the total number of Ukrainian military personnel is more than 1,100,000 people. While the number of people directly performing their military duty on the front line is about 450,000 people.
 
For example, the TOTAL composition of the French armed forces as of 2022 is 203,250

If only there was a good simulation to help work some of this out....
 
It needs mentioning here that "snow" is an extraordinarily variable thing. It is quite possible that 95% of the time the mines work more or less normally, but that there is some combination of thaw, refreeze, and more snow or freezing rain that would disable most mines temporarily. A question I am pondering very hard is could such circumstances be created by carefully controlled flooding somewhere. Find just the right low lying spot, knock down an otherwise inconsequential dyke, and create the conditions for a few kilometer stretch to freeze solid enough. to support at least light vehicles. It would probably have to be timed at warmish moment before a hard freeze. I realize that is a very complicated basis for a plan, but the entire defensive scheme on both sides in Ukraine depends on the assault being slowed enough to let all the supporting fires come to the party. If a couple of brigades of light vehicles could suddenly just floor it right through a section of the defenses things might get very lively.

Our famous Ukrainian sapper, who maintains a blog on YouTube dedicated to mines, claims that snow is a serious problem for the detonation of anti-personnel mines. Deep snow can also be a problem for the detonation of anti-tank mines, when a large amount of snow, when driven over by a wheel, is compacted around the fuse.
Moreover, burying an anti-tank mine too deeply in ordinary soil, when the fuse does not protrude above the surface of the ground, can also cause the anti-tank mine to fail to fire when even a tank caterpillar hits it. He describes the Taliban tactics, when an anti-tank mine installed in this way exploded not under the wheel of the lead vehicle in the column, but under the wheel of the middle car, after the wheels of the cars in front gradually pushed through the edges of the hole in which the mine was installed. In this way, an ambush on the convoy was simulated (the convoy thought that it was a shot from an RPG and not a mine explosion, since the first vehicles in the convoy passed without being detonated). Thus, the movement of convoys was greatly slowed down and logistics were disrupted
 

I feel that Ukraine must destroy the Kerch bridge and recapture Crimea. Only then Putin will negotiate.
I think the Ukrainian offensive failed due to mine fields. And nothing else.
I am from Sydney Australia. Apart from a few ski trips around the world I am not familiar with snow.
So, if a mine field is covered with a meter of snow, what happens if tanks or infantry pass over it?
/
 
 
 

This was common practice in the USSR. Here is a quote from Wikipedia:
Since the 1960s, there were military departments at universities in 497 of the approximately 890 universities operating in the post-war USSR (at the very end of the 1980s, the number of military departments was reduced to 441)

Krynky bridgehead. Next TOS-1A, which was spotted by SOF was destroyed by night drone bomber of 36th marines brigade
Situation in Krynky still heavy for Ukrainian troops, but completely catastrophic for Russian troops
Just some Russian TG messages from there:
They are killing our guys. No EW. They [command] just wait something. 

Krynki. Situation is very hard. Khokhol's artillery fu...ng hit us, we can't supress it, drones like a bees. 
My friend called yesterday. There is meat grinder. Arty and drones hit like fu...g hell. On Tuesday a company in 130 men came there on positiosn. And yesterday so far they were withdrawn to the rear. Only 18 men left.
Tell anybody about bodies evacuation.
There is too hard in Krynki. We can't go out within three days until it's quiet.
  
It's obvious, why NYT issued two days ago pessimistic article with interview of "UKR wounded marines", who told about "useless operationin Krynky", "huge losses". Russia invested huge money now to PsyOps.  Putin on own briefing told "Russian troops has only several sanitarу losses in Krynky, when Ukraine - dozens of killed"

All officers, whether Regular or Reserve, basically enter the service with the same amount of training. The vast majority of officers were officers simply because they were college grads. They all received the same amount of basic Officer training, and then got their REAL training and experience in the field. The successful “good” officers were successful and good because they listened to their experienced NCOs. Even a college degree wasn’t really necessary. During recruit training, everyone takes a battery of tests to determine their GCT (I believe it stands for “general college test”) score to determine their general placement and “job qualification.” If it it high enough, you qualify for Officer training. In 1969, I was offered the opportunity to attend U.S.M.C. Basic Officer Candidate School, even though I was 19 years old, graduated High School one month before, and had no college. I declined the offer.
One young (under-aged) Soldier from Texas during WWII  had tried to join the Marine Corps, but was rejected because he was too short. He got into the Army as a Private, and finished the war as a Major, AND, the most decorated serviceman in WWII. His name was Audie Murphy. So I would question the validity of any statement that a “90-day wonder” is something less than a West Point or Annapolis graduate.

Much worse. Many new Ukrainian officers are so-called "jackets" - this is the name regular Soviet officers gave to reserve officers - ordinary citizens who graduated from a civilian higher educational institution with a military department at that university. For example, at the law school where my friend studied there may be an artillery department that trained artillery platoon commanders. The preparation was very minimal (a friend told me that they had an 85 mm D-44 cannon as a training tool).
Before the war, institutes with a military department were super popular, because they made it possible to avoid conscription. You calmly graduated from university, after which you automatically became a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Then no one thought that war would happen and that he would have to become a real officer.
The disparaging nickname “jackets” was given to these people by real regular officers of the Soviet army. Because these so-called officers came to military training in civilian clothes. They didn't even have military uniforms. Due to their extremely poor training and virtual uselessness, the attitude towards such officers was very dismissive (we are not members of the same family).
Today, such officers command platoons and even companies in the Ukrainian (and also in Russian) army. To be fair, I can say that not all “jackets” are bad officers. Just like not all regular officers are “good” officers. Everything depends heavily on a person’s motivation and desire for self-development.

Much worse. Many new Ukrainian officers are so-called "jackets" - this is the name regular Soviet officers gave to reserve officers - ordinary citizens who graduated from a civilian higher educational institution with a military department at that university. For example, at the law school where my friend studied there may be an artillery department that trained artillery platoon commanders. The preparation was very minimal (a friend told me that they had an 85 mm D-44 cannon as a training tool).
Before the war, institutes with a military department were super popular, because they made it possible to avoid conscription. You calmly graduated from university, after which you automatically became a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Then no one thought that war would happen and that he would have to become a real officer.
The disparaging nickname “jackets” was given to these people by real regular officers of the Soviet army. Because these so-called officers came to military training in civilian clothes. They didn't even have military uniforms. Due to their extremely poor training and virtual uselessness, the attitude towards such officers was very dismissive (we are not members of the same family).
Today, such officers command platoons and even companies in the Ukrainian (and also in Russian) army. To be fair, I can say that not all “jackets” are bad officers. Just like not all regular officers are “good” officers. Everything depends heavily on a person’s motivation and desire for self-development.

Much worse. Many new Ukrainian officers are so-called "jackets" - this is the name regular Soviet officers gave to reserve officers - ordinary citizens who graduated from a civilian higher educational institution with a military department at that university. For example, at the law school where my friend studied there may be an artillery department that trained artillery platoon commanders. The preparation was very minimal (a friend told me that they had an 85 mm D-44 cannon as a training tool).
Before the war, institutes with a military department were super popular, because they made it possible to avoid conscription. You calmly graduated from university, after which you automatically became a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Then no one thought that war would happen and that he would have to become a real officer.
The disparaging nickname “jackets” was given to these people by real regular officers of the Soviet army. Because these so-called officers came to military training in civilian clothes. They didn't even have military uniforms. Due to their extremely poor training and virtual uselessness, the attitude towards such officers was very dismissive (we are not members of the same family).
Today, such officers command platoons and even companies in the Ukrainian (and also in Russian) army. To be fair, I can say that not all “jackets” are bad officers. Just like not all regular officers are “good” officers. Everything depends heavily on a person’s motivation and desire for self-development.