evilman222

Searching for Gas: Totally didn't mess that mission up. At no point did my Pumas advancing under a hunt command stop in the worst possible spot and suddenly explode. Definitely didn't happen.

Targnon complete. Minor victory, but I lost six panthers. At first I thought I was en route to a total victory, but (spoilers here), a single Sherman had somehow survived the massacre, and managed to take out three of my tanks before I found it after five minutes of searching. Also would like to give a shoutout to Kaufmann, commander of Panzer 211, who, despite having no optics for the entire battle, managed to take out six tanks in this engagement alone.

Thought I'll chime in here. I wouldn't go as far as to call myself an expert, but I am about a semester away from an MA in International Relations with a focus on Eastern European security, so I'm not exactly talking out of my ass here.
First off, Hal Turner is a bumbling idiot. That's probably the least credible source out there. If you see anything by him, COMPLETELY disregard it. He peddles in conspiracy theories, instead of doing any kind of "analysis".
With that out of the way, what's going on in Eastern Europe right now is still concerning, and I would go as far as to say that this is the most dangerous crisis that we've seen since Able Archer. Even if we strip away the whole NATO-Russia angle, there is a realistic chance of war between the two largest military forces in Europe. If that turns into a full on conflict it would not be crazy to imagine a six figure death toll. That said, I am growing increasingly convinced that this is just Russia trying to increase pressure on the West and roll back their expansion to a state that Russia would feel more comfortable with. In fact, I don't think the Russian buildup has as much to do with Ukraine as it does with Belarus. One of the main areas where Russian equipment is being stockpiled is Yelnya. Most analysts that I've seen works from or talked to personally agree that Russian forces in Yelnya (even prior to this current buildup) serve two purposes: for a rapid drive on Kyiv should the situation in Ukraine devolve into open warfare, or to transit through Belarus and cut off the Baltic states in the event of hostilities with NATO. Given the fact that most of the rhetoric from Russia about this mess has been about NATO (instead of Ukraine), I find it hard to believe that they'd build up forces there, then use them to attack Ukraine, removing one of their main assets in conflict with NATO from the board, so to speak. Instead, I think they're building up forces so that they can establish a military presence, including a large portion of the 41st CAA as well as ballistic missiles, in Belarus should this week's talks fail. This isn't necessarily a preparation for war, but is instead Russia's way of saying "NATO expanded uncomfortably close to our borders, so we'll do the same thing and send our troops uncomfortably close to your borders as well". They could also up the intensity of their efforts in Donbas, but the most aggressive move I can see Russia making in the near future would be a move for Mariupol, MAYBE Kharkiv, but the latter is incredibly unlikely.
 
A couple other notes about crap from the Turner piece
I have not seen any good evidence for a Ukrainian buildup in preparation for a military operation to retake the Temporarily Occupied Territories. Can't say 100% that it doesn't exist, but I suspect that at least someone I know would have heard about it. Plus it Zelensky has been fairly passive regarding the war, and such an operation would be out of character for him.
I have also not seen any evidence that the mess in Kazakhstan is related to the Ukraine/NATO-Russia situation. Timing seems to have been a coincidence. That said, Central Asia is a bit out of my wheelhouse so I can't comment much beyond that.
The whole "NATO missiles in Romania" thing is mostly BS. The US Army has been developing a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk, possibly to be deployed to Europe, but those are not yet operational, and despite all the complaints from Moscow, there is no good evidence that the Aegis Ashore system in Romania is anything but defensive in nature.
There is also no evidence that the US has deployed tanks to Europe (Moving that number of vehicles without somebody noticing is nearly impossible), nor is there evidence of American aircraft being moved to Ukraine. Russia would be publicly freaking out if either of those happened.
 
 

Stoumont scenario is definitely too dark. I've got an unbuttoned panther which somehow doesn't notice a Sherman firing away at infantry even though the Sherman is less than 40m away. Seems that the game's spotting system doesn't really cooperate well with historical light/weather conditions.

@John Kettler
A couple points on what you found.
Russian Nuclear Exercises: This is concerning, but I wouldn't freak out just yet. The 2019 exercise was simply an exercise (although any large-scale nuclear exercise is concerning, of course), and I suspect that what happened in March was just a you-know-what measuring contest to show the new president what kind of toys Russia has available. Russia wants to continually show off their new equipment, as it would, in theory, give them an advantage over the US in a nuclear exchange. What a lot of people don't get, however, is that these new toys may not actually mean much. Despite all the hype about the S-500 and other ABM systems, a US nuclear strike/retaliation on Russia would convert the overwhelming majority of the country to a parking lot, even if Russia manages to strike first with their various fancy missiles, torpedoes, unnecessarily large warheads, etc. Putin's obsessed with getting his name in the history books. This requires a few people to be around to read those history books. You must remember that simply possessing a capable nuclear stockpile (even if you have no intention of ever using them) is of massive strategic value.
Mass Graves: After talking to a few friends and colleagues from Russia and who focus on Russian governance, I'm reasonably certain that preparations for mass graves were strictly COVID related. It's an open secret that Russia's official covid fatality numbers only cover a fraction of the true number of deaths. Hell, just about every Russian I know has lost a family member due to covid. If I remember correctly, the document was released shortly after the Omicron variant of COVID was discovered, when we knew it was more transmittable but did not know that it caused less severe illness. If the Russian government expected a new, more dangerous covid wave, it makes sense to begin preparations for the digging of mass graves as was necessary as previous waves threatened to overwhelm morgues across the country. Further, while the number of burials detailed in the manual may be useful in the event of casualties due to a conventional war, 1000 a day is a joke when you've got millions dead in a single city alone as you would during a nuclear exchange. The document mentions CRBN dead, but I suspect that the N in this case is something like a Chernobyl- type incident, rather than a nuclear detonation. Hell, if there's a nuclear detonation due to a strategic nuclear exchange, burying the bodies is probably pretty low on the to-do list.
 
There's a lot of evidence that indicates that Russia could be launching an invasion of Ukraine, and there's no professional consensus as to whether or not Russia will do anything. Time will tell about that part. But I don't see a nuclear exchange any time soon being a realistic possibility.

Thought I'll chime in here. I wouldn't go as far as to call myself an expert, but I am about a semester away from an MA in International Relations with a focus on Eastern European security, so I'm not exactly talking out of my ass here.
First off, Hal Turner is a bumbling idiot. That's probably the least credible source out there. If you see anything by him, COMPLETELY disregard it. He peddles in conspiracy theories, instead of doing any kind of "analysis".
With that out of the way, what's going on in Eastern Europe right now is still concerning, and I would go as far as to say that this is the most dangerous crisis that we've seen since Able Archer. Even if we strip away the whole NATO-Russia angle, there is a realistic chance of war between the two largest military forces in Europe. If that turns into a full on conflict it would not be crazy to imagine a six figure death toll. That said, I am growing increasingly convinced that this is just Russia trying to increase pressure on the West and roll back their expansion to a state that Russia would feel more comfortable with. In fact, I don't think the Russian buildup has as much to do with Ukraine as it does with Belarus. One of the main areas where Russian equipment is being stockpiled is Yelnya. Most analysts that I've seen works from or talked to personally agree that Russian forces in Yelnya (even prior to this current buildup) serve two purposes: for a rapid drive on Kyiv should the situation in Ukraine devolve into open warfare, or to transit through Belarus and cut off the Baltic states in the event of hostilities with NATO. Given the fact that most of the rhetoric from Russia about this mess has been about NATO (instead of Ukraine), I find it hard to believe that they'd build up forces there, then use them to attack Ukraine, removing one of their main assets in conflict with NATO from the board, so to speak. Instead, I think they're building up forces so that they can establish a military presence, including a large portion of the 41st CAA as well as ballistic missiles, in Belarus should this week's talks fail. This isn't necessarily a preparation for war, but is instead Russia's way of saying "NATO expanded uncomfortably close to our borders, so we'll do the same thing and send our troops uncomfortably close to your borders as well". They could also up the intensity of their efforts in Donbas, but the most aggressive move I can see Russia making in the near future would be a move for Mariupol, MAYBE Kharkiv, but the latter is incredibly unlikely.
 
A couple other notes about crap from the Turner piece
I have not seen any good evidence for a Ukrainian buildup in preparation for a military operation to retake the Temporarily Occupied Territories. Can't say 100% that it doesn't exist, but I suspect that at least someone I know would have heard about it. Plus it Zelensky has been fairly passive regarding the war, and such an operation would be out of character for him.
I have also not seen any evidence that the mess in Kazakhstan is related to the Ukraine/NATO-Russia situation. Timing seems to have been a coincidence. That said, Central Asia is a bit out of my wheelhouse so I can't comment much beyond that.
The whole "NATO missiles in Romania" thing is mostly BS. The US Army has been developing a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk, possibly to be deployed to Europe, but those are not yet operational, and despite all the complaints from Moscow, there is no good evidence that the Aegis Ashore system in Romania is anything but defensive in nature.
There is also no evidence that the US has deployed tanks to Europe (Moving that number of vehicles without somebody noticing is nearly impossible), nor is there evidence of American aircraft being moved to Ukraine. Russia would be publicly freaking out if either of those happened.
 
 

@John Kettler
A couple points on what you found.
Russian Nuclear Exercises: This is concerning, but I wouldn't freak out just yet. The 2019 exercise was simply an exercise (although any large-scale nuclear exercise is concerning, of course), and I suspect that what happened in March was just a you-know-what measuring contest to show the new president what kind of toys Russia has available. Russia wants to continually show off their new equipment, as it would, in theory, give them an advantage over the US in a nuclear exchange. What a lot of people don't get, however, is that these new toys may not actually mean much. Despite all the hype about the S-500 and other ABM systems, a US nuclear strike/retaliation on Russia would convert the overwhelming majority of the country to a parking lot, even if Russia manages to strike first with their various fancy missiles, torpedoes, unnecessarily large warheads, etc. Putin's obsessed with getting his name in the history books. This requires a few people to be around to read those history books. You must remember that simply possessing a capable nuclear stockpile (even if you have no intention of ever using them) is of massive strategic value.
Mass Graves: After talking to a few friends and colleagues from Russia and who focus on Russian governance, I'm reasonably certain that preparations for mass graves were strictly COVID related. It's an open secret that Russia's official covid fatality numbers only cover a fraction of the true number of deaths. Hell, just about every Russian I know has lost a family member due to covid. If I remember correctly, the document was released shortly after the Omicron variant of COVID was discovered, when we knew it was more transmittable but did not know that it caused less severe illness. If the Russian government expected a new, more dangerous covid wave, it makes sense to begin preparations for the digging of mass graves as was necessary as previous waves threatened to overwhelm morgues across the country. Further, while the number of burials detailed in the manual may be useful in the event of casualties due to a conventional war, 1000 a day is a joke when you've got millions dead in a single city alone as you would during a nuclear exchange. The document mentions CRBN dead, but I suspect that the N in this case is something like a Chernobyl- type incident, rather than a nuclear detonation. Hell, if there's a nuclear detonation due to a strategic nuclear exchange, burying the bodies is probably pretty low on the to-do list.
 
There's a lot of evidence that indicates that Russia could be launching an invasion of Ukraine, and there's no professional consensus as to whether or not Russia will do anything. Time will tell about that part. But I don't see a nuclear exchange any time soon being a realistic possibility.

Thought I'll chime in here. I wouldn't go as far as to call myself an expert, but I am about a semester away from an MA in International Relations with a focus on Eastern European security, so I'm not exactly talking out of my ass here.
First off, Hal Turner is a bumbling idiot. That's probably the least credible source out there. If you see anything by him, COMPLETELY disregard it. He peddles in conspiracy theories, instead of doing any kind of "analysis".
With that out of the way, what's going on in Eastern Europe right now is still concerning, and I would go as far as to say that this is the most dangerous crisis that we've seen since Able Archer. Even if we strip away the whole NATO-Russia angle, there is a realistic chance of war between the two largest military forces in Europe. If that turns into a full on conflict it would not be crazy to imagine a six figure death toll. That said, I am growing increasingly convinced that this is just Russia trying to increase pressure on the West and roll back their expansion to a state that Russia would feel more comfortable with. In fact, I don't think the Russian buildup has as much to do with Ukraine as it does with Belarus. One of the main areas where Russian equipment is being stockpiled is Yelnya. Most analysts that I've seen works from or talked to personally agree that Russian forces in Yelnya (even prior to this current buildup) serve two purposes: for a rapid drive on Kyiv should the situation in Ukraine devolve into open warfare, or to transit through Belarus and cut off the Baltic states in the event of hostilities with NATO. Given the fact that most of the rhetoric from Russia about this mess has been about NATO (instead of Ukraine), I find it hard to believe that they'd build up forces there, then use them to attack Ukraine, removing one of their main assets in conflict with NATO from the board, so to speak. Instead, I think they're building up forces so that they can establish a military presence, including a large portion of the 41st CAA as well as ballistic missiles, in Belarus should this week's talks fail. This isn't necessarily a preparation for war, but is instead Russia's way of saying "NATO expanded uncomfortably close to our borders, so we'll do the same thing and send our troops uncomfortably close to your borders as well". They could also up the intensity of their efforts in Donbas, but the most aggressive move I can see Russia making in the near future would be a move for Mariupol, MAYBE Kharkiv, but the latter is incredibly unlikely.
 
A couple other notes about crap from the Turner piece
I have not seen any good evidence for a Ukrainian buildup in preparation for a military operation to retake the Temporarily Occupied Territories. Can't say 100% that it doesn't exist, but I suspect that at least someone I know would have heard about it. Plus it Zelensky has been fairly passive regarding the war, and such an operation would be out of character for him.
I have also not seen any evidence that the mess in Kazakhstan is related to the Ukraine/NATO-Russia situation. Timing seems to have been a coincidence. That said, Central Asia is a bit out of my wheelhouse so I can't comment much beyond that.
The whole "NATO missiles in Romania" thing is mostly BS. The US Army has been developing a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk, possibly to be deployed to Europe, but those are not yet operational, and despite all the complaints from Moscow, there is no good evidence that the Aegis Ashore system in Romania is anything but defensive in nature.
There is also no evidence that the US has deployed tanks to Europe (Moving that number of vehicles without somebody noticing is nearly impossible), nor is there evidence of American aircraft being moved to Ukraine. Russia would be publicly freaking out if either of those happened.
 
 

@John Kettler
A couple points on what you found.
Russian Nuclear Exercises: This is concerning, but I wouldn't freak out just yet. The 2019 exercise was simply an exercise (although any large-scale nuclear exercise is concerning, of course), and I suspect that what happened in March was just a you-know-what measuring contest to show the new president what kind of toys Russia has available. Russia wants to continually show off their new equipment, as it would, in theory, give them an advantage over the US in a nuclear exchange. What a lot of people don't get, however, is that these new toys may not actually mean much. Despite all the hype about the S-500 and other ABM systems, a US nuclear strike/retaliation on Russia would convert the overwhelming majority of the country to a parking lot, even if Russia manages to strike first with their various fancy missiles, torpedoes, unnecessarily large warheads, etc. Putin's obsessed with getting his name in the history books. This requires a few people to be around to read those history books. You must remember that simply possessing a capable nuclear stockpile (even if you have no intention of ever using them) is of massive strategic value.
Mass Graves: After talking to a few friends and colleagues from Russia and who focus on Russian governance, I'm reasonably certain that preparations for mass graves were strictly COVID related. It's an open secret that Russia's official covid fatality numbers only cover a fraction of the true number of deaths. Hell, just about every Russian I know has lost a family member due to covid. If I remember correctly, the document was released shortly after the Omicron variant of COVID was discovered, when we knew it was more transmittable but did not know that it caused less severe illness. If the Russian government expected a new, more dangerous covid wave, it makes sense to begin preparations for the digging of mass graves as was necessary as previous waves threatened to overwhelm morgues across the country. Further, while the number of burials detailed in the manual may be useful in the event of casualties due to a conventional war, 1000 a day is a joke when you've got millions dead in a single city alone as you would during a nuclear exchange. The document mentions CRBN dead, but I suspect that the N in this case is something like a Chernobyl- type incident, rather than a nuclear detonation. Hell, if there's a nuclear detonation due to a strategic nuclear exchange, burying the bodies is probably pretty low on the to-do list.
 
There's a lot of evidence that indicates that Russia could be launching an invasion of Ukraine, and there's no professional consensus as to whether or not Russia will do anything. Time will tell about that part. But I don't see a nuclear exchange any time soon being a realistic possibility.

Thought I'll chime in here. I wouldn't go as far as to call myself an expert, but I am about a semester away from an MA in International Relations with a focus on Eastern European security, so I'm not exactly talking out of my ass here.
First off, Hal Turner is a bumbling idiot. That's probably the least credible source out there. If you see anything by him, COMPLETELY disregard it. He peddles in conspiracy theories, instead of doing any kind of "analysis".
With that out of the way, what's going on in Eastern Europe right now is still concerning, and I would go as far as to say that this is the most dangerous crisis that we've seen since Able Archer. Even if we strip away the whole NATO-Russia angle, there is a realistic chance of war between the two largest military forces in Europe. If that turns into a full on conflict it would not be crazy to imagine a six figure death toll. That said, I am growing increasingly convinced that this is just Russia trying to increase pressure on the West and roll back their expansion to a state that Russia would feel more comfortable with. In fact, I don't think the Russian buildup has as much to do with Ukraine as it does with Belarus. One of the main areas where Russian equipment is being stockpiled is Yelnya. Most analysts that I've seen works from or talked to personally agree that Russian forces in Yelnya (even prior to this current buildup) serve two purposes: for a rapid drive on Kyiv should the situation in Ukraine devolve into open warfare, or to transit through Belarus and cut off the Baltic states in the event of hostilities with NATO. Given the fact that most of the rhetoric from Russia about this mess has been about NATO (instead of Ukraine), I find it hard to believe that they'd build up forces there, then use them to attack Ukraine, removing one of their main assets in conflict with NATO from the board, so to speak. Instead, I think they're building up forces so that they can establish a military presence, including a large portion of the 41st CAA as well as ballistic missiles, in Belarus should this week's talks fail. This isn't necessarily a preparation for war, but is instead Russia's way of saying "NATO expanded uncomfortably close to our borders, so we'll do the same thing and send our troops uncomfortably close to your borders as well". They could also up the intensity of their efforts in Donbas, but the most aggressive move I can see Russia making in the near future would be a move for Mariupol, MAYBE Kharkiv, but the latter is incredibly unlikely.
 
A couple other notes about crap from the Turner piece
I have not seen any good evidence for a Ukrainian buildup in preparation for a military operation to retake the Temporarily Occupied Territories. Can't say 100% that it doesn't exist, but I suspect that at least someone I know would have heard about it. Plus it Zelensky has been fairly passive regarding the war, and such an operation would be out of character for him.
I have also not seen any evidence that the mess in Kazakhstan is related to the Ukraine/NATO-Russia situation. Timing seems to have been a coincidence. That said, Central Asia is a bit out of my wheelhouse so I can't comment much beyond that.
The whole "NATO missiles in Romania" thing is mostly BS. The US Army has been developing a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk, possibly to be deployed to Europe, but those are not yet operational, and despite all the complaints from Moscow, there is no good evidence that the Aegis Ashore system in Romania is anything but defensive in nature.
There is also no evidence that the US has deployed tanks to Europe (Moving that number of vehicles without somebody noticing is nearly impossible), nor is there evidence of American aircraft being moved to Ukraine. Russia would be publicly freaking out if either of those happened.
 
 

Thought I'll chime in here. I wouldn't go as far as to call myself an expert, but I am about a semester away from an MA in International Relations with a focus on Eastern European security, so I'm not exactly talking out of my ass here.
First off, Hal Turner is a bumbling idiot. That's probably the least credible source out there. If you see anything by him, COMPLETELY disregard it. He peddles in conspiracy theories, instead of doing any kind of "analysis".
With that out of the way, what's going on in Eastern Europe right now is still concerning, and I would go as far as to say that this is the most dangerous crisis that we've seen since Able Archer. Even if we strip away the whole NATO-Russia angle, there is a realistic chance of war between the two largest military forces in Europe. If that turns into a full on conflict it would not be crazy to imagine a six figure death toll. That said, I am growing increasingly convinced that this is just Russia trying to increase pressure on the West and roll back their expansion to a state that Russia would feel more comfortable with. In fact, I don't think the Russian buildup has as much to do with Ukraine as it does with Belarus. One of the main areas where Russian equipment is being stockpiled is Yelnya. Most analysts that I've seen works from or talked to personally agree that Russian forces in Yelnya (even prior to this current buildup) serve two purposes: for a rapid drive on Kyiv should the situation in Ukraine devolve into open warfare, or to transit through Belarus and cut off the Baltic states in the event of hostilities with NATO. Given the fact that most of the rhetoric from Russia about this mess has been about NATO (instead of Ukraine), I find it hard to believe that they'd build up forces there, then use them to attack Ukraine, removing one of their main assets in conflict with NATO from the board, so to speak. Instead, I think they're building up forces so that they can establish a military presence, including a large portion of the 41st CAA as well as ballistic missiles, in Belarus should this week's talks fail. This isn't necessarily a preparation for war, but is instead Russia's way of saying "NATO expanded uncomfortably close to our borders, so we'll do the same thing and send our troops uncomfortably close to your borders as well". They could also up the intensity of their efforts in Donbas, but the most aggressive move I can see Russia making in the near future would be a move for Mariupol, MAYBE Kharkiv, but the latter is incredibly unlikely.
 
A couple other notes about crap from the Turner piece
I have not seen any good evidence for a Ukrainian buildup in preparation for a military operation to retake the Temporarily Occupied Territories. Can't say 100% that it doesn't exist, but I suspect that at least someone I know would have heard about it. Plus it Zelensky has been fairly passive regarding the war, and such an operation would be out of character for him.
I have also not seen any evidence that the mess in Kazakhstan is related to the Ukraine/NATO-Russia situation. Timing seems to have been a coincidence. That said, Central Asia is a bit out of my wheelhouse so I can't comment much beyond that.
The whole "NATO missiles in Romania" thing is mostly BS. The US Army has been developing a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk, possibly to be deployed to Europe, but those are not yet operational, and despite all the complaints from Moscow, there is no good evidence that the Aegis Ashore system in Romania is anything but defensive in nature.
There is also no evidence that the US has deployed tanks to Europe (Moving that number of vehicles without somebody noticing is nearly impossible), nor is there evidence of American aircraft being moved to Ukraine. Russia would be publicly freaking out if either of those happened.
 
 

Thought I'll chime in here. I wouldn't go as far as to call myself an expert, but I am about a semester away from an MA in International Relations with a focus on Eastern European security, so I'm not exactly talking out of my ass here.
First off, Hal Turner is a bumbling idiot. That's probably the least credible source out there. If you see anything by him, COMPLETELY disregard it. He peddles in conspiracy theories, instead of doing any kind of "analysis".
With that out of the way, what's going on in Eastern Europe right now is still concerning, and I would go as far as to say that this is the most dangerous crisis that we've seen since Able Archer. Even if we strip away the whole NATO-Russia angle, there is a realistic chance of war between the two largest military forces in Europe. If that turns into a full on conflict it would not be crazy to imagine a six figure death toll. That said, I am growing increasingly convinced that this is just Russia trying to increase pressure on the West and roll back their expansion to a state that Russia would feel more comfortable with. In fact, I don't think the Russian buildup has as much to do with Ukraine as it does with Belarus. One of the main areas where Russian equipment is being stockpiled is Yelnya. Most analysts that I've seen works from or talked to personally agree that Russian forces in Yelnya (even prior to this current buildup) serve two purposes: for a rapid drive on Kyiv should the situation in Ukraine devolve into open warfare, or to transit through Belarus and cut off the Baltic states in the event of hostilities with NATO. Given the fact that most of the rhetoric from Russia about this mess has been about NATO (instead of Ukraine), I find it hard to believe that they'd build up forces there, then use them to attack Ukraine, removing one of their main assets in conflict with NATO from the board, so to speak. Instead, I think they're building up forces so that they can establish a military presence, including a large portion of the 41st CAA as well as ballistic missiles, in Belarus should this week's talks fail. This isn't necessarily a preparation for war, but is instead Russia's way of saying "NATO expanded uncomfortably close to our borders, so we'll do the same thing and send our troops uncomfortably close to your borders as well". They could also up the intensity of their efforts in Donbas, but the most aggressive move I can see Russia making in the near future would be a move for Mariupol, MAYBE Kharkiv, but the latter is incredibly unlikely.
 
A couple other notes about crap from the Turner piece
I have not seen any good evidence for a Ukrainian buildup in preparation for a military operation to retake the Temporarily Occupied Territories. Can't say 100% that it doesn't exist, but I suspect that at least someone I know would have heard about it. Plus it Zelensky has been fairly passive regarding the war, and such an operation would be out of character for him.
I have also not seen any evidence that the mess in Kazakhstan is related to the Ukraine/NATO-Russia situation. Timing seems to have been a coincidence. That said, Central Asia is a bit out of my wheelhouse so I can't comment much beyond that.
The whole "NATO missiles in Romania" thing is mostly BS. The US Army has been developing a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk, possibly to be deployed to Europe, but those are not yet operational, and despite all the complaints from Moscow, there is no good evidence that the Aegis Ashore system in Romania is anything but defensive in nature.
There is also no evidence that the US has deployed tanks to Europe (Moving that number of vehicles without somebody noticing is nearly impossible), nor is there evidence of American aircraft being moved to Ukraine. Russia would be publicly freaking out if either of those happened.
 
 

While they're truly devastating against enemy infantry, I'm finding that the single greatest threat to my infantry on the battlefield are my own Wirbelwinds 😅

While they're truly devastating against enemy infantry, I'm finding that the single greatest threat to my infantry on the battlefield are my own Wirbelwinds 😅

Well I totally screwed up the end of that scenario lmao. Exited the tigers, but there was so much time left that I figured there was another wave coming. Ended up losing two AA crews before time expired, only to realize I could have ceasefired twenty minutes earlier. Oops.

Just happened to me as well. Plane early in the scenario bombed a half track that was passing in front of the bunker. Explosion killed him. I'll admit that I did revert to a previous save, as in this case it seems like he's intended to be in an invincible position (and not supposed to be killable)

Looks like it's come a long way since the first version. Shame I couldn't help test it a bit more, but with grad school and all I've had very little free time to do so

I can also confirm that the scenario is worth getting the British module for. Plus, it seems like there were more SF1 scenarios (which can also be played in SF2) made for the British module than for other modules.

It often feels like the M113s have armor which is only designed to protect against vigorously thrown paperclips. While playing as the Soviets, I managed to clip the M2 on one with a Sabot round and somehow kill everyone inside the vehicle.

It often feels like the M113s have armor which is only designed to protect against vigorously thrown paperclips. While playing as the Soviets, I managed to clip the M2 on one with a Sabot round and somehow kill everyone inside the vehicle.

Even if it's not the priority for the game, I think QBs need an overhaul for the next patch. The point totals mentioned in this thread for the next patch still feel a bit low (should be about 30k vs 30k default imo), and I'm really surprised that some of the larger maps from the US campaign aren't available as QB maps.

I think for that exact reason they'd be included as part of other modules, similar to how additional Syrian formations were included in the various CMSF modules.

I was thinking something a bit more out of the box, and maybe them doing a module featuring Turkish forces fighting in NE Turkey and into the Caucuses.

First time I try to buy CW, my internet cuts out before I can complete the purchase
The second time, my credit card company throws a tantrum and refuses to allow the purchase through thinking someone has stolen my card.
Third time, the website goes down. I'm beginning to think that this outage is partially my fault hahaha

Is it just me or are some of the American TOW-equipped AT vehicles (Mainly the LAV-AT and the M1134 Stryker variant) absolutely pathetic at spotting enemy units? I don't have any issue spotting (and destroying) enemy armor with TOW-equipped Humvees, and the regular LAV variants see enemy vehicles just fine, but not with AT variants or AT strikers.