danfrodo

Nice, if true. Feels a little inflated, but there's definitely money to be made in shell production these days, so why not. 
 

First Oscar in Ukrainian history. 
 

This month's target list has been provided by the Russian Defense Ministry - thank you very much!
Ukraine's military intelligence claims cyberattack on Russian Defense Ministry (yahoo.com)
Ukraine's military intelligence agency (HUR) launched a cyberattack attack against the servers of the Russian Defense Ministry, gaining access to "a bulk of classified service documents," the agency said on March 4.
The operation by military intelligence cyber specialists reportedly helped to obtain orders, reports, instructions, and reports "that circulated among about 2,000 structural units of the Russian security service," as well as information security and encryption software.
The analysis of captured data also helped to identify generals and other high-level commanders of the Russian Defense Ministry's structural units and "all those who used the software for electronic document management," the agency's statement read.
The agency claims to have obtained official documents of Timur Ivanov, a Russian deputy defense minister.

Just came across this and thought maybe everyone could use a chuckle.
 

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1766256716214100061?t=3Q7rTwMgjJ4ITNUn1qIT9g&s=19

I've noticed that they never just roll off the the vehicle.  In this instance, not much chance to do anything.  but so many times I see them cringe & shoot & curl into ball.  RU should have training so that the instinctual move is to just jump/roll off.  The drone is after the vehicle, at least the infantry could survive.  But it happens fast and they only way one could react is to have practiced so it becomes an automatic response.

I'm reminded of the old film 'Poltergeist'. The dad is trying to watch the football game but his neighbor's TV remote is on the same frequency so his TV channel keeps switching to 'Mr Rogers'. I would imagine frequency saturation would be a limiting factor in drone warfare, especially for long range drones. A dozen drone in the air all trying to broadcast pictures back to their operators and the operators all trying to broadcast steering commands to their drones. How are these frequencies being coordinated?

What follows will be my own befuddled musings on the Claymores Through Kleve campaign as I go along. Other forumites are welcome to share their own experiences.
First up you'll find that it is as much a mudbath, as bloodbath. And, of course that is an accurate reflection of how it was back in 1945. So if you want sunny days, with bone dry ground and long sight lines this wont be for you.
Just as a way of illustrating the murk ... 

If you listen carefully these Jocks are saying, "If that Sassenach Bastard wants us tae pose fer pictures, we want more drams, now!""  
 

Hi,
As a Swede I thought today would be a good day to stop lurking for a bit and drop a comment. Been playing cm for 20 years and following this forum for a long time.
Thank you all for contributing to this thread, checking it daily. Always a good source for news and discussion, so much knowledge and experience gathered is hard to get elsewhere. 
I always was all for our countrys neutral stance combined with a strong Defense but last decade has of course swayed us all in Sweden a bit. I have my background in the army, cv90. Seeing us finally start to retake our capabilities regarding defense is good.
Anyways thanks for having us in the club I guess (why am I thinking about brothers Marx)?
Carl 

I've been thinking about this post most of the day, and keep coming back to "Neat. Now what?"
Which got me thinking about how other step changes in military capability were handled. The two obvious ones that come to mind are tanks in WWII, and airpower during the Cold War. Now, clearly, in both cases they existed early, but they only really became effective/worrisome/"game-changing" some decades after their entree to the battlefield.
For the infantry, in both cases, the response became basically the same: very small infantry units became fully capable of anti-ing the other thing, either anti-tank or anti-air.
During WWII anti-tank rifles, bazookas, fausts, shrecks, Piats and hearty grenades gave platoons and sections an ability to defend against or attack against tanks, pretty explicitly at the detriment to the nominal role of the infantry, which was to oppose and defeat enemy infantry. That trend was significantly enhanced during second half of last century with things like RPGs and M-72s. This is at the point now where with weapons like Javelin tanks perhaps have more to fear from infantry than the vice versa, even though lugging Javelin around is a royal PITA especially for light infantry.
The introduction of air power, and especially effective CAS, started us on the road to the fully illuminated battlefield, where nowhere is safe and to be seen is to die. During WWII the only real counter that the infantry had was to dig on, or hide, or both. But during the Cold War a lot of effort went into MANPADS, resulting in the Stinger in the 1980s and with other systems following soon after. Just like their anti tank weapons, lugging around anti-aircraft missiles is a PITA which detracts from the nominal role of engaging enemy infantry, not to mention the drain on budgets and training schedules. But on the other hand now every platoon and section is capable of destroying any tank or aircraft that wanders into it's little tactical AO. And once the air and armour battle is won - either locally or globally - then the rest is just mopping up. The degradation of the infantry platoon and section's ability in the infantry-battle doesn't really matter, since while that bit remains hard and unpleasant, it is incredibly harder and more unpleasant in the absence of either air or armoured support.
So you can probably see where this is going.
Assuming UAS remains in play (and why wouldn't it?), then the role of infantry platoons and sections will change again. Instead of being little nodes of anti-tank and anti-air goodness,with some residual anti-infantry capability, they will become little anti-UAS nodes, with the weapons, training, mindset and purpose to defeat enemy UAS in their local area, and also protect or project friendly UAS capability around themselves. If an enemy tank or aircraft turns up then the section or platoon mightn't be able to deal with it themselves, but they will be networked to someone who can - guns, missiles, friendly armour or air, or friendly UAS. And they'll still, you know, carry rifles. Mainly out of habit and tradition, as well as giving the NCOs something to inspect every day. But most of their weaponry, and sensors, and just the general claggage they're carting about will be geared towards winning the UAS fight, because winning that will mean that the rest is just mopping up.
In other words, the infantry will be able to concentrate physically and cognitively on the UAS battle because it won't be their role any more to win the tank, infantry, or local airspace battle.

Or UKRAINIAN floating objects!

Lol
 

Havent seen the news here yet but russia officially ended Armata development, citing its high cost as  mine clearing vehicle

do you recall at all what happened in Bucha?  I mean FFS what exactly do you think is gonna happen with negotiations with Russia?  JFC people have such poor memories or just don't give a rat's a55 for reality when they have an agenda.

Seriously and @squatter can look here too.  For anyone advocating Ukraine pursuing peace negotiations or suing for peace - easy to say but no one in this camp has provided a coherent theory of what that would look like right now.
Let’s say “Ok, you guys are right. Ukraine is out of options here. There are no viable way for Ukraine to continue to prosecute this war.”  Ok, so what?  What would peace negotiations look like?  How exactly do you guys see these “peace negotiations” happening.  Every time I ask this question I get some hand waving but no one has yet to unpack just how any peace negotiations could end up in anything but weakened western influence and a more vulnerable Ukraine that Russia is going to exploit.  What peace negotiation, that Russia is going to accept - while, as we are continually reminded, Russia is still capable of waging offensives to take ground?  What possible leverage does the west or Ukraine have in guaranteeing Ukrainian independence and security.  Is Russia going to offer reparations?  How about war crimes prosecution?  Is Russia going to give up an inch of ground it has taken?  Are they going to push for recognition of Crimea and Donbas as Russian provinces.
This is what is so disingenuous about this line of advocacy - at best it is delusional liberal left “let’s give peace a chance”.  At worst is it far right BS designed to program failure into this entire war so that their presidential candidate can be “right all along”.  In both cases the idea of peace negotiations right now is an empty coffin where actual ideas on this war go to die.  We may very well need a negotiated end-state in this war, but suing for peace now, while on the back foot is going to embolden Putin and his regime…and is exactly what they are looking for in order to promote themselves “Look we brought them all to their knees”.
But let’s open the floor.  Please walk us through what a peace process would look like right now.  Let’s stop sideline heckling on won’t work and tell us what you think will work.

Could have been worse than where we are now as Ukraine would have had to take more troops off the front line to learn and integrate an influx of equipment.
You clearly forget the discussions at the time that we needed to send soviet era kit as easily used by Ukraine.
We could not just dump modern kit into Ukraine and expect it to be used effectively.
People want easy answers. This war isn't easy and there is no magic wand. Sure we need to better upgrade Ukrainian military forces, but that ain't easy...
 

Reportedly on Avdiivka front "war of reserves" started in full height. Russian threw in the battle 74th motor-rifle brigade and prepare to involve own three territorial troops MRRs (form 1 to 3). Recently they began to assault Krasnohorivka town and could distract there part of 3rd assault brigade. Though this didn't bring Russians almost nothing. In current time intensive clashes are continuing on the line Berdychi - Orlivlka - Tonen'ke. These villages aren't completely controlled by any side. 
Map just for illustration, situation is very dynamical, positions сonstantly change hands, but interesting, Russian miliblogger with regret pointed out that "UKR frorces already don't retreat from Avdiivka, but try to fight back with reserves" 
Also UKR soldier in own twitter wrote the number of Russian sorties with gliding bombs significantly reduced. For yesterday only 4 strikes. 

Bradley's ERA blocks protected vehicle after ATGMs hit (likely non-tandem). One missile hit the edge of turret without detonation, the second hit side block and activated it. Reportedly Bradley still operational, crew is ok.
 
 

Oh good, you are back.  So I posted links to two estimates of RA force lay down south of Kherson.  From OS we have at least a decent idea that there is roughly a division down there.  I then did a force to space analysis that would show roughly 100 RA troops per km.  That is roughly 1/3 of the average troops density elsewhere and much less than RA offensive concentrations.  But, again, you simply ignore it.
I am not sure what a discussion in Kherson sector has to do with the larger strategic force comparison; however the argument was never that the “RUS are outnumbered and outgunned in Ukraine”, it was: the RA is thin at Kherson and Ukraine has on opportunity to exploit that.
Well at the CFC we also do not assume the enemy is “superior in every way so every option is too hard…so let’s just quit” either.  I have no doubt the RA has hard points along that obstacle but they do not have enough forces to create an effective “wall”, they have likely no depth and they definitely do not have air superiority.  I mean, seriously, how much more do you need?
So first off “difficult” does not automatically translate into “impossible” - that is not a good military rule of thumb.  So how “beleaguered” is that force at Krynky?  How much has it cost the UA to hold that bridgehead.  How hard have been the RA c-attacks.  You basically “have seen pictures of tired Ukrainian Marines” and translate that into “impossible mission”.  So who is demonstrating bias here, in order to fit a foregone conclusion?  Krynky shows that a small light force one the other side of the Dnipro can be sustained and resist RA attempts to push them out.  It demonstrates that the RA do not have decisive force at Krynky and I suspect the bridgehead is acting as a patrolling base.  The fact that they have held on for months reinforces this deduction.
Now the real question is, can the UA do 6-10 Krynkys?  Upscaling is a completely different issue.  It depends on availability of trained troops, water crossing equipment, stores and intelligence.  It is a complete complex operation.  Is it guaranteed?  Absolutely not - war is not a menu with items you can simply return to the kitchen because you don’t like them - this will be a very hard and dangerous operation.  However, it is 1) possible and plausible and  2) likely one of the better operational offensive options on the table.  You appear to write off any offensive operation for your own reasons, however, here is one professional military analysts who is telling you that there is an option space here given the proper resources.  The risks are high, however, the payoff may be high enough to warrant the risk.  Further the other options are all pretty much worse unless the UA has solved for minefields in this war.
(This is your queue to get huffy again and argue with the kitchen btw)
Your state position has been, and is (unless you wish to retract) - “Ukraine is out of options and as such we should be pursuing peace negotiations.”  If you can provide a single post where you do not reinforce this central premise then I think we can re-assess your position.  You have worked incredibly hard to remove the southern light operational option - to the point that Steve also called you out for ignoring evidence being presented in favour of your underlying position.  You have also dismissed any and all other options - again to reinforce your position.  You have side-stepped historical references as “out of date”, you have side-stepped force-space analysis and you have downplayed Ukrainian successes.  
Now, you are correct.  This could all be quite innocent and you do not have a conscious ulterior motive.  But now you might want to take a look at your own biases because you are definitely projecting a sub-conscious motive here.  You can get all huffy and demand to see the manager, but I still smell and suspect you of political motivations that align with other posters who have come through here who employ pretty much the exact same MO on the discussion of future Ukrainian military success - ignore or downplay any analysis or assessment that would give Ukraine any chance of success; over subscribe Russian capabilities and capacity: land back at “Ukraine is done…we must sue for peace”.
No argument on the transformative impact ISR has had on the battlefield.  And no one is saying a water crossing operation is going to be easy.  Like minefields, it will require pre-conditions which include a level of c-ISR.  However, we have a proof of concept that it can be done, which is a helluva lot more than we have with respect to minefields and RA forces elsewhere.  That is one large obstacle to try and cover in detail - 85-100kms.  And the UA has freedom of movement along most of that obstacle (I.e. unlike a minefield they can cross at multiple locations).  So what?  Well if one can keep the logistical demand low, one could sustain light operations through over the water and air resupply (see: heavy drones)…you know, like in other times in history.
A light force water crossing is damned hard and comes with significant risk, no getting past that.  However, compared to other options it may be the best of the bunch.  And it may very well work…and by “work” I mean draw RA forces away from other sectors to deal with it, which may open up other opportunities.
As to “Russian stooge” and “f#cking idiot”…you realize you are the only one to make these statements in this debate?  I still suspect you of ulterior motives but of course that will need proof otherwise.  No, I suspect you are a guy who is entirely enamoured in your own opinion and is always pushing to be the smartest guy in the room.  Now which rooms?  In the end, I really do not care.
Now who is throwing around “you are all f#cking idiots and Pro-Ukrainian bots”?  So if your purpose was to highlight how challenging future offensive operations will be for the UA…well, ok, got it. Contribution noted.  But it really appears you are working very hard to convince everyone that Ukraine has no offensive options left, and its defensive ones are nearly as hopeless…and therefore Ukraine should “sue for peace”.  
This will have been at least the 2nd, possible 3rd time someone has come out of the woodwork after Adiivka to push this perspective.  Your approach of 1) being entirely in love with your own opinion and 2) ignoring any and all evidence or counter analysis, and 3) becoming very offended when called out, matches those previous poster profiles.  Could all be innocent coincidence and you honestly believe this is the situation despite also hoping for a better outcome, but I remain suspicious.
Why?  Because like those other posters, you are not promoting actual discourse.  You are pushing a single position without room for anything else.  I am more than willing to admit a water crossing operation south of Kherson may very well fail, it is no guaranteed success.  I am also very willing to publicly admit that Ukraine is definitely facing some tough decisions this year.  I do not believe we are at the “beg Russia for peace” stage though and see still possible opportunities but windows may be closing.  You on the other hand dismiss any and all ideas that run counter to your position.  You are preaching, not discussing.  Could be just who you are, but you picked a really crappy time to come out and self-actualize.

And I keep asking myself "when/if it will ever matter" that putin is sending these schmucks to slaughter.  They are so clueless they make videos complaining of abuse -- who do they think will help them?  Who do they think cares?  Their wives/girlfriends seem more interested in the combat death payout.  I know is a LOTR-only forum, but I keep wondering if a platoon sized group will do Game of Thrones "kill the masters" and have it spread.  So far it seems they just don't care about the deaths until suddenly some officer shows up and says "you're next!" and off they go.

Now imagine the Bradley able to view the drone footage in real time giving themselves real time BDA.  In this fully illuminated space, any EM signature downsides would be more than offset by the better situational awareness.  Suddenly vehicles get to see the map in overhead view with all the benefits that those weak willed among us who don’t play on ironman.  
 

What interesting times are coming... Caution Germany became a locomotive of military aid, France, who wanted "to allow Putin to save his face" now allowed own SOF and other units to cross Ukrainian border. Interesting also that current commander of French Foreign Legion is ethnical Ukrainain (at least by surname) Cyrille Yushchenko.
 

Oh that is interesting.  RU strikes on static positions are up, but vehicle strikes are still well out of balance.  That suggests that UA ISR is still superior.  Infantry is also interesting but is likely tied to increases in static position numbers.
My advice for the UA is to keep hitting the vehicles - it is a freakin long walk to Kyiv.

Impressive video.