shift8

What is not being understood here is that "murdering" the enemy force IS NOT the objective in war. Neutralizing the enemy force is. 
 
And no, that is not just semantics. Like Bill pointed out earlier, unless you have a massive advantage in firepower or manpower, you cannot ignore terrain in a fight, and even then doing so would be wasteful in most circumstances. In reality, all battles are won by achieving and advantage of some kind. Whether that is through troop concentration to achieve mass for assault, or bombardment reduce the enemy's ability to resist, or through maneuver to force the enemy into a disadvantageous position that enhances your own forces ability to fight. 
 
Attacking the enemy with cookie-cutter fire and movement is a recipe for suicide. It is very much akin to clearing  a room. NOBODY in their right mind stacks up and breaches a room through weight of bodies if your rules of engagement would have allowed you to satchel the entire building instead. Room clearing or building clearing tactics  are a basis for clearing a structure with the fewest possible casualties by attempting to mass bodies into a room before the enemy can cut you all down. Somebody is going to die though if your enemy is not caught unawares. Same goes with platoon or company fire and maneuver. Im not going to initiate an assault involving suppressive fires and bounding movements when I could just sneak around the back of a hill and come up inside the enemies flank. 
 
That being said, the terrain objectives on a map have to be assumed to have some sort of strategic/operational/tactical significance. Lets just look at another historical example shall we? 
 
During the Mortain Counter-Attack in August of 44, Hill 317 Could not be bypassed because it was an important spotting point for artillery and air support. IE: Terrain dictated the focal point of an entire offensive, and successful defense of that objective impeded the entire advance (among other things.)
 
Bastogne, possessed a road network that was important to maintaining the German advance in the Bulge. Not taking it tied down units that could have been doing other things. 
 
We could also mention the cities of Caen or Saint Lo, or the Rhine as important pieces of Terrain that influenced how battles were fought and their outcomes. 
 
If a mission designer puts a box around a town, it only makes sense that on some level it is necessary. Going beyond that objective, and attempting to destroy the enemy beyond what you were ordered to do would in most cases be stupid. For example, lets say you are orders to seize a high point that overlooks a bridgehead. You successfully do that. So are you now going to assault the bridge on your own into enemy forces that might now have a defensive advantage? What your force even set up for such an operation? Are you authorized to go on wanton assaults you were not ordered to? 
 
It therefore makes sense to push into or closely around Terrain objectives as (as the terrtain allows) because if I get there first, then I can be on defense for the rest of the match. If I ignore the "stupid designers objectives" I will most likely fight myself having to fight and offensive battle that I might have entirely avoided. Commanders issue limited terrain objectives FOR A REASON. By taking important pieces of terrain, I  might force the enemy to retreat to some other place where the battle for the rest of my army will be easier. Its alot like how in  game of chess, you sometimes move pieces into certain spaces just so you can get the enemy to move his pieces somewhere else, some where when you can reap far greater rewards than if you had committed totally on the spot. 
 
So in short: If there is a terrain objective, it is there for a reason. Maybe not for the tactical battle you are fighting, but for the larger war you are fighting in. If I fight for a road junction and lose far more men than my opponent, that is just fine, because at the end of the day holding the junction (perhaps not useful for me tactically) might mean the difference between between resupply or reinforcements arriving. 
 
I cannot emphasize enough that there is no single paramount military objective. In certain circumstances, a terrain feature may be a means to and end. In others, maneuver might be, or in others simple reduction of the enemy force. A nation fights to defeat another nation: not the nations army. If I can blockade you and starve you out, then Id rather do than than fight a pitched battle. If killing the enemy was the only thing that mattered, then any time you came across a superior force you would just retreat. But eventually you would run out of places to go, and would have to make a stand somewhere. So in effect, seizing terrain produces increasingly less realistic options for your opponent. If you do that well enough, they might just give up without a fight. 

Regardless, the strategic examples don't really help us with the tactical reality that is present in CM. They are good as far as analogies go, but really are off topic as far as this discussion goes.

As shift8 stated above, every tactical commander needs to account for all elements in METT-T (I have deleted the civilian component as it has no place in these games). You cannot concentrate on just one element of METT-T... that is the bottom line point that most of us have been trying to get across.

The rapid destruction of the Soviet army was unlikely, given its size. You would also be wise to remember that one of the linchpins of the Stalingrad battle, you know the one that constituted the turning point of the Eastern Front, was as much about Hitler obtaining the oil fields behind the city as it was about the Russians recuperating and reorganizing for the counterattack. Armies run on gasoline, and food etc. Those resources exist on land, they dont grow on the backs of soldiers. 
 
I cant think of a single major war in the last 100 years that resulted in the utter and total destruction of the enemy army that was not the result of the loser running out of places to retreat to. Ultimately, destruction of the enemies forces only happens when he surrenders because he has been forces back onto and untenable position and chooses to surrender. Nobody wants to fight to the last man, and even if they did, it wouldnt matter (see Japanese holding out on islands until the 70's...) OR all the islands in the Pacific we bypasses that had large numbers of Japanese troops on them. 
 
Terrain and Attrition are both means to and end. They do not exist in as vacuum. One does not superseded the other intrinsically, only with the situation dictates. 
 
But dont mind me, just look at how an ACTUAL army does things. The US Army trains METTC. NOTE: Terrain and Enemy are BOTH on there. Most people in the Army simply refer to the aforementioned acronym as "mission dictates" or in layman's terms, IT DEPENDS. 
 
Mission Enemy Terrain and Weather Troops Time Available Civilian Considerations

Actually I agree in whole with your Eastern Front assessment sburke. (Which you've edited out and reposted below)
 
Bil isn't incorrect, the failure to drive to Moscow and instead getting caught up with the encirclement of Kiev was a war-losing move. The flip-side is that, even if they hadn't suffered from target-fixation, it (probably) wouldn't have mattered, Operation Typhoon was doomed to failure, as JSj notes. If Stalingrad and the even earlier 1941 counteroffensives show, STAVKA had an almost superhuman ability to raise and equip strategic reserves anywhere the Germans were poised to strike. Couple this with the RKKA slowly but surely recovering their operational awareness from the 1930s with truly poor military intelligence on the part of the Germans, and the Soviets had the German's number quite early on. 
 
Taking the railhub would've mattered very little, in the words of the Bulgarian ambassador - "Even if you retreat to the Urals, you will win in the end." The military importance of Moscow had been greatly decreased since the evacuation of an already potent industry (supplemented in ever increasing numbers by material aid from the United States) and government further East, and its only true value at that point was as a communications hub. 
 
EDIT: The main sticking point is that, even if the drive to Moscow was conducted earlier, it was still going to be conducted by deeply eroded mobile units low in material and tuckered-out by high tempo operations. Its doubtful they had the striking power to once again encircle and destroy the Moscow Front group even if they launched their offensive a full month earlier. 
 
 
Ayy lmao

I argue that Hitler's insistence of weakening the drive on Moscow in order to reduce the Russian forces in the Smolensk pocket was a war losing move. The delay thus incurred and the losses they suffered, can be directly blamed for the German failure to capture the rail hub that was Moscow (in my opinion the key to the war in the East). He had target fixation and was keyed in to capturing or destroying as many enemy soldiers and as much enemy material as he could, without concentrating on the one terrain objective that really mattered.

I am far from an East Front grog so hesitate to use these historical anecdotes, but in this case, as in many others it does not take a rocket scientist to know that concentrating on killing the enemy force is rarely the most efficient or even the correct way to go.

The rapid destruction of the Soviet army was unlikely, given its size. You would also be wise to remember that one of the linchpins of the Stalingrad battle, you know the one that constituted the turning point of the Eastern Front, was as much about Hitler obtaining the oil fields behind the city as it was about the Russians recuperating and reorganizing for the counterattack. Armies run on gasoline, and food etc. Those resources exist on land, they dont grow on the backs of soldiers. 
 
I cant think of a single major war in the last 100 years that resulted in the utter and total destruction of the enemy army that was not the result of the loser running out of places to retreat to. Ultimately, destruction of the enemies forces only happens when he surrenders because he has been forces back onto and untenable position and chooses to surrender. Nobody wants to fight to the last man, and even if they did, it wouldnt matter (see Japanese holding out on islands until the 70's...) OR all the islands in the Pacific we bypasses that had large numbers of Japanese troops on them. 
 
Terrain and Attrition are both means to and end. They do not exist in as vacuum. One does not superseded the other intrinsically, only with the situation dictates. 
 
But dont mind me, just look at how an ACTUAL army does things. The US Army trains METTC. NOTE: Terrain and Enemy are BOTH on there. Most people in the Army simply refer to the aforementioned acronym as "mission dictates" or in layman's terms, IT DEPENDS. 
 
Mission Enemy Terrain and Weather Troops Time Available Civilian Considerations

The rapid destruction of the Soviet army was unlikely, given its size. You would also be wise to remember that one of the linchpins of the Stalingrad battle, you know the one that constituted the turning point of the Eastern Front, was as much about Hitler obtaining the oil fields behind the city as it was about the Russians recuperating and reorganizing for the counterattack. Armies run on gasoline, and food etc. Those resources exist on land, they dont grow on the backs of soldiers. 
 
I cant think of a single major war in the last 100 years that resulted in the utter and total destruction of the enemy army that was not the result of the loser running out of places to retreat to. Ultimately, destruction of the enemies forces only happens when he surrenders because he has been forces back onto and untenable position and chooses to surrender. Nobody wants to fight to the last man, and even if they did, it wouldnt matter (see Japanese holding out on islands until the 70's...) OR all the islands in the Pacific we bypasses that had large numbers of Japanese troops on them. 
 
Terrain and Attrition are both means to and end. They do not exist in as vacuum. One does not superseded the other intrinsically, only with the situation dictates. 
 
But dont mind me, just look at how an ACTUAL army does things. The US Army trains METTC. NOTE: Terrain and Enemy are BOTH on there. Most people in the Army simply refer to the aforementioned acronym as "mission dictates" or in layman's terms, IT DEPENDS. 
 
Mission Enemy Terrain and Weather Troops Time Available Civilian Considerations

The rapid destruction of the Soviet army was unlikely, given its size. You would also be wise to remember that one of the linchpins of the Stalingrad battle, you know the one that constituted the turning point of the Eastern Front, was as much about Hitler obtaining the oil fields behind the city as it was about the Russians recuperating and reorganizing for the counterattack. Armies run on gasoline, and food etc. Those resources exist on land, they dont grow on the backs of soldiers. 
 
I cant think of a single major war in the last 100 years that resulted in the utter and total destruction of the enemy army that was not the result of the loser running out of places to retreat to. Ultimately, destruction of the enemies forces only happens when he surrenders because he has been forces back onto and untenable position and chooses to surrender. Nobody wants to fight to the last man, and even if they did, it wouldnt matter (see Japanese holding out on islands until the 70's...) OR all the islands in the Pacific we bypasses that had large numbers of Japanese troops on them. 
 
Terrain and Attrition are both means to and end. They do not exist in as vacuum. One does not superseded the other intrinsically, only with the situation dictates. 
 
But dont mind me, just look at how an ACTUAL army does things. The US Army trains METTC. NOTE: Terrain and Enemy are BOTH on there. Most people in the Army simply refer to the aforementioned acronym as "mission dictates" or in layman's terms, IT DEPENDS. 
 
Mission Enemy Terrain and Weather Troops Time Available Civilian Considerations

The rapid destruction of the Soviet army was unlikely, given its size. You would also be wise to remember that one of the linchpins of the Stalingrad battle, you know the one that constituted the turning point of the Eastern Front, was as much about Hitler obtaining the oil fields behind the city as it was about the Russians recuperating and reorganizing for the counterattack. Armies run on gasoline, and food etc. Those resources exist on land, they dont grow on the backs of soldiers. 
 
I cant think of a single major war in the last 100 years that resulted in the utter and total destruction of the enemy army that was not the result of the loser running out of places to retreat to. Ultimately, destruction of the enemies forces only happens when he surrenders because he has been forces back onto and untenable position and chooses to surrender. Nobody wants to fight to the last man, and even if they did, it wouldnt matter (see Japanese holding out on islands until the 70's...) OR all the islands in the Pacific we bypasses that had large numbers of Japanese troops on them. 
 
Terrain and Attrition are both means to and end. They do not exist in as vacuum. One does not superseded the other intrinsically, only with the situation dictates. 
 
But dont mind me, just look at how an ACTUAL army does things. The US Army trains METTC. NOTE: Terrain and Enemy are BOTH on there. Most people in the Army simply refer to the aforementioned acronym as "mission dictates" or in layman's terms, IT DEPENDS. 
 
Mission Enemy Terrain and Weather Troops Time Available Civilian Considerations

Jason, nobody is arguing that stretching the rules and fighting in an unconventional manner isn't desired. Always look for a unique and unexpected approach, of course I agree with that.

Your contention that ignoring the terrain objectives and simply going after the enemy's force is what has raised hackles. I contend that it is never so simple and you should use those objectives and the designer's briefing to drive your recon plan and orient your force on his when you can determine the most efficient way to attack him, and most of the time that means attacking where he is weakest.. Often that is also terrain driven, if it means capturing a piece of high ground that provides better visibility or a piece of ground to his rear which will force him to reposition.

You can't simply say "kill the enemy nothing else matters", that is nonsense.

Lol. 
 
You are living in a fantasy land. The geopolitical situation is absolutely relevant to the definition of victory. People don't fight wars for the hell of it. 
 
If you invade my nation and I push you out, I WIN. You wanted to take my land, and I pushed you out. You failed your objective, which by any sane definition is losing. 
 
Winning a war is determined solely by whether or not my political objectives are achieved. Your army can twiddle its thumbs for all I care If control the territory or resources I am fighting for. Very often, neutralizing your force is the means to that end. But not always. The path to victory is situation based. The massive overwhelming bulk of the Japanese army in WW2 was bypassed. Seizing key terrain isolated entire armies and made them useless. The war ended with Japan having 2 million troops still untouched in the home islands alone. You gonna claim the USA lost? You are trapped in a doctrine vacuum and your not considering the nuances of reality. There is no such thing as a one size fits all military strategy---period, full stop, end of story, THE END. 

Lol. 
 
You are living in a fantasy land. The geopolitical situation is absolutely relevant to the definition of victory. People don't fight wars for the hell of it. 
 
If you invade my nation and I push you out, I WIN. You wanted to take my land, and I pushed you out. You failed your objective, which by any sane definition is losing. 
 
Winning a war is determined solely by whether or not my political objectives are achieved. Your army can twiddle its thumbs for all I care If control the territory or resources I am fighting for. Very often, neutralizing your force is the means to that end. But not always. The path to victory is situation based. The massive overwhelming bulk of the Japanese army in WW2 was bypassed. Seizing key terrain isolated entire armies and made them useless. The war ended with Japan having 2 million troops still untouched in the home islands alone. You gonna claim the USA lost? You are trapped in a doctrine vacuum and your not considering the nuances of reality. There is no such thing as a one size fits all military strategy---period, full stop, end of story, THE END. 

Absolutely nobody is arguing that you should seize a hill just because the enemy has placed defenders on it. We are arguing that you might take said hill even at a tactical disadvantage because it will create tactical advantage in the future, or because it creates a operational or strategic advantage either now or later. To that end, a scenario designers choice of a victory point on the map does not need to be of tactical significance to justify capturing it as a definition of victory. 
 
 
 
What you are still not getting is the killing the enemy IS NOT the goal. Taking terrain IS NOT the goal. There is only one goal: win. If that sounds vague, its because its supposed to. The victory conditions of every battle in every war are different. They take into account politics, attrition, terrain, time, and any other endless number of factors. Over emphasizing some singular formula for victory is a recipe for defeat. 
 
Wars are not fought for their own sake unless you are some sort of pacific islander tribe. We fight them for things like "terrain" or "morals" or "resources" etc etc etc. To that end, kill the enemy, or take his terrain, as much as I need to to win. No more, no less. 
 
If someone invades my nation, my goal is to repel them. Maybe I push onwards into his nation, or maybe I dont. But I dont have to annihilate his army to win. If I only want to control my own land, then I need only push him out and then sit on my haunches and defend till he gives up. If I am the invader and he has more manpower or industry than I, I may very well need to come close to annihilating his force to win. And we could come up with different situations with different definitions of victory and different methods to achieve those ends all day long. 
 
Even if I focus on the enemy army, It would be sheer lunacy to set out to pulverize said army for its own sake. Like I said earlier, in that scenario my goal isnt absolute destruction of his forces. It is far more likely his army will be defeated because his situation becomes untenable, not because I wiped him off the face of the earth. Very, very, few battles have resulted in complete destruction of forces. My goal is to force checkmate, not kill every piece on the board. I only kill the enemies I need to do this. 
 
I would bloody well love to see you ignore orders on the battlefield as a commander of some sort. See how well that fly's in any army. It wont. 

Lol. 
 
You are living in a fantasy land. The geopolitical situation is absolutely relevant to the definition of victory. People don't fight wars for the hell of it. 
 
If you invade my nation and I push you out, I WIN. You wanted to take my land, and I pushed you out. You failed your objective, which by any sane definition is losing. 
 
Winning a war is determined solely by whether or not my political objectives are achieved. Your army can twiddle its thumbs for all I care If control the territory or resources I am fighting for. Very often, neutralizing your force is the means to that end. But not always. The path to victory is situation based. The massive overwhelming bulk of the Japanese army in WW2 was bypassed. Seizing key terrain isolated entire armies and made them useless. The war ended with Japan having 2 million troops still untouched in the home islands alone. You gonna claim the USA lost? You are trapped in a doctrine vacuum and your not considering the nuances of reality. There is no such thing as a one size fits all military strategy---period, full stop, end of story, THE END. 

Lol. 
 
You are living in a fantasy land. The geopolitical situation is absolutely relevant to the definition of victory. People don't fight wars for the hell of it. 
 
If you invade my nation and I push you out, I WIN. You wanted to take my land, and I pushed you out. You failed your objective, which by any sane definition is losing. 
 
Winning a war is determined solely by whether or not my political objectives are achieved. Your army can twiddle its thumbs for all I care If control the territory or resources I am fighting for. Very often, neutralizing your force is the means to that end. But not always. The path to victory is situation based. The massive overwhelming bulk of the Japanese army in WW2 was bypassed. Seizing key terrain isolated entire armies and made them useless. The war ended with Japan having 2 million troops still untouched in the home islands alone. You gonna claim the USA lost? You are trapped in a doctrine vacuum and your not considering the nuances of reality. There is no such thing as a one size fits all military strategy---period, full stop, end of story, THE END. 

Very Clausewitz of you ... "What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy?  Simply the destruction of his forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means—either completely  or enough to make him stop fighting. . . .  The complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be regarded as the sole object of all engagements. . . .  Direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration."   I do think you're enjoying trolling everyone though by refusing to acknowledge any of the other people's points.  Or you're just incredibly stubborn lol.

Since some time I am reading this forum with much interest and play CM since the CMBO days. This is the most informative thread so far and I have deep respect for the knowledge displayed here. Thank you all.

Concerning terrain VL I think, that a scenario can be set up and played like a chess game (CMFI has some), but for me, there is much more fun, when a good briefing gives it an operational context and a PURPOSE and that perfectly fits to a terrain objective.

Imagine, your battalion has the order to block a road to close a huge pocket filled with enemy forces. The objective is not to neutralize the last enemy formation between you and the road, rather to find a bypass or an efficient way through this formation.

The objective is the road in operational context. I enjoy objectives with purpose.

Henning

Superb first post!

Absolutely nobody is arguing that you should seize a hill just because the enemy has placed defenders on it. We are arguing that you might take said hill even at a tactical disadvantage because it will create tactical advantage in the future, or because it creates a operational or strategic advantage either now or later. To that end, a scenario designers choice of a victory point on the map does not need to be of tactical significance to justify capturing it as a definition of victory. 
 
 
 
What you are still not getting is the killing the enemy IS NOT the goal. Taking terrain IS NOT the goal. There is only one goal: win. If that sounds vague, its because its supposed to. The victory conditions of every battle in every war are different. They take into account politics, attrition, terrain, time, and any other endless number of factors. Over emphasizing some singular formula for victory is a recipe for defeat. 
 
Wars are not fought for their own sake unless you are some sort of pacific islander tribe. We fight them for things like "terrain" or "morals" or "resources" etc etc etc. To that end, kill the enemy, or take his terrain, as much as I need to to win. No more, no less. 
 
If someone invades my nation, my goal is to repel them. Maybe I push onwards into his nation, or maybe I dont. But I dont have to annihilate his army to win. If I only want to control my own land, then I need only push him out and then sit on my haunches and defend till he gives up. If I am the invader and he has more manpower or industry than I, I may very well need to come close to annihilating his force to win. And we could come up with different situations with different definitions of victory and different methods to achieve those ends all day long. 
 
Even if I focus on the enemy army, It would be sheer lunacy to set out to pulverize said army for its own sake. Like I said earlier, in that scenario my goal isnt absolute destruction of his forces. It is far more likely his army will be defeated because his situation becomes untenable, not because I wiped him off the face of the earth. Very, very, few battles have resulted in complete destruction of forces. My goal is to force checkmate, not kill every piece on the board. I only kill the enemies I need to do this. 
 
I would bloody well love to see you ignore orders on the battlefield as a commander of some sort. See how well that fly's in any army. It wont. 

Turns 42-45
 
This set of turns begins with my 81mm barrage coming down on the last known position of the ATG that hit my tank on the high ground:
 
      That about sums up the action that occurs on the high ground, as the rest of the turn set is dominated by getting everyone in position and mounted up to attack.  On the right however, its busy, and here's the situation:
 
  I've decided that the engineer platoon doesn't need the Tank Platoon to cover my exposed left, and have sent them back to their parent company, their job is to set up overwatch and make sure the main thrust off the high ground doesn't deal with any bypassed infantry trying to filter out of their positions. The idea is that with the 3 tanks over watching the most obvious route, they will filter instead towards my company team on the right...       ...and that they do, but unfortunately for me, my enemy filters through the wood faster than I anticipated, and I take a Panzerschreck shot from the woods that narrowly misses and lands among the trees. I'm willing to change the plan and allow the right-side company team to root out the bypassed enemy while I attack with 2 platoons of tanks and infantry off the high ground towards the town instead, so here's what I came up with:     The Platoon HQ is now in position to observe the last-known ATG position, but doesn't re-establish contact with it, meanwhile a MMG squad and a rifle squad should be enough to push back or kill the Panzerschreck team, and they dismount and begin moving towards the woods (inset). In the distance you can see the main striking force now. I'd like to try and stick with the idea of pincering the town but with the right-side company team having been delayed greatly by the firefight with the Germans along the river-bank and the orchard I'm not sure that can happen now.       

You, Sir, are a poet.

Just cause I gotta ask, what exactly is your military experience? If the sum of it is some books and a few war games, well I gotta wonder. Captains, Majors and even Lt Cols do not get to raspberry their commanding officers and decide that objective X is not worth their effort. They do not have the full picture to make that call.

Moreover, you are expected to be sitting on that terrain within an explicit time table. It is implied to me in the scenarios and campaigns that these objectives must be seized violently due to a strategic window of opportunity. Circumstances dictate its immediate seizure. Storming an objective with infantry is yes costly and hard but for one reason or another The Brass have told you it must be done here. If they could've neutralized a given objective with corp artillery or mines or trained ninja chimps they would have. Fact is those assets are not available for various reasons beyond your control but this damned hamlet needs to be ours by tonight and it's not because Pvt. Timmy heard they serve great croissants.

What is not being understood here is that "murdering" the enemy force IS NOT the objective in war. Neutralizing the enemy force is. 
 
And no, that is not just semantics. Like Bill pointed out earlier, unless you have a massive advantage in firepower or manpower, you cannot ignore terrain in a fight, and even then doing so would be wasteful in most circumstances. In reality, all battles are won by achieving and advantage of some kind. Whether that is through troop concentration to achieve mass for assault, or bombardment reduce the enemy's ability to resist, or through maneuver to force the enemy into a disadvantageous position that enhances your own forces ability to fight. 
 
Attacking the enemy with cookie-cutter fire and movement is a recipe for suicide. It is very much akin to clearing  a room. NOBODY in their right mind stacks up and breaches a room through weight of bodies if your rules of engagement would have allowed you to satchel the entire building instead. Room clearing or building clearing tactics  are a basis for clearing a structure with the fewest possible casualties by attempting to mass bodies into a room before the enemy can cut you all down. Somebody is going to die though if your enemy is not caught unawares. Same goes with platoon or company fire and maneuver. Im not going to initiate an assault involving suppressive fires and bounding movements when I could just sneak around the back of a hill and come up inside the enemies flank. 
 
That being said, the terrain objectives on a map have to be assumed to have some sort of strategic/operational/tactical significance. Lets just look at another historical example shall we? 
 
During the Mortain Counter-Attack in August of 44, Hill 317 Could not be bypassed because it was an important spotting point for artillery and air support. IE: Terrain dictated the focal point of an entire offensive, and successful defense of that objective impeded the entire advance (among other things.)
 
Bastogne, possessed a road network that was important to maintaining the German advance in the Bulge. Not taking it tied down units that could have been doing other things. 
 
We could also mention the cities of Caen or Saint Lo, or the Rhine as important pieces of Terrain that influenced how battles were fought and their outcomes. 
 
If a mission designer puts a box around a town, it only makes sense that on some level it is necessary. Going beyond that objective, and attempting to destroy the enemy beyond what you were ordered to do would in most cases be stupid. For example, lets say you are orders to seize a high point that overlooks a bridgehead. You successfully do that. So are you now going to assault the bridge on your own into enemy forces that might now have a defensive advantage? What your force even set up for such an operation? Are you authorized to go on wanton assaults you were not ordered to? 
 
It therefore makes sense to push into or closely around Terrain objectives as (as the terrtain allows) because if I get there first, then I can be on defense for the rest of the match. If I ignore the "stupid designers objectives" I will most likely fight myself having to fight and offensive battle that I might have entirely avoided. Commanders issue limited terrain objectives FOR A REASON. By taking important pieces of terrain, I  might force the enemy to retreat to some other place where the battle for the rest of my army will be easier. Its alot like how in  game of chess, you sometimes move pieces into certain spaces just so you can get the enemy to move his pieces somewhere else, some where when you can reap far greater rewards than if you had committed totally on the spot. 
 
So in short: If there is a terrain objective, it is there for a reason. Maybe not for the tactical battle you are fighting, but for the larger war you are fighting in. If I fight for a road junction and lose far more men than my opponent, that is just fine, because at the end of the day holding the junction (perhaps not useful for me tactically) might mean the difference between between resupply or reinforcements arriving. 
 
I cannot emphasize enough that there is no single paramount military objective. In certain circumstances, a terrain feature may be a means to and end. In others, maneuver might be, or in others simple reduction of the enemy force. A nation fights to defeat another nation: not the nations army. If I can blockade you and starve you out, then Id rather do than than fight a pitched battle. If killing the enemy was the only thing that mattered, then any time you came across a superior force you would just retreat. But eventually you would run out of places to go, and would have to make a stand somewhere. So in effect, seizing terrain produces increasingly less realistic options for your opponent. If you do that well enough, they might just give up without a fight. 

Any doctrine that views "murdering the enemy" as a objective that occurs within a vacuum is also rubbish.
 
Terrain is more than just cover to defend your troops or block your opponents movement. To treat terrain like a side note is pure fantasy. You are placing a cookie cutter concept  (destroying the enemy force) on a pedestal and ignoring any other possible considerations. Talking about a game of basket ball stating "you only goal is to score points" and ignoring the effect that controlling sections of the court has on that, is crazy.
 
Terrain effects nearly every facet of combat, tactical/operational/strategic. It determines engagement ranges, choke points, avenues of approach, mobility, etc, etc, etc. In many ways it is like having a 3rd army on the battlefield, which opposes both sides. A lot like the weather actually. It is a heck of a lot more than simply defense for your units and places your can block the enemy.