Kinophile

Wot Border Guards doin'? 
 

First time I've seen footage from a s400 crew during a HIMARS attack on it. 
 

First Oscar in Ukrainian history. 
 

Information Is Beautiful website. Good graphic at the end that shows the significance of the currently delayed US support. 
https://informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/ukraine-russian-war-infographics-data-visuals/#two-years

First time I've seen footage from a s400 crew during a HIMARS attack on it. 
 

First time I've seen footage from a s400 crew during a HIMARS attack on it. 
 

First time I've seen footage from a s400 crew during a HIMARS attack on it. 
 

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30664/ukraine-battlefield-dynamics-manpower-fortifications-and-ammunition/
My notes:
They made another trip to UKR front lines. They are doing these around every 3months. 
Ukraine's Challenges: Ukraine faces a triple threat with manpower, fortifications, and ammunition shortages. Mobilization remains stalled at political level, hindering long-term force generation. This decision also has a long lead time to effects on the battlefield Last year we saw you cannot make brigades in couple of months  Fortifications are being worked on now, but only lately. Ammunition depends on external factors like US aid and Europe commitment drones are going to help to bridge the gap to an extent. These problems are the same as last trip three months ago. Ukraine leadership changes are still an unknown. Generally seems the leadership is on the same page about the main challenges as the front line troops The war is at an intersection. Many things can go either way, US support, UKR mobilization... Depending on these the war can change radically. Even a Harkiv-style collapse for the Ukrainians is not out of the question on the "bad timelines".  Overly extended summer offensive and pointless commitment of reserves to those attacks have depleted Ukraine Especially Ukrainian infantry has been under extreme strain, battalion might be in OK condition but only have a couple of platoons of fully mission-capable infantry.  Unlikely to see any strategic level offensives from the Ukrainians in 2024  Some Russian challenges:   Russian Force Quality: While a concern in 2023, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to sustain casualties and maintain a baseline level of force quality. This has been shown in practice during the summers stubborn defense and the bloody assaults we are now seeing. UKR has reported increased discipline and executions by the RU Manpower: So far Russia has been able to compensate for it casualties with recruitment. This has been surprisingly successful. Several 100k last year and now in the tens of thousands a month. Unkown how long Russia can keep up. If they cannot a new mobilization wave is going to be required. Equipment availability: Main limiting factor for the Russians at this moment. Ukraine's Evolving Tactics: Shortage of Soviet-era AA ammunition is a major concern. and now also western ammunition  UKR is having increasing success with small mobile AA defenses (MANPADS, AAA, HMG) supported by well integrated sensors and coordination. This is against RU cruise missiles and suicide drones. Especially in parts of the front UKR is developing integration of assets, intelligence and troops to a whole new level. Big steps compared to three months ago Drone war moving more towards competition in quality and integration rather than quantity. 
Ukraine Battlefield Dynamics Manpower, Fortifications, and Ammunition.mp3

If you're not already aware of him, this guy (assuming) does really good threads on various Soviet weaponry and vehicles. Time to share. 
 

Wot Border Guards doin'? 
 

Wot Border Guards doin'? 
 

Further to that strange ship attack:
We'll see. 
Could easily be just this:
"ship was grounded after Russia blew the Nova Kakhovka dam last June. Being used as a command/control base". 

What do we figure are the base requirements for Russia to maintain AEW coverage.? I would find it hard to believe they would forego any coverage at all over their Far East bases.  They need to cover the Moscow/St Petersburg axis and then the actual war zone. You need multiple shifts and time for maintenance.  What is the minimum they need to avoid gaps or start prioritizing away from Far East coverage- assuming they haven't done so already.
 
Heh heh just had an amusing thought.  I guess Russia won't be doing another major military exercise with China.  Be real embarrassing to show up with T55s and no AEW craft.  🤣

Kerch Bridge delenda est. 

Not exactly "cut", but definitely a latent and growing threat. 
Instead of Russia cutting off UKR grain corridor UKR could start sinking RUS/proxy ships carrying stolen grain from Azov/Crimean ports. 
Wouldn't that be a turning of the worm? 

This is more my angle, such as it is. Ukraine with a stable and steadily increasing shell supply is very dangerous to Russia. 

Not dead yet? 
 
 

Nice, if true. Feels a little inflated, but there's definitely money to be made in shell production these days, so why not. 
 

The other question is, what are they counting that matters?  Maybe Russia can sustain MBT losses, maybe continue to scrounge artillery shells etc.  But those A50 AEW aircraft are in short supply and appear to be an endangered species.  The UA seems to have a laser focus on strategic assets that have a downstream effectiveness on Russia's ability to fight this war. 
As you said a while back - "- Re-think C4.  Data is a resource more important than gas.  We need to see the modern battlefield as a competitive data, information and knowledge environment.  We need to stop going to war to validate what we already know and accept that things are evolving very quickly."
If the UA can further deplete Russia's C4 capability more options become available to wage strategic strikes on Russia's infrastructure as well as find opportunities to use the F16 aircraft as they become available.

That's what I interpreted him as saying. Asking when Russia will run out is like asking when the world will run out of oil. The answer is never, it just becomes more scarce. In fact the IISS estimate I posted above does not actually predict a run dry date, but rather how long Russia will be "able to sustain its assault on Ukraine at current attrition rates".