Abdolmartin

Well, maybe they are pointing out their friends? 
Or: "This is the one to surrender to.  It has great AC and Central Heat."

What is not being understood here is that "murdering" the enemy force IS NOT the objective in war. Neutralizing the enemy force is. 
 
And no, that is not just semantics. Like Bill pointed out earlier, unless you have a massive advantage in firepower or manpower, you cannot ignore terrain in a fight, and even then doing so would be wasteful in most circumstances. In reality, all battles are won by achieving and advantage of some kind. Whether that is through troop concentration to achieve mass for assault, or bombardment reduce the enemy's ability to resist, or through maneuver to force the enemy into a disadvantageous position that enhances your own forces ability to fight. 
 
Attacking the enemy with cookie-cutter fire and movement is a recipe for suicide. It is very much akin to clearing  a room. NOBODY in their right mind stacks up and breaches a room through weight of bodies if your rules of engagement would have allowed you to satchel the entire building instead. Room clearing or building clearing tactics  are a basis for clearing a structure with the fewest possible casualties by attempting to mass bodies into a room before the enemy can cut you all down. Somebody is going to die though if your enemy is not caught unawares. Same goes with platoon or company fire and maneuver. Im not going to initiate an assault involving suppressive fires and bounding movements when I could just sneak around the back of a hill and come up inside the enemies flank. 
 
That being said, the terrain objectives on a map have to be assumed to have some sort of strategic/operational/tactical significance. Lets just look at another historical example shall we? 
 
During the Mortain Counter-Attack in August of 44, Hill 317 Could not be bypassed because it was an important spotting point for artillery and air support. IE: Terrain dictated the focal point of an entire offensive, and successful defense of that objective impeded the entire advance (among other things.)
 
Bastogne, possessed a road network that was important to maintaining the German advance in the Bulge. Not taking it tied down units that could have been doing other things. 
 
We could also mention the cities of Caen or Saint Lo, or the Rhine as important pieces of Terrain that influenced how battles were fought and their outcomes. 
 
If a mission designer puts a box around a town, it only makes sense that on some level it is necessary. Going beyond that objective, and attempting to destroy the enemy beyond what you were ordered to do would in most cases be stupid. For example, lets say you are orders to seize a high point that overlooks a bridgehead. You successfully do that. So are you now going to assault the bridge on your own into enemy forces that might now have a defensive advantage? What your force even set up for such an operation? Are you authorized to go on wanton assaults you were not ordered to? 
 
It therefore makes sense to push into or closely around Terrain objectives as (as the terrtain allows) because if I get there first, then I can be on defense for the rest of the match. If I ignore the "stupid designers objectives" I will most likely fight myself having to fight and offensive battle that I might have entirely avoided. Commanders issue limited terrain objectives FOR A REASON. By taking important pieces of terrain, I  might force the enemy to retreat to some other place where the battle for the rest of my army will be easier. Its alot like how in  game of chess, you sometimes move pieces into certain spaces just so you can get the enemy to move his pieces somewhere else, some where when you can reap far greater rewards than if you had committed totally on the spot. 
 
So in short: If there is a terrain objective, it is there for a reason. Maybe not for the tactical battle you are fighting, but for the larger war you are fighting in. If I fight for a road junction and lose far more men than my opponent, that is just fine, because at the end of the day holding the junction (perhaps not useful for me tactically) might mean the difference between between resupply or reinforcements arriving. 
 
I cannot emphasize enough that there is no single paramount military objective. In certain circumstances, a terrain feature may be a means to and end. In others, maneuver might be, or in others simple reduction of the enemy force. A nation fights to defeat another nation: not the nations army. If I can blockade you and starve you out, then Id rather do than than fight a pitched battle. If killing the enemy was the only thing that mattered, then any time you came across a superior force you would just retreat. But eventually you would run out of places to go, and would have to make a stand somewhere. So in effect, seizing terrain produces increasingly less realistic options for your opponent. If you do that well enough, they might just give up without a fight. 

Any doctrine that views "murdering the enemy" as a objective that occurs within a vacuum is also rubbish.
 
Terrain is more than just cover to defend your troops or block your opponents movement. To treat terrain like a side note is pure fantasy. You are placing a cookie cutter concept  (destroying the enemy force) on a pedestal and ignoring any other possible considerations. Talking about a game of basket ball stating "you only goal is to score points" and ignoring the effect that controlling sections of the court has on that, is crazy.
 
Terrain effects nearly every facet of combat, tactical/operational/strategic. It determines engagement ranges, choke points, avenues of approach, mobility, etc, etc, etc. In many ways it is like having a 3rd army on the battlefield, which opposes both sides. A lot like the weather actually. It is a heck of a lot more than simply defense for your units and places your can block the enemy.

Geez, the German fanboism is strong here, everyone else must have been stupid by default too. 

I want to add a comment or two, to avoid misunderstandings.  I present the "freezing", "immobility" goal of the German attack method not because it is the only aspect of the maneuver attack method, but because it is the simplest to see and grasp, and perhaps the most decisive when fully realized.  The principle behind it is alluded to and its generalization hinted at, in the second set of my "tweet" versions, above.  This principle is that it is the articulation of the enemy force, the intelligent adaptation that animates it, that is the source of most of its combat power.  Coordination and teamwork are thought of as the core power generating capacity or aspect of any force, and then the deduction is made that attack can *target* the enemy's coordination and teamwork, and seek to degrade that aspect of his force.  Forcing immobility upon him is one clear example of that, but it is not the only one.
 
To act in a coordinated fashion, an army needs to see, understand, assess, communicate, and control - as much as it needs to move.  Measures directed at the enemy's capacity to do those things can be as paralyzing as pinning fire.  This includes deception, stealth, unexpected timing and direction of attacks, physical attack on the enemy's headquarters, commanders, and communication equipment, physically separating his forces from each other by the interposition of friendly forces or fire.  It also includes "mental" means - forcing a pace upon the enemy that he cannot sustain, making his older orders obsolete before they have even had time to take effect, stressing or physically preventing his supply, and seeking to intimidate both rank and file and the enemy command.  These may accumulate into the local commander failing his own personal morale check; they surely make his job harder.  
 
Meanwhile, friendly forces are tasked and operated and assessed with an eye to their own capacities in these respects.  Meaning, the German force strives to keep combined arms coordination, to maintain the ability to move shoot and communicate at all times.  Flexibility under future contingencies is valued as much or more than immediately application of combat power now.  This may extend to reserve slope deployments on defense, to ensure an ability to move in a sheltered fashion, to keeping a reserve, to expecting a defense to operate by local counterattack behind thin screens that reveal enemy intentions rather than thick fronts meant to shoot down attackers immediately.  (Keeping the enemy in the dark is as important as shooting his men; a German defense does not want to reveal itself too soon).  It means denying battle altogether, on both attack and defense, when the local conditions are not favorable.  And it means pushing decision making down to the lower ranks and forward locations, where information is most immediate and most accurate, and can be acted on as rapidly as possible.  A good plan executed immediately is considered infinitely better than the best plan executed tomorrow.
 
The German way of war is always in a hurry.  It wants to exhaust the enemy, mentally as much as physically, by giving them too much to cope with, too much to adapt to, and then watch carefully for his worst mistake, and make the most of that mistake.
 
Some of those principles go beyond what one can implement at the tactical level in CM, but the whole train of thought behind it definitely applies.  The core of that thought is that every single piece of the enemy army is weak and defenseless if not supported by the rest.  Its strength and even survival depend on overall coordination, and that their coordination can be stressed by *varying* the threats they face.  Constantly changing threats force the enemy to "dance" to meet each new threat - and then one can cover the dance floor with tripwires and landmines, and see how well they can "keep up", with those in the way.
 
I write this to avoid any interpretations of the German method as being exclusively about the enemy's physical mobility.  That is an illustration of the principle and one of its most important methods or avenues of implementation, but the overall method is wider and more general, than that specific goal.

In the thread on Russian doctrine in CM, we went through how the Russian attack, especially their Rifle formation branch.  That method applies the principles of attrition warfare, depth, firepower, relentlessness, last man standing stuff.  German doctrine on infantry attacks was entirely different.  SlowLarry asked about it in the previous thread, and rather than bury an answer there, I am moving that part of the discussion to its own thread, here.
 
Elements of German attack doctrine apply to panzer forces as well, but the focus here will be on infantry division attacks.  Which may include StuG support or similar, generally divisional artillery FOs, battalion and company mortars - and squad infantry up at the pointy end.  Obviously there are some requirements of overall odds, suitable terrain, fire support, and enemy strength that are needed for infantry formations to attack successfully.  But the German doctrine uses everything differently, because the focus of their attack doctrine is positioning and articulation of forces - maneuver warfare stuff  - not primarily force ratios and losses and attrition thinking.
 
In the German doctrine, the chief element of the offense is surprise.  The idea is always to hit where and when one isn't expected, to catch the enemy napping, unprepared, with the wrong dispositions to deal with your chosen point and method of attack.  To achieve that, the focus is on information on the one hand, and adaptation on the other.  Adaptation includes mobility, heightening your own safe, feasible shifts of forces and weights, and restricting those of the defender.  Those can then all be used to arrange many on few fights at chosen points, which once won, further disarticulate the enemy force.  His elements are supposed to become less able to help each other, to find their proper combined arms targets, or to have the conditions of terrain and range and such they need to fight effectively. Some local advantages may be "cashed in" for dead enemy to move the overall forces in your favor, but most will be focused instead on continually reducing the enemy's options and moves.
 
In the ideal case, this ends with a surrounded and trapped enemy unable to move an inch without taking murderous fire.  Fire lanes into open ground wrapped around an enemy position are like ropes binding his legs.  Once all sides are covered around a given enemy this way, his "movement allowance" has been reduced to zero.  His ability to pick what firefights he will engage in has therefore disappeared.  You can decide whether to engage him, and he can't make an equivalent decision.  By fire and movement principles, that is as good as a kill.  An artillery barrage can then be laid on that immobilized enemy to destroy him at leisure.
 
In short, the idea is to surprise the defender, hogtie him, and fight the remainder of the battle with him in that condition.  Needless to say, this places considerable greater demands on the attacking commander than the comparative straightforward methods described in the Russian doctrine thread, and it can readily be screwed up, and will fail if it is screwed up.  The German approach in the matter was to take risks and generate chances for lopsided wins, and expect enough of those to pay off, to defeat the overall enemy more efficiently than the attrition method. The Germans don't ever want to fight fair - meaning no even engagements of like arm vs like arm without a big edge in their favor from one factor or another.  If there isn't yet such an edge, maneuver for one before engaging too closely.
 
That difference in approach is easily stated, but what does it mean in practice for infantry attack methods?  Three ways, really, each with some variations and subject to mixing with the others, at different distance, time, and force scales.  The three ways are (1) broad front, recon pull, aiming at envelopment (envelopment for short), (2) the coup de main, which is effectively trench raid tactics on a grander scale, and (3) infiltration tactics proper, which stresses getting well into the enemy defended zone, by slow and stealthy processes, before the main engagement occurs.
 
Broad front recon pull means that a skirmish line of infantry sweeps forward like a single wave, and finds *all* the enemy positions.  Not just one or two of them to chew on, but locating the entire enemy front line.  Weak outposts are driven in by this wave to find the real enemy positions, the ones with enough strength to stop a single thin infantry wave.  Besides finding the enemy, this leading wave is expected to pin him in place, to "find and fix".  That works by not pressing hard anywhere, sitting down in the cover nearest the enemy but not physically held by him.  Then reaching out by fire - from the LMGs the squad infantry brings forward, first of all - to cut up the enemy side of the field with fire lanes, around each body of cover on his side of the field.  The goal is to freeze in place as much of the enemy force as possible, by making lateral movement far too risky, several hundreds yards deep into his own positions.
 
Then a reserve and assault group, which has been kept back out of that leading wave, picks targets found and isolated by it.  The goal is to find gaps in the defenses already, and to widen promising fissures by destroying specific bits of the defense, to get deeper into it.  The reserve maneuvers in the German "backfield", sheltered by the leading wave and the knowledge it has provided as to which locations are clear of the enemy, which routes already traversed drew no enemy fire, and the like. It sets up opposite its chosen targets.  It brings with it heavier weapons - StuGs, FOs, 81mm mortars - and infantry weight in numbers.  These supplement the fire of the elements of the scouting wave nearest the chosen target, and "escalate" the pressure on those chosen enemies.  Meanwhile the rest of the battlefield is being ignored.  The scouting wave is just waiting in the ground they took and preventing easy lateral movement by the enemy, to help the position chosen for the point of attack.
 
The overloaded point is thus destroyed.  Now a new wave spreads from that point, into the deeper parts of the enemy defense.  The scouts nearest follow in the wake of the now leading reserve, and form a new reserve behind the entry point.  The new spreading wave finds the new enemy positions, and the process is repeated.  The goal is to roll up the enemy defenses or break through them, always fighting only the new few that matter for the moves the attack is making next.  But the attacker lets enemy weakness dictate where those points of attack should be.  Always, hitting where they ain't, and trying to get into them before help can come from either side, or from the enemy rear and reserves.  
 
Speed matters in this, because the enemy learns where the main point of attack is, as it gets going, and he will try to adapt.  The attack wants to adapt too, faster, with better information.  The scouting wave is also a counter-recon screen blinding the enemy as to one's own deployments.  If a reserve is arriving at A, the point of main effort wants to already be over at B by the time they get to the front.  Think of a running back making the defensive linebackers miss - it requires anticipation of enemy moves, faster reaction to new information.  It helps if ranged weapons can also disrupt enemy movements - StuGs get missions like interdicting all movement across a certain road, pairs of HMGs put down fire lanes with a similar intent, an FO may plaster the only cover point that allows movement from the east side of the map to the west side.  In other words, the role of fire is as much or more to restrict enemy movements as it is to hurt him directly.  
 
Every area of open ground on the enemy side of the field is analyzed for its usefulness on cutting up enemy moves, and locations that can see each are determined, heavy weapons teams maneuvered to such positions long before the attacker knows he will need them.  Enemy moves are systematically taken off the board by firepower threats into such open ground areas.
 
Frequently the scouting wave may start with a bias or direction, too.  E.g. as a wing attack on the left 2/3rds of the field, with the intent of turning the enemy's left flank.  Such routes or plans are made with an eye to being the least expected and likely to be the least defended against, *not* on the principle of the most promising terrain or routes for the attacker.  Otherwise put, since the first principle of the attack is surprise, "most promising" normally equals "least expected" - even if it means crossing dangerous ground - as long as that can be done quickly.
 
The infiltration method can be thought of as a more extreme version of this on a wider scale and with less of an emphasis on fixing the enemy, and more on using stealth to find his gaps.  Night actions, fighting in fog, use of smoke sometimes, are used along with this approach.  The idea is to sneak into the enemy position.  As much as possible, as deep as possible into his whole defense scheme, before first trigger pull.  And after first trigger pull, the triggers are used as a distraction - look, look, over here, there are some Germans over here - while the haymaker is winding up from the other hand.  The same principle of removing enemy moves by a tactically defensive stance and fire lanes to cut up enemy positions, executed by advanced wedges, is used here too, just like the scouting wave did in the previous method, once it went to ground.  
 
There is a critical mental shift involved in this understanding of the value of positions pushed forward.  They do not need to assault straight onto enemy positions. They do not need the weight to do so.  They don't need the weight to shoot down enemies in good cover, nor do they need to press home to root him out of his holes.  All they need to do is prevent him from leaving his present positions, without being cut up by ranged fire into the open ground bits he has to cross, to leave that cover and get to some other body of it.  Anything isolated in this sense, by having all its useful safe moves taken away, is "hogtied".  No reason to run up against them or fight that at all.  They are already in a prison cell, and artillery can execute them later if need be.
 
There is also a new principle in true infiltration methods - to just bypass, wherever possible, rather than fight.  Any position that can be ignored should be ignored.  If there is a route that blocks LOS to that position, maybe someone watches it or at least prevents easy moves out of it, but for the rest, they might as well be on the far side of the moon.  Consider anything that can't see you already defeated by poor positioning.  Bypass and press deeper, all the way to the back of the defense.  German infiltration attackers do not expect to keep the enemy in front of them.  They expect to have enemies on all sides of them.  Then blind them and pin them in place, and move between them.  You can see how limited visibility conditions are critical to the full application of this method.
 
I passed over the coup de main.  It is about surprise in the purest sense.  Here, instead of waiting for recon pull to tell you everything about the defense, you need to guess it.  Rapid, more limited scouting may be used, and there are certainly leading half squads going first - the usual drill.  But you just guess where the enemy is and isn't going to be; you pick a key point you think you can get to that will put some portion of those enemies at a disadvantage, and then you drive like hell for that key point.  Faster than the enemy can react.  Others are trying to pin him where he is - heavy weapons from back at the start line, e.g., or a 105mm artillery barrage that discourages anyone from getting up and walking around from over on the right side of the field.  But the basic idea is just "get there first with the most", where you picked the "there".  Win at that point by weight of numbers and the right combined arms brought to that fight for the enemy faced, and do so before the enemy can adapt his positions to that new info about what you are doing.
 
The follow up can be another such adaptation, or just to exploit what was taken in more of the "fixed them, then pick the next spot to overload" method described in the first approach.
 
Coup de main differs from the broad front recon in that it is less driven by what the scouts first discover, more by your command push decision.  But you are trying to base that on a guess as to where the enemy will be weak and won't be expecting you.  If your guess is wrong, you back off and try something else, don't turn it in to an attrition attack on enemy strength.
 
The coup de main effort can be materially aided by having armor behind it, or as a second best, good approach terrain over a wide area (e.g. large continuous woods or city).  It expects to win at the chosen point by getting a many on few fight there and winning that fight before the enemy can even the local odds.  For that to work, it can't be the case that all the enemy weapons bear on the chosen point.  You need to pick both the concentration objective and a route, such that only a modest portion of the enemy force has any chance to contest your approach, at first.  Then you just want to go down that route so fast that "at first" equals "until the fight for that objective is over", because they only differ by 2 minutes (5 max, 2-3 a lot better).
 
Now, in all of this, you still have to pay attention to combined arms, meaning having 81mm mortars around and HQs to spot for them if there is going to be an enemy gun or HMG position, and a StuG or a panzerschreck up close if there is going to be an enemy tank, and 105mm or 150mm artillery fire if there is going to be a big block of woods full of Russian tommy gunners.  Or you can put HMGs on fire lanes on 3 sides of those woods and just go around them, never into or by them.  Remember, if they can't see your main force, and they can't safely move to change that, they are already dead (hogtied, same thing).  They just don't know it yet.
 
I hope that helps explain the very different way German infantry attacks.

Combatintman - gratitude isn't your strong point, is it, or did you want me to never bother trying to help anyone understand tactical systems again? Why not ask a coherent question?

That was about the worst imaginable response I could have dreamed up. It looks like you just saw the length of the post, read nothing, made up a complaint, reposted it, and asked to understand WWII combat inside a twitter tweat because your brain can't take in more. Hint, this is not the way to get a constructive response. You only have to read it. I had to write it, and before that to know it and understand what was required to explain it pretty rapidly. And your complaint is that reading it is too hard?

Trust me, you won't ever learn tactical methods with that amount of focus and attention span. Don't bother trying, if this is as hard as you can try.

This blog is a bloody gold mine!

for me this would be my most preferred time period for a Cold War CM game as well for the reasons you listed, plus for me I am a big fan of the game World in Conflict, which takes place in '89. I would love to recreate some of the missions from that game in a CM Cold War game.
 
I like all of your other ideas as well. I really hope that we eventually get a game set in 1950 Korea (after CM: Fulda Gap of course ) and I think the modern/future Korea setting could be very cool as well, however that would be pretty low on my list. I would want to see a few more titles before CM: Second Korean War, but that's just me. 

My personal favorites of your list. Particularily Fulda Gap would be cool. Just think of the possibilities of a Cold War CM title: how about a US/German REFORGER '85 campaign? Or how about Soviet campaign á la Seven Days to the River Rhine (image below):
 

 
That' s my wet dream in termans of CM!

Given the choice between discussing whether German armor doctrine was effective or wasn't, and discussing whether they wrote halt as they clearly did, or half as some fool on the internet guessed, the brilliant tacticans of this site spend 3 pages weighing in on the second "question". This is why I write for Board Game Geek these days, far more than this forum. Just saying...

Gents, the campaign is finally completed.

Join the paratroopers of "Attack" Company, 1-503rd Airborne, as they rush to stem the tide of the Russian advance in central Ukraine!

There are two files associated with the campaign. There is a "Mod Pack" which consists of a compilation of my favorite mods as well as some additional mods specifically for the campaign. The second file is the .cam file for the campaign.

Many people contributed to the creation of this campaign, without your help I could not have completed this project. I thank you all.

Until I can get it on the Repository, the campaign can be downloaded from here:

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/27642219/Task%20Force%20Spartan%20Resolve%20Campaign.zip

From recent PBEM match. Armored game against US mech is always difficult. 
 

Redfor graveyard
 

Blufor graveyard
 

His nickname wasn't true, but did the most serious damage to my forces. 
 

This guy was also pain in the ass, claiming 4 tanks. 
 

Lucky AT-15 kill
 

This guy tanked total 6~7 AT-15, with frontal armor + APS. But eventually, couldn't took them more. 
 

This T-90 bravely sacrificed himself to save the flank, with one very important Abrams kill. 
 

Khrizantema graveyard. Escorting T-90s tried their best, but their optics were not good enough to see them coming. And DU frontal armor was too damn thick 
 

Hero tank
 

Hero Khriz 
 
Playing Ru army in CMBS OBEM is fun, but sometimes I feel myself why am I torturing myself Still I believe that all Rus vehicles in game (and UA vehicles too if needed) need a bit of price discount. (Though I don't think that will be realized) 

The hardware is a big difference from the capability.  The strong example would be Iraqis with M1 tanks, it was functionally irrelevant what equipment they had, as long as the men manning it were poorly trained, equipped, and somesuch.
 
That said:
 
 If there's superiority in the American military, it is in the three following areas:
 
1. Size matters.  While it's getting a lot smaller, the simple size and funding of the American military means a lot of capabilities that are simply too expensive for most other countries are a matter of course for the US (see the combined air fleet of the USAF, USMC, and USN and then compare it to the various other NATO countries, or things like having several carrier battle groups active at once)
 
2. Logistics/support/expeditionary warfare.  When France went into Mali it was riding in USAF planes, and supported by logistics moved through the US log systems.  Further in the operations over Libya while the "shooting" part of the operation was very well spread across the different NATO members, the AWACS/refueling/other support asset was overwhelmingly yankee imperialist.  
 
While it's easy to funnel a lot of this into "bigger is better" is worth noting this ability to not only deploy, but sustain forces, and equip them with potent enabler elements is something that is well into an art/skill all its own, and is finely honed in the regards that since 1890 or so, Americans have been doing most of their fighting well over the horizon on distant shores.  
 
No other force can do that to the degree the American military can, and again it's a skill and training that is well beyond simply having more planes or money to expend.
 
3. The average training tempo, and realism for the US military is quite a bit more elaborate than many peer countries.  The number of rounds fired, and miles maneuvered by my tank company in a year was roughly equal to how much some battalion sized armor elements in western European military forces do in a similar time scale.  Additionally every "combat" unit (to include National Guard units) goes to NTC on a regular basis to get its face peeled off by the OPFOR in training that is what could best be called "hyper realistic" (in that the enemy is significantly more capable than he should be) situations.  It's hard, tough training, but what separates it from simply tossing troops in Siberia or marching several hundred KM through North Africa, is that the hardness has a focus, and there's a lot of post-action analysis.  It's not just enough to successfully assault the fake town in the desert, but each step will be broken down, and looked at honestly (having sat through some other country's AARs, there's a lot of face-saving and hand waving when things go wrong.  This is really not the case in an American type AAR in which even your random privates can speak up about what they saw/suggestions to do it better).
 
You get a lot of anecdotal stuff, Legionaries roundhouse kicking Taliban, British bayonet charges, 100% objective success rate for Excercise Donbass Freedom or whatever, but there's a wide margin between what the American military is capable of, and what the rest of NATO and most potential threat nations can do*
 
 
*Which is not to say it is unbeatable, but what gets tiring is the "well we have 300 Leo 2s and they're better than Abrams!" or "here's this link discussing how fast the French moved through Mali when it took the US ten years to sort of pacify Iraq!" There's certainly ways to beat the US in conventional warfare even...it's just not really in trying to meet it at a 1:1 ratio in terrain that doesn't highly favor you if you get my drift
 
Of course, as a post script I'm not sure how much longer we'll be able to maintain a lot of those advantages.  One of the great problems with being "the best" is that it engenders a perception that it is simply a state that will be maintained without further investment, when in reality we're seeing the miltiary budget get hacked and slashed to maintain other spending, while at the same time not seriously re-examining if a lot of what we invested in during "good" times is worth keeping (like the always lovely JSF).  

The french army surrendering to each and everybody is a common meme on the internet, but actully they are quite capable. I recently saw a documentary on the French SF operating in Mali and they appeared very professional to me.
 
More importantly, the FAMAS is a really looking rifle. I hope we' ll see it in one of the CMBS modules.
 
http://i.ytimg.com/vi/iOdMN-HoKP8/maxresdefault.jpg

What playtesting ?
The scenarios are not updated at all.

And what miracle ?
No matter of CMBN, CMFI or CMRT, it the same game essentially. So how should a engine "upgrade" with a few additional features be a miracle ?

Plenty of people manage to criticize the game without being passive-aggressive.

I have no problem with locking threads but i too dont like the "i have the last word" thing...

I dont know, maybe the BFC forums are a place where everyone is happy.
Take for example the DayZ forums (a game i play). There are hard discussions about which way the game should evolve and if the devs are fast enough fixing bugs and getting the game to Bata status.
Here this is not possible.

Honestly i dont think that you are capable of anything that even closely resembles a contsructive and rational or even just mature conversation.

You should keep that for yourself. What makes you think you are entitled to such kind of generalization???
I enjoy multiplayer a lot, but also the campaigns and single missions. CMSF nato campaign is an act of beauty (and I personally enjoyed the british one too), not to mention CMBS campaigns.
Just because you don't like them doesn't mean it's a useless thing or something people don't like.
 
The good part is that BFC will keep making them in future titles, so I belive most of the user base likes them.

Does Germany still use conscription? 
 
So here is your list of Combat Mission Fails and why the game is broken for you

Okay, so these are primarily a graphics complaints. We'll just give that to GTOS - advantage GTOS
 

As you may or may not be aware, from both a fog of war and a player control aspect there is a code limitation that makes what you are asking for difficult if not impossible to do in CM. Does GTOS have full FOW fighting positions that are deployable by the player in it?
 
I am going to assume that you mean something that the player can deploy or influence during set up. Once again though there are code limitations that make this difficult if not impossible to do in the game. If you mean something that could be placed by a scenario designer on the map in the editor then I'm sure it could be done. If the player can't control where the reinforced buildings are located that makes it harder for the player to integrate such buildings into their defenses. So GTOS has reinforced buildings that are deployable by the player too then?

That's already in the game. It isn't 3D so it just falls on the screen but it is there. If GTOS has 3D falling snow I'll give that one to GTOS.

There are two categories of buildings in the game - modular and independent. The modular buildings will probably always be the same, but perhaps with different facades. More independent buildings would be nice, but there are staff limitations and creating stuff in 3D takes a lot of time. Most buildings in most places tend to have similar characteristics so why reinvent the wheel every game?

So GTOS has all of that does it? Pretty amazing game
 

Yes, this would be nice to have. No doubt about it.
 

Well as an "infantryman" (assuming anyone can put any credence to anything that you say) I expect you would know that the equipment is what the equipment is. If the game is set in 1944 the game will have equipment from 1944. That seems self evident to me.

Wiggum15 - are you at all capable of rationale and mature debate? From your previous posts it does appear as if you are going out your way to appear both irrational and immature. TBH your attitude and the way you interact with other posters comes across as hostile and combative. You wonder why other posters then react in the way you do? 

wiggum15 why you dont stop playing then cm if its sou bad ? and moust of this what you asked here are all ready answered to you month/ yars agou by game makers. 

Wow, you reached a new low with this post sburke...

No, you DONT criticize how CM handles Bridges !
If that was the case you would stard threads about it and ask BFC why they did not fix it in 8 years.
You have a strange desire to always be polite toward BFC, thats why you never would ask them harsh questions or demand a answer from them.

Then you try to get this thread closed...
That typical, get the critic banned or derail his threads so they got closed...again, very mature.

And about World Cup, as far as i know Germany won it, i mean the real thing not the Women's thing nobody cares about.
And i guess you care as much about football as i care about American Football or Women's "soccer"...
Thats so childish but you still got me to answer this...i know thats your plan because you want m,e banned or at least this thread closed...

Wiggum, it is often said that the definition of intelligence is knowing how much you do not know. With that in mind please re-read what you have just written and think again about how it makes you sound.
Most people on these forums want all the same improvements that you do. They are not disagreeing with those ideas, they are pointing out that it isn't as easy to do as you keep asserting that 'you think' it is. If you don't like that, you have two interesting options:

1. Start a religion which teaches that, yes, the world is as Guru St. Wiggum (peace be upon Him) Thinks it is, that He has Thought that BFC represents the sinful twin heads of the Daemun of Coding Incompetence and Overpriced Wargames and then base yourself in Britain so that you can sue everyone on these forums who disagrees.

2. Learn how to code a game engine which is quick and easy to update seven years later and how to make AI pixeltruppen act like human soldiers did in the 1940s, then come back, prove that you were right and everyone else was wrong and bathe in the respect you earn for doing so.

Every other option IS boring, because I think it is, so please keep it to yourself.