The_MonkeyKing

At least this Leopard/MBT crysis is giving a smoke screen for the GLSDB, that is a system that matters much, much more in the sort and medium term.

There is going to be a series standoff with these Leopards and the H-hour is tomorrow in Rammstein meeting. Poland PM hinting that we will do what has to be done, no matter the German export permissions. Germany painted itself to a corner with the US M1 Abrams demand. I think there was absolute no plans for doing this anytime soon, for multiple good reasons. Only compromise I can think of is US making a sale of M1 Abrams with a far off delivery date. EDIT: new plot twist: Cannot make this **** up

Yes, dumping ground for equipment that was created for the job that they would be doing in Ukraine. Sounds good to me. Of course planning and coordination(and generally using sense) is needed and has been lacking in the past (example lets not give 4 different types of western MBT, optimally just one maybe two). Ukrainians clearly want them and think they need them. Brittish can support this equipment but don't want to because it is not optimal for them. Not that they are some sort of "toxic waste".

It is true. Such a small matter that has many many solutions. In no way is argument for not sending the tanks, it is a line to add to the expense calculation. That problem can be solved with money, equipment renting, shared exercises and maybe Britain wants to downsize its armored force significant now that the threat it was created for practically disappeared and is not coming back in anyway same scale, NATO allies can compensate and Britain role could shift to air and navy even more.... That is what I came up with in couple of minutes. I am sure the whole British MoD can solve this and put a price on the solution.

Moot point

Ukrainians are operating old(and less old) soviet T-80s with turbines. As one person knowledgeable of the subject stated the Abrams turbine will be "easy mode" compared to these.

One of the most brilliant interviews(in term me learning new stuff) of the war: former head of RAF Intelligence Edward Stringer https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNepMICxRJM To raise the best part: timestamp link https://youtu.be/SNepMICxRJM?t=2566 "Is it time to gift the entire British tank fleet to UKR?" (includes the whole mech force) TLDR or TLDW: Absolutely yes. One of the "best deals" in security strategy in a long while. Strategically thinking MoDs exists to protect from acute threat to our way of live in the transatlantic area. The threat has revealed itself clearly, we do not have to wait on the goal line for it to come to us. We need to remove that threat and that threat will not come back in years. (combine this to the fact RUS is using up the super power heritage that is never coming back) British have old legacy equipment that was created for this job. We already saw the announcements of AS90 that he takes to mean that "We have now pretty much decided to get rid of those". The counter sending the tanks is: "We have NATO commitments and need to defend ourselves and always be ready". He says that is what he would call "fallacy: No, sorry you cannot take that, it is the last one and somebody might want that." The task it was bought originally for is now, why would we need to keep it? Lets look who would really worry about giving the tanks? 1. NATO: Stoltenberg is arguing for more aid and has not raided such concerns 2. What countries would be most worried about Brits losing their mech force? Those are the ones on the frontlines (Estonia, Poland...) and they are to most enthusiastic for these transfer for Ukraine. If they are saying this, we should be listening. This is an opportunity for Britain to get rid of (and replace) its indigenous, no longer produced or sold tank fleets. Time to join multinational programs?

Hey Germans here How is this dude in terms of Russia and Ukraine?

Have we seen any PT-91 footage from Ukraine? Those would go well together with the new IFVs.

Indeed, and even much the costs and risks can be argued away quite effectively. - Security risk have lowered (also in part permanently) now that Russia is using up its military heritage of the soviet superpower. - Much of the equipment sounds expensive but it is in most cases sunk cost to equipment that would have to be replaced or modernized anyway. - Aid given further lowers Russian capacity and so the threat environment - The shorter the war the less expensive it is. Now only balancing the UKR budget is taking at least billion a month. I think the only argument that is too elusive to argue away is "the escalation" fear. Good thing is that west is starting to get over that fear. Russian capacity to expand the war is diminishing by the day, RUS red lines have been crossed 10 times too many, only one left is the nuclear war fear that is also losing its fear factor.

summary of the Finnish situation with the Leopards: https://corporalfrisk.com/2023/01/15/free-the-leopards/ some picks: Because Finland “can’t send many tanks“. And here is where I call a foul. Finland can send a significant number of tanks, but it would be expensive and we would take a national security risk. The short version is that we could send all Leopard 2A4, which would mean the tank part of an under-strength armoured brigade. The Leopard 2A4-force was slated for a mid-life upgrade already a decade ago, but that was eventually scrapped due to cost and the opportunity to buy second-hand 2A6NL from the Netherlands at throwaway cost. The word then was that they would replace the 2A4 which we couldn’t afford to upgrade, but as it turns out the Finnish Defence Forces decided to instead double the armoured force. Here we run into a particular quirk of the Finnish Defence Forces: The Army doesn’t like to talk. This isn’t just restricted to tanks, but in general they don’t discuss their wartime formations, and as such they don’t talk about their plans for the future as that would lead to people getting ideas about the current situation. If we send the Leopard 2A4s somewhere else, they would obviously need to be replaced, and for once we have something approaching a reasonable cost-estimate. The Norwegian project to acquire new tanks sport a budget of approximately 1.8 billion Euros (19.3 Bn NOK) for 72 new tanks. So why would Finland send tanks to Ukraine? Why can’t anyone else do so? The whole point was that the Leopard 2 is in widespread use, right? Scratch the countries in Asia and South America, because so far the Ukraine aid has been a decidedly North American and European affair. Then you can remove Greece and Turkey, since neither will part with any armour before it literally is falling into pieces. This leaves Norway, Spain, Poland, Canada, and Finland. The counter-argument is obviously that we aren’t a NATO-member (yet), which makes things tricky. I agree on that, and that is indeed the key question which only the top-diplomats can currently answer – how safe does the current status as applicants make us feel? How much of a risk would we take by halving our tank force for half a decade? As mentioned, the Leopard 2A4 are by now approaching a decade since the planned MLU was cancelled, meaning that they will need either a serious upgrade or a replacement within the next five to ten years in either case. As such, the option of shipping them off to secure Finnish interests in another country is not as outrageously expensive As such, it’s not that Finland can’t deliver a serious number of tanks to Ukraine – it’s that we aren’t prepared to pay the costs and take the risks such a decision would include. And I for one does not know for certain if that is the correct decision or not.

One big challenge with IFV and especially tank maintenance is that they get hit a lot. Also broken in million other fun ways. Probably the most. For artillery systems that is way less common. Lots of repairs and often and a lot of it is done in the field with tanks to speed things up and up the force availability. Not saying it cannot be done. Definitely can be, but this is one reason why a simpler tank often has more challenges in supply chain than the more complex artillery systems.

Interesting . With distance knowledge indeed lessens, I never thought about Spains defense policy and it actually pointing south. We fins have a saying: "Finnish security policy is threefold: Russia, Russia, Russia" I am only thinking of 2A5 and better for UKR. Look out, Finns are after your 2E tanks for UKR!

Thank you for the Spain insight. I somehow always thought Spain as pretty militarist and ready to go with the Ukraine support. Never thought it would have been a taboo of any sort.

Me commenting as a Finn, we have experience in transitioning from BMP equipment to CV9030 and from T-72 to Leopard 2. Generally everything from operation to maintenance got easier to do with these modern systems than the soviet ones. Example old DOS based computer systems are pretty hard to use compared to modern ones, also switching parts extra is pretty much plug and play. This is a point our trainers and officers brought up very often in form of recollecting "the old times".

Koffman: Good piece by Jack: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/14/tanks-will-help-kyiv-break-deadlock-but-its-ukraine-allies-now-face-a-fork-in-the-road?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_medium&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1673697791 I find the tank discussion somewhat talismanic, but agree that it represents an important political decision point on whether to take the better kit from current fleets to support UA, as opposed to relying on older equipment in storage. 1/ That said, IFVs are probably more important in what they offer UA overall. ADS, arty, barrels, and ammunition, remain the more significant issues. Tanks are often being used in an indirect fire role, though that could be particularly characteristic of fighting over the winter. 2/ I've been very much on 'team tank' in terms of their utility, and don't subscribe to the recurring post-1973 claims about tanks being obsolete, etc. That said, this war raises two distinct sets of questions: are tanks being used effectively & has maneuver warfare been viable? 3/ Worth raising this to manage expectations on what impact X or Y system will have. It is fair to say that we've not seen much combined arms in this conflict, and attrition has governed this war much more than maneuver. The latter has been possible where it was relatively easy. 4/ Increasingly I see what I think is the right conversation to be had about this being a longer war, and what it will take to sustain it medium-long term. It's already too late for this to be a short war. Winter 2023 is a time for important decision points on the way forward. 5/ From the article: The upshot is that Ukraine’s international partners are approaching a hard fork in the road. For months, they have gifted equipment they have held in storage. Although these donations have been expressed in dollar terms, few of them have incurred heavy financial costs to donors. As donations begin to push into critical fleets and stockpiles, however, Ukraine’s partners face the need to invest in regenerating their capabilities as well as supporting Ukraine. In a challenging financial environment, they have tried to defer this decision. But if they want a Ukrainian victory, then they can defer it no longer. To defer investment is to offer Russia an opportunity to protract the war. Jack Watling is a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute

I wonder what exactly are the Spanish needs for MBTs? At least right now in the coming couple of years. Here in Finland we are debating if UKR would need ours more than we. Poland already decided to send more than half of its tanks over the year and is now eyeing their Leo fleet for UKR. The question must be financial in nature in there. I hope some sort of Leopard pool funding will be created. I see no reason for Spain not giving at least half of its operational fleet for fair compensation.

Yeah, MBTs get hit probably the most on the battlefield (and live to be repaired). This creates a need for constant repairs.

Glad Poland has done as it has. I am guessing now that the conversation is moving from "we cannot escalate" to "we cannot afford to give" the resistance is going to have to start breaking easier. The arguments are so much more concrete here than the elusive "escalation" risks. Actually president of Finland stated exactly that Finland's support is limited by the combination of being outside NATO and having the second longest border with Russia in Europe. I suspect the stance will change with the NATO membership. EU leading countries are Germany, France and Italy. Sadly I think we are lucky to have Germany leading out of that trio....

Reminds me of argument gaining traction fast in Finland. Being unwilling to weaken our own defense is in direct conflict with helping Ukraine to victory. Even every ammunition order is very likely to reduce availability for Ukraine. Investments have to be managed carefully not the overlap with the Ukrainian defense needs(example F-35 is very safe investment but buying 155m ammo on quick order is detrimental). If we are unwilling to weaken our own defense or want to strengthen it, those resources are definitely not going to Ukraine. And Europe has extreme weak stockpile and industry base for these.

Rheinmetall made statement that GER industry won't be able to supply any MBTs this year because hundreds of millions retrofit investments that have not been made yet. (Rheinmetall cannot make such investments without orders) I remember Rheinmetall bringing this up last summer... I guess because procrastination on this for so long GER tanks are going to have to come out of Bundeswehr inventory.

Bundeswehr cannot afford because? I wonder how Poland could have afford to send hundreds and hundreds of tanks and invest in hundreds and hundreds of new ones.

Didn't realize this. Changes things. Sounds like unbelievable long time.

UKR Is not taking civilians and converting them to professionals in these cases. They are taking battle experienced soldiers and converting them to operate western kit. For tank training I give you example of Finnish military where creating a Leo2 commander takes 9 months (+ first 3months is basic training, total 12 months). Equipment course takes 3 months. This is also converting civilians to military. How long this takes for US military? Years. So for UKR T-72 crew conversation is going to take couple of months. Similar "laws" apply for air force and helicopters

Timelines talked about for hypothetical Western planes are in this ballpark. The longer time is the support infrastructure, this is smaller with helicopters. What is your evidence it taking anywhere near as long for UKR to train than it does in western peacetime professional army?