ikalugin

On the air war - this all depends on scenario. Ie what kind of presence does NATO (or specific NATO members) deploy? Because the proposed measures essentially imply direct and full Russia-NATO war, if not on Russian/NATO soil, which brings a lot of implications I don't like (such as nuclear dimension).
 
On the PRC - basically if before Ukraine Russia was thinking about staying sort of on the fence between the East and West, recent events have firmly pushed us east wards, de facto completing an alliance with the PRC. Such alliance is not only economical (currency swaps, energy and more importantly other industries deals) but also semi defensive in nature at the moment.
Morever attacking Russia directly in such situation would lead to en mass use of tactical nuclear weapons (~1000 weapons in the first wave), which would sort of defeat the point of China going north. Not that it needs to - the conditions for Chinese companies to do business there are good anyway, and who would ever wish to live in place like Yakutsk (except Russians ofc) anyway?

Steve,

The conflict was initiated by the West, via sponsoring a take over in power by western/central areas of Ukraine, which could not out vote the eastern/southern areas of Ukraine. Same thing happened in 2004, as it did in 2014.
Previously, since before 2013 there has been an active ongoing public campaign to isolate Russia politically (by boycotting the Olympics, the Magnitsky process and so on). Hence Russia has been reacting to the western attacks, not attacking Ukraine as it may appear to you.
The roots of this conflict are within the resolution of the cold, where West assumed that Russia had no rights for national and security interests and thus ignored those. If not the actions by Yeltsin or the first maidan, the 2007 speech or the Georgian war were the waking calls that there is a need to respect Russian national and security interests.
However instead of seeking a good compromise, by providing the security guarantees to Russia, everything was done to threaten Russian security, including the expansion of NATO eastwards.
You could of course go and talk about the need to isolate evil Russia from the rest of the world, but the you have a right to express that view if you wish.

Note, Russia is not actually fighting a Cold war with the West at the moment, as we are free to acquire the critical consumer and industrial goods (and other things). It is a false sense that we are isolated economically and politically, an example of hybris on part of anyone who thinks so.

Now, onto the budget. The reason why we don't get a budget deficit due to falling oil prices is:
- because ruble also fell, which meant that we got the similar level of ruble budget income.
- the share of oil incomes is not as major as it is assumed.

Stuff about the budget deficit being shifted onto the large state owned corporations is simply not true - my father runs one (Rostelecom to be specific) and does not have any such issues.

So, to sum up, the sanctions and falling oil prices are not a good thing, but they are not doing critical damage to Russian economy as some appear to think.

Also, an amusing article:
http://periscope2.ru/2015/01/19/8298/

On the air war - this all depends on scenario. Ie what kind of presence does NATO (or specific NATO members) deploy? Because the proposed measures essentially imply direct and full Russia-NATO war, if not on Russian/NATO soil, which brings a lot of implications I don't like (such as nuclear dimension).
 
On the PRC - basically if before Ukraine Russia was thinking about staying sort of on the fence between the East and West, recent events have firmly pushed us east wards, de facto completing an alliance with the PRC. Such alliance is not only economical (currency swaps, energy and more importantly other industries deals) but also semi defensive in nature at the moment.
Morever attacking Russia directly in such situation would lead to en mass use of tactical nuclear weapons (~1000 weapons in the first wave), which would sort of defeat the point of China going north. Not that it needs to - the conditions for Chinese companies to do business there are good anyway, and who would ever wish to live in place like Yakutsk (except Russians ofc) anyway?

I think that everyone should just stop fuelling the OT. 

Can you please expand this comparison then, possibly providing some numbers into this comparison?
P.s. when you intend to talk about a specific tank variant, then please specify the variant.

Some comments on the topic. I apologise in advance if you find this post too long or somewhat incoherent.
 
First of all, the Russian Armed Forces evolution post 1991 - the short version. Originally Russian Armed Forces derived from the Soviet ones and thus were an army made for a single and one purpose only - to fight a major mechanised war. Thus it was mostly made out of reserve (cadre) units, often with the older equipment internal MDs would be left with. However young Russian Federation could not sustain such Armed Forces, not if there were intended to have a given active component (as a lot of manpower was used up in cadre units), thus leading to transformation of the VDV (and a number of other units) into those elite forces mentioned by the Battlefront (the Admin), they have performed with mixed result in the first Chechen war, in the 080808 war. 
The 080808 war lead to the expansion of this "elite constant combat readiness" tag onto the entire armed forces, first creating the constant combat readiness brigades, beginning their rearmament (Armed Forces did not receive much of anything prior to the GPV2015). The second part of the reform (happening under Shoigu) is the expansion of those brigades into divisions, large combined arms exercises, ie Russian armed forces never lost the sight of fighting a major (regional on one front) war and have began preparations for such war before the Ukrainian events. A historic parallel could be made with WW2 events - the mechanised corps were disbanded and tnk brigades were formed, which later were expanded into new mechanised and tank corps. Thus talking about Russian Armed Forces being limited to the elite parts (which ones by the way?) is simply wrong in the post 2008 world.
A summary of those events (pre Shoigu) written by CAST could be found here:
http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf
 
Secondly, the build up on Ukrainian border was of demonstrative nature (show of force, a deterrent and so on), and thus is not indicative of Russian capabilities to deploy such forces in that area. If anything Russian exercises some distance from the border have shown the capability to rapidly redeploy forces into the theatre, into the range of possible single leap manuever operations. Ie - Russian forces do not have to sit across the border looking scary to attack, they would attack from some space within the border, from movement, as to preclude identification of the time place and intent of the attack. That much should be obvious to any student of the Soviet (and by the extension Russian) way of war. 
 
Thirdly - onto the balance of forces. The factors one must account here are:
- shortage of weapons for the Ukrainian loyalists (they loose more than they could repair/produce, and currently the level of equipment is dropping severely as they pull out equipment that was not properly stored, much less properly maintained or upgraded in the past 25 years and send those items to the front line without critical parts such as radios. Unless there is some sort of massive aid to the Ukrainian loyalists they would be fighting on the unreliable (due to bad maintenance) 1970s vintage systems.
- shortage of trained men on both sides, the mobilisation you have mentioned would be that of essentially untrained (Ukrainian Armed Forces were hit even worse than Russian ones) or elderly (whose who may remember their Soviet training) men. While the separatist draw on the pool of Russian volunteers (who may have decent training due to the post 2008 reforms) and maintaining their size means that most of their troops would have combat experience and training, the expansion of Ukrainian Armed Forces (the kind you envisioned, though from past experience I would say that the new waves of mobilisation would fail) would lead to the majority of their troops not having anything but most basic training (the kind provided semi accidentally by more experienced troops) and poor morale (being forcefully conscripted out of their houses).
- complete dissaray of Ukrainian loyalists chain of command, not only are the troops micro managed from up high (the local sectoral and brigade command has very little authority about what they are doing), there are signs of double command (from the High Command and from the Command of Land Forces - later normally being purely admin body before the ambitions of the man in question took over his sense of duty) and this is Armed Forces alone (ie in reality there are more than 2 authorities in command of forces there, leading to poor operational security and troop command).
While one could argue that this overview is based on past experience (as recent as this winter actually) I see there no movement for improvement in the direction of improvement. Thus while the local commanders (battalion and below) may have some form of tactical experience, they have no successful experience of fighting war on the level above battalion, nor do they have experience of fighting a mobile war (those who did were cauldron'ed this summer).
- the efforts of Russia to equip and organise the separatist forces into new units (numbered brigades) and into operational level formations (corps) with unity of command on operational axis. While those efforts did meet some friction (recent events with "Batman" illustrate this) overall they are progressing forward, essentially bringing those forces under (essentially) direct Moscow command, eliminating any opposition or competition inside the separatists ranks. Those forces would provide a substantial threat to the Counter Terrorism Operation Forces as they would have superior or equal equipment, high morale (all are volunteers, vs forcibly conscripted Ukrainian troops).
- ultimate superiority of Russian Federation in air (both fixed and rotary wing), in operational level firepower (recon-strike complexes, recon-fire complexes, TBMs, anti missile SAMs such as the S300V4 and so on), in C3 (deployment of new command systems post 2008 through out the armed forces, especially above company), intelligence (ability to gain intel from Ukrainian HQs due to poor operational security, ability to locate and intercept unprotected communication means Ukrainian CTO Forces use and so on) and logistics (logistics are centralised, have organic rail road element and so on) and others.
 
As to the operations themselves. The likely scenario on strategic level in my opinion would:
- consists of advance on 4 separate operational axis.
- be conducted by 4 Combined Arms Armies (that is around 16 combat brigades and divisions), all of VDV troops, most of Specnas forces, the Black Sea Fleet.
- be supported by the (nearly) entire Russian Airforce and intelligence gathering means.
- be conducted from the posture of an exercise (in south-west of Russia and an exercise with Belarus), of the "readiness check" type, thus precluding any obvious and lengthy build up (which for some reason people assume for both Russian and Soviet scenarios).
- be supported by extensive under ground movement in the potentially pro Russian areas, as well as special forces operation.
- be supported with the newly formed separatist forces under direct Russian command, within the Russian chain of command (under the Army level HQ, hence corps designation vs army designation).
 
Such preparation would take less time than any extensive aid efforts by the US, weapons would take time to be delivered and more so to be trained with and pushed into service, there is a degree of political drag in decision making, this means that by the time the aid from US reaches the front lines the mobile phase of operation would be over.
 
The effect of the war on public - according to my media acquaintance Russia has essentially mobilised population at the moment, thus allowing for standard 30 percent losses of the first echelon troops (and more). 
 
as a p.s. - I think I really should work out this scenario with OOBs and what not. currently I got in contact with hind, I think we may work this one out at some point.
 
p.p.s. "cargo 200" and the owner of that resource - the lady shown above are completely mad and murder poor book characters, football team members and those from the university acceptance lists. I would strongly advise against using their materials as source information.

I think further political derailment would be unwelcome. Please refrain from it. (I would try to hold myself together too).

Donetsk Airport (as you may have noted) has been attacked mainly by non numbered brigades/corps, thus making the use of that example rather dubious, and comparable to (for example) the inability of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces to take the Saur Mogila heights. 
 
Considering that there would be token forces in the area at best, meaning lack of continued defence and lack of substantial mechanised reserves for counter strokes, Russian air and fire, troop command, intelligence and control superiority, enfixing attacks of separatists against the bulk of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces, I do not see anything that would preclude rapid advance, on the post breakthrough WW2 rates (if you are interested I would gladly provide those, as well as the depths of such operations). Morever 250km is not all that deep (by Russian/Soviet terms) - this is completely within a single operational bound.
 
Weeks would be spent consolidating ground, reducing pockets of resistance, installing the pro Russian authorities and so on. The initial advance itself would be rapid (days). Thus while the entire operation could (and most likely would) take time, due to the small depth of the objectives and afore mentioned conditions, the initial advance would be conducted in one leap (with relevant airborne and amphib assaults), which would (most likely) go at a high rate of advance (100+ km/day).
 
p.s. I assume that the war begins in Spring, after the likely offensive by Ukrainian loyalists.

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

That industry did not receive any significant domestic arms orders prior to the GPV2015/2020.

On the air war - this all depends on scenario. Ie what kind of presence does NATO (or specific NATO members) deploy? Because the proposed measures essentially imply direct and full Russia-NATO war, if not on Russian/NATO soil, which brings a lot of implications I don't like (such as nuclear dimension).
 
On the PRC - basically if before Ukraine Russia was thinking about staying sort of on the fence between the East and West, recent events have firmly pushed us east wards, de facto completing an alliance with the PRC. Such alliance is not only economical (currency swaps, energy and more importantly other industries deals) but also semi defensive in nature at the moment.
Morever attacking Russia directly in such situation would lead to en mass use of tactical nuclear weapons (~1000 weapons in the first wave), which would sort of defeat the point of China going north. Not that it needs to - the conditions for Chinese companies to do business there are good anyway, and who would ever wish to live in place like Yakutsk (except Russians ofc) anyway?

I think that everyone should just stop fuelling the OT. 

Can you please expand this comparison then, possibly providing some numbers into this comparison?
P.s. when you intend to talk about a specific tank variant, then please specify the variant.

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

Some comments on the topic. I apologise in advance if you find this post too long or somewhat incoherent.
 
First of all, the Russian Armed Forces evolution post 1991 - the short version. Originally Russian Armed Forces derived from the Soviet ones and thus were an army made for a single and one purpose only - to fight a major mechanised war. Thus it was mostly made out of reserve (cadre) units, often with the older equipment internal MDs would be left with. However young Russian Federation could not sustain such Armed Forces, not if there were intended to have a given active component (as a lot of manpower was used up in cadre units), thus leading to transformation of the VDV (and a number of other units) into those elite forces mentioned by the Battlefront (the Admin), they have performed with mixed result in the first Chechen war, in the 080808 war. 
The 080808 war lead to the expansion of this "elite constant combat readiness" tag onto the entire armed forces, first creating the constant combat readiness brigades, beginning their rearmament (Armed Forces did not receive much of anything prior to the GPV2015). The second part of the reform (happening under Shoigu) is the expansion of those brigades into divisions, large combined arms exercises, ie Russian armed forces never lost the sight of fighting a major (regional on one front) war and have began preparations for such war before the Ukrainian events. A historic parallel could be made with WW2 events - the mechanised corps were disbanded and tnk brigades were formed, which later were expanded into new mechanised and tank corps. Thus talking about Russian Armed Forces being limited to the elite parts (which ones by the way?) is simply wrong in the post 2008 world.
A summary of those events (pre Shoigu) written by CAST could be found here:
http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf
 
Secondly, the build up on Ukrainian border was of demonstrative nature (show of force, a deterrent and so on), and thus is not indicative of Russian capabilities to deploy such forces in that area. If anything Russian exercises some distance from the border have shown the capability to rapidly redeploy forces into the theatre, into the range of possible single leap manuever operations. Ie - Russian forces do not have to sit across the border looking scary to attack, they would attack from some space within the border, from movement, as to preclude identification of the time place and intent of the attack. That much should be obvious to any student of the Soviet (and by the extension Russian) way of war. 
 
Thirdly - onto the balance of forces. The factors one must account here are:
- shortage of weapons for the Ukrainian loyalists (they loose more than they could repair/produce, and currently the level of equipment is dropping severely as they pull out equipment that was not properly stored, much less properly maintained or upgraded in the past 25 years and send those items to the front line without critical parts such as radios. Unless there is some sort of massive aid to the Ukrainian loyalists they would be fighting on the unreliable (due to bad maintenance) 1970s vintage systems.
- shortage of trained men on both sides, the mobilisation you have mentioned would be that of essentially untrained (Ukrainian Armed Forces were hit even worse than Russian ones) or elderly (whose who may remember their Soviet training) men. While the separatist draw on the pool of Russian volunteers (who may have decent training due to the post 2008 reforms) and maintaining their size means that most of their troops would have combat experience and training, the expansion of Ukrainian Armed Forces (the kind you envisioned, though from past experience I would say that the new waves of mobilisation would fail) would lead to the majority of their troops not having anything but most basic training (the kind provided semi accidentally by more experienced troops) and poor morale (being forcefully conscripted out of their houses).
- complete dissaray of Ukrainian loyalists chain of command, not only are the troops micro managed from up high (the local sectoral and brigade command has very little authority about what they are doing), there are signs of double command (from the High Command and from the Command of Land Forces - later normally being purely admin body before the ambitions of the man in question took over his sense of duty) and this is Armed Forces alone (ie in reality there are more than 2 authorities in command of forces there, leading to poor operational security and troop command).
While one could argue that this overview is based on past experience (as recent as this winter actually) I see there no movement for improvement in the direction of improvement. Thus while the local commanders (battalion and below) may have some form of tactical experience, they have no successful experience of fighting war on the level above battalion, nor do they have experience of fighting a mobile war (those who did were cauldron'ed this summer).
- the efforts of Russia to equip and organise the separatist forces into new units (numbered brigades) and into operational level formations (corps) with unity of command on operational axis. While those efforts did meet some friction (recent events with "Batman" illustrate this) overall they are progressing forward, essentially bringing those forces under (essentially) direct Moscow command, eliminating any opposition or competition inside the separatists ranks. Those forces would provide a substantial threat to the Counter Terrorism Operation Forces as they would have superior or equal equipment, high morale (all are volunteers, vs forcibly conscripted Ukrainian troops).
- ultimate superiority of Russian Federation in air (both fixed and rotary wing), in operational level firepower (recon-strike complexes, recon-fire complexes, TBMs, anti missile SAMs such as the S300V4 and so on), in C3 (deployment of new command systems post 2008 through out the armed forces, especially above company), intelligence (ability to gain intel from Ukrainian HQs due to poor operational security, ability to locate and intercept unprotected communication means Ukrainian CTO Forces use and so on) and logistics (logistics are centralised, have organic rail road element and so on) and others.
 
As to the operations themselves. The likely scenario on strategic level in my opinion would:
- consists of advance on 4 separate operational axis.
- be conducted by 4 Combined Arms Armies (that is around 16 combat brigades and divisions), all of VDV troops, most of Specnas forces, the Black Sea Fleet.
- be supported by the (nearly) entire Russian Airforce and intelligence gathering means.
- be conducted from the posture of an exercise (in south-west of Russia and an exercise with Belarus), of the "readiness check" type, thus precluding any obvious and lengthy build up (which for some reason people assume for both Russian and Soviet scenarios).
- be supported by extensive under ground movement in the potentially pro Russian areas, as well as special forces operation.
- be supported with the newly formed separatist forces under direct Russian command, within the Russian chain of command (under the Army level HQ, hence corps designation vs army designation).
 
Such preparation would take less time than any extensive aid efforts by the US, weapons would take time to be delivered and more so to be trained with and pushed into service, there is a degree of political drag in decision making, this means that by the time the aid from US reaches the front lines the mobile phase of operation would be over.
 
The effect of the war on public - according to my media acquaintance Russia has essentially mobilised population at the moment, thus allowing for standard 30 percent losses of the first echelon troops (and more). 
 
as a p.s. - I think I really should work out this scenario with OOBs and what not. currently I got in contact with hind, I think we may work this one out at some point.
 
p.p.s. "cargo 200" and the owner of that resource - the lady shown above are completely mad and murder poor book characters, football team members and those from the university acceptance lists. I would strongly advise against using their materials as source information.

Some comments on the topic. I apologise in advance if you find this post too long or somewhat incoherent.
 
First of all, the Russian Armed Forces evolution post 1991 - the short version. Originally Russian Armed Forces derived from the Soviet ones and thus were an army made for a single and one purpose only - to fight a major mechanised war. Thus it was mostly made out of reserve (cadre) units, often with the older equipment internal MDs would be left with. However young Russian Federation could not sustain such Armed Forces, not if there were intended to have a given active component (as a lot of manpower was used up in cadre units), thus leading to transformation of the VDV (and a number of other units) into those elite forces mentioned by the Battlefront (the Admin), they have performed with mixed result in the first Chechen war, in the 080808 war. 
The 080808 war lead to the expansion of this "elite constant combat readiness" tag onto the entire armed forces, first creating the constant combat readiness brigades, beginning their rearmament (Armed Forces did not receive much of anything prior to the GPV2015). The second part of the reform (happening under Shoigu) is the expansion of those brigades into divisions, large combined arms exercises, ie Russian armed forces never lost the sight of fighting a major (regional on one front) war and have began preparations for such war before the Ukrainian events. A historic parallel could be made with WW2 events - the mechanised corps were disbanded and tnk brigades were formed, which later were expanded into new mechanised and tank corps. Thus talking about Russian Armed Forces being limited to the elite parts (which ones by the way?) is simply wrong in the post 2008 world.
A summary of those events (pre Shoigu) written by CAST could be found here:
http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf
 
Secondly, the build up on Ukrainian border was of demonstrative nature (show of force, a deterrent and so on), and thus is not indicative of Russian capabilities to deploy such forces in that area. If anything Russian exercises some distance from the border have shown the capability to rapidly redeploy forces into the theatre, into the range of possible single leap manuever operations. Ie - Russian forces do not have to sit across the border looking scary to attack, they would attack from some space within the border, from movement, as to preclude identification of the time place and intent of the attack. That much should be obvious to any student of the Soviet (and by the extension Russian) way of war. 
 
Thirdly - onto the balance of forces. The factors one must account here are:
- shortage of weapons for the Ukrainian loyalists (they loose more than they could repair/produce, and currently the level of equipment is dropping severely as they pull out equipment that was not properly stored, much less properly maintained or upgraded in the past 25 years and send those items to the front line without critical parts such as radios. Unless there is some sort of massive aid to the Ukrainian loyalists they would be fighting on the unreliable (due to bad maintenance) 1970s vintage systems.
- shortage of trained men on both sides, the mobilisation you have mentioned would be that of essentially untrained (Ukrainian Armed Forces were hit even worse than Russian ones) or elderly (whose who may remember their Soviet training) men. While the separatist draw on the pool of Russian volunteers (who may have decent training due to the post 2008 reforms) and maintaining their size means that most of their troops would have combat experience and training, the expansion of Ukrainian Armed Forces (the kind you envisioned, though from past experience I would say that the new waves of mobilisation would fail) would lead to the majority of their troops not having anything but most basic training (the kind provided semi accidentally by more experienced troops) and poor morale (being forcefully conscripted out of their houses).
- complete dissaray of Ukrainian loyalists chain of command, not only are the troops micro managed from up high (the local sectoral and brigade command has very little authority about what they are doing), there are signs of double command (from the High Command and from the Command of Land Forces - later normally being purely admin body before the ambitions of the man in question took over his sense of duty) and this is Armed Forces alone (ie in reality there are more than 2 authorities in command of forces there, leading to poor operational security and troop command).
While one could argue that this overview is based on past experience (as recent as this winter actually) I see there no movement for improvement in the direction of improvement. Thus while the local commanders (battalion and below) may have some form of tactical experience, they have no successful experience of fighting war on the level above battalion, nor do they have experience of fighting a mobile war (those who did were cauldron'ed this summer).
- the efforts of Russia to equip and organise the separatist forces into new units (numbered brigades) and into operational level formations (corps) with unity of command on operational axis. While those efforts did meet some friction (recent events with "Batman" illustrate this) overall they are progressing forward, essentially bringing those forces under (essentially) direct Moscow command, eliminating any opposition or competition inside the separatists ranks. Those forces would provide a substantial threat to the Counter Terrorism Operation Forces as they would have superior or equal equipment, high morale (all are volunteers, vs forcibly conscripted Ukrainian troops).
- ultimate superiority of Russian Federation in air (both fixed and rotary wing), in operational level firepower (recon-strike complexes, recon-fire complexes, TBMs, anti missile SAMs such as the S300V4 and so on), in C3 (deployment of new command systems post 2008 through out the armed forces, especially above company), intelligence (ability to gain intel from Ukrainian HQs due to poor operational security, ability to locate and intercept unprotected communication means Ukrainian CTO Forces use and so on) and logistics (logistics are centralised, have organic rail road element and so on) and others.
 
As to the operations themselves. The likely scenario on strategic level in my opinion would:
- consists of advance on 4 separate operational axis.
- be conducted by 4 Combined Arms Armies (that is around 16 combat brigades and divisions), all of VDV troops, most of Specnas forces, the Black Sea Fleet.
- be supported by the (nearly) entire Russian Airforce and intelligence gathering means.
- be conducted from the posture of an exercise (in south-west of Russia and an exercise with Belarus), of the "readiness check" type, thus precluding any obvious and lengthy build up (which for some reason people assume for both Russian and Soviet scenarios).
- be supported by extensive under ground movement in the potentially pro Russian areas, as well as special forces operation.
- be supported with the newly formed separatist forces under direct Russian command, within the Russian chain of command (under the Army level HQ, hence corps designation vs army designation).
 
Such preparation would take less time than any extensive aid efforts by the US, weapons would take time to be delivered and more so to be trained with and pushed into service, there is a degree of political drag in decision making, this means that by the time the aid from US reaches the front lines the mobile phase of operation would be over.
 
The effect of the war on public - according to my media acquaintance Russia has essentially mobilised population at the moment, thus allowing for standard 30 percent losses of the first echelon troops (and more). 
 
as a p.s. - I think I really should work out this scenario with OOBs and what not. currently I got in contact with hind, I think we may work this one out at some point.
 
p.p.s. "cargo 200" and the owner of that resource - the lady shown above are completely mad and murder poor book characters, football team members and those from the university acceptance lists. I would strongly advise against using their materials as source information.

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

I think further political derailment would be unwelcome. Please refrain from it. (I would try to hold myself together too).

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

Sumy-Romny-Kiev axis should be covered by other mechanized brigade formation (I intentionaly left out any other ukrainian units from my map since that would require whole another case study of strategic positions for all the ukrainian forces), but the position is even more exposed than the E101. However, any forces defending Sumy should be able to buy some time since the terrain there is once again somewhat defendable. Naturally this leaves a HUGE gap around byryn-terny area between the two brigades. Any RA-thrust trough this gap would have to be met by mobile forces held futher west around Ichnya-Pryluky-area. Wich is a whole another story.
 
Same goes for area north of the brigades AO wich should be held by neighbouring unit of some size, at least independent battalion formations or two at minimum.
 
As far as i understand the RA would definately enfix the defenders at Krolevets and go for a flanking move, but the major highways are still important as supply routes and I would hold it as fairly certain that some forces would be commited to clearing the highway. As for why going to Kiev at all, well tbh I dont want to even speculate too much at that but its the core of the official "story line". Ofc artillery pounding down on kiev could be a leverage for bargaining for the real prize wich would be, like you posted, the sympathetic south and south east.

First off I want to thank you every one for participating in this interesting discussion! Please do continue presenting your visions/speculations about the tactical and strategic nature of this hypothetical war.
 
I will now follow with my "case study" for a Ukraininan defensive delaying action in a strategic location along the E101 Highway near town of "Krolevets"
When planning this study I was struck by the enormous distances each military unit will have to cover. Gone are the days when battalions, brigades or even divisions would share common borders with their Areas of Operations. I was also struck by what seemed at first glance as impossible terrain to defend or even to conduct delaying action of any sort. However after some late nights spent with google earth i began to find some defendable locations along the Moscow-Kiev Highway, wich would be vital to clear and capture regardles of the ultimate goal of the war. It is simply strategically very important if you are going to attempt offensives towards Kiev.
 
One of these locations is Krolevets with it's surrounding terrain of forest, marshy riverbeds, hills and gullies with broken farmlands and minor villages. It is by far NOT a perfectly defendable location, (if there ever is one) and would be bypassed eventually, but the aim here is to buy as much time as possible and deplete the enemy as much as possible, even with the prospect that the defending troops never get to go home again.
 
The following picture is the rough outline of defensive sector of single Ukrainian Mechanized Brigade (would be most likely the 72nd)
 

 
The AO for the brigade is way way too large but the problem here is that ukraine military does not have the brigades to defend along the entire border. Therefore we must make do with what we have and this is my estimate of a possible AO. Now the catch is this: There is also a ukrainian artillery brigade or at least elements of it, within the Mechs AO near "Baturin" wich should be able to use their BM-30 smerch (or similar systems) to strike at advancing RA-forces  along the E101 and as well as other locations of importance (demonstrated by the yellow "explosion" markers)
 
The brigades objective is to act as the first line of defence, buy time, wear down the RA-advance units and protect the artillery brigades assets while they pound the invading enemy as long as they can (asuming the first airstrike wont neutralise them withing first hours of war). Brigade has been divided into three separate mechanized combat teams: one in Krolevets, one screening the SE direction near Konotop and one in reserve near Baturin ready to reinforce either one of the two other combat teams and/or conduct counterattacks with or without support from armored brigade situated around "Borzna, Nizhyn, Ichnya" -area. If the brigade is bypassed or otherwise compromized, the remaining units are to fall back towards Chernigov for regroup and refit. Expected RA forces will range from 3-4 mech and tank brigades in strenght, attacking in battalion formations. Brigade must rely on recon screen in Shostka, Buryn, Terny -directions  to provide intel on enemy axis of advances and counter them by redeploying battalion combat teams accordingly as well as provide target info for the artillery brigade assets.
 
Next picture is the possible locations I have planned to map (if RL allows) in the Krolevets area:
 

 
Each should be reasonably plausible locations for actions ranging from platoon to company/depleted battalion scale. They can also be easily converted for use with more robust defensive formations (for example an entire brigade defending the locale) and should cover the most likely paths of advance by RA-units locally (naturally the entire locale is possible to bypass elsewhere)
 
Next three pistures are my very rough demonstrations of a possible defensive plan for the ukrainian Mechanized taks force defending Krolevets:
 

 
-the broken blue arrows represent the intended direction of retreat  and should these direction be compromized the battalion will be isolated quickly. The "toothed" blue lines are possible prepared defensive locations wich a mechanized company can occupy according to the situation at hand. As with the brigade, the battalion must also rely heavily on intel to be able to respond to the multiple possible directions of threat. This intel is to be provided by attached brigade level recon screen and drones.
 

 
-Likely russian routes of advance, the hollow arrows point out the threat of flanking through "Yaroslavets-Bezkrovne" -area but that is something the defenders will just have to live with.
 

 
and finaly the rough demonstration of planned demolitions and minefields to cut the highway E101 and provide some security along flanks. Naturally each mechanized company has own mine fields and other demolitions in their corresponding AO's  depending on available time and materiel. The primary taks of the attached brigade level engineers and corps level engineer assets is to deny the E101 from the enemy. The more time there is to prepare the better. If preparations are begun well before the advent of war, all of the avenues of advance will be covered with extensive minefields, demolitions, and AT-ditches.
 
The defending battalion must be proactive in it's defence and ready to pull back to secondary and tertiary defensive positions in timely manner before the inevitable RA artillery grinds to dust any known point of resistance. Concealment must be taken from built up and wooden areas. Krolevets will be the last stand before the remaining men and materiel are to fall back towards west and north west. (I seriously doubt there will be any!)
 
Any thoughts, comments and/or critique is much welcomed!
 
Cheers!
-H1nd
 

Donetsk Airport (as you may have noted) has been attacked mainly by non numbered brigades/corps, thus making the use of that example rather dubious, and comparable to (for example) the inability of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces to take the Saur Mogila heights. 
 
Considering that there would be token forces in the area at best, meaning lack of continued defence and lack of substantial mechanised reserves for counter strokes, Russian air and fire, troop command, intelligence and control superiority, enfixing attacks of separatists against the bulk of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces, I do not see anything that would preclude rapid advance, on the post breakthrough WW2 rates (if you are interested I would gladly provide those, as well as the depths of such operations). Morever 250km is not all that deep (by Russian/Soviet terms) - this is completely within a single operational bound.
 
Weeks would be spent consolidating ground, reducing pockets of resistance, installing the pro Russian authorities and so on. The initial advance itself would be rapid (days). Thus while the entire operation could (and most likely would) take time, due to the small depth of the objectives and afore mentioned conditions, the initial advance would be conducted in one leap (with relevant airborne and amphib assaults), which would (most likely) go at a high rate of advance (100+ km/day).
 
p.s. I assume that the war begins in Spring, after the likely offensive by Ukrainian loyalists.

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.