ikalugin

I think it is important to diffirentiate between the standard practice of using the units to generate BTGs (essentially splitting them apart in wartime into independent commands) vs generating temporary mission orientated task forces or detachments, such as forward detachment, flanking detachment, forward guard, etc, which operate within the overall mission and intent of their parent unit or formation.
p.s. the idea of forward detachment is not knew, it was used not only in WW2 but before then, as you always could use a force to secure key points or routes in advance of the main forces, to fix defending enemy forces until the main forces arrive (or bypass) etc.

The fires are called in by the forward based artillery officer, not the manuever unit commander. As such I am not sure how the above is applicable.
Incidentally this is why you get separation between commander's vehicles and senior officer's vehicles down to battery level, one moves with the troops, the other stays with the guns. Such direct and competent control of arty, all other things being the same, allows for faster fires.

The fires are called in by the forward based artillery officer, not the manuever unit commander. As such I am not sure how the above is applicable.
Incidentally this is why you get separation between commander's vehicles and senior officer's vehicles down to battery level, one moves with the troops, the other stays with the guns. Such direct and competent control of arty, all other things being the same, allows for faster fires.

The fires are called in by the forward based artillery officer, not the manuever unit commander. As such I am not sure how the above is applicable.
Incidentally this is why you get separation between commander's vehicles and senior officer's vehicles down to battery level, one moves with the troops, the other stays with the guns. Such direct and competent control of arty, all other things being the same, allows for faster fires.

The fires are called in by the forward based artillery officer, not the manuever unit commander. As such I am not sure how the above is applicable.
Incidentally this is why you get separation between commander's vehicles and senior officer's vehicles down to battery level, one moves with the troops, the other stays with the guns. Such direct and competent control of arty, all other things being the same, allows for faster fires.

Local admin has an agenda to challenge -Russian narratives- and a strong confirmation bias.
If you want to discuss the politics behind this crisis you should consider doing it elsewhere, especially if your position is not pro-Kiev.

That was some quality necromancy.

Yes, it is that time of the year and the big annual exercises begin.
I would try to cover them, as it seems to me that they are not covered otherwise here and that they may be of interest to the public here.
While they may not be as exciting as Zapad-2017 or Kavkaz-2016 to certain observers in Europe (as we can remember said observers claimed that those exercises are a cover up for an attack on Baltic and Ukraine)  they do seem to be the biggest exercises since Zapad-1981 with 3 MDs (East, Central, North) and various centrally commanded assets (VDV and others) participating. Overall it appears that the overall event can be split into 3 main parts:
- surprise alert drills
- logisics/rear area exercises
- actual final exercises
Between the three above it appears that around 1/4 (some 262k servicemen) participated (and/or will participate, as final exercises would be in September) in the event,
The scenario appears to be combating a mass attack by a peer adversary, with a lot of emphasis placed on:
- mobilisation
- rear services such as repairs and logistics
- inter theatre and local relocation of forces (especially aircraft), dispersal (ie to back up airfields or road strips)
- counter sabboteur exercises (by some VDV air assault units and by Navy)
- cruise missile strikes (by Tu95MSs, Iskander-Ms, Bastions)

Overall it is unclear who is the adversary, as large scale invasion, which would warrant the scale of the exercise, by Western Forces seems implausible in the East and China is participating with some 3200 troops as an ally rather than as an enemy.
Some footage by Zvezda:
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808210347-s1gh.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808220534-z7b1.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808211749-lo17.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808230431-koxp.htm/player/
 
 

I doubt that they had some 25k troops, 7k equipment items and 250 helicopters and aircraft in that movie (those are the stated numbers for Cugol training area where the main focus of the exercise would be, as well as PLA/Mongolian troops)

The plan for Cugol trainin area exercsie

Split between "eastern" and "western" forces

Looks like Vostok-2018 main event would be a battle of the 5 Armies, with 2 from Center and 3 from East on a single training area.

You are welcome, but actual Vostok-2018 final exercise would start later this month
It appears that there are also a number of other exercises and events going on, such as:
- large exercise in Med from combined forces from Northern, Baltic, Black, Caspian, Red seas, 26 ships and vessels would participate, including 2 submarines, as well as 34 aircraft. Flagship would be Marshal Ustinov cruiser. The force would be supported by Naval Aviation MPA  (Tu-142 and IL-38 series) and fighter aircraft (Su-33 and Su30SM), as well by Long Range Aviation's Tu160 bombers.
- RVSN exercise, with mobile TELs being dispersed onto their patrol routes.
- Peace Mission joint exercise of the SOC countries held in southern Urals region (so in the Vostok-2018 area but separate from it), video related:
 

https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/09/01/vostok-2018-pre-exercise-review-of-events/
Review by Kofman, a good read as always.

Yes, it is that time of the year and the big annual exercises begin.
I would try to cover them, as it seems to me that they are not covered otherwise here and that they may be of interest to the public here.
While they may not be as exciting as Zapad-2017 or Kavkaz-2016 to certain observers in Europe (as we can remember said observers claimed that those exercises are a cover up for an attack on Baltic and Ukraine)  they do seem to be the biggest exercises since Zapad-1981 with 3 MDs (East, Central, North) and various centrally commanded assets (VDV and others) participating. Overall it appears that the overall event can be split into 3 main parts:
- surprise alert drills
- logisics/rear area exercises
- actual final exercises
Between the three above it appears that around 1/4 (some 262k servicemen) participated (and/or will participate, as final exercises would be in September) in the event,
The scenario appears to be combating a mass attack by a peer adversary, with a lot of emphasis placed on:
- mobilisation
- rear services such as repairs and logistics
- inter theatre and local relocation of forces (especially aircraft), dispersal (ie to back up airfields or road strips)
- counter sabboteur exercises (by some VDV air assault units and by Navy)
- cruise missile strikes (by Tu95MSs, Iskander-Ms, Bastions)

Overall it is unclear who is the adversary, as large scale invasion, which would warrant the scale of the exercise, by Western Forces seems implausible in the East and China is participating with some 3200 troops as an ally rather than as an enemy.
Some footage by Zvezda:
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808210347-s1gh.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808220534-z7b1.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808211749-lo17.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808230431-koxp.htm/player/
 
 

Yes, it is that time of the year and the big annual exercises begin.
I would try to cover them, as it seems to me that they are not covered otherwise here and that they may be of interest to the public here.
While they may not be as exciting as Zapad-2017 or Kavkaz-2016 to certain observers in Europe (as we can remember said observers claimed that those exercises are a cover up for an attack on Baltic and Ukraine)  they do seem to be the biggest exercises since Zapad-1981 with 3 MDs (East, Central, North) and various centrally commanded assets (VDV and others) participating. Overall it appears that the overall event can be split into 3 main parts:
- surprise alert drills
- logisics/rear area exercises
- actual final exercises
Between the three above it appears that around 1/4 (some 262k servicemen) participated (and/or will participate, as final exercises would be in September) in the event,
The scenario appears to be combating a mass attack by a peer adversary, with a lot of emphasis placed on:
- mobilisation
- rear services such as repairs and logistics
- inter theatre and local relocation of forces (especially aircraft), dispersal (ie to back up airfields or road strips)
- counter sabboteur exercises (by some VDV air assault units and by Navy)
- cruise missile strikes (by Tu95MSs, Iskander-Ms, Bastions)

Overall it is unclear who is the adversary, as large scale invasion, which would warrant the scale of the exercise, by Western Forces seems implausible in the East and China is participating with some 3200 troops as an ally rather than as an enemy.
Some footage by Zvezda:
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808210347-s1gh.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808220534-z7b1.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808211749-lo17.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808230431-koxp.htm/player/
 
 

A bit late (but then I don't really post here much anymore):
https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160906/1476182016.html
A new contract for 132 Armata based vehicles has been sighned, so it seems that Armata is moving towards LRIP and brigade sized IOC.
Full scale rearmament, however, indeed has been pushed beyound 2020 with all the delays, which creates a need for the T90A->T90M upgrades, as the Ground Forces need more tanks than the 1000+ run of T72B3s can provide.

http://rostec.ru/news/3150
Interesting article.

Would it help if I make the photos from parade myself?
 
There are already open 3d modeling efforts going on using availiable open source data.
 
If we are talking about combat capabilities - the gun is fairly well known (information about the round length, muzle energy is fairly availiable), what else? Mobility (general mass category and geometrical size, as well as engine power are known)? Protection (a tricky part, though this would be fairly obvious by the time parade comes)?

Would it help if I make the photos from parade myself?
 
There are already open 3d modeling efforts going on using availiable open source data.
 
If we are talking about combat capabilities - the gun is fairly well known (information about the round length, muzle energy is fairly availiable), what else? Mobility (general mass category and geometrical size, as well as engine power are known)? Protection (a tricky part, though this would be fairly obvious by the time parade comes)?

While the comparison is not precise it does illustrate a point.

Atleast it is not one of those weird Stechkins.

It appears that they mostly use non encrypted voice over radio systems. Those and cell phones (though phone usage has decreased by a lot since summer).
Which is why they get Grad a lot.

We would see how Russia-EU negotiations would go (if those do happen), they may yield some results.

I think that calling in a full grad divizion salvo would essentially end the match.

I think that calling in a full grad divizion salvo would essentially end the match.

I think that calling in a full grad divizion salvo would essentially end the match.