Krasnoarmeyets

I think it is still relevant even for CMBS-type conflict overall force ratios. Even without any mobilization Russian Ground Force fields more than 2000 MBTs (248 * 1 TkDiv + 82 * 1 MRDiv + 124 * 3 TkBde + 41 * 34 MRBde). With rapid (1-2 months, i.e. can probably be done within the escalation period prior to conflict) limited mobilization of pre-deployed reserve units this can be increased by an additional ~700 MBTs (124 * 1 TkBde + 41 * 14 MRBde). Then additional units can be mobilized as necessary from long-term storage at central vehicle reserve bases to replace the frontline losses and reinforce areas of the border where regular units have been withdrawn (the total number of MBTs in storage is about 11000; even if only half of that is operational, that is still enough to equip over 130 MRBde-sized units (though they will be progressively worse equipped - after ~40-50 brigades supporting equipment will start running out in this order: first sophisticated ADS (i.e. better than MANPADS, though since Air Force would still have hundreds more long range SAM systems to provide overall coverage that is not such an issue), then self-propelled artillery (the towed systems would last quite a while), then MLRS, then SP ATGM systems, then APCs, then lastly IFVs (I guess the infantry will have to remember their grandfathers' tank riding experience - by this point the ERA-equipped tanks will probably run out too )). Okay, that last point is probably more relevant for a global type of conflict, but it serves to illustrate that there is a significant reinforcement capability, and some limited mobilization would probably take place even in a regional CMBS-type conflict (especially with such an opponent - who warrants its use more than NATO?). Overall, given these factors and that Ukrainian theater is much closer to Russia than to North America both operationally and logistically (an interesting question in its own right, but generally it seems much easier to bring reinforcements by rail even from Siberia than to ship them over Atlantic), I would expect Russian forces to be easily able to maintain at least a 3-4 to 1 numerical superiority ratios over US forces, and depending on the number of prepositioned US units at the beginning of the conflict, maybe up to 10+ to 1. Which would translate into a tactical ability to engage any US unit with a larger level unit, or maybe even two of them (meaning 1-2 battalions per company, 1-2 brigades per battalion, etc.). Of course, US would probably be able to utilize its greater situational awareness to achieve temporary tactical numerical parity or even some superiority in particular sections of the battlefield, but operationally I would expect these ratios to hold throughout the campaign. One factor that remains to be considered is what use the more rapidly deployable SBCTs and IBCTs would be (in this type of conflict with mostly linear combined arms engagements) compared to ABCTs and Russian units. They can probably be used defensively if equipped with enough Javelins, and can conduct some screening and reconnaissance, but they are obviously not a powerful offensive tool that a mechanized unit is. If a successful "Javelin-countering" factor is introduced (like IR camouflage or all-aspect APS) I would be tempted to discount them almost completely for not significantly contributing to the overall operational picture. Similarly for the USMC MEUs/MEFs that seem very light on heavy armor (no pun intended ). For the same reasons, I am not counting Russian airborne, air assault and naval infantry units (airborne and marines are mechanized, but not as heavily as one would wish for). Or am I missing something here? Yes, this is how I counted: 3 CABns * (1 CO MBT + 2 tcoys * 14 MBTs) = 87 * 13 ABCTs = 1131 MBTs (and rounded it up just in case). Feel inclined to share them with the rest of the forum sometime?

Do we factor in the production numbers? Because most of them exist in low hundreds (and for some not even that many), and can be considered local curiosities. If we set the bar for noteworthiness at ~1000 vehicles, then only Type-96/99, K1 and Merkava (if we count all versions as the same model family) make the cut. If we lower it somewhat, then Leclerc and Challenger-1/2 (again, if counted as the same model family) can be considered also.

Actually, that has been of long interest to me - what are US mobilization plans and capabilities beyond the current standing force? As far as I understand, there are 11 Army and 2 National Guard ABCTs for a total force of about 1200 MBTs. Of course, there are additional vehicles in the training centers and forward deployment prepositioning around the world (not to mention several thousands more in storage), but my main curiosity relates to the availability of personnel: can US field additional ABCT-equivalent units within a short to medium timeframe (up to 6-8 months)? Are there provisions to track personnel with relevant training that get transferred to less capable formations (SBCT, IBCT), Army reserve, or retire; and to recall them on short notice (and can retired soldiers be reactivated without reinstituting the draft)?

That is a cloth undercollar, which is supposed to be changed periodically, so that the collar itself does not get grimy. If you are referring to Lt. Tulskiy's unit ("rookies") - they are mostly fresh conscripts, who are yet to get a feel for army service (and you can see them quite often get chewed by their commander for incompetence, though he seems to be much more concerned for their combat performance rather than all looking and behaving neatly). Some older soldiers are contract servicemen, but probably also quite new, and some of them seemed to join just for a steady job and are not very eager to follow orders to the letter - these tend to sift out for rear and support duties positions eventually. As for Sr. Lt. Kotelnikov's unit - most of them have long term contracts and many years of service (and some are combat veterans), so they know each other very well and have adopted a less formalized attitude amongst themselves. The recon has always been allowed more liberties (compared to line infantry, especially in a "fighting" unit (being stationed close to action in North Caucasus)), as long as they got the job done. Still, the officers can drill them quite hard if they deem that beneficial. That was filmed a couple of years ago, so they are probably right in the middle of transitioning from old VSR-98 (with leafy "Flora" pattern) and what looks like a variation of "Kamysh" and classic KLMK/KZM field overalls to new VKBO (with "digital" EMR pattern). Some officers and veteran soldiers also have nonstandard equipment (like "Gorka" overalls) which they likely bought themselves (perhaps they thought it worked better, or wanted spare sets of clothes for exercises and long missions) - again, recon liberties.

But even in the dense urban environment (and some may say - especially in it) it is still preferable to have a lot of heavy armor support. So, that armor should better be ready for urban fighting. Or did you mean something else?

Well, they try to keep in line with spetsnaz's "fighting spirit" and call each other that sometimes (usually in jest, though), but technically they are line recon, not special purpose. I remember watching it some time before, and recall that very little of what the presenter says is actually worth listening to - hearing regular civilians trying to describe military matters with civilian terms is quite cringeworthy. By the way, I am not sure if you noticed that this film is in three parts - here are second and third just in case:

"Mountain Soldiers": http://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLETCqLNCeor0v6fY-bqHPkuuRDgOaBVGT A few days in the life of the recon battalion of the 34th independent motor rifle brigade (mountain), stationed in North Caucasus. Focuses on the training and competition of two recon groups, one composed mostly of "veterans" and one of "rookies". It has a bit of reality TV touch, so there are some "human interest" moments (especially in the first episode), and English dubbing is quite cheesy and not always accurate, but still might be insightful.

Looks like they did not get a very good score for the campaign - they missed the secret mission where the 1st Belorussian front takes Berlin again.

akd: Ooh, nice diagrams... Thank You! Vanir Ausf B: Hmm, interesting... Thank You for the second reference - I would have to study that, and also probably ask Fofanov where he gets the material properties coefficients.

2! 1st is for VVS.

Are you sure that you are not thinking of at least type 1984 initial T-72B, or even an earlier version? Because IIRC, various sources already give 490-500 mm vs HEAT to T-72A glacis (and that is before early 1980s "Deflection" study which gave it an additional 30 mm armor plate), and B is further uparmored. So, does the "Javelin" in direct-attack mode make a jump at the end of the trajectory / fly at higher trajectory relative to target an makes a dive at terminal stage, or does its warhead produce a directed stream at an angle to the flight vector? Does it specifically select the lower part of the target profile to strike? At what angle would its HEAT stream typically meet the targeted area?

If you will make a "side-neutral" variant (no stripes, flags and other ID symbols), then these vehicles can be used in UKR vs UKR battles to represent Kiev's forces vs militia. P.S.: Any progress on that red star?

Curious. T-72B type 1989 (protection standard for T-72B3) should have 650-700 mm equivalent vs HEAT without ERA (1000 - 1100 with K-5 ERA), T-90A - 800-900 mm eq. vs HEAT without ERA (up to 1400 with K-5 ERA). And Ukrainian "Metis", "Konkurs" and "Shturm" complexes all have ATGMs with monoblock warheads (the tandem warhead ATGMs for them (9M131, 9M113M, 9M120 and further modifications) were all introduced by Russia in post-Soviet time). How often does that happen (maybe some lucky strikes on weak spots, like driver's viewport)? P.S.: With "Javelin", though, there may be other factors. Does anybody know what its exact flight path in direct-attack mode is? What section of the target's profile does it select and at what angle does it make contact with it?

Actually, they all should be on relatively similar armor level for the glacis (composite + K-5). T-90A probably has somewhat better composite filament structure and somewhat higher protection (its new welded turret should also be more protected), while T-72B3 ERA coverage on the turret is not as good as on T-80U / T-90. But they all should be impenetrable for these ATGMs at such projections. Are you getting these frontal kills even with the 1.01 ERA fix?

T-72 (original object 172) was intended as T-64A with a "mobilization" engine from V-2 line (because Khar'kov had troubles with real mass production of 5TDF). However, UKBTM considered T-64s tracks, wheels and suspension unreliable and prone to failure, so it executed a "working initiative" and introduced many features from its object 167 prototype, including AZ-type autoloader instead of MZ-type. Thus object 172M was born. T-80 was ultimately the result of a long effort to produce a tank with a gas turbine engine, which have been going on in some form or other since 1950's. The latest stage was started in 1967. The most advanced vehicle at the time was T-64A, so that was the base provided to SKB-2 for its work. The original tank (object 219sp1) only had the engine replaced, but Leningrad engineers soon also determined that T-64 drive was insufficient for increased power and speeds of the gas turbine, and came up with their own design (that proved to be the best of the three) on the next version (object 219sp2), which became the T-80. After that, T-72 largely went its own way, while T-80's fate continued to be closely intertwined with T-64 and other KhKBTM designs.

As a matter of principle, we have to keep some jet tanks in until "Abrams" is dieselized or is put out of service.

Well, UVZ has produced 270 T-72B3 in 2013 and 294 in 2014, so the normal rate for their production would seem to be ~300/yr. They can perhaps bring it up to ~500/yr through concentrating all efforts, but since they also prepare for "Armata" production and have export contracts there is not much sense in that. Meanwhile, the repair factories can work from the other end, upgrading T-80s that are still in service, so that total interim rearmament would be finished in half the time (i.e. when UVZ finishes with upgrading ~1500 service T-72s, it would not have to replace ~1000 service T-80s, and can concentrate resources on "Armata" production).

At this point, so far down the line, I do not think there is that many additional exploitation costs associated with it - there are stocks of spare parts already, and repair factories have been tuned to working with it. Also, it may be said that T-80 is "region-standardized" - it is the prevalent platform in the north-west and far east, with gas turbine offering better exploitation parameters in the cold environment. Therefore, it can be allowed to continue to serve until a better replacement arrives, which is still a few years away (we still have about 800-900 T-72B/BA to go through before turning to T-80BV). Besides, one additional benefit to keeping T-80 fleet in operation is that it gives additional incentive to keep working on gas turbine engines. It seems that LKZ and Klimov have been quietly tuning GTD-1250 and continuing exploration of prospective GTD-1500, so if Armata's X-diesel does not work out, there would be an alternative. I would agree in part - yes, from economics viewpoint, T-64 production should probably have been discontinued when T-80B arrived. But there are other considerations of military nature to keep in mind - the groups of forces and western MD rearmament was going at full pace in order to stay ahead of NATO, and stopping the 75th factory to retool it for T-80 production might not have been acceptable. Similarly, in ideal world, T-72 should have been just a T-64 with a more produceable engine (or, even better, T-64 should have had a better engine from the start), but in reality by the time T-64's suspension issues were worked out, UKBTM already had an entirely different running train for the T-72, for which the 183rd factory was already retooled. With hordes of T-54/55/62 demanding replacement in SA's second-line units, and in Warsaw Pact allies' and third world clients' armies, production had to start ASAP, economics be damned. Everything for the frontline, everything for victory.

So envious that they went back in time and rolled T-80 out 4 years before M1? As for "historical memory" - you can always turn it either way you want, choosing what to put into spotlight and what to avoid. For its designers it was a great technical exercise. For the generals it was a useful tactical tool. For the sustainment departments it was a logistical challenge. For its crews it was a reliable high performance vehicle that did everything that was needed and more. For the Ural transport machinebuilding design bureau it was a dangerous competitor. The elephant has many sides. Furthermore, I do not think T-80's story is over just yet. Its forefather T-64 was all but written off as 'the tank that never went to combat'* (if you discount some minor engagements in Transnistria) up to last summer... P.S.: * - On the other hand, though, that is not such a bad title for any weapon system at all. Let's hope that there will come a time when all weapons would be able to claim it, and war and violence will ultimately be relegated to pages of history and fiction...

AFAIK, most of the UD ended up in units stationed in Russian SFSR (2nd gds MRD alone should have gobbled up almost a third of the production run), and the majority of 150-200 T-80s listed in Ukrainian reserve are BV. But that reminds me - T-80 already is in CMBS (kind of): for most intents and purposes, BM "Oplot" can be thought of as T-80UDUM.

Considering that this unit (4th TD) is the largest armored fist in the Russian armed forces, and itself alone has about as many serviceable tanks (248 in 2 tank regiments) as the entire Ukrainian armed forces, and furthermore is located within about 2 days march (or 1 day train lift) from Ukrainian border, then its inclusion in CMBS might be quite reasonable indeed.

Do not give up on the flying tank just yet. Yes, a few years ago it seemed that Defense Ministry under Serdyukov has finally gotten the upper hand over General Staff and Chief Auto-Armored Forces Directorate in its long struggle to kill T-80 in the name of standardization and fuel economy. All T-80s were slated to be put in reserve by 2015. However, the dwarves dug too greedily the replacement process was organized too hastily, and several units had T-80BVs replaced not with T-72B3s, but with regular old T-72Bs - a noticeable downgrade in terms of fire accuracy, mobility and serviceability. This resulted in a wave of formal and informal complaints from the troops. When Serdyukov was replaced by Shoigu, who is much more restrained and catious in his approaches, and who seemingly holds more respect for the soldiers' opinion, the process of T-80 replacement seemed to slow down or be halted altogether. One indication is a recent interview with the deputy commander of the 4th guards Kantemirovskaya tank division, where he indicates that they are actively rearming with "T-80E" (likely a misspelling of T-80U-E1: surplus T-80UD turret gets a modified FCS with 2nd gen. "Plisa" gunner TI sight and is dropped into T-80BV hull with a modernized glacis (improved composite filaments structure + "Kontakt-5") and modified GTD-1250 gas turbine engine (turbochargeable to 1400-1500 hp)). Also, it seems (could not find official confirmations, but some people connected with tank repair plants were confirming it on several military forums) that 600 T-80BVs of the Eastern military district are slated for technical status repair (i.e. anything not functioning up to specifications will be repaired, but no complete overhaul) and minor modernization (so far the digital communications suite and improved engine were mentioned) - apparently this modification is called T-80BA. My guess from all this is that MOD ultimately decided not to rush things, and replace T-80BV/BA only with superior performance T-72B3. As the T-72B service fleet upgrade is about halfway through, it should take about 2-3 years for production capacity for T-80 replacement to be available. As for the more advanced T-80U-E1 and T-80UA (T-80U with improved FCS with 2 gen. gunner TI sight (likely also "Plisa") and other upgrades), which are similar or superior to T-72B3, perhaps they would be left in service all the way until replacement by "Armata"-based vehicle. The winds can change again, though, so we shall see. This and next year's exercises should prove quite informative.

Actually, I believe the design had the Hispano-Suiza of the Schutzenpanzer Lang in mind - BMP-1 entered service 5 years before Marder.

All figures IIRC-type, do not have time to re-check with sources right now: BMP-1/2: Hull top front + turret front - protected vs. 20mm AP (not APDS) from 500+ m, vs. 12.7 AP from 100-200+ m Hull sides - vs. 7.62 rifle (x51/54) regular round from 100+ m BMP-1D/2D: Hull sides - vs. 12.7 AP from 200-300+ m, vs. 7.62 rifle AP - point-blank BMP-3: Frontal 60 degree arc - vs. 30mm AP (not APDS) from 300+ m Hull sides - vs. 12.7 AP from 500+ m, vs. 7.62 rifle AP point-blank BMP-3 with NII stali uparmor package (BMP-3M ERA variant in CMBS): Hull sides - vs. 12.7 AP from 100+ m Hull top (over dismounts compartment) - vs. 12.7 AP from 200+ m BTR-60PB/70: mostly anti shell fragment and anti small arms (7.62 intermediate) armor; front vs. 7.62 rifle AP from 100+ m, vs. 12.7 AP from ~700+ m, sides penetrable with 7.62 intermediate AP from 100-200- m. BTR-80: slightly uparmored, do not recall exact figures BTR-82: somewhat more uparmored + antispall lining

The T-72B/B1 modernization that was ongoing since late 90's and until B3 introduction in 2013 brought them up to the BA modification standards: improved FCS (initial version mostly just tying in new wind sensor, later much more significant automatized versions), "Kontakt-5" ERA (kept original "Kontakt" on the first several batches), better gun stabilizer, improved engine, transmission and chassis, improved driver mine protection, IR signature reduction, digital communications, older vehicles receive 1989-type turrets, other various minor improvements. B2 exist only as factory testing and demonstration vehicles.