DougPhresh

Oh no here comes another Simon infodump lol...
The biggest bottleneck was manpower which Germany's industry was sharing with the Army. The Heer took priority and the entire reason why production didn't fall and even increased during the war was simply because the Nazis turned to ruthless forced labor to keep the civilian economy functional and work sub-human untermensch to death at the same. 
There was a lot going around that Speer had worked some kind of miracle in the armaments industry, but this was only partly true. He did inject some rationality into the system of armaments production that Fritz Todt and Goering had been badly mismanaging but ultimately it was his partnership with Himmler that yielded his success in squeezing the German economy to its absolute maximum. The upshot of this partnership not only allowed Germany to maintain and even increase armaments production during the war, but also enabled Germans to maintain a much better standard of living than the occupied territories in spite of all the bombing right up until the nation's infrastructure finally began to collapse as the frontline overtook it. 
The downshot which of course the Nazis weren't likely to care about was the horrifying death toll and misery being inflicted upon the rest of Europe while Nazi forced requisitions of labor and food literally exported the war's ruinous effects on other civilian economies. Aside from the moral outrage of such actions the Nazis may not have saved themselves as much trouble as they believed either. In 1943 the French coal industry collapsed requiring Germany to export its own coal supplies to keep the French rail and energy network functioning. Shutdown of transport would paralyze the movements of military formations and if the electrical grid failed work on the Atlantic Wall would halt. Famine broke out in Italy the same year and badly undermined what little support was left for Mussolini's regime, the Allied invasion was the straw that broke that camel's back even though it was more like a falling tree...
If what happened in France was any indication than allowing Russian troops to retreat would've invited defeat and annihilation. French and British troops were allowed to retreat in 1940 and this led to mass routs all the time. Generals kept informing Weygand and London that they were conducting "tactical withdrawals" of course...right on through Paris and beyond. Paris was the center of the rail network by the way and giving it up would ensure German victory by freezing military transport and cutting off the French forces still holding the Maginot Line. The same was true of Moscow. Fighting from beyond it would be pointless, so the Stalinist authorities ordered men to stand where they were and fight. Horrifying yes but I simply cannot find anything to indicate that these measures weren't the chief reason why the Soviet Union survived 1941.
Other explanations like German supply problems and the weather could only partly explain the failure of Barbarossa and definitely played a role. Remember the most frustrating fact of all...Stalin's mismanagement was most likely why the situation got as desperate as it did and why the Red Army was so unprepared for the invasion. Yes the consequences of these actions inflicted many disasters and injustices upon Red Army troops. Many times Generals were right to request a retreat and men accused of desertion were in fact following orders to reposition or were just lost etc. It was hard to say, so the Stalinists took no chances and as distasteful and horrifying as it was it's hard to argue that the measures the Communists took to ensure the Soviet Union's survival weren't...well...effective. 
 Stalinist measures most definitely got in the way of the war's prosecution after the first year, but crucially Stalin came around to that fact as the war went on. Though it'd be untrue to say that he had come to trust his Generals and relaxed Communist influence over the military entirely. Certainly the desperate measures of 1941 were not borne out of any strategic insight or sound military rationality. Moscow was afraid of losing control, but that's just a sign of how seriously Soviet authorities took the threat they were facing. By comparison France never took the threat it faced from Germany seriously, and look where that got us all. 
It's crucial to understand that in both Europe and Eurasia there was a great and visceral fear of a man on horseback or a military man gone self-proclaimed Dictator. Since Francisco Franco, Miklos Horthy, and Philippe Petain all became that very nightmare it's harder than one thinks to accuse the Communists of having been irrationally paranoid...
God I should go get a beer. You know you all don't need to read my crap if you don't want to lol. 

Let's try to get the topic back on track. Many people really want a new Africa CM game, but I think an open desert setting is actually not the best match for the CM engine. The advantage CM has over something like Graviteam is that CM models small-scale infantry warfare much better. I'm worried that a CM Africa would basically just be shootouts between tanks at long ranges, with infantry in trenches reduced to more or less spectators.

That'll happen when you have to fight for survival from the very beginning and find fascists and capitalists arrayed against you from within and without. Haiti has had a similar experience - It's hard to have a stable and prosperous society when you have a giant target on your back. Cuba survived when all of the socialist governments in South America that tolerated liberalism within their borders and didn't militarize their societies fell to coups and the USSR outlived the other socialist governments that were crushed in 1918-20. 
There's not much to speculate about. The alternative was not only the complete eradication of the European Jewry, but also most of the people of Eastern Europe as well.
This is wandering a long way from Afrika Korps but I think the tide is beginning to turn against Cold War historiography and apologia for White Terror.

That'll happen when you have to fight for survival from the very beginning and find fascists and capitalists arrayed against you from within and without. Haiti has had a similar experience - It's hard to have a stable and prosperous society when you have a giant target on your back. Cuba survived when all of the socialist governments in South America that tolerated liberalism within their borders and didn't militarize their societies fell to coups and the USSR outlived the other socialist governments that were crushed in 1918-20. 
There's not much to speculate about. The alternative was not only the complete eradication of the European Jewry, but also most of the people of Eastern Europe as well.
This is wandering a long way from Afrika Korps but I think the tide is beginning to turn against Cold War historiography and apologia for White Terror.

I think, as Citino says that the Allies as a whole thought the Wehrmacht was collapsing and wanted to take big risks while they were off balance. While Citino is more forgiving of Clark for his failure to encircle the German Tenth Army near Rome, by Market-Garden the harsh criticism of Allied generals for letting the Wehrmacht "get away" at Messina, the Anzio Breakout and Falaise must have been a consideration for Monty and SHAEF.  
21st Army Group was already having problems making up for infantry losses and the Americans did not share the Commonwealth appreciation for set-piece battles and slow, methodical operations. The British did not have the manpower to land a "knockout blow" and as the Americans came up against the West Wall and bogged down in Metz, the Americans didn't have the room to fight their preferred battle of maneuver. If the British didn't catch the Germans while they were too disorganized to blow the bridges and firm up their defenses, they would have to conduct a series of set-piece river crossings. I suspect that there was not a lot of patience or enthusiasm for that idea among the Americans. Market Garden would have succeeded two weeks earlier, and if the weather had been better, and perhaps better drop zones been selected, may still have worked when it was launched.
As Monty proved with Operation Plunder, and the Americans at Remagen, fighting their preferred kind of war the Western Allies were very successful. Perhaps had the British been on the right wing fighting set-piece battles to reduce Metz, Aachen and the Siegfried Line, and the Americans on the left running down the retreating Germans like they did after Operation Dragoon or the Cobra Breakout, things would have gone better. The same could be said for their respective areas of Normandy, but of course the beaches were ultimately determined by where in the UK the Allied armies were encamped.
The Allied army that least preferred the kind of rapid operation needed to seize bridges before they could be blown had to launch it, and as Citino says the criticism of Montgomery of the plan is flawed for the same reason that plan itself was - the enemy gets a say too.

Robert M. Citino. “The Wehrmacht's Last Stand”

Pop History is Pop History. Citino, one of the best western historians of German Arms, while focusing on the Wehrmacht thoughtfully analyzes the Soviets and Western Allies where applicable, using the latest research. 
His judgement of Monty from the beginning to the end, including Market Garden, I think is fair. Monty was the epitome of the British Way of War, with all the good and bad that comes with that, in the way that some German generals embodied their way of making war. Americans judge him harshly because the American conception of battle, operation, campaign and generalship generally is different.
Maybe it's because I was trained and served in a Commonwealth military, but the Commonwealth campaign in Normandy is I think one of the best fought positional campaigns, featuring some of the best set-piece battles ever. Fire plans, firepower, shooting the infantry onto the target, displacing the enemy from their positions by weight of fire, these all make sense to me - probably for the reasons they frustrate Americans and Germans.

Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't. I would greatly prefer the approach that came with R2V, for example the French forces - They are under the Infantry tab, but have their vehicles. Right now there is no way for example a British Infantry Battalion to have their carriers in QB. Worse than that, there is no way for the Indian army to have any of their vehicles at all in QB. No Jeeps, no carriers, no trucks.
I'd rather all QB formations be the same as in the editor. Foot only units would simply be a matter of going through and deleting the vehicles as house rules with your opponent, or when you pick the enemy force as well.
 

The fighting in the Scheldt Estuary should be a must for any future CW module in CM:FB.....On a personal note I'd like to see the Belgians, as the 1st AC Squadron was based just up the road from me in Malvern, prior to returning to liberate their homeland:
http://www.be4046.eu/ACSqdn.htm
http://www.warwheels.net/images/ACJfinal17.pdf

Garth Ennis found a way to combine Warsaw, Blitzkrieg and Israeli tankers. 😂


If you haven't read War Stories, or Battlefields, check them out! Garth Ennis is obviously a history buff. He also wrote a series about the Tuskegee Airmen.

Confirmed and reported internally. QA 8089
Confirmed and reported internally. QA 8090

You can actually use runners in this game. Detach a team possessing some C2 information you want to pass along, and move it into close proximity to a unit you want to have it, or a unit equipped with a radio. The information will then be shared.
@MOS:96B2P Made a thread about C2 and information sharing some time ago.
 
 

Been looking into this and considering whether a change might be needed.  The problem is I find a bunch of different reduction schemes, one of which is described in Zaloga & Ness's Red Army Handbook as reducing to 3x larger squads to trim some manpower (along with other changes).  That is what was put in, at least generally, for the 44 reduced org.  It could perhaps be considered a first stage of reduction, although the full strength 43 platoon is a bit over strength in the first place.  However, I have recently found some material on a scheme that reduced the platoon to 4x 7-man squads each with 1 LMG that seems to be related to the mid-43 Stavka order to form SMG platoons in all rifle companies and am wondering if a 7-man squad was a more widespread "standard" reduction imposed across fronts?  Also found a schematic for a 1944 reduced regiment that has the rifle company down to 72 men and 3x platoons with 3x 6-man squads each, then another for only 60-man company with 2x platoons, 3x 6-man squads.
The thing is, you can use headcount adjustment in the editor to get the 44 org down to approximately 6-7 per squad pretty easily (although that does mean you may lose squad leaders in some squads), but if the headcount is set at 6-7, you cannot use the editor to add back in men to an individual squad, so I am somewhat reluctant to advocate for a change to the 44 org on that basis unless such an org was never used.
 

This is SS-Sturmbrigade "Reichsführer-SS" on Corsica in the Sept-Oct 43 time frame.   SS becomes available again with the newly raised 16. SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reichsführer-SS" sending a kampfgruppe to Anzio.  The full division and all it's elements does not become available until June 1944, IIRC.
"Infantry-only" is supposed to restrict purchase to foot formations.  It is not "branch" or parent formation based like the editor.
Yes, as noted above.
Not sure how it would be reversed.  Is this across all formations or just in this specific panzergrenadier battalion.  The 16. SS formation panzergrenadier battalion is unique because it was only ever partially motorized.
Swear this was reported long ago, but will check.
Don't think they had any M5s in Italy, just M10s.
 

I'm also hoping someday Rangers and Commandos get added to CMBN. Plus CMBN needs the Brummbar. just saying.  

Yes, good points.  However, attacking France thru the Ardennes in early 1940 arguably was a huge gamble that no one of the Allied side predicted of defended adequately against.  That was the whole point.  The MG gamble was that the Germans would be completely unprepared for it. 
Am not justifying the silly bureaucratic bungling which happens everywhere - even in successful organizations.  Only that many senior folks thought MG was a great idea and worth the risks (including Eisenhower), and had it succeeded, the war would have been greatly shortened and Monty (or whomever got the credit) would be hailed as the "greatest military genius of all time".
Had the Ardennes gambit failed, we would be saying similar negative things about Manstein and Rommel would never have happened and North Africa would never have happened.  Actually, WW2 would probably have ended right there.
Am simply saying that hindsight makes things easy for us.
 
 

"Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan", right? 

Good ideas.  With the increasing number of new CM2 game families and modules and with all the updates, it's increasingly hard to keep all the info straight in one's mind - (mine at least).  One almost envies newcomers to the game as they get to learn the latest versions and play everything fresh rather than us old-timers constantly having to play catch up and unlearn some old rules etc. to replay older missions.
 

The invasion of France was full of risks, but no single one of them could defeat the invasion by itself. Operation Overlord was full of risks, but no single setback or defeat would cause the invasion to fail. Market Garden had a crippling design flaw that risked making the entire assault moot if literally just this one thing happened that always happens which was the Germans blowing up a bridge in imminent danger of capture. How could they make this plan around the hope that this would be the one time they failed to do that? This was a plan that created far more questions than it answered and that's just what tends to emerge out of a bad plan. 
Market Garden was an unfortunate example of something that can emerge from the kind of large and complicated bureaucracy of the Allied war effort. It's not something that people limited to military experience encounter in their daily lives. If you've ever worked for a Corporation or just about any multi-level organization there has most certainly been a "Market Garden" at your place of work and if you stick around long enough there's certain to be another. An operation, directive, initiative, etc thought up at high levels (ie: management) and then passed down to subordinates fully cognizant that it was either out-of-touch with reality or foolish. The solution is good communication between the various levels of management and staff and minimal insulation between those levels so accountability for both success and failure can be distributed appropriately. Criticism makes people uncomfortable and can be painful but it is part of the process of learning and while it's also important to be fair sometimes you can't have both. Montgomery is fortunate that all he ever faced for the debacle on the Nederrijn was criticism. Men under his command faced things far worse. 

And the best thing is they are working on an eastern front module, starting with the Russian-Japanese war of 1939.

This would be cool.  I think one of the main problems with huge maps are Computers being able to handle the maps.  I'm working on a scenario now with a 13km2 map, and it takes about 3 minutes to load.  I have a fairly decent computer (getting a little old now) that was built for the purpose of running CM games.  I suspect Battlefront is cautious about allowing maps so big that many of their customers would not be able to load them or if they did load the map there would be lagging, draw distance problems, stuttering, etc.     
I still want bigger maps and will upgrade my computer in the next year or two.  Maybe CM3 will allow for bigger maps that more computers can handle?  Will have to wait and see I guess.    

Great staff work, that's for sure.

This is a very good point, and one that is often overlooked. During war, lots of chances are taken, usually based on incomplete information. Some generals are brilliant, most are at least decently competent, but the ones that we praise the most are the lucky ones.

+1   CM2 teaches lessons from when played on maps that are smal and/or offer short LOS - also with WW2 era.  eg that SMG's are much more valuable/useful than rifles etc so why do armies bother with rifles.

I'd like all QB lists to be updated to the FI/SF2 standard. By that I mean infantry units having their organic vehicles.
Right now there is no way for say a British Infantry Battalion in Fortress Italy to have Bren Gun Carriers in the Carrier Platoon.