Haiduk

Mmmm? Where? If we had thousands of its, why, in this case, only two brigades from six, established in Dec 2014 became mechanized (on BMP), when other four - motorized (BTR/BMP in one comapny of battalion, rest on trucks). And why later these motorized brigades got BRDM-2L1 for 7-men squad, like herring in the barrel... And why in 2016-2017 we bought several dozens of former Сzech BMP-1AM? Maybe you used Military Balance info, but they give total number of vehicles, not operational. Many of UKR armor was sold since 1991, but much more became a rusty trash. All what we could repair, all this was brought to service as far as before a war. And we continued to buy BMP-1 in other countries, but in small number.

As I told Wagner has different personnel: zeks, free-hired civilians with no service experience (or with conscript service experience), former contractors with 1-3 year of contract service experiense, retired veterans with wide service and combat experience and just "advanture seekers" with propensity of violence. So, this attutude of "human waves" PMC command uses only for "zeks" and sometime for "free-hired". If up to 2015-2017 PMC Wagner was "closed club" only for experienced men, that after PMC became a tool of Russian influence not only in Syria, but in Africa too (CAR, Lybia, Mozambik, Mali), enlistment was opened for all. If in 2015-2016 PMC had about 2800 of personnel, that later, I forgot the exact year, but in pre-war years Wagner had some less of 5000 of troops. Since this time "Wagner" became more symbol of romantic for Russians (they even made a movie "Tourist" about Wagners in CAR, which was very good PR for this PMC), but lost reputation of "elite unit only for dogs of war". From Wagner were "detached" other PMCs - "Liga" and "Redut". They are real "elite" forces, but not so large as "Wagner" and of course they don't act in "human wave" mode Interesting, that first Wagner commander Dmitriy Utkin (codename "Wagner", from which PMC takes own name), who was well known in 2014-2017 now silently dissapeared from scene, giving the way to Prigozhyn - formal "master" of PMCs (but indуed he is just "right hand" of Putin and FSB stays behind him). But back to Wagner tactic again. Here is a video, filmed from UKR frone by "Birds of Madyar" UAV team probably from 10th mountain-assault brigade. This guy posts many inteersting videos, commenting it in very fanny manner - he uses a pointer to show orcs on the screen, which soon will be dead after grenade dropping or arty strike, so some western readers named him "Madyar - the Pointer of Doom" So, part 1 (upper video) Wagner assault group of 10 men approaches to small UKR position. On approach group is diavided on two fives. They slowly advance 1,5 km along the ditch or ravine, Madyar names this "canal". When first five appear on the screen, likely mortar shell impacts and one Wagner became "200". After explosion secon five appears. First five (already four) in this time spots UKR position - both teams divide on pairs and first four aggresively advances forward, consucting suppressive fire from rifles and maybe MG. Then they started to throw grenades. Part 2 (lower video) We see UKR trench with 2 or 3 soldiers, shooting at Wagners. Wagners continue grende trowing and firing. One pair tried rapidly attack the trench, but probably UKR soldiers have thrown grenades or opened very intensive fire (we don't see this), but Wagner pair quicly retreated. All 9 Wagners now in one place. Then we have some cutting of video and next we already have seen Wagner fighters in UKR trench. UKR soldiers likely withdrew, after they pushed back first pair. Part 3 (lower video) Wageners in captured UKR trench have a skirmish with UKR soldiers, which withdrew on other position. On 0:06 Wagner got the bullet directly in face and we have already second "200". In this moment grenade was dropped from Madyar's drone. Probably explosion inflicted light wounds to other two orcs, so they abandoned the trench and became withdrawing. Next drop - next wounded, one of them seriously. Temperature is -18, without evacuation wounded can die very quicly, probably the group got permission to withdraw, so they try to drag wiunded guy, but lot of obstacles and fallen tree branches hindered to do this. At the end of this episode we can see third killed, laying on the ground. Part 4. (lower video) Light wounded orcs spotted UAV and try to shot it down, but a sun blinds them. One evacuation group brought wounded wagnerites enough far, alsmost to own position, but drone drops next grenade on them - explosion and wounded got more injuries like and one his comrade. Next Madyar says he is not big fan of using of valuable drones as hunters for infantry, but in condition of big advantage of Russian arty in barrels and problems with in-time support from UKR arty, such bomblets turned out very useful because they often can foil attempt of assault of small group like you can see above

Or WWI trench cleaners tactic. Before a war in Russian army engineer-assault units should have been restored, but I don't know how they advanced in this.

I add very important thing, which wasn't told in this article. But first of all about some other tactical things. Main tactical unit of Wagner is so-called "assault detachment" (rus. "shturmovoy otryad") - it approx equal to reinforced company in 120-150 men (though, other sources say this is battalion-level unit). Lower level is assault group. Groups are froming due to current task and can be from squad to platoon size. In many cases assault groups attack in some different way, than was described above. For example if suprize attack is need or arty support is not available, than assault groups try sneak under cover of terrain or in the night, fog, rain etc as close to UKR position as possiable and wait command. Then they divide on subgroups of suppressive fire (MG, RPG, RPO, RShG) and attackers. Latter rash to the UKR positions on the distacnce of grenade throwing and just rained it with grenades, which they carry in big number. If they can shock opponents with grenades they burst into trenches and clean it. But main reason of Wagners effectiveness is not their human waves, which having huge losses eventually degerade opponents defense, but in their battlefield control system and experienced commaders, which unlike in Russian army feel free in achievment of goals. For control over the battle Wagners detachment commander use drones and special software on the any gadget. If Ukrainian soldiers use own small tactical drones like Mavic only for recon and arty/mortar targeting, but very rare for control over the battle (this do mostly special drone teams like TERRA and other), than Wagners widely use commercial drones for battlefield command. Here is screenshot from gadget of killed Wagner detachment or assault group commander. This is battlefield control software. There was an opinion that these color dots on the screen are locations of each soldier in his detachment and we can see here two assault groups (green and purple), but other think (and this is more logical) - we can see here battlefield waypoint grid. Software allows to make plan of battle and merging it with picture from drones to command, for example, to one assault group - go by waypoints 1,2,3,4 - objective XXX. Assault group leader(s) has(-ve) this battle plan and via radio comms or maybe via gadgets can receive some corrections. Also important note - Wagners put tasks only based on combat capabilities and quality of units. Tasks for "zeks" small groups are primitive but not more complicated, than their training level. If they will be kileld in battle, other meat substitute them, until this primitive task is completed. There is no way back. Withdrawal is allowed only for wounded and if group obviously lost own attack capabilities. Else - a death penalty. So, detachment commander actually plays some sort of CM game, contrloling situation with drone or several drones. This is really mixing of Soviet "human wave" and HiTech. So, one way to disrupt Wagner plans is get down their eyes in the sky.

MTLB vs super-mud. MTLB won.

Russian soldier had old Soviet police scale body armor ZhZL-74, which protects only against cold steel.

Russian P-18 radar being destroyed likely by HARM strike

Not always. Rotating of 93rd mech.brigade in this sector passed enough normal. All depends from commanders skills on all levels - from squad leaders to brigade HQ. If brigade command takes care of personnel selection and training, it mostly will not have such mess. For example, 46th air-assault brigade, which resqued situation is almost completely consists of new-mobilized personnel - before a war this was "paper" brigade of reserve, which had only HQ and small number of personnel. When they participated in ATO they just "leased" personnel in other brigades. But in this war brigade command could maintain effective training and we have seen results. You can ask, but big number of your officers and sergeants passed ATO, so they are should be experienced? Not always. We still have many officers, who studied as far as in USSR or in 90th-2000th by old Soviet principles and command style. Soviet command of worse style are: "initiative is punishable", "if you can shift your task to somebody other - do it and higher chief will not fu...k your brain", "I'm chief - you are fool", "soldiers have to be fu..d out with stupid work", "subordinate officers have to fill out 100500 journals" So, because since 2015 many retired officers were mobilized, they despite some command experience in ATO still use this Soviet principles in work with personnel to this time. And now we have conditional three classes of commanders: - real good experienced commanders or young commanders, for which effectiveness if their unit is important and they try to maintain it in any cost and grow up in own command skill. - good commanders with enough experience, but which don't want to learn. Most of them are ATO veterans, which think their experience in ATO is completely enough for this war. Many of such people are commanders of lower levels. - commanders of "old style" or just young carrirists. Effectiveness? What is a sh...t? l "All good, troops have all what they need, tasks are acomplishing" (not), journals are filled out - MoD commitee have to be satisfied! Mostly becaise this category we have problems. Mostly this category send own troops in stupid attacks like on several videos, which I posted. Alas, I afraid we have many and many in this category. Now we have several volunteer initiatives, which organized special trainings for squad and platoon leaders, for drone operators, for artillery spotters and these "self-organized" courses (of course with full support from General Staff) gives more effect than similar courses in MoD training centers, where teach mostly formulaic and "students" not always interested in own growing up as commanders.

There were some delays in train shedule, but not significant - 5-6 hours maximum in worst case. If railroad power supply was off that trains got diesel locomotives instead electrical. We have enough extensive ralroad network and it's possible to redirect trains in bypass way if some line will have problems. Though, left bank part of counttry has less of bypassing capabilities Here is railroad network map on 2014 (you can open it on other page and zoom it). Grey lines - non-electrified, green - electrified with alternating current with 25kV voltage, blue - electrified with direct current with 3kV voltage. Since 2014 some sections were electrified, but I hadn't newer map

Premium of Darwin for most stupidest death to this orc. Enemy soldier raised up in front of UKR position and began to threaten them with sapper shovel. Maybe he didn't know sniper group of 28th mech.brigade was there. About 4 seconds from the shot to hit.

Two days of sharp aftercooling on Donbas caused some problems with vehciles. Mud has frozen and deadly stuck tracks. In previous night temperature in Bakhmut fell to -17. But from Thursday the warming will come.

About Soledar. From what I read from different sources, situation was approx next. Again there was coincidention, when part of UKR troops came on position after roatation and Russians in this moment launched mass attack. Officers of new arrived units almost didn't organize communications with right and left neighbours and with troops, which remained on positions in northern part of the town. Crisis has started not two days ago, but earlier likely on 4th Jan, when Russians captured Bakhmutske village and next day all SE part of Soledar. Allegedly some officers of new arrived troops just abandoned own soldiers, which caused collapse of control and fleeing from positions. For example one platoon suddenly has found out that they are completely surrounded by enemy in own position in 5-storey building, because their neighbours just retreated and didn't warn them. They about day sat in full encirclement and only in the night could to sneak to UKR-controlled part of town with support of 46th air-assault without losses. Not all their comrades were so lucky - there was a video issued by Wagners after mopping-up of the similar 5-storey building, where they showed about 5-7 dead soldiers on the stairs and near entrance door (there was too dark on video, but at least several bodies had yellow tapes) Lost of Bakhmutske and SE part of town caused pressure on Pidhorodnie village - UKR troops retreated form most part of village - this were elements of 57th mot.inf. brigade. I will not wonder if this "unlucky" brigade caused this collapse since Jan 4th. But I can't confirm this yet on 100 %. Next gain Russians had on 6th of Jan, when they captured 1st, 2nd, 3rd salt mines complex. And since this day in UKR social media started huge PsyOps attack, alas, picked up by many UKR accounts "we have lost all, Soledar has fallen, Bakhmut next, it betrayal!". In the night from 6th on 7th Jan units of 46th air-assault brigade conducted counter attack and likely regained control over salt mine compplex. Known selfie of Butusov was made on the territory of 4th salt mine (museum) in 400 m west from occupied salt mine complex, but this video, appeared today, how UKR tankers with support of Border Guards drone shell Russians, shows that probably yesterday clashes took place at the eastern end of salt mines territory and UKR troops very likely mopped-up it. Geolocated: 46th air-assault claims they control Soledar (be fair, NW part with townhall) and UKR troops are repelling continous attacks of Russians from three sides. Our soldiers note that Russians are attacking with huhe mass of infantry, with small number of armor, but with mass of mortar and arty fire. Before new year UKR destroyed with HIMARS strike large ammo dumps in Brianka and Kadiivaka, which caused defficite of shells, so Russian (mainly Wagner's) arty significantly reduced own activity and Wagners accused General Staff in almost sabotage. This caused next level of tensions between Prigozhyn (FSB) and General Staff, but looks like at last Wagners got new batch of shells and they renewed attacks. Also in this time to attacks on Bakmut direction were involved some VDV and LPR units.

How Pion turned to Tiulpan - UKR 2S7 lost a barrel after the shot. The barrel has flown away with a shell and fell in several dozen meters

UKR tank after Lancet strike. ERA is worked properly - 4 blocks were activated, one was damaged. Explosion also damaged smoke grenade launcher, also was dmaged external fuel tank

I think, Scholz is gradually shifting own position about heavy wepon for Ukraine not because he wants to act in interests of Ukraine, but because he suffers a pressure from USA side (and likely is getting some benefit offers from them) as well as from inner forces in local politicum and large business, which also as for me has 50/50 position - either to support Ukraine with heavy weapon or do not spoil the relationship with Russia for future (+ "guilt memory" for WWII).

It HAD good reputation between the end of 2015 and 2019, when among their experts were also several UKR researches, writing about ATO. Though after 2020 they again returned to 2014 ura-propaganda-style, but some their information still worth to see at least to comparison

@The_Capt @Battlefront.com @sburke About Ukrianian losses. During ATO/JFO UKR Wiki had memory page, where due to official reports and local media reportages was gathering database of fallen soldiers of all military and volunteer branches. In novadays the stream of information is too high, many soldiers still unrecognized, missed, captured, so this makes new data entries difficult. Wiki count since 24th Feb up to 31st Dec - 4047 new entries. Though, from other side our losses also counts Russian OSINT source LostArmour. On 5th of Dec they issued summary from 24th Feb to 30th Nov, based on official UKR lists of posthumous awarding Here theese data by month. ...And by military branches As we can see, overall 5166 of losses. And these are awarded only ones. Among them Armed Forces - 4367, National Guard - 575, State Border Guard - 169, State Emergency Service - 21, National Police - 34 To count unawarded fallen soldiers from our Wiki to add this number to LostArmour list is huge piece of work. But roughly I think we can add about 3000 of soldiers. Also Zelenskiy after some POWs exchange told, that Ukraine turned back already 1350 of people (but not all they were militaries). Since he has said this we returned more 300 soldiers and civilians. Also other infographic from LostArtmour - losses among UKR officers on 30th of November. But this list was made according differnet sometime unverified information and including all officers - awarded and unawarded. So, LA claims in this list UKR lost 1501 officers: 62 colonels, 120 lt.colonels, 177 majors, 260 captains, 438 sen.lts, 288 lts, 78 jr.lts, 20 other officers of unknown rank, 53 retired officers, 5 foreign officers. Also pay atatntion - in first table we can see 766 awarded fallen officers, and the second table gives to us total number of lost officers 1501, approx 1:2 ratio. I think among soldiers and sergeants this ratio should be bigger. In this case total number of UKR losses (KIA) could be around 13000-15000

Name of the tank on turret - "Guchi" (misspelled Gucсi)

@sburke Lt.colonel Aleksandr Ishchenko, likely HQ of 37th motor-rifle bigade, 36th CAA, Eastern military district. Was killed on 27th of December after missile strike in Kherson oblast Major (old photo when he was a captain) Nikolay Goncharov, engineer of unknown tank unit. Was killed on 12th of September Major Alan Gazdanov, probably 49th separate special purpose brigade of Rosgvardiya, N.Osetia, Northern-Caucasus military district of Rosgvardiya Major Aleksandr Seikayev, commander of separate medical battalion. Was killed on 3rd of January in Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia oblast after missile strike Lt.colonel <name unknown> Bachurin, deputy commander of 1444th rifle regiment of Samara oblast. Was killed on 1st of January during missile strike in Makiivka, Donetsk oblast

In several past days we had two temeperature records, in Kyiv was +13, so loads on power grids were lesser and electricity cut-offs in Kyiv have been minimized. Though upcoming weekend will be with frosts up to -9. On Donbas up to -12...-14. In Russia even in border oblasts will be up to -15...-18 and Moscow and central part of country around -25. Syberia - 30...-42. I wonder how much mobiks will survive

@sburke Lt.colonel Eduard Ergashev, 30th separate special ELINT regiment "Sviatogor" of Rosgvardiya, Northern-Caucasus military district of Rosgvardiya. Was killed on 23rd of June Major Ivan Matiushchenkov, HQ of 49th CAA, was killed on 8th of July, likely in Kherson oblast Major Ainur Safiulin, HQ of 37th motor-rifle bigade, 36th CAA, Eastern military district. Was killed on 27th of December after missile strike in Kherson oblast Lt.colonel of justice Yevgeniy Rybakov, chief deputy of control and investigation department of Investigation Committee of Russia. Was killed on 30th of December in Donetsk during strike at hotel "Victoria"

Your Shwarz is as big as mine (C)

@sburke Major Aleksey Botov, unit and duty unknown, was killed on 19th of September Major Denis Akhtiamov, deputy commander of military-political work ("zampolit"), probably 177th naval infantry regiment, Caspian flotilia, Southern military district Major Maksim Sokolov, probably 24th Spetsnaz brigade, Central military district. Was killed on 29th of August

@sburke Major of police (retired) Aleksey Buvakin. I doubt he is appropriate for the list or not, because despite his previous rank, he enlisted as contractor to tank regiment and became squad leader of tank repairing company, this is maximum senior sergeant duty. Was killeld on 2nd of December in Luhansk oblast Colonel Aleksandr Krylov, deputy commander of armament, 25th AD division of 11th AF/AD army, Eastern military district. Was killed on 6th of August in Kherson oblast Major Yevgeniy Shvalev, chief of recon, HQ of 12th engineer brigade, Central military district