BletchleyGeek

No we are not.  I have not posted my military resume for some very good reasons, but let’s just say it is extensive.  And there are a lot of other business experts posting here as well.  A guy I work with noted that we are one of the few professions that has to put up with this much amateur armchair quarterbacking - pretty sure chest surgeons are not on a forum trying to explain by-pass surgery to a bunch of guys who played Surgeon Simulator 2, and then get accused of “talking down”. (Who am I kidding it is 2023…)
Ok, so the “curve” you are boiling this down to appears to be a magic 65000 troops to do a break out battle in the south before the RA can (and here you get a bit muddy) - get reinforcements or Chinese-backed capability in place to deny it until the Second Coming?  So a force generation competition “curve” with some pretty vague components.  Or more simply put “the curve of the UA generating Attack faster than the RA can generate Defence” and based on your assessment Ukraine is behind that “curve”?
Ok, let’s just put all the other inconvenient facts about force generation to the side - because why would we need any of that getting in the way? - and roll straight into your simple model.
Yes, your wargaming experience has taught you well….attacking is hard and costly because you have to get out of your hole, move in the open into defences that are by-design aimed at skewing force ratios…at a tactical level.  At operational and strategic level Defence becomes far more costly because of frontage and depth.  Now if all you have to do is defend a narrow defile in Greece - with a ridiculous Scottish accent - your problem is pretty easy.  If you are defending about 800kms of frontage in depth of land you stole, from an opponent with all the ISR and accelerating levels of precision strike while your own AirPower is not working and getting blown up in strange smoking accidents…well let’s just say your Defensive curve is pretty f#cking steep.
So while we are clearly at “Amateur Pearl Clutching Day” again - oh, I tried polite, but the gods of Dunning-Kruger and “I have an internet connection” clearly rule these lands, so we are at “Grasshopper”; unfortunately you are not in range of a well aimed rice bowl being tossed at your head - just employing your adorable little model, Russia’a defensive problem is absolutely enormous.  Like epic historical big.  Way back we did some back-of-cigarette-pack estimates that the RA would need around 1.5 million troops in-country to secure that line in something that resembles completely air tight. And last I checked they are no where near that “curve”.  In fact even employing old Defensive ratios the RA would need around 20k effective troops (meaning at equal or better quality) to defend against this 65k being generated in the UA backfield…in the right location and able to react quickly enough, and supported/enabled, to counter along a 800km front.  So you tell me, in your well informed opinion, just where the RA is on their force  generation curve to solve that one?
Ok, back to UA problem. 65k troops is the number that came out of that EU report.  It is roughly 3-4 Divisions, really a modern Corps and a heavy one.  If the UA had that force today on top of what they are employing to bleed the RA white, this war would likely be over in a few weeks. In all three major UA operational offensives the UA did not need anywhere near that level of mass.  All three were variations on the theme of corrosive systemic collapses that were projected onto the RA, they were done with frankly baffling force ratio closer to 1:1 or in the case of Kyiv completely upside down.  
So what?  Well first off Attack-Defence ratios are in the wind, at least on the UA side.  They retook Kherson at a 1.5:1 attacker to defender ratio, while successfully defended Kyiv at as high as a 1:12 defender ratio.  The RA has had nearly an inverse result, massive overmatch ratios do not work, nor do traditional defensive ones.  The determinative factor appear to be ISR advantage, combined with an ability to generate ersatz Air superiority through deep precision strike.  Bottom line, there is not much good news for the RA with respect to mass.
Next, corrosive strategies are a thing.  The RA did not simply “over-extend” they were made to be “over-extended” by cutting up their entire military system front to back.  Even if they dig in - and based on the ground they have to cover, it will be shallow - they are not immune to whatever this thing is.  All those minefield are useless if the guns covering them are dead or cannot get ammo.  Nor can the RA plug holes if their C2 is slow (it is) their LOCs visible and hittable (they are) and they do not have robust logistics to sustain a counter move (they do not).
So when I hear Ukraine shooting for 65k, I do not think “hmm clearly this is what they need to win this war”, I think “hmm, Ukraine is already thinking about the next one”.  Regardless, based on the steady stream of hints - ATACMS training, whisperers of engineer equipment and a steady stream of troop training going on all over freakin Europe, I am betting the UA is actually ahead of “the curve” for a spring-summer offensive when compared the the RA problem-set.  Will it be easy? Of course not.  Is the UA demonstrating that is is near a breaking point - not even close.  The large drunken guy swinging in the bar right now looks like he also has stage 4 pancreatic cancer, and it ain’t Ukraine.
Now I would really like to unpack the southern axis Melitopol problem based on what we do know but that will have to wait a bit.

Good to see you back, hope things are all ok with you and yours
P

Can't see that this has been shared before
https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?ll=50.46236913639948%2C31.009234156915404&z=9&mid=1hit_p7DptnwsFEyv5g_sD2dE-SH0vvc

P

Exactly.
Note to fans...if it's too good to be true then it probably isn't what it says it is or it is outright fabrication/fanfic. Big warning signs: topicality, breadth of knowledge, etc. 

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

(I searched back a dozen pages to see if this was previously posted).
I love these kinds of infographics: rather than land area, each square is 15,000 Russian citizens. So the vast oblasts of Siberia show here as tiny, while metro Moscow and StP.....

For comparison (from Galeev), population growth in these oblasts... red means aging/ emigrating/ not breeding. Notice Ukraine also has a demographic problem....

****
1. So let's set aside the obvious item about Putin sending (rural) non-Slavs to die while sparing his metropolitan core base. Entirely true, but they haven't rebelled yet.
2. The above map shows 15,000 identified KIA. Actual KIA are thought to run about 10x. Let's assume regional distribution about the same (if the ID'ed are mainly officers, that may undercount non-Slavic areas). We also need to ignore non-Russians (conscripted Tajiks, Syrians).
3. So in the high casualty 'red' zones, that's 200-500 KIA out of 50,000 males (half). So up to 1% of all males in each oblast have been killed in the last year, with an additional c.2% disabled physically or mentally.
4.  Military aged males (say, age 18 - 52) are (eyeballing), about half that 50,000? keeping in mind that this is an all-Russia dataset.

5. So in the 'red' areas, that's up to 500 x 3 per 25,000 = 6%. In other words, about 1 male in every 20 in their economically productive/family years is effectively lost to the Rodina.
At 1 in 20, pretty much everyone in the red oblasts personally knows/of somebody in this group. 
Not a tipping point yet, as I'd guess everyone in these oblasts also knows of a man who has died/is nonfunctional from alcohol related causes. Also, some (20-40k?) of the dead are convicts, whom relatively few will miss.
6.  But once KIAs hit 300,000 (x 3 = 10-12%), pretty much everyone in these areas has lost someone dear to them. Do they rebel then?
Probably not, but at that point I suspect nobody is buying the cheery Great Russia Ultimate Victory line, or putting Z stickers on their cars.
(Yes, this math is crude. Have at it)

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

I have seen a few of these and frankly they are kinda big celebrations of confirmation biases.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the BTG, it lies somewhere between Combat Team and Battlegroup in organizational constructs. I think the theory was that the unit would really heavily on quick response firepower linked directly into the tactical level C2.  Add UAS and this sort of unit worked and saw some success when facing mounted manoeuvre units back in 2014.  
In some ways the BTG has advantages in lower size and profile, and logistics requirements.  In the right hands and fully enabled the BTG looks a lot like some sort of ACR/ACS concept.  Lighter, faster and carrying a lot of boom-boom.  Obviously the BTG runs into problems in infantry heavy fight requirements, but so do ACRs - not designed for it.  The RA actually had several BTG types if you look them up and some look more manpower heavy.  I think the intent may have been to make the modular but it looks like it did not pan out. Overall the thing looks like a self contained raider unit with a lot of integral firepower.
The BTG failed not because it was a bad design, it failed because so many other aspects of the Russian military system failed.  A BCT without air superiority and under constant illumination and deep strike PGM is not going to fair well either. The second problem is that a BTG is fine so long as you only ask it to do what a BTG can do.  If you ask it to do too much any unit organization will fail.  The third problem was what looks like a serious lack of peer-coordination.  These sorts of units will need to work together a lot and provide mutual support - this is very MC and self-synchronization stuff, which we have seen that the Russian doctrine on C2 does not support.  And finally on support, this organization will work fine if it has a formation over it to C2 all the enablers.  And we know that was a serious issue.
I mean the BTG didn’t work in the same way that asking an ACR to do a heavy urban assault unsupported, after losing air superiority etc, would not work.  Focusing on the organization as the “reason” for Russian failure is missing the much larger issues at play here and frankly highlights some incorrect lessons.

Bakhmut: Ukrainians are making short counterattacks in the north (they managed to hold last line of hills through the night) and south (fights for Krasne are again in the way). 17th. Armoured and 46th Brig. attacked in the north and pushed katsaps up to Jahidne.A lot of casualties again on both sides, but Russians are clearly crawling forward in several places.
Interesting movie showing heavy conditions in the city- unfortuntelly only in Ukrainian, but worth to watch for combat footage.
Excellent material. Author himself described it  as orientantional rather than fixed organizational measure- Russians are experimenting in a way that is becoming similar to various assaults groups in WWI. Bomber section, Lewis section, bayonets etc. Note how small "assault platoon" is- only 12-15 people, they clearly (but probably temporarly) left template based on squads fit in APC/IFV.
It's curious if this pattern is indeed ppular among the frontline troops or just an example of local adaptation.

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

OK, I am now picturing General Secretary Lugnuts putting a bandage on his head and bringing to life the full glorious spectacle of 'Gumby Theatre'!
 

Good stuff, cheers. This looks like that 'belly formation' UkraineVolunteer is describing in his latest post.  Except in that case, the Russians don't have a firm fix on the Ukrainian defensive scheme in the woodlands.  And they can't neutralise the UA artillery.

Author reply to a comment on the thread:
As far as I know 1st and 2nd corps, VDV, and some motor rifle brigades are doing this. They usually just form few of these "assault units" within the brigade/regiment. The quality and longevity really depends on the unit, but overall it's not great

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

Clearly they wish to commemorate their 3-day seizure of Kyiv.

Now that’s just crazy talk!
The USMC has four Divisions, three Active and one Reserve. The mission of the Marine Corps is “To seize and secure advanced Naval bases….) You are advocating using one-third of the Marines in the same mission of the Army? That has been the same ridiculous mistake that the DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff have been making since the Korean War. Marines are not Army! The Commandant of The Marine Corps (who now finally has a seat on the Joint Chiefs) has already aligned the TO&E of the Marine Corps to fight what the Marine has identified as the most likely next combat area of operation for them, the South China Sea. That is why they gave divested of their Armor and long-range artillery, and formed an additional Infantry Battalion.
if the intent is to fight a fixed, land battle, then they should use a Division of the U.S. Army, which is actually the mission of the Army, not The Marine Corps.

Sorry, but I think this will be appreciated here...

Why you are flat wrong:
We have spent $30 billion on this war so far, much of which is actually recycled back into the American economy. That's equivalent to something like 4% of our defense budget to cripple the biggest threat to the global political order in half a century or more. This war is less than a year old  and Russia has already lost about half of the territory it gained.   It isn't our "foreign adventure" it is Russia's...which has repeatedly said Moldova and the Baltics are next. Which means NATO...and we certainly intend on defending it hell or high water and obviously should.

Some folks here may be reading this fairly anodyne communique (translated from Russian/Chinese) a little too closely and seeing what they want/fear to see.
That said, I have been worried from the beginning that Chinese support will allow Russia's 1940s dumb army to hold the field far longer and kill far more Ukrainians than it otherwise would.

Our shared canvass will be CMCW.

This is kind of unanswerable, and a bit chauvinistic.
Unanswerable in that no one involved is going to say. Like the Capt I have little doubt there is a lot of integration in certain areas. ISR and targeting is an obvious one: I doubt NATO are just piping raw intel into an HQ somewhere in Kyiv, or emailing random target packs to intel@mil.gov.ukr   I *assume* there is some back and forth dialog along the lines of "is anything going on south east of Bakhmut?" "Well, this is what we found, and this is what we think they're up to. We assess their critical vulnerabilities as this and that, located here and there. You could hit them with these things at this time." "Thanks. We'll get back to you."
Similarly, I don't think NATO are just leaving random 40' containers just on the Polish border, with a consignment note and instruction manuals taped to the doors. I assume the loggies are talking to each other in great detail about what is where, when things are arriving, and collaboratively managing the sustained flow of materiel. NATO - and the US especially - really are really good at logistics.
But i believe the strategy and strategic decisions are all with UKR.
Chauvanistic in that it kinda comes across as "silly Ukes. What you're doing is cute, but get out of the way now, and let us show you how it's really done."

I remember a shorter clip of the complete clusterflock at the hedgerow opening when the artillery zeroed in, ISTR it was a few months ago.
This one is essential viewing for CMers IMHO. Long continuous shots and pans are priceless; too many jump cuts to the big booms make many 'Level 5' vids incomprehensible.
Take a look at the 'map' size too.