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BletchleyGeek

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  1. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Thewood1 in off road / Tanks belong on the roads. Seelow Heights   
    I have always liked how Steel Beasts does it for vehicles.
    Select the platoon/company leader. Select the destination with an option for direct path, use road, or use cover.  Default is direct. Choose the formation...column for a road follow option.  Default is line abreast.  You can actually set default to column as the scenario default if you want. Set spacing as close, medium, far...default is medium.  With close, road movement faster than slow can sometimes create jams. Set speed.  Default is medium. You can optionally set SOPs if they spot enemy units, are direct fired upon, encounter artillery, etc. You can also set how the units deploy at the end of the path, as well as copy and paste the route to other units.  You have to put a little thought into it, but the order system is fairly easy to use.  But without SOPs and formations, CM would struggle with a similar approach.
    I should note that there is a special task force convoy function mentioned at 4:50 that I have not used.  Just habit.  The video is from a version 2-3 years ago.  There have been a few significant changes since then.  I would play a lot more CM if some of these basic functions were available.
     
     
  2. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Vacillator in Tank v. tank spotting.. (what a ***** mess)   
    Any reason why Mikey?
    Oh, I see.
  3. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to JonS in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    It's not slumbering.
    It's swallowing fistsfull of pentobarbital, and washing them down with vodka.
  4. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to sttp in The year to come - 2024 (Part 2)   
    I think it's extremely likely that Steve is referring to CMx3. There is nothing else BFC could be doing -- no new module, no engine upgrade, not even a whole new title in the CMx2 series -- that would warrant that type of language.
    Steve had talked about Charle's insane programming workload over the last xx months. Nothing in CMx2 would likely be taking that much programming time. Plus there is now defense contract money coming into BFC. The engine is showing its age, despite still providing most of use with many hours of fun, so it's reasonable to surmise that the wargamers on this forum are not the only ones pushing for advancements. Plus... a few things said only a week or two ago in the "Is CMBS Dead?" thread might've revealed more than some people desired or noticed?
    It's fun to speculate about what the potential first CMx3 title would be.
    To me, yes, Normandy (or at least France '44), makes the most sense. CMBN is the company's most popular and highest selling CMx2 title for a reason.
    I am so, so ready to give BFC even more of my money!
  5. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to JonS in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Hmm. Long range missiles that hit ground targets tend to go to a geographic location - a lat/long - rather than seeking a 'thing' to hit. Shorter range missiles that target a thing (eg javelin) are told which thing to go after by a human operator.
    Missiles that operate against maritime targets are looking for big metal boxes on a large, wet, and flat but otherwise featureless table. In particular there are notably few non-combatants walking about the place.
    Air missiles are looking for metal darts in a vacuum that's even less feature-filled than the ocean.
    I'm not sure how testing for those applies to drones?
  6. Thanks
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Blazing 88's in Is CMBS dead?   
    It's because russia is losing and the war may not be over before the end of 2024. It won't look good to release a game about the war in Ukraine as the war will still be going on.... 
    I  am pro-Ukrainian just calling it like I see it.
     
    I hope I am wrong and this is all over soon and in a positive way for the Ukrainian people
  7. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Thewood1 in The year to come - 2024 (Part 1)   
    So is the only true comparison of CM an exact copy of CM?  I would easily put the graviteam games up there against CM.  And its wasn't stated as a copy of CM, complicated and detailed.  A far more complex wargame is CMO, by far.  Steel beasts is also far more detailed in many ways.
  8. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Thewood1 in The year to come - 2024 (Part 1)   
    I criticize parts of their business model and some of the decisions made around games vs modules.  But one thing I completely grant to the BFC crew is that they have been building wargames and making money on it for 25 years.  If they didn't know what sells and what doesn't sell, we wouldn't be here discussing it.
    And yes, your comments came across as snarky and butt-hurt.
  9. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to kohlenklau in Annual look at the year to come - 2023   
    Years ago I tried a GoFundMe here. For that operational level game. I tried to prime the pump with $1000 of my own. It fizzled quick. No interest.  
    Edit: my own mods help me bridge the gaps where BFC will never go. Imperfect as these mods are, I really enjoy them. The latest Korea 1950 has been tons of fun. Steve has written that he depends on modders to take the game where BFC will never take it. He gave an example of where he would never take it, he said Crete, so I made a mod for that the very next month. He never mentioned my name. BFC has never ever contacted me. All my requests or ideas for help from BFC to allow my mods to be better, like a special module with stuff, have been ignored.
  10. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to LongLeftFlank in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    https://www.axios.com/2023/12/05/humanoid-robot-factory-agility-bipedal-amazon

    If not slaughterbots just yet, at least a source of quick and dirty mine tramplers and ammo bearers?
    ...Of course, since these startups need funding all their core IC is already out during the vapourware stage, which means China Inc. can and will beat them to 'market' with crappy but functional knockoffs.
    Whatever happens we have got / the Maxim gun / and they have (Not!)
  11. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to JonS in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    What does this actually mean?
    The UK, its Dominions, and France entered a war against Germany in September 1939 to - amongst other things - guarantee the independence of Poland. Six years later that war ended. Had Poland's independence been secured? Can the UK be said to have 'won' in those terms? What about France, or even Poland?
    If they didn't win, does that mean Germany did?
  12. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to kohlenklau in Any news on the upcoming module?   
    FORGET THAT 24/7 CRAP. The goal is to work 7/24. 7 minutes every 24 months. Maybe somebody HAS achieved that goal.
     
  13. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Thewood1 in Any news on the upcoming module?   
    Just to put a quantitative point on it, Steve has posted around 65 times in the last week in the Ukraine thread.  He's averaging about 10 posts a day in a topic that right now has nothing to do with the game.  And no where else in at least a month, and maybe more.  Its his company and his time to do with what he likes.  But based on some of the counterpoints that communicating with people is exhausting, he either is doing heavy doses of uppers or he is completely exhausted.
    BFC has gone through this before.  Back when CMSF 1 came out and was almost a disaster of a CM product for the first few months, Steve was spending all of his posting energy for weeks at a time prolifically debating the concept of the Stryker brigade in one thread.  It finally hit a point where enough established players were vocally walking away that he shifted his comms from his Stryker tirades to addressing game issues.
  14. Like
    BletchleyGeek got a reaction from Kraft in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I hope the forum software behaves and doesn't eat my response... Thanks very much for your very detailed answer. It is appreciated, even if I am not 100% sure it was written with the purpose of inviting ideas to be exchanged. 
    Well, as you admitted in a few posts up, we can all say that we all have been wrong to a certain degree. How much more wrong is someone or another still needs to be adjudicated?
    I am ESL and perhaps we understand different things for the expression "to break through". Yet I do not think one can classify how the initial phase of the war played out as anything other than breaking through all axis but one, which has barely moved since February 2022. The Russian Army penetrated deeply into Ukrainian territory, became overextended, and when it became clear to them that they were being defeated in detail, they pulled back from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy axis. No major retrograde movements were appreciated in the south (the biggest success of the Russian armed forces, until they tried to reach out to Mikolayev and Kryvyi Rih, and became hopelessly overextended) and the NE (where they flanked the JFO forces covering the DNR and LNR proxies). Mariupol was devastated, surrounded, besieged, and conquered.
    That was what the first Russian Army achieved in Feb-May 2022. Certainly everyone, including Michael Kofman, you, me, and the Russian command, were expecting that their initial forces (which are no more I think we agree) would achieve much more than that. Still significant, as they did severe damage to, yet did not destroy, the Ukrainian state. Slava Ukraini!
    On this last bit, I wholeheartedly agree. There was clearly a consensus being formed around the narrative that Ukraine was being defeated, slowly but relentlessly. This if anything was being amplified by the harrowing accounts of what was going on in Mariupol and evocations of that great "disaster" that was the evacuation of Kabul. 
    The Russian Army was still overextended after their initial retreats (or rout, I don't know it seemed quite touch and go)... and the dangerous thing for them was that they weren't aware of it. So they were surprised in Kharkiv and routed in what I consider was a masterful demonstration of the very same warfighting principles that lead to the smashing victory of the German army in very much the same area in May 1942. But, and this is a big one, the Russian Army managed to evacuate most of its personnel (yet not their material).
    On the campaign for Kherson, I have mixed opinions. To my mind, that one clearly did not meet its most immediate objectives. The Russian Army was better entrenched and had (for the most part) better troops. But the logistics were not workable: it just took nearly two months for the Russian Army to realize that, aided by the progressive crumbling of their right flank, which was anchored on the Dnipro. 
    I have the sense that the secondary offensive (Kharkiv) turned out to be the one that exceeded expectations. I think it is indicative that the Ukrainian forces didn't have reserves to further exploit all the way to Starobi'lsk. Which did indeed seem doable for a fleeting moment in September.
    Yes, that is a fact that can be duly appreciated.
    I'd rather say that the question is about what hasn't happened. I think it is fair to say that there was a wide expectation of Ukraine launching some form of an offensive in Winter as the ground conditions improved. That didn't happen, instead, the Russian Army went again on the offensive, with very little success, but a lot of fanfare. 
    I am sorry, but I am not sure anybody is claiming that the Ukrainian Army is "on the ropes". That the Russian Army got back on its feet is a fact, as they were the ones attacking, no matter how unsuccessfully.
    That was an over-the-top remark, Captain. We have no idea about what the activities were, and I think it is likely that there were a lot of interviews with the planners and managers of the battle for Bakhmut.
    Could you please state clearly what you mean by "historic force ratio losses attacker to defender"? Like showing a curve of the historical versus what you think the open source info evidences for this conflict? If you are quoting a document, could you please provide it?
    As we have discussed many times in the past, one can only count what comes to the surface of the open-source arena. Recently I saw clearly an episode where a Ukrainian mechanized platoon was pretty roughly handled by Russian artillery. They seem to be rarer events... but they happen.
    On this, I think I can't be other than in agreement. I am not sure who is saying that the Ukrainian Army is "bleeding out". That the casualties accumulate and degrade forces over time I think it is self-evident. Clearly as well, this is not happening at the same rate for every unit, everywhere.
    Just consider for a moment a scenario in which the US (or NATO) practically loses ~50% of its professional forces, very much as the Russian Federation has. Do you imagine us coming back from that, like Britain in 1940-42? The answer to that question is the whole point of this "long game" discussion.
    Let me remind you that exactly a "few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots" was a significant chunk of the contribution of NATO to the defense of Ukraine... back in February '22. The question is, how much farther can the PRC go to match like for like? 
    Regarding the C4ISR the "not there yet" is I think based on too many cozy assumptions about incapability (see the Balloon saga and so-called "domain awareness gaps"), and pivoting C4ISR doesn't seem that hard (just as the US has done probably from the Pacific and the Gulf as well...). So let's not talk ourselves into a safe space, Captain.
    Agreed. This is indeed the benchmark.
    I recently finished reading B. A. Friedman "On Operations", and he made a very compelling case about the so-called "operational level" being something that has no purchase as an idea (that's now coming out with some balls). Clearly, in what respects the "operational level"  (planning, sustainment, command & control, inter-service co-ordination, that is, all the "scientific" military disciplines) the Russian Federation sucks very, very hard. And this is very surprising. But it is not clear to me that you need to master all of those things all the time to avoid losing completely this war or prolong for a significant amount of time.
    From all the news I have that's what has been going on in the south (where they now know their logistics are weak) and Luhansk oblast to some extent (as there we're seeing a mixture of offensive-defensive stance).
    I am not sure about the Russian Army having had to weaken their positions elsewhere, Captain. If anything, a spoiling counterstroke would have followed, I have only seen what I would qualify as Ukrainian probes. 
  15. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek got a reaction from Vanir Ausf B in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I hope the forum software behaves and doesn't eat my response... Thanks very much for your very detailed answer. It is appreciated, even if I am not 100% sure it was written with the purpose of inviting ideas to be exchanged. 
    Well, as you admitted in a few posts up, we can all say that we all have been wrong to a certain degree. How much more wrong is someone or another still needs to be adjudicated?
    I am ESL and perhaps we understand different things for the expression "to break through". Yet I do not think one can classify how the initial phase of the war played out as anything other than breaking through all axis but one, which has barely moved since February 2022. The Russian Army penetrated deeply into Ukrainian territory, became overextended, and when it became clear to them that they were being defeated in detail, they pulled back from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy axis. No major retrograde movements were appreciated in the south (the biggest success of the Russian armed forces, until they tried to reach out to Mikolayev and Kryvyi Rih, and became hopelessly overextended) and the NE (where they flanked the JFO forces covering the DNR and LNR proxies). Mariupol was devastated, surrounded, besieged, and conquered.
    That was what the first Russian Army achieved in Feb-May 2022. Certainly everyone, including Michael Kofman, you, me, and the Russian command, were expecting that their initial forces (which are no more I think we agree) would achieve much more than that. Still significant, as they did severe damage to, yet did not destroy, the Ukrainian state. Slava Ukraini!
    On this last bit, I wholeheartedly agree. There was clearly a consensus being formed around the narrative that Ukraine was being defeated, slowly but relentlessly. This if anything was being amplified by the harrowing accounts of what was going on in Mariupol and evocations of that great "disaster" that was the evacuation of Kabul. 
    The Russian Army was still overextended after their initial retreats (or rout, I don't know it seemed quite touch and go)... and the dangerous thing for them was that they weren't aware of it. So they were surprised in Kharkiv and routed in what I consider was a masterful demonstration of the very same warfighting principles that lead to the smashing victory of the German army in very much the same area in May 1942. But, and this is a big one, the Russian Army managed to evacuate most of its personnel (yet not their material).
    On the campaign for Kherson, I have mixed opinions. To my mind, that one clearly did not meet its most immediate objectives. The Russian Army was better entrenched and had (for the most part) better troops. But the logistics were not workable: it just took nearly two months for the Russian Army to realize that, aided by the progressive crumbling of their right flank, which was anchored on the Dnipro. 
    I have the sense that the secondary offensive (Kharkiv) turned out to be the one that exceeded expectations. I think it is indicative that the Ukrainian forces didn't have reserves to further exploit all the way to Starobi'lsk. Which did indeed seem doable for a fleeting moment in September.
    Yes, that is a fact that can be duly appreciated.
    I'd rather say that the question is about what hasn't happened. I think it is fair to say that there was a wide expectation of Ukraine launching some form of an offensive in Winter as the ground conditions improved. That didn't happen, instead, the Russian Army went again on the offensive, with very little success, but a lot of fanfare. 
    I am sorry, but I am not sure anybody is claiming that the Ukrainian Army is "on the ropes". That the Russian Army got back on its feet is a fact, as they were the ones attacking, no matter how unsuccessfully.
    That was an over-the-top remark, Captain. We have no idea about what the activities were, and I think it is likely that there were a lot of interviews with the planners and managers of the battle for Bakhmut.
    Could you please state clearly what you mean by "historic force ratio losses attacker to defender"? Like showing a curve of the historical versus what you think the open source info evidences for this conflict? If you are quoting a document, could you please provide it?
    As we have discussed many times in the past, one can only count what comes to the surface of the open-source arena. Recently I saw clearly an episode where a Ukrainian mechanized platoon was pretty roughly handled by Russian artillery. They seem to be rarer events... but they happen.
    On this, I think I can't be other than in agreement. I am not sure who is saying that the Ukrainian Army is "bleeding out". That the casualties accumulate and degrade forces over time I think it is self-evident. Clearly as well, this is not happening at the same rate for every unit, everywhere.
    Just consider for a moment a scenario in which the US (or NATO) practically loses ~50% of its professional forces, very much as the Russian Federation has. Do you imagine us coming back from that, like Britain in 1940-42? The answer to that question is the whole point of this "long game" discussion.
    Let me remind you that exactly a "few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots" was a significant chunk of the contribution of NATO to the defense of Ukraine... back in February '22. The question is, how much farther can the PRC go to match like for like? 
    Regarding the C4ISR the "not there yet" is I think based on too many cozy assumptions about incapability (see the Balloon saga and so-called "domain awareness gaps"), and pivoting C4ISR doesn't seem that hard (just as the US has done probably from the Pacific and the Gulf as well...). So let's not talk ourselves into a safe space, Captain.
    Agreed. This is indeed the benchmark.
    I recently finished reading B. A. Friedman "On Operations", and he made a very compelling case about the so-called "operational level" being something that has no purchase as an idea (that's now coming out with some balls). Clearly, in what respects the "operational level"  (planning, sustainment, command & control, inter-service co-ordination, that is, all the "scientific" military disciplines) the Russian Federation sucks very, very hard. And this is very surprising. But it is not clear to me that you need to master all of those things all the time to avoid losing completely this war or prolong for a significant amount of time.
    From all the news I have that's what has been going on in the south (where they now know their logistics are weak) and Luhansk oblast to some extent (as there we're seeing a mixture of offensive-defensive stance).
    I am not sure about the Russian Army having had to weaken their positions elsewhere, Captain. If anything, a spoiling counterstroke would have followed, I have only seen what I would qualify as Ukrainian probes. 
  16. Like
    BletchleyGeek got a reaction from LongLeftFlank in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Definitely he sounds a lot like Peter calling wolf... yet, as recent events suggest, if the US/NATO is the (reluctant) Arsenal of Democracy, the other side may have China play the role of Arsenal of Tyranny. And like in 1941-45, when the Stumbling Colossus regained its feet and smashed the German Army in great part thanks to the arctic supply line, this "Sick Man of Eurasia" that is the Russian Federation may regain its feet too, and do even more damage.
  17. Like
    BletchleyGeek got a reaction from LongLeftFlank in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    One year one I think it is clear that Michael K. (and other like-minded people, like Rob Lee) is concerned about reaching for conclusions prematurely. That's his job: to think out of the box and try to seek out the black swan. In particular, his concern is that the Russian ability to win this war is discounted prematurely due to the "Winter War"-like experience of Feb-April 2022. There were lots of comparisons out there with the first part of the Finnish-Soviet war of 1939 and 1940. Interestingly, those analogies seemed to forget how the war ended: with the defeat of the Finnish forces, crushed by the material superiority of the Red Army. He has been quite consistent for the time that I have been following him and reading his stuff. And now he's gone to check things by himself (how close to the heat I don't know, but I think we are in agreement that hands-on experience on a topic has intrinsic value).
     
    Certainly, the Ukrainians are very good at selling the story that they are in trouble, and use this for maskirovka to misdirect the Russian Army (and also out of necessity, as otherwise, it would be even more difficult for them to get the equipment and ammunition that they do _desperately_ need, like mortars). 
    My thoughts about how hard things may be for the Ukrainian army follow from a very simple mathematical model which has been adopted by NATO war planning for a very long time. If you have blue suffering 1% losses per day, and red 10% losses per day, as long as Red has the ability to replenish the ranks, it won't be long until Blue casualties are also catastrophic (e.g. like losing 20% of fighting personnel, which I think is a heuristic used to determine loss of combat effectiveness). Then there is the tactical psychology angle in all this: the more casualties a well-trained, close-knit force suffers, the less willing it will be to come under fire. Inserting well-trained replacements into those formations (in the style of the US Army in 1944-45) is generally deemed to be a bad policy, so the alternative is to pull out entire formations and let them reconstitute.
    There is a breaking point for everyone, and I think that making the question re: Bakhmut is valid. It is good to quote Nathaniel Greene regarding Bunker Hill "I wish I could sell them another hill at this price", but like also happened to the Continental Army later in Brooklyn, the roles of "buyer" and "seller" of hills can be traded inadvertently with pretty bad results.
    I do think though, that drawing further inferences about what this means for hypothetical Spring counter-offensives treads on thin ice.
     
  18. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Maciej Zwolinski in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I really do not get the Kofman hate. Apart from the initial asessment which was too favourable to Russians, and which he quickly corrected, he has been consistently close to what really happened during this war. It pains me to say, that he was closer to the truth that the majority opinion on this forum, which predicted Russians to collapse in summer of 2022, then in autumn 2022. If his credibility is low, then whose credibility is high? Maybe Ukrainians - but they do not say much in comparison. Among the analysts who cover the war the most solid ones are probably Kofman, Rob Lee, Konrad Muzyka, Jack Watling, Dara Masicot. They all pretty much say the same thing, so to single out Kofman as the low credibility guy is not fair.
  19. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Haiduk in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Examples? Especially Chaikovskiy %). They were people of own time. Cancelling of Russian classics for "ukrainophobia" is the same sh...t like cancelling of J.Washigton and A.Linkoln by idiotic leftists for "racism". 
    If we cancel old Russian culture for anti-Ukrainism, well, let cancel also Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewich for his "By fire and sword" - pure anti-ukrainian thing, and director Hofman - who filmed a movie.
    We can cancel Chaikovskiy, but we can't cancel his contribution in world culture. So, why? In WWII also all German was under taboo. German philosophers, writers, musicians. This is just emotions of war. We must cancel all existing in Russian culture, who actively inspired the war, who sow a dirt and sh..t on brains and souls like Mikhalkov, Morgenshtern or Skabeyeva, but not Mendeleyev or Pushkin or to prohibit classical comedy movies of Haidai. Though, of course, we don't need parks of Pushkin and streets of Pushkin in each town and city. 
  20. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    RU culture is essentially a gopnik macho culture - you are supposed to dominate your victim without offering anything. Any offer/suggestion to victim signals that you are not exactly in control of the situation. What Prig did was a big No-No but he did it anyway.
  21. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek got a reaction from Vanir Ausf B in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Boots on the ground...
     
  22. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Butschi in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvador_Allende
    Not a communist but since socialism and communism even here are used pretty much interchangeably he's a good enough example.
  23. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to poesel in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    But then you were building and flying new planes in the US, didn't you? You didn't just keep the ones from the 60s and 70s?
    The comparison falls short as the missiles are not actually used. But you could have put a DC-9 in storage in 1970, do maintenance and replace parts meticulously. After 50 years, you roll it out of the hangar and 9 out of 10 would fly.
    Obviously, no one would do that, but if money is of no concern, you could.
    Since you continuously order spare parts over 50 years, the knowledge to make those parts will be kept alive. Even if the original designers are long dead.
     
    Edit: just checked - according to Wikipedia, 31 DC-9s are still flying...
  24. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to LongLeftFlank in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Sorry DF, that slot's taken 😆
    You can challenge for the title once you draw at least a half-page sized text Wall of Exasperation from @The_Capt.
  25. Upvote
    BletchleyGeek reacted to Sojourner in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    A little patience, things will get interesting soon...
    "The U.S. is also roughly tripling the number of Ukrainian forces it is training on advanced battle tactics at a base in Germany, to help them punch through entrenched Russian lines. At the Grafenwoehr training area, Ukrainian forces run through a five-week course that prepares them to conduct advanced combined arms maneuvers with Bradley fighting vehicles, M109 Paladins and Stryker armored personnel carriers. The first 600 Ukrainian troops completed the course last month and 1,600 more are in training."
    https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-weapons-russia-biden-war-0e52e87ade3d2300da8be14a3ebcc9ff
     
     
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