Vencini

The M18 is a recoilless rifle, you'll find the info on page 8 under the U.S. Special Weapons section. The effective and maximum range are within the specs I have for it, so it isn't worth quibbling over.
 

Both are right, but just like everything else in the real world the approach is situationally dependent. 
First rule is that you never engage in a breach and clear of an occupied building unless you HAVE to. The only time you have to is when there are non-combatants known to be inside and for whatever reason the building needs to be secured. Fighting inside buildings is very deadly and should be avoided at all costs. 
If you do have to take the building then the preferred method is to always enter as high as you can. It isn't always the roof, but if you can make entry somewhere other than the ground floor it is preferred. The ground floor is usually the most heavily defended and any competent defender will make every threshold a kill zone. Even if you can't get to the roof but you can enter the second story, it is generally a better option. The roof presents the tactical problems noted by others, but in a perfect world with all the right tools and transport it would be the way to go.
If you do have to enter the ground floor, then you make your own door if at all possible. Explosive breaching is the preferred method as it generally makes the inside of the breached area uncomfortable for any defenders. If you don't have explosives you can use vehicles. Generally knocking the corner off a structure or punching a hole in the wall. These are messier and don't usually result in a nice clean entry point, but they tend to avoid the preset defenses and traps. 
The other thing to keep in mind in order to help mitigate other tactical problems is to always isolate the building before entry, either control approaches with fire or physical security. Failing to isolate allows the enemy options to escape or reinforce and therefore should be avoided if at all possible.

Thanks for this. 
 
re the result - I think you are perhaps missing the point of these missions. They are training lessons - designed to enable the player to explore and try out RL tactics, within the restraints and idiosyncrasies of the Combat Mission game engine.
In this case a result of a draw is fine. Keep in mind players completing this will often score a victory of some level. So yeah you can cease fire however long in, and as long as you suffer no casualties you'll at least get a draw. But the outcome of this is you have learned nothing regarding using SPWs, support and dismounts to conduct aa tactical recce. Thats the point of this mission.
Like I totally appreciate you posting comments and your excellent graphics but what i would ask is being cool regarding spoilers. Both post have given a potential player a heads up as to what is there. For some (many/most) this breaks the Fog of War and the immersion factor. Could I politely ask if you intend posting possible spoilers re a mission a/ create a separate post and b/ put the spoiler info behind a warning. that way players can choose whether they wish to read the post (and uncover spoilers) or leave alone till they play it. Like its brill to hear your thoughts and see your playthroughs so hope you continue doing that, just mind the possible spoiler bit please?
Many thanks

Lesson 2 SPW second scout mission battlepack
Beautiful map, excellent attention to detail. I played about 20 turns.
- They give you points for reaching objectives, and identifying units.
- I looked for good positions in hull down, with visibility between 800 and 1100 meters deep on the map. We did not locate any unit in those 20 minutes.
- I used an SPW to transport half a platoon as vehicle protection, and the engineering team to reach objectives. Another SPW giving covering fire so that he could break through the enemy line.
- I arrive at an objective, they discover me near the other, there are 40 minutes left, and there is no need to return to any exiting area.
- I press ceasefire and get a draw... I have the feeling that the quality of the map, and the objectives of the mission, are unbalanced...   🤔  Thanks and regards !

Hello, I would like to make some suggestions regardins the first scenario, Lesson 1 SPW scout. Sorry, but I don't know how to spoil it. SPOILER ALERT !
I would like to suggest the possibility of area fire in this scenario, from this higher position towards lower enemy positions, since, currently, the Soviet side sees you and can fire at you (even in hulldown), but the German side does not see them, or you can't make area fire on their positions. 
I think it would be nice to add this option, since the briefing instructions ask you to cross areas with ambushes, obstacles, and mines. Thanks and regards.

Do you guys sleep?  It must be a time zone thing.  First off the new Perun video dropped and it is also on the long war, haven't watched yet so FYI for now:
Second, I think it is a very good idea to look inside the adversaries head from time to time so well done to @LongLeftFlank for pulling all this.   First thing that struck me was how much of this are noted vulnerabilities of the Russians which tracks as a lot of propaganda plays on projection mechanisms. 
This whole assessment, on both sides, is really asking what is the calculus of attrition in this war.  The overarching theory in the mainstream is that "the war is costing the Russians a lot but they have much deeper pockets/UA is on the brink"  The theory being that in a long war, Ukraine will break and Russia will be able to achieve its original aims - some see this with fear, others with glee depending who you talk to.  The high-level idea is that if a nations power is drained faster than its opponent their ability to resist will crumble = "victory". 
The reality is that it is a lot more complicated than that....like macro-economics complicated.  So for arguments sake let's break out the Capt's national power model and do some comparison:
Strength:  Let's start here as it really is all most people tank about.  On paper, even if we accept Russian faults, failings and corruption, the Russian Federation is "stronger" than Ukraine.  It has much more manpower, its economic strength is still higher even given sanctions, its standing forces - even if we cut them in half - well outnumber the UA and Russia has a strategic weapons inventory to rival the US.  The hard power reality is that Russia could turn Ukraine to glass with a small fraction of its nuclear arsenal and could do a general mobilization that could threaten the entirety of Europe if it put it all in motion.  If this was a uni-dimensional model, we should all be asking why Russia "has not won yet?", and many are doing just that. But Strength is a slippery beast and not one that simply responds to the sound of its masters whistle....we will come back to that.
Relationships.  Oh my when you start to unpack this one the view on Russian superiority swings dramatically.  Ukraine has relationship superiority in just about any metric one wishes to measure.  Externally the disparity is obvious as we ship heavier weapons and billions in support to Ukraine, while Russia gets deeper into the desert of international isolation.  However, it is the internal relationships that are even more interesting.  Internally Ukraine is a lot stronger, again for obvious reasons; however, the moral and collective connections in Ukraine scream "unity", Ukrainians are willing to die for each other and are proving it everyday.  Russia is a bit more complicated.  The Russian domestic audience is clearly a factor here based on the lies its own government has had to tell them, which are getting progressively larger and stretched.  When it comes to narrative superiority, Russia is clearly struggling.  I am sure internal polls in Russia are showing 110% support to the war but the amount of crackdown effort and epic "alternative facts" building going on do not speak to a galvanized Russian population.  Lastly, this whole war crimes thing was literally the dumbest thing Russia could do (beyond being barbaric), as it has become a strategic turning point in the relationship space deeply in favor of Ukraine - hence the crazy lies of Ukrainian snipers coming from Russia...worst damage control scheme ever.  So score a solid win on Ukraine for this one.
Will.  No need to really get into this one too much because my assessment is that Ukrainian Will has increased over time while Russian Will has eroded, worse it is very fragile because it is largely coming from a single node - Putin.  Over time Will ebbs and flows, shaped by events/outcomes and factors such as Strength and Relationships - remember all war is negotiation with the future, so people use these factors to weigh their odds.  Ukrainian Will is incredibly high right now... I do not care if Russia get that big naked blue guy from the Watchmen to stride the battlefield zapping Ukrainians with his laser eyes; the second that happens Ukrainian defence will work on how to cut his toes off.  Ukraine is all in, like Taliban all in.  I see pictures of 12 year old with toys guns and that says to me that for Ukraine, killing Russians is becoming cultural, part of their identity - this is how global powers are born.  In 100 years when Ukraine is a major power in Europe and the globe our great grand-kids can point to this war as the start point.  So, again, a major win for Ukraine and this is really the one that matters.
Opportunity. I left this one for last because it links back into Russian Strength.  This is why Russian strength is not what it appears on paper.  Russia is lacking in a lot of the stuff it take to create the opportunity to bring its national power to bear.  Relationships, make its nuclear arsenal almost useless as any use immediately risks drawing in the western powers, who have much more Strength.  Nuclear weapons have enormous deterrence power but almost zero coercive power as once used whatever the aims were to justify their use become irrelevant.  Will is the other problem.  Russian will is not strong, or Putin could have ordered general mobilization by now and he has tried every trick but that.  Then even if he did the tyranny of the physics of this universe means it will take time to pull together that Strength to the point it is "Opportune", worse that time further erodes Russian Will and Strength as economic sanctions start to kick in.  Ukraine is the exact opposite the lights are almost all green on Opportunity.  It would really appreciate more and even for NATO to get directly involved but here we have Opportunity costs of our own to worry about...you can see how it gets complicated. 
So back to LLFs list.  Well the first three are all Strength-offset-by-Relationships.  Until the RA cuts off supply from the West or the will to support fails, there is nothing there that we cannot simply drive across the Polish border.  Russia completely failed Step 1 of Invading Another Country (it is a lecture package) - Isolate and as such there is nothing we cannot send to the Ukrainians on that list.  The last one "Capable Soldiers" is probably the one thing, aside from volunteers, we cannot provide but we can help Ukraine make them in Poland and send them back across the border with the equipment...and I will bet money that is happening right now.  
Finally, what is interesting about the Russian-list in the OP is what is missing.  What about Information?  The Russians are clearly not even thinking in terms of modern warfare because any list I would make up would have Ukraine is cut off and in the dark due to lack of information and then build some BS reasons/examples why.  But information superiority isn't even in their lexicon, let alone C4ISR.  The fact that Russia propaganda is all on Strength and mentions nothing about other dimensions of power that really matter tells me more about the Russian mindset than anything else...and it screams amateur hour. 
 

What you seem to be describing is a form of warfare free from most of the friction which Clausewitz described. You still have to deal with friendly friction, losses from movement, the physical time and act of movement, C2 breakdowns and misunderstandings. But the biggest form of friction is of course the fog of war. Without it, the main body could maneuver as you describe. 
Of course this requires a high level, nearing perfect & instantaneous, awareness of the battlefield AND a superior enough OODA loop to be able to produce action based off the information. Ukraine seems currently to posses this, and likely the US Army does (to some extent, we could debate endlessly how much) as well. Probably China does or soon will. But it seems to me the the stumbling block then regards ones ability to make decisions. Imagine, hypothetically, that Ukraine has perfect ISR and is totally aware of RA activities, and always with enough time to check them. Practically I'd guess this hypothetical isn't that far off of the truth. The defense against this situation would seem to be to develop a deception plan sophisticated enough so that when the enemy inevitably detects your movement, they are drawn either to the wrong conclusion OR into a dilemma from which there is no 'winning' response. To the first, a trick Iraqi tankers used (apparently to some effect) in '91 was to light barrels of oil on fire in the belly of knocked out vehicles. Eventually theyd heat up and glow on thermals, leading to a wasted engagements. The sensors worked, were accurate, and reported back proper information. Its just the information was inaccurate. On a strategic level the inflatable army of 1944 preformed a similar function. There was no way the Luftwaffe could know the photos were inaccurate, their sensors reported the proper information but the conclusions drawn from it were wrong.
Imagine if Russia had unleashed on D+1 a long horde of self driving metal plates which emitted radio signals like a tank, bounced off a tanks worth of Radar waves, maybe even looked like tanks from orbit. But were not tanks. The sensing information is not wrong, but without a single key piece of info (boots on the ground, which obviously Ukraine now has lots of) the analysis is incorrect. What you would need is a strong picture, developed pre war, of the enemy's ISR capabilities and emphasis. In addition to a plan to decoy and deceive them. 
Your point about the Navy is interesting, and probably true. Though there are some complicating factors. Most importantly the Navy has the possibility to solve this problem through the use a vast maneuver space and the ability to most easily amongst the branches wage strategic warfare. For example, much ink has been spilled over Chinese A2/AD capabilities in the South China Sea. The USN probably can no longer sail their in the event of war, and certainly not with CVBGs. Part of this is detection related, part of it is the ability to prosecute targets. But China has several centers of gravity outside the danger zone. For example, access to the worlds oil market. For China and much of East Asia this still runs through the Straight of Malacca. Deny China oil through Malacca, you attack their economy directly. It doesn't matter if the see you do it or not, as the Straight could be denied (thanks to air and submarine power) at a very significant distance. What we could be seeing then is a transition toward more strategically oriented more decisively planned warfare. You fight on Day One to control the center of gravity, wherever it may lie, rather than faff about with presidents and capitals and military forces. 
An interesting article in one of the old Makers of Modern Strategy editions by Michael Geyer. Its on Germany between the World Wars. It basically argues that the German Army after 1914 lost its sense of strategy. It didn't have a winning strategic vision, so it retreated into winning battles without worrying about strategy. Take Verdun. Win a battle at Verdun, inflict lots of casualties, and France will just miraculously collapse. Or 1918 in the Spring Offensive. Attack everywhere, win everywhere, and SOMEHOW the war will be over. This continue, Geyer argues, into WWII where the German army was often the best operational and tactical power of the war BUT never translated that into a strategic victory. In this case because the Nazi strategy and war goal was out of its mind. The point being though, in the west/NATO weve inherited a few of these bad habits. How do you win in Afghanistan? IDK just go win some battles and hope things work out. How do we win in Vietnam? Have you tried killing more people? The ISR pivot may mean that nations dont have months or years to figure out how to win, but rather have to do it in the course of one offensive. Deceive your enemy, gore them on the horns of a dilemma, push forward with decentralized forces, or bog down and get smashed. Ones expectation might now be to win while the whole world is watching (and shooting) rather than, as you say, hope that surprise (in the form of the fog of war) will catch them unawares. 
Here is your fun test of these ideas: Go in to CMBS. Increase the values for the detection range of UAVs as well as their ability to spot hidden units. Make them able to sense almost everything. Then fight a few battles, see what happens. 

I don't think tanks are an obsolete tool. The key is to use the best tool for the task while all other tools support it. Using mechanized forces with little infantry in crowded terrain makes no sense. Attacking or defending in open terrain with light infantry but little armored support is pointless. Attacking a fortified line with armor and infantry, but little artillery is also meaningless. The Russians aren't using their tanks the right way, and their units are over-armored because of the wrong infantry-to-tank ratio, but that doesn't make the tank a bad tool.

I 

Another vital issue, one that I see a lot, is what paradigm of war you choose as your model. If you assume a WWII European model, most of the 'turning points' were operational in nature. The Battle of Stalingrad was a huge affair, millions of men fought, immense casualties, across a space maybe 1000km2. The Battle of the Bulge, again a significant engagement fought over a vast tract of land involving major forces over the course of weeks. But tactically, what battle really matters? Was the action at Pavlov's House in Stalingrad really decisive? Or was it 'just another' in the grind? I think many of these operational scale games, both pro and not, just default to the WWII model. Or perhaps a WW2.5 model where the assumptions are the same but the sides have modern kit. I've been playing Compass Games' World War III, great reprint of a classic WWIII era operational scale wargame. But its just a WWII style game with some extra bells and whistles. The same assumption that tactical actions dont really matter and can safely be abstracted in the face of greater operational scale mechanical depth. 
I dont know what the best way to model WWIII is. Personally I think WWIII would have been won on either side by the action of a few brigades/regiments on a critical axis, landing it in the scale of a big CM campaign. But for something like the GWOT or this new conflict? Even for Vietnam? I think Steve your right. Tactical actions play a much more significant role on the outcome of a war than even any operational maneuver. How do you account for someone like Zvika Greengold or the Ghost of Kyiv (assuming he exists)? Modern technology and the much smaller overall force ratio makes these things far more likely to occur. A handful of fanatical diehards really can hold up an entire operational movement in ways that was much harder in WWII. Even Bastogne was held by most of a division of troops. 
Which suggests to me that modern gamers should increasingly be looking to reintegrate tactical and operational (and strategic) action into one overall simulation. IDK how you would do that, if I did I'd be selling it myself right now! But its an interesting question, and perhaps in another venue might open up debate again about what really decided a conflict like WWII. Tactics, Operations, and Strategy should be seen as an integrated whole, the greatest flaw with modern wargaming is that most games are very good, but only in one tier of this whole. 

I think we described this way back, I referred to it as the Nagasaki strategy.  A lot of problems with this:
- First, I am not sure it would work.  Say the tac nuke Mariupol and "demand surrender, or else".  Well I am not sure at this point if the UKR PM stood up and declared "unconditional surrender" that the Ukrainian people or the UA would even listen.  At best, Russia is now looking at a very long term resistance and occupation it cannot afford.
- Blow back from Ukraine may include asymmetric actions within Russia from domestic insurgency/mutiny that may be western backed.   Might work, might, not but even the Russian people have a breaking point and this might be near it.  It may also result in his military finally bucking or those in power deciding that their interests are better served with Putin in a hole in the ground. 
- It gives the West permission.  By using nuclear weapons Putin throws one of his last cards on western restraint.  I am not sure if it leads to a no-fly zone but it does create a forcing function for western leaning in.  I am not sure we have a red line in Ukraine but a tac nuke might just do it.  I know a lot of people are frustrated by the response from the West ("why aren't we doing X"), that is because the ultimate risks of where this might lead far outweigh any direct actions we might take.  A thermonuclear war with Russia is a civilization re-set event, hundreds of millions die immediately, billions on what follows. You can downplay it (it will never happen), or sidestep it (Russian capability is a lie) but the facts are the west will do everything it can to avoid that escalation...unless Russia moves first, then the calculus changes.  I am pretty sure that "first strike" options are out there and they won't be theoretical if Putin starts playing fast and loose with nuclear weapons.
- Zero chance of normalization with the west, may even alienate the Chinese.  Those sanctions will become a new Iron Curtain, which may happen anyway but China is not some rabid dog nation.  They are rational in their objectives and strategies, even if we disagree with them.  Dropping tactical nuclear weapons is so disruptive and bad for business that it may spoil China's game and they will draw back.
- Misunderstanding signals.  Lot of fingers on nuclear buttons right now and Putin knows it, because he started it.  A nuclear detonation in Ukraine could be how it all starts up, and by "it" I mean the real deal.  Putin has to be wondering what the US did with all that SDI technology over the last 30 years and if the nuclear deterrence equation doesn't have his back anymore.  He talks tough but that usually points to what he is really afraid of, so employment of nuclear weapons is a really big step.
So, no, the nuclear button is not the "easy button" by a long shot, or he already would have pushed it.
  

So I think we are at the point that we can call it, I think the Russian strategic Offensive Phase of this war is pretty much at an end.  We went from Quick War, to Siege/Grinding War, to what is looking more like Balkan War as Russian forces appear to be 1) pulling back and consolidating and, 2) trying to assert control in the areas they do "control".  This does not mean we won't see offensive action at the tactical scale, in fact I suspect the Russians will burn assets and troops trying to take Mariupole and any other hub they can; however, the big red sweeps are likely over, at least for now.
So what happens next?  Or maybe what could happen next? 
- Strategic Pause.  The Russians almost look like they are trying to conduct a strategic pause, which is in effect and attempt to re-mobilize within political constraints/restraints.  Stories of troops being pulled in from the east and weird "contracts" are a possible sign that Russia is trying for a major re-org/re-boot before they would likely double down on Plan A.  Given how badly they have been chewed up this theory is not too far out there.  If Russia goes this way, it means they think they can sustain the war for months into the summer and make another run at Putin's Dream.  They will need to re-stock a lot of equipment and ammunition so there should be signals in strategic Russian production and pulling out of war stocks.  On the pers side we might see some sort of rumors of a Russian version of "stop-loss" as they start playing fast and loose with military contracts.  I don't think Putin has the backing to go full national mobilization (or he would have likely already done it), so this will be "as much as we can and still be able to call this a 'special operation' nonsense".
- Grab, Hold, Bargain.  More likely, but not exclusive of the Strategic Pause theory is that Russians are going to try to dig in and hold onto as much leverage as they can in order to shore up their position at the negotiating table.  This will likely see lots of medieval stuff to terrorize the UKR government into concessions.  We saw exactly the same ploys in the Bosnian War with Sarajevo (and Mariupole is starting to look worse than that).  The question will be how long this takes but it cedes the pressure back onto the UKR government in a typical extortionist/domestic abusers argument of "it is your own fault that I have to beat you". 
- Last Gasp.  Another option, and one I know favored by Steve, is that this is the beginning of the end for the Russian military in Ukraine.  What we are seeing is a lot of "scrambling for success" a the lower levels so that they can say "we did our part" while the higher levels are no doubt thinking about "alternative options".  The test as whether this is collapse or simply digging in will be how well the Russians can hold up to inevitable UA counter attacks.
So Whats?
    First off the Russian military has an enormous defensive problem, entirely of their own making.  By my rough measurements, by attacking along 4-5 separate operational axis of advance in an attempt to take the whole eastern part of the country, they now have a frontage of roughly 1400km+ to try and "defend".  That is roughly three times as long as the entire Western Front in WW1.  To make any areas they control even close to airtight, they are going to need hundreds of thousands of troops to do it.  Troops I am not sure they have, nor can equip, let alone conduct C2 for at this point.  If Russia is serious about Grab, Hold Bargain, they may have to simply wholesale abandon some axis and gains likely in the East in order to be able to create credible defensives and pressures.  We do know the UA has troops all along those 1300km frontage, they are either regular, hybrid, or resistance/territorial defence.  They know the ground intimately and are continuing to see a steady flow of weapons in from the west.  How the UA counter-offensive goes will be key to determining the actual situation of Russian forces.
    Second, without making the areas they defend "airtight" they will continue to be plagued by attacks along their LOCs.  The Russians might try to make ironclad support corridors but given the ranges of the UKR weapons systems this is a huge undertaking of interlinked strong points just to get the supplies to some sort of front.  This will make the logistics problem worse.  That, and defence still puts a lot of strain on logistical systems, but in different ways.  Ammunition, not gas becomes the central issue.  Field defence stores and landmines take a lot of truck space, so we should be seeing more of that, along with of course artillery and other ammunition.  That and now Russia needs a lot more manpower, which all need a lot more pers-based supplies such as food, water, clothing, sanitation (unless you want General Disease getting into the game) and medical.
    Third, C4ISR in the defensive is a bit of a nightmare.  Whereas in the offence you can prioritize your main efforts, in the defence you have to be able to see and coordinate fires everywhere at the same time.  Doing that along a 1300km frontage is...well, simply insane but hey here we are.  The UA, did a pretty good job of it but it was their ground, they had the HUMINT going their way, and very likely buckets of ISR feeds from the west.  The Russian architecture has not demonstrated they are set up for this.  Further, this is contested airspace so one cannot simply dig in and sit, they are going to have to keep high value assets moving, like artillery, all the time or it will get tagged and hit quickly.  This will mean that Russians will need to employ a dynamic manoeuvre defence, much like the UA did, and I am not seeing that within the Russian repertoire.
    The UA counter-offensive will be key.  I suspect they will stick with the game that has carried them this far and simply cut up Russian rear areas to isolate and then chop up slices piecemeal to keep making gains.  Their hybrid "sharp mass" has been extremely effective in the defence, we will see how it does in the offense but I give them good odds to be honest.  
   If the Russians can do a full Strategic re-set, a big ask, then we could see a Round 2 Offensive Phase of this thing but the odds of it success get worse everyday as the UA "beginners" are becoming veterans very widely.  Further they are likely refining C4ISR building on their successes and more and more lethal aid is pouring in from the west.  If the Russians cannot get back up and moving before that $800M from the US shows up, well they too deserve what happens next.   
   To be honest, if someone tasked me with shooting for a Russian Strategic re-set, I would tell them it is going to take years because whatever they came with in this "come as you are war" was a failure and we are talking about deep military reforms and training in order to re-build a force that could actually pull off what the aspiration of this thing.  In fact you might need to invent a military that does not exist on this planet.  In '03 the US had to advance roughly 500kms to Bagdad and they owned the sky and the sea, had set operational pre-conditions, massive C4ISR overmatch, and have some of the best military logistical systems on the planet.  It took the US 3 weeks to take Bagdad and they were fighting a eroded and beaten Iraqi military that had zero outside support.  The US did not try a 4-5 axis grab along a 1300km frontage because the military planners knew it was impossible with what they had, which was 2-3 times what the Russians brought to this fight (466K, over 500k with allies).  And, politics completely aside, Iraq '03 was not well thought of and still is not well thought of in professional military circles as it failed to secure the gains and led to a multi-year insurgency.  
   So as we proceed on this journey, I am wracking my brain to make a list of the "Dumbest Wars in History" but this one has to be on it and moving upwards rapidly.
 
 

That was a great find @keas66, thank you! I think many concerns around where this conflict may be going are justified. I would like just to share a few thoughts of mine on this.
Today I had an online chat with a wargaming friend based on Seattle. As we were catching up, it became apparent to me that he was quite anxious and worried about the implicit threat posed by Putin declaring Russian nuclear forces to adopt a "higher" degree of readiness. He lives close to the water, across the huge US Navy shipyards in Puget Sound. An obvious target for an SS-25 Topol or worse. You don't need to "play" a bit with this little thing
https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/
to be worried.
That somebody implies a threat to start a nuclear war is something sure to attract attention and focus the minds. But to what end? Is he really going to trigger the end of the world (for Russia definitely would be the end of the world, and probably cripple our cities and economies for generations too)?
Now, let's say that you're leaving a bar in Long Beach late at night, walking to your car, and the another car stops and some dude walks out with a gun and puts it to your head (real story from a good friend from LA). Do you give them your wallet? Or you turn around, look into his eyes and dare him to shoot?
In the real world story, obviously my friend gave away the wallet. Did that make them a coward or a really smart person? I want to think it was smart because all the incentives were for that gunman to shoot at them if they weren't cooperative: there was no real possibility of retribution or "negative reward" if they were uncooperative and finished off.
Putin isn't even pulling out the gun, or putting it on top of the table, or anything like that, more like giving an order to "make sure that there are no birds roosting in the launchers, and every vehicle has their battery". Which given what we're seeing in Ukraine at the moment, it may already be a tall order.
He also doesn't know for sure how good the US anti-ballistic missile defence systems are. He doesn't know how effective the US and British SSBNs can be at making sure that him and anyone related to him would have a horrible death within 15 minutes of the first Russian ICBM taking off. What he knows is that if he started a nuclear war there would heaps of "negative reward" flowing the way of everyone, and first and foremost his people. Maybe he doesn't give a turd about his people, but I am pretty sure he gives one about his legacy. And what a great legacy would be to have all major cities in Russia become graveyards, and Siberia gingerly colonised by the Chinese in 30 years or so. Sure, you have also ruined Europe, the US and anybody else they're targeting, but not really a great legacy, by any reckoning.
Maybe he's a psychopath and doesn't give a damn about his legacy or anything or anyone else. Then we're already royally screwed guys, and we should all check out the NUKEMAP app to see where we should be relocating. Unless someone produces a time machine from their garage (John Kettler?) and goes pays a visit to Harry S. Truman to convince him to forget about the work at Lost Alamos, and give the go-ahead for Operation Olympic.
Let me consider another counterfactual, and a more serious one. Let's go back to 1938. And now let's imagine that the French and British tell Mr. Hitler to sod off, and he goes and launches a "special operation" on Czechoslovakia. Without straining credibility, let's consider that the 1938 Wehrmacht gets hopelessly bogged down trying to break through the Czech fortifications at the border (which were quite serious). Let's imagine those Panzer I and Panzer II being taken out by the same anti-tank rifles and guns from Brno that then armed the Nazi war machine early in World War 2. Would have the Third Reich then "escalated" and launched an attack on Poland (or France)? Nope. Can Czechoslovakia counterattack and go all the way to Berlin to force a German surrender? Nope.
I think we're right now at an scenario very much like the counterfactual above. The blatant difference with respect to 1938 is that Mr. Hitler's alter ego now has the means to "escalate" or to credibly threaten with escalation. But giving the appearance of having the means for an escalation doesn't mean that those means 1) are ready or 2) they are really willing to use them.
 

The rational discussion I've received has been for people to tell me I'm wrong, then tell me to read 275 pages of forum posts.
I work for a living. Give me a break.
Starlink.
Okay. What about all the other altitudes?
I do think the Russians had the plan to establish air superiority, they failed to do so. There were a ****load of cruise missile attacks on radar sites and AA positions early on, but the Ukrainians proliferate mobile systems just like the Russians do.
I don't think a complete absence of threat was ever in the cards, but being able to cruise around largely unmolested at the higher altitudes you mentioned is still a huge advantage, and the complete absence of UKR air power these days is a big disadvantage to the defenders.
Thank you.
Which makes me wonder one burning question, "Are they waiting for something else to happen first?"
I don't know, but it will be interesting to find out.
Honestly I think Putin is safe politically, unless the entire population rises up against him, but I don't see that happening yet.
Economic? Definitely. This does seem to have been a massive throw of the dice on a very shaky bet. HOWEVER: Nord Stream 1 and 2 are still pumping gas, aren't they? We'll see.
Militarily? Seems so. But like I said before, let me know when the UKR counterattack shapes up because I REALLY want to see how that plays out.
Yeah, but a lot of that is shaped by a media perspective. One thing is for sure, all the media and information we receive is dominated by Ukrainian sources. I'm not saying I don't believe them, but I do question things when it's this one-sided.
One thing is for sure, Ukraine isn't going to surrender, so once again it's up to Mr. Putin to throw in the towel.
What I don't get is that they really seem to have drank the kool-ade and not deployed their best stuff. Either they didn't think they needed it, or they're waiting. If they are waiting, why?
If it is a matter of them simply tripping and falling on their own faces, then Putin should trow in the towel, come to the table, and just take whatever we tell him because Russia's days as a power of any scale are well and truly over.
But for some reason, I just don't see that happening.
I don't side-step that at all, I said repeatedly and many times it's up to Mr. Putin to end things. Ukraine is obviously going to fight, so this war will last as long as Putin makes it last.
That is my point and it's directly in line with everything stated here, but let me know when Ukraine invades Russia, because that would be awesome.
Russian Nationalism being destroyed by the Neo Cossack. What a reversal of history that would make!
Admittedly that's just a fever dream and I have no doubt if Russia is kicked out of Ukraine terms will be set.
IF...
That assumes Russia isn't content to control 15% of the country.
That may have been the plan all along. Who can say? Putin isn't talking to CNN so we don't know.
As much as I enjoy that old forum game. I've been around here for a very long time.
I take your point though, all I was trying to do was post 'Wot I Think'. Y'all were free to ignore it.
I whole-heartedly agree, which is why I'm not casting dispersions, blame, guessing at motives, propagandizing, describing anyone as hitler, or screaming to high heaven about support for one side or the other.
I just want to know whats happening, why, and how things might turn out. I gave my best assessment according to the information I have received over the past few weeks, layered it atop an assessment of likely capability going forward into the future, and made my conclusion.
This war will go on until Putin throws in the towel. Period.
I say the best way to get there is to kick his dudes back across the border with their tails between their legs, and until that happens victory will be incomplete. There will be that lingering doubt on the other side about, "If we try it again it might work next time." The problem is the UKR dudes are going to have to do it themselves. I don't think there will be a no-fly zone established, I don't think NATO will get involved, and beyond sending money and weapons and few crazy redditors trying to join the foreign legion, Ukraine is in this by themselves. The real test is whether or not they can do it. They have the will to fight, but can they physically do it?
I don't know. We'll see.
Thanks for the conversation.

So I gotta start by asking: are you honestly engaging in a discussion here and want to explore ideas?  Because you are coming across as a guy whose mind is made up and no amount of rational discussion is going to matter.  I am honestly going to try here, you get exactly one shot based on your tone so far:
1 - Absolutely true, plans definitely do not survive contact, as old as warfare.  However, what is important is how fast one can re-plan and pivot.  In this the Russians have not demonstrated an ability to come up with a "new plan" and re-org to it.  They have had a pregnant pause which has allowed their opponent to organize/mobilize, arm up, dig in, dominate the narrative, and access billions in military support.  And then there is the quality of that initial plan.  Failing to establish some key operational pre-conditions (e.g. why does the internet still work for Ukraine?) is also not a very good sign. So let's see the quality of the second (or third) plan and then we might now better what is going on.
2 - You said "The Russians have taken losses, but they remain free to operate combat aircraft and helicopters over most of the country." That is not true, in fact it is very not true below about 10k feet.  The fact that Russian forces did not set the basic pre-condition of gaining air superiority is a demonstration of their problem, not Ukraine's.  Plenty of evidence of Ukrainian UAV strikes online to demonstrate that we really are in more of an airpower stalemate and that is bad for an invading force.
3 - The Russian Navy is definitely still a factor.  They have sea control and are hitting with missiles but 1) like everything else the Russians are doing, there appears little integration between naval, air and land power at this point and 2) the Russian amphibious capability is in serious question. If for the sole question, "why have they not used it yet?  that said sea control will likely not be decisive, nor has it been decisive so far.
4- Evidence of defeat (https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html), so that is coming up on 24 BTGs of tanks, look at the logistics vehicle, coming up on 485...that is bad.  But even if you refuse to believe this, then one has to ask "what losing looks like".  Over to you as you asked the question.  However, it is a layered issue.  Political defeat, military defeat, economic defeat - if we are talking military defeat, well then an inability to influence or shape negotiations in the direction of national interest is near the top for me.  And as we watch the bubble slide on the Russian side of the table, it is not looking good, but I will give you that the jury is still out. 
5- Well backwards, as on a map, is kind of a one dimensional view to be honest. The primary way Russia has "gone backwards" is in the will of the Ukrainian people.  This is not about terrain, it is about their willingness to fight.  I think if Russian had one a quick and fairly clean fight that will might have stayed relatively dormant; however, that "plan did not survive" and now the entire nation is galvanized in an existential fight...that is definitely "backwards" from a Russian perspective.  Economically, narrative and just about any other non-military metric you want to apply Russia has gone backwards severely and let's not even start on the diplomatic front as it has been a complete disaster.  But if you only want to measure ground, then I guess we have to see.
So we have discussed a lot on forces and comparisons.  Right now, conservative estimate is that UA and Russian manpower is pretty near parity in theatre.  Russia does have equipment advantage but it has failed to be able to really leverage that.  Why?  Well that is a million dollar question.  What we have seen is that Russian mass is not working, if it was that map would look a lot different.  I suspect it is either because the Russian war machine simply is not setup for this complexity and has fallen under its own weight, and the Ukrainians help them along with that.
You are correct on one point, this is coming down to Will.  The Russians can keep pouring men into this fight, even if they are dismounted and have no ammo or food but if they have the Will that is an option.  What you seem to be sidestepping is the other issue, the Ukrainian Will to fight.  They see this as existential and are acting as such, so that is a problem right there for the Russians, unless they want a decades old resistance blowing up in their face but frankly I can't even seeing them getting that far as that would mean the Russians actually have to control the entire country and not about 15% of it.  Until then arms and support will flow in from the west and Russians will bleed...but we will see who blinks first.
 Lemme just close with a very important point - this is not an internet argument that anyone can "win".  I know the reflex is there to play forum games and try to "out argue each other" but that is not what is happening here.  For the most part no one really has a full picture of that is going on so we are sharing information and trying to build the best picture we can.  So the usual internet argument games do not apply here.  If you have a different assessment based on information you have, present it and we can all get a better picture.  This is a real war and people are dying in droves, so I frankly do not care who is "right or wrong" on a given Thurs because the situation is too dynamic.  But if you honestly want to contribute then do so, but this is not a contest...it is a really violent and scary puzzle.  Finally, there are people posting here who are actually in range of all those guns so let's also try and keep that in mind.

🤣 I do wonder what universe some people live in.
 
They lost. Just have to remind you they lost. Okay? They lost. All right, let's move on.
 
So it's been about a month since this thread was started, and I think we have an answer to the question posed in the title. This is as hot as it's going to get. Whether or not Russia takes the entire country, or whether they are content to partition it is up to them to decide (but personally I'm leaning towards partitioning as a means of keeping them out of NATO), but a few things are clear now the situation has developed:
Ukraine cannot stop all of the Russian advances. They have had success with local counterattacks, and have stopped some advances temporarily, but Russian forces continue to advance in other areas. There have been 'operational pauses' but there have been no STOPS. The presence of western AT weapons and other lethal support extended to Ukraine by (he who shall not be named) (and others) has given them much more than the walkover they were expecting, but the Russian is tough and used to hardship, even those inflicted upon him by his own command structure. No supplies? No problem! Just steal food and gas from Ukrainian gas stations! People throwing molotov cocktails at you? No problem! Just tell them to go away or you will shoot them! The Russian is used to operating this way. Ukraine cannot control it's airspace. The Russians have taken losses, but they remain free to operate combat aircraft and helicopters over most of the country. Ukraine itself seems only capable of operating aircraft and helicopters in certain areas, and they cannot replace their losses without outside help. Very early in the invasion we heard reports of Ukrainian helicopters and aircraft attacking advancing Russian columns but those reports have died down, and the Russian wouldn't be parking a 40km long line of tanks, trucks, and other vehicles on the highway if there was any existing air threat. The Russian Navy has free access to the Black Sea, which means they can conduct fire support and amphibious operations anywhere they want to at any time. Ukraine has shown exactly zero capability to effect this outcome, although something makes me think there are still existing defenses in some areas., because the Russian has not operated as aggressively as I would think he could. The United States will do nothing but levy sanctions. The current leadership is incapable of doing anything else, an entire generation of people are now sick of foreign wars and interventions, and there will be no groundswell of support for intervention in Ukraine despite the froth mouthed rhetoric of people on twitter and reddit. The average American is more concerned about the crashing economy, inflation, the price of food and gas, and the fact we're currently stuck with a President and a Congress that doesn't seem capable of undoing the decisions that led to this outcome in the first place. I certainly am not running over to the recruitment center any more than I didn't for Afghanistan, or Iraq, or Syria, or Libya, etc. That's just me though, if you want to get your nuts up, and hop on a plane to Ukraine go right ahead. If you happen to meet a guy named Yuri Gavriluk tell him I said hi. Europe will do nothing more than levy sanctions. They rely too much on Russian oil and gas to make up shortfalls in their overall energy production, and they have long since allowed their defense spending to fall below the minimums set by NATO participation. They will need to increase funding, acquire new equipment, recruit and train  new troops, and then maybe a couple years from now consider intervention. Despite the fact (he who shall not be named) tried to call them out years ago for their lack of defense spending, insisting they 'pay their fair share' Europe at large just didn't care. Now the situation will most likely end before the EU is in a position to do anything about it. It really comes down to, how long does Russia want to keep this up, when they do call a stop, and what are going to be their terms for a ceasefire?
I'm only on page 12 right now but I doubt I'll see anything to refute any of this.

Well I guess we are coming to the "what happens next" discussions - which is a very good sign, as it likely means this thing is coming to a close; however, like every step of this thing...accept that we will probably be wrong, until we either are or are not.  
Ukraine
So let's assume this thing ends tomorrow.  What it gains or loses is not as important in the short term.  In the short term Ukraine will need to deal with a pretty significant risk of humanitarian crisis.  The good news is that this happened in the Spring and not the Fall, but you have millions of IDPs and refugees and highly damaged internal infrastructure.  Ensuring basic food, health and habitation security, is going to be a challenge.  Western aid will no doubt pour in but the Ukrainian government will have about 8 months to get basis services up and running enough that people can come home and re-start their lives. This will be the challenge of the next year through next winter.
In the mid-to-long term, Ukraine will have to undertake a pretty significant reconstruction effort to  1) recover/clean up all the remnants of war that are littered around their country right now, from landmines to UXOs. 2) re-build damaged infrastructure/economy back to pre-war levels, and then 3) move past that toward something more resilient in the event they are attacked again.  All this will all take time and a lot of money.  As a minimum the Ukrainian government will need to get the economy back on track looking at long term sustainment of whatever strategy they chose.
On military power in the long term, Ukraine does not need NATO to become secure - it is not an essential pre-condition.  Beyond various bi-lateral arrangements, the Ukrainians could go the way of Switzerland or Israel, who can manage on their own quite well.  They do not even need massive numbers, they played to qualitative strengths and will likely double down on that.  They will need a lot of support and funding but I think that will be a tap that is turned on for awhile yet.  They only need to keep the doubt of "A Second Ukrainian Disaster" in the minds of the Russian government, which should not be too hard for the next decade.  They will have to fend off numerous subversive and political warfare attacks, Puntin will likely try to go back to his A game so we can expect Cold War levels of this backfield stuff, along with all sorts of proxy actions, of which Ukraine will get caught up in.
I can see Ukraine being pulled into the EU or other Euro-centric mechanisms but it will always have to do so carefully.  As to re-normalization with Russia, not this generation, likely two or three before that happens, if ever.  Ukraine is likely to be westward facing for years to come.
Russia
Big unknown.  The Russian people have repeatedly demonstrated that it takes a lot to get them moving, revolution-wise.  I think if Russia can get out "clean" the current power structure will hold in the short term.  Players behind the throne are likely already planning for Putin's exit, when or how that will happen is anyone's guess.  What the next version of a Russian regime look like is also anyone's guess; however, we do know it will likely be a kleptocracy, xenophobic particularly to the west, and autocratic (with a veneer of democracy).  
I do not see full renormalization with Russia and the West for a long time, although we will likely keep buying their gas.  Russia broke the deal and as such will remain in isolation from a western perspective.  Further, any grey zone, political, subversive actions against the west are not going to met with the "hey they just tampered with our democratic processes...whacha goign to do?" shoulder shrugging.  Russia has shown itself to be a clear and present danger to global stability so we are very likely to see that isolation continue.  
In the longer term this will likely push Russia deeper into China's power sphere, as the world become more and more bi-polar.  Much like the relationship between the UK and the US, Russia will still cling onto the pomp and ceremony of an empire but China will own them.  This sets us all up for the real power struggle this century as the world decides who hold the pen in writing the global order...as the planet continues to heat up.  Some are calling it Cold War 2.0, others a gunfight in a phone booth, no idea but we need to be ready for both.
The West
NATO just got the boost it needed for the next 30 years.  Some will point out "Russia sucks" but the seal is already broken and collective defence will be on the menu as western public will likely demand it.  Whether or not the internal divisions that have plagued the western world are impacted by this remains to be seen.  Oddly it would have been "better" for western unity if Russia had succeeded.  Now with this, whatever-this-is, we might see some of the old divides resurface...which is dumb...because China.  The West (and here I mean largely western Europe and its scions in NA) has been ruling the planet really since the 19th century (giver or take) and the question of "is time up?" is forefront in almost every national strategic calculus. 
This thing in Ukraine is a western power bloc failure, it never should have happened, but it did.  We are going to be hand-wringing over this for years.  To say this has been a disruption, particularly coming on the heels of the largest pandemic in a century is an understatement.   I am not sure what that disruption means but there are a lot of potential outcomes and not a few of them are scary - "you better start believing in human singularities Mrs Robinson, cause you are in one".

Heard this multiple times here and elsewhere so I think it is time for us to have a Pause talk.  We pretty much know the Russians have pretty much halted operational level offensives and are stalled, that is all over the place and even mainstream media has picked it up.  So the theories on what is happening to the Russian forces now are roughly assembling around 3 possibilities:
- Stopped, cannot start so digging in for a long haul, which will see broad operational defensive operations with limited tactical offensive actions designed to terrorize the population.
- Stopped, will never re-start and are heading towards total collapse.
- Stopped, conducting an operational pause to consolidate/re-org before re-starting the massive offensive to surround major cities and begin the Russian Grind strategy. 
I am going to leave off the first two and focus on that third one.  A military war machine is a really big system built in layers, we do this for both C2/span of control and sustainment reasons.  Normally a modern military will lay itself out in echelons of some shape or size in depth, the Soviets had a really organized system for this, the Wests was a bit more fluid but we all are set up to fight in what are essentially structures waves since the Roman legions (somebody google the opening of the HBO Rome series and you can see it in action).
For arguments sake let's go with the rule of three and say the Russians are setup in three tactical layers (the West kind of does it as well with "2 up, 1 back and the last one as "Reserve", bit more of a pyramid scheme).  The first tactical layer will be given main objectives and then some stretch ones, unless they are using mission-command then it gets a bit more opportunistic, but the concept is the same; whistle blows first wave into the breach. 
That echelon/wave is expected to be able to fight for a certain period of time based on a lot of factors like attrition, distance, logistical consumption; however, the old rule is that in human based systems you can get about 72-96 hours of action (i.e. little to no sleep) before people start to break down ("beware the 5th day" by Moltke (I think)).  So that first wave can theoretically do up to 4 days of intense action before it needs to be relieved by the second wave.  This can change based on conditions but it is important to understand that it can get shorter but not longer because we are still fighting with human beings as the basis of the system.  So no matter how tough the guys might think they are, or how many chin ups they can do, after 4 days without sleep their brains start to shut down (trust me, been there and done it).
Then the second wave is supposed to conduct some sort of passage of lines and process continues for another 72-96, and then the third wave (if you have one).  While the second and third are doing their thing the first wave is supposed to be going through a tactical consolidation which include resupply/reinforcements/replacements and reorganization.  This is also when things like vehicle and weapons systems maintenance happens because vehicles will break down like people.
Now that whole system, which for arguments sake we can call the "operational system" is designed to be able to keep this up for weeks to months.  However after a certain amount of time all the losses and wear & tear start to add up and you need...wait for it...an operational pause.  [Aside: eventually, all these operational pauses add up and you see a strategic pause but that can take much longer].  This pause is basically an entire system overhaul to do all sorts of things that look like refitting a ship.  Replacements, rotations and re-organization of tactical units.  Planning and boring stuff like orders.  A lot of logistical and ISR scene setting for the next phase, and lastly...don't let your opponent know you are doing an operational pause until it is over.  So you will still see tactical action such as feints, tactical offensives but with short small gains - more jabs than actual punches - are often employed to try and make it hard for an opponent to figure out that you are in fact pausing...why?  We will come back to that.
Ok, so how does that apply to the current situation.  Let's accept that this is an operational pause for a moment and the big nasty Russian Bear is just cleaning the blood out of its fur before going back to ravaging Ukrainian bunnies.  Well first off it was not a planned pause, it happened too quickly.  Based on the big maps and overall tempo, it appears like the Russians were really advancing hard for the first 3-4 days.  We did see a likely echelon flip on the next 3-4 days as they pushed depth forward but by about day 10 of this thing everyone was starting to notice that the big red blotches on the map had stopped moving.  So let's give the Russian the benefit of the doubt and say they actually managed to use all three echelons effectively, well what likely did not happen was that 1st wave reloaded while waves 2 and 3 continued.  Remember formations are designed to be able to do this for weeks and out to months if the situation allows. So having the whole operational system come to a stop in 10 days is a very good indication that this was not in the plan.
10 days into this war was 5 March, a week and half ago.  Even the most uninformed journalist (and here I cast a baleful eye at our own CBC because it is harder to find a more uninformed bunch when it comes to warfare) is getting the drift that the Russians are not moving.  Now remember when I said "don't let your opponent know you are pausing"?  The reason for this is that you do not what them to try and grab the operational initiative, it is bad if they do because you are now on the defensive pretty much by definition.  Now if you plan for this, you can do all sorts of clever things like pull you opponent into over reaching etc, not sure I see a masterful design on the Russian side here.  But the UA has shown more offensive actions and c-attacks.  We have all been talking about a big UA operational strike, not sure if it will happen but the Russians are leaving the door open to one because of this pregnant operational pause. 
So to summarize, the Russian operational pause: 1) came much earlier than it should have, why?, 2) has lasted the length of an Old Testament reading in modern warfare timelines, and 3) is handing initiative over to their opponent.
So what?  Well if this is a Russian operational pause (at this rate, and with rumors of those other 40 BTGs it could be strategic) it is not a good one.  The conditions that led to that are very likely really poor pre-planning, ample evidence of that, and systemic failures that happened very quickly.  This speaks to a brittle operational system that they are having to almost re-tool from the ground up.  I have serious doubts that the Russians, who have lost some of their best troops, can come out of this as a new "super-force" able to mass joint effects and cut through the UA in days.  The types of planning and quality organization/preparations, from logistics to C4ISR, that a military force needs to do in order to pull off what the Russians are attempting takes years to prepare and build.
So if this is an operational pause, it is probably a master class in "how not to do this" and I doubt it will solve much for the Russian forces who are now coming up on two weeks of time they have given their opponent to prepare, supply and continue to hit them as they are pausing.

First step, sealing of urban centres and countryside.  Russia would have to commit it entire professional ground force (208k) and then call up reserves and do conscription to even look at sustaining it - we are talking about a country the size of France.  Also what do you do about the other nations you are trying to menace?  Harsh language? Because everything is now tied up In this operation without full mobilization, which creates enormous domestic resentment.  But you are all in.
Second step. You dig into firebases/FOBs whatever to try and control the ground.  This is setting yourself for continuous attrition, now with reserves and conscripts as your professional forces can only go so far.  Now you start taking a steady stream of dead and wounded with spikes and horror stories, compounded by you own troops war crimes and massacres (see: sustaining resolve of the west for the long term).  Because you never really break the will of the nation to fight and in reality you only control the FOBs and about 1000m from them and insurgency has got all the room.  Your LOCs are the stuff of nightmares, ambushes and captured troops.  Troop morale is a total mess and discipline will follow.
Step 3 - Go on the Offensive, search and destroy and all that good stuff.  Here you even have fewer troops as this is very dangerous and specialized work.  But you are all in, you got all the sigint firing, you are working humint and even doing nasty infiltration stuff (you do speak the language), you get some wins but this takes a very long time and for most of it especially early on you are coming up empty and losing people…and ever time you screw up you deepen resentment and resolve of locals to fight. You never get enough intel to really swing things your way.  You bag some insurgency leaders but it doesn’t seem to make a difference. You kill the #2 insurgency leader, 17 times.
Step 4- Wasteland.  Ok, so you give up search and destroy and go all Rolling Thunder, start breaking things.  Short of nukes this will take a mountain of ordinance and money you no longer have, and this whole time you are still bleeding.  By this time you might even start seeing terror tactics in Russia itself.  But you are now starving people, so mass migration for many, for others nothing left to lose.  You also cannot stop all supplies, these cities and countryside are just too big, so there will be a network of Selensky trails over the parts you control better and pretty much freedom of movement where you don’t.   
Ok, so you have spent let’s say 18 months now, entrenched in FOBs barely controlling your own LOCs, bleeding daily so some really big numbers start adding up, focused on a single operation so other nations are getting cocky, you are really going broke, you have not broken the will of the Ukrainian people or at least enough of them and somehow you have not had a domestic revolution.  So let’s add up the bill for what you would need to make this work:
- a new economic system because this semi capitalist one Russia currently has will not survive the plan.  Something insular and self contained.
- a completely new and huge internal security mechanism to keep domestics in line backed by even more military to back them up.
- an ideology that somehow glues it together to try and win the hearts and minds of your own people.
Well we have just re-invented the Afghan War and the communist system to try and sustain it…and it still failed. Except this time the Ukrainians have the entire western world onside backing them with weapons and support, no yellow jugs of homemade crap, no we are talking EFPs and next gen autonomous stuff.
You say the Ukrainians should not base a strategy on domestic Russian pressure, why not?  It worked very well for Vietnamese and Afghans (twice) and is the strategic centre of gravity for the Russians.  By the approach above you have elevated “killing Russians” as a new Ukrainian religion so their will is solid, the domestic home front is where it always fails in these messes.
The fundamental change in calculus that needs to be made here is that light fragmented forces that 1) are armed with some very advanced western equipment and munitions, 2) can sense, connect, communicate and synchronize in near real time and 3) is motivated, desperate or just really pissed off, are not “light or fragmented”, they are distributed warfighting mass resting on a foundation of home field support.  They can, and have, won in the long term without #1 and #2, they really only need #3.  And Russia would need to go full Genghis in order to try to shoot their way through that, which neither their own population or the west could tolerate.
 

This gentleman, and I am sure he is scholar, is absolutely correct...if this was a conventional war.  He is talking about a war long gone and the calculus makes no sense here.  Conventional Ukrainian forces in this sort of war are difficult to "cut off" at all because everywhere that they wind up, they are in friendly terrain.  So lets take that example up in that thread.  Say the Russians manage to pinch off from that fat bit on the Dnieper and link up at Horlivka trapping that "pocket".  By conventional metrics the Russians should be able to wait 72-96 hours and any Ukrainian force should be out of supply, cut of from C2 and ready to surrender, brilliant.  Very slow...damn near glacial, but nice and Soviet. 
[Aside if you look at CMCW Soviet Campaign, the Soviet MRR is supposed to cover 50km in about 48 hours.  This is straight out of the manual for a breakthrough battle scenario.  In the original plans the Soviets wanted to be on the Rhine in seven days so in game terms they had 5 days to go down past Frankfurt and capture Rhine crossings at the end of the Soviet Campaign.  That is a distance of about 200km.  The deepest penetration I can see for the Russians (wikipedia) is about 150km along two very narrow corridors and we are heading into day 8, they have stalled...calling it]
But!  This is already not a conventional war, the widescale arming of civilians and all those Molotovs was our first hint.  So if the Russians do create that southern pocket, they are looking at roughly 20000 sq kms of hostile civilian country that now have Ukrainian force integrated within them...and no air superiority.   The UA will have any and all gas it needs from the locals for a lot longer than 72 hours (not every town had a gas station in 1941) but eventually it will run out but not before it really messes thing up with what armor it keeps.  Further it is not like this has been Pear Harbor, the Ukrainians have stockpiled caches and planned for this exact fight.  So local support in the form of food and gas, ammo caches, medical support and recruits...and 20000 sq kms to hide in.  Further, the Russians seem incapable of shutting down internet (and with star link they might not be able to at all) so these now hybrid forces are not only connected back to HQ, they are connected to each other.  That is a nightmare occupation scenario if there ever was one.  
One can draw red lines on the map all day long but they are just that, lines.  They do not represent the actual situation on the ground by a long shot.  If one uses WW2 metrics, sure it looks bad but we are very far from that.  Finally this is in the south east in what was supposed to be a "soft" area from a support point of view, so it may actually work here if the locals opt out and start turning in UA, maybe.  Once you get west of the Dnieper, forget it.  You can pinch and encircle all you want but you are lying to yourself...you are the one who is encircled, unless you are willing to create camps and do mass evictions, which just makes your strategic situation worse (see: domestic support issues).
I have watched a few experts drawing lines like this was the Gulf War and unless the will of the Ukrainian people breaks on a massive scale (and there are no indications it will, in fact it has gone the other way), encirclement is a really bad idea as you now stretch out your forces along very long LOCs, surrounded by hostiles.   In fact this whole 5-6 prong attack was dumb, it looks like one of those "power point" ideas that the political level loves:
"We will hit them along all those axis and create a shock that will break their will", brilliant, clapping. 
Old Afghan Veteran "Wait a minute.  You want 5-6 axis of advance, all having about 100-200 kms of hostile territory to cover in...sorry did he say 72 hours?  And then we have to hold those LOCs, right?  Oh, sorry, of course they will surrender their cities and not engage in urban warfare so we won't need those LOCs for more than 72 hours...hmm.  And how long was the air campaign?  Oh, about 24 days...well that makes sen...oh, you said 24 hours...wow, that is a little light, no?  And of course we will hit them with cyber attacks to cripple their C2, comms/internet instead...huh...ok, but what about social media...oh, right the total surrender thing.  Well for something this ambitious we must be leading with our best shock troops...oh, 3rd echelon who we aren't going to even tell what is going on...ok....well, good luck with that."
In short, if the Russian government worked as hard on this operational plan as they have on trying to hide their money this thing might have really been over in 3 days.
 
 

Improvised protection against shaped charge weapon, often bed frames welded or otherwise affixed to the tank.

I think this is to simulates that recovered equipement maybe damaged. Sometimes you can recover it, sometimes not. It's aleatory. 
Link to IanL's post
Regards