Jump to content

ArgusEye

Members
  • Posts

    232
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Everything posted by ArgusEye

  1. There are many different projectiles, which ones do you want to know? By the way, as technical data goes, filler mass is one of the easier figures to find.
  2. I understand your point, but let me explain my doubt: When I take the data for the Püppchen from the FREotGA and plug it into my ballistics models, I get -even allowing for no obturation, incomplete combustion, and dialing energy loss due to gas escaping up as far as my model goes- gun-level pressures, extreme ranges of two kilometers, and point-blank ranges of 600m. That isn't right. The thing is not going to survive firing at those pressures. It would give muzzle velocities around 250 m/s. Nobody claims anything close to that. However, if I take a standard Ofenrohr projectile and run the same simulation, it burns half in, half outside the tube, with much lower pressures, and ends up with an extreme range of 710m and a point blank range of 236m. The muzzle velocity goes between 50 and 60 m/s, the top speed at 145 m/s. This sounds much closer to what is claimed. Can you see my reasons for being confused?
  3. Ripped off from Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 9, May 1944. 1. INTRODUCTION The cyclic rate of fire of the German MG 42 is 25 rounds per second. Most of the disadvantages, as well as the advantages, of the gun can be attributed to this single characteristic. As a result of the high rate of fire, the gun has a marked tendency to "throw off," so that its fire stays on the target for a much briefer time than does that of the MG 34, which can fire only 15 rounds per second. This section summarizes the German Army views as to the length of bursts to be used against hostile forces when the MG 42 is employed as a light machine gun or as a heavy machine gun. 2. AS A LIGHT MACHINE GUN The Germans are instructed to fire bursts of from 5 to 7 rounds when they employ the MG 42 as a light machine gun, since an operator cannot hold his gun on the target for a longer period. The gun must be re-aimed after each burst. To enable the bursts to fall in as rapid a succession as possible, the Germans try to cut the aiming time to a minimum. Under battle conditions the MG 42 can fire about 22 bursts per minute—that is, about 154 rounds. Under the same conditions, the MG 34 is capable only of about 15 bursts per minute, at a rate of 7 to 10 rounds per burst, totalling about 150 rounds. Thus the MG 42, used as a light machine gun, requires a slightly higher ammunition expenditure. Although the Germans believe that when the weapon is properly employed, the compactness and density of its fire pattern justify the higher expenditure, recent German Army orders have increasingly stressed the need of withholding machine-gun fire until the best possible effect is assured. Although the German defensive trick of "lying in wait" has been adopted partly to gain the tactical advantage of surprise, it also fits in with recent German efforts to conserve, not only ammunition, but all other matériel manufactured by the hard-pressed industries of the Reich and the occupied countries. 3. AS A HEAVY MACHINE GUN German soldiers are instructed that when the MG 42 is employed as a heavy machine gun, sustained fire must be avoided at all costs. The German Army has ruled that the results of sustained fire are disappointing and that the expenditure of ammunition involved is "intolerable." This, and the following German observations, do not apply, however, to fire placed on large targets at short range. The Germans believe that if the compact beaten zone of the MG 42 is on the target, a burst of 50 rounds should be effective. If the burst is not on the target, the Germans are instructed to re-aim the gun and, if necessary, to adjust the sights. The enemy considers it wrong to fire long bursts before fire for adjustment has been undertaken and observed. At a range of 2,000 yards, for example, the time of flight is 4.7 seconds. This means that the point of impact cannot satisfactorily be observed under 6 seconds. Six seconds of sustained fire results in an expenditure of 150 rounds. The German Army tells its soldiers that if they will wait to observe the point of impact in firing for adjustment, a burst of 50 rounds should then prove adequate. While U.S. soldiers have expressed a healthy respect for the MG 42's high rate of fire, they agree that the gun's dispersion is very small—so small in fact, that they have frequently been able to make successful dashes out of the field of fire.
  4. The Wiki shot shows a wire hanging from the back of the projectile. The Schreck used a wire, the Püppchen a cup with a percussion primer. Therefore that *is* a Schreck projectile. The other photos don't show a shorter projectile either, that is true. But all in all, there still is no explanation. Was the shorter projectile a fluke, a damaged specimen? Was there really difference in projectiles? Nobody references German papers, which is odd. I have not been able to find much at all. Another thing: when I start computing, I don't get to the same muzzle velocities that Wiki cum suis report. Is that because the Püppchen should be using a castrated projectile, or because people have been filling in the same data as for the Schreck because 'they're the same rocket'? I'm thoroughly confused here.
  5. You're right. Those pictures do show a shorter projectile for the Püppchen. I am not convinced yet, but this is getting really complicated. I'll try to find a German source, but so far I have not had any luck with that.
  6. I do apologize for the delay in answering. You have a talent for showing up with good finds, I appreciate it. The first one in particular is very useful - although it tempers my enthusiasm about my pet theory a bit. The second publication, in which there is a statement about the Püppchen firing a shorter round, refers to an intelligence bulletin where the Püppchen round looks to be damaged. I have not found any corroboration elsewhere of the rounds being shorter for the Püppchen. This publication is one where conclusions are [necessarily] drawn before thorough investigation can verify them. For now I remain suspicious. As for the Field Rocket Equipment ~~~, it gives little extra information, but both agrees and disagrees with the first publication above. I have the inclination to trust the 'German Explosive Ordnance' more, if only because their description sounds like it makes more sense.
  7. In cases like this I find it instructive to look through unit reports. How often don't we see 'the company was held up by a heavy machine gun until mortars could root them out'? Platoons suffer heavy casualties, companies are stopped dead, in Italy sometimes entire batallions get blocked by a single machine gun nest. And this is not limited to the Allies, either. Heavy machine guns were a force to be reckoned with. In commendations and to accompany medals, one often reads the heroics of a small team attacking machine gun nests. This was not considered trivial at all. The kill numbers I read seem to match more what a platoon in good cover would suffer whilst trying to stay down and finding a way around the MG nest, than a platoon sauntering over a billiard table toward the same.
  8. Good find! It seems that the warhead and rocket were identical, whereas the ignition means were different. Not compatible, but substantially the same projectile. The rocket seems well-balanced for fast launch. Does anyone know cross sections or drawings of them? They would be interesting to analyse. I suspect they were matched to the Püppchen to make a flat trajectory shot, like the RPG7 or similar modern weapons.
  9. For the leIG it was too long ago, I seem to remember lifting the data from an article about changes in propellant storage and composition in late '41 to make the propellant behave more reliably in extremely cold weather. For the sIG it came from Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 14, May 25, 1943 by the US Army. The Püppchen was popular with the troops, less so with the higher ups. It was meant to be an easily transported weapon, but it turned out to be tactically mobile, but strategically less so. The vulnerable rockets it ate in bulk and the fact it could not be towed properly made it more of a burden than its competitors. It's a funny device, somebody must have had a good time designing it.
  10. I'm not RockinHarry, but analyzing the trajectories for the leIG 18 yields a minimum charge highest elevation range of 492m, and the same for the sIG 33 the same yields 665m. The Püppchen was not recoilless. There was no backblast. It fired rockets, but the tube was closed. This allowed greater range and accuracy than with the Ofenrohr. It should be eminently suited for indoor use.
  11. The B-10 uses the ZhN-881 propellant charge, which is 821 gram of nitrocellulose/nitroglycerin. This amounts to 12-16 times the backblast of a PzF100, and to about 42-56 times the backblast of a PzF30k. Evidence all points toward firing recoilless weapons from indoors not being a big deal in reality. Not just anecdotal evidence, but full US Army studies. I am surprised this is still a contentious issue.
  12. True, but a truce was in effect, yet the bombing happened. That it was because of Luftwaffe incompetence doesn't make it any more right. Bombing of military installations [rather: bombing of random water and quay next to military installations] had been taking place earlier, but this was a mass firebombing raid on the residential center. There was nothing military about the raid. It was planned and executed as a terror attack on the populace. Recent research has come up with statements by Hitler to the effect that the bombing should be a reprisal, and should be carried out whether or not the Dutch capitulated.
  13. Very nice find. A lot of circumstantial information I didn't know. I just collected, fiddled with and fixed the things. It looks like he's only into collecting the German stuff. Selling off American stuff seems to meet with less buyers.
  14. Don't know about the one on Belgrade, but the one on Rotterdam was during a truce called by the Germans.
  15. That paints a very different picture. Great find!
  16. Hardly useless! That there are better devices around doesn't make them bad per se. When I make these comparisons, I try to point out the differences. I show what one can do, which the other can't. There is no use in listing the abundance of things they can both do. The Brit ones worked just fine, but the Russian, German and to some extent American ones were just outperforming them. As to the state of the devices: if they weren't at least decent, I wouldn't have made a comparison. True, old devices get degraded sometimes, but if you've been inspecting them you know what's right or wrong about them. A bunch of German sights and especially rangefinders are completely useless after years of decay eating away at their Canada balsam, and a lot of instruments made plenty use of glues and putties which disintegrate. But a trained eye can spot whether a failure is due to damage or due to design. You'll have to trust me or go and buy some collectors beers! On a scale like that, on a photo of that quality, on a target that well-lit, any of the effects I could see differences in would be obliterated. The difference is not whether or not you can see and aim at a man standing 50 meters away, the difference is whether you can spot that muzzle brake sticking out from the embankment 1500 meters away. Whether or not something was stolen from wherever (with simple inventions like this, it is always unclear whether they were stolen or just very obvious), this is a design of a system, a whole instrument, of which lenses are a component. The same system can perform very differently depending on the quality of its lenses, and therein lies the rub. Brit systems were no less advanced than its counterparts, although they were more finicky. They didn't have the range variable sights the Germans used, for instance, but that was a luxury the Krauts could afford because of their better glassware. If the Brits had wanted to, they were well able to implement the same. That they didn't probably had to do with the image degradation they would have had to cope with. John, thanks for the links. I work in the field of optics, so maybe I was expecting something more glass-groggy! I appreciate it.
  17. A very large proportion of Tiger B breakdowns (which also seems to have been a big problem for Tiger E and Panther) was due to final drive failures. The final drive is basically the part that takes place on and within the bolted-on bulge under the drive sprocket. These were heavy-duty reduction gearings. Another part of the final drive was the sprocket tooth ring, mounted on the sprocket wheel with bolts. Failure of the final drive -according to the Inspekteur der Panzertruppen- came mostly from wear of the reduction gearing, due in large part to substandard metal. This means that you don't have -per se- sudden unexpected failures due to overloading the drive, but tanks breaking down on long road marches when the gears get too worn or too hot. Operational failures more than tactical failures, if you will. The tank was engineered to allow relatively quick exchange of the drive in the field, so this can be said to be expected and 'accepted' behaviour. Having said this, I have read soldiers accounts of Tigers shearing off the teeth from their sprockets in sudden loads, like braking hard on a downslope. Whether this is true or not, that would be annoying on the battlefield if it happened - although it would be a quick thing to fix.
  18. The loading footage is an Ampulomet, the firing footage directly after is a gun, unfortunately. It would have been fun to see the thing shoot, but I've yet to see that.
  19. The Stielgranate 42 for the 15cm sIG 33 was meant as a more-or-less daisycutter weapon, to obliterate cover, mines or wire [and basically anything else]. The HC round was a normal projectile. The sIG 33 was never meant to go into combat against tanks, it was supposed to be held behind the lines. Of course, in practice it was sometimes moved up to the front lines for some direct fire (or, in France, dropped off a cliff onto a fortified position), but this was against doctrine. When you look at HE shells hitting tanks, you should first appreciate what incredibly tough stuff armour steel is. The stuff is hard but tough, and if you ever get the chance, try twisting or bending some of it. You'll see why it can keep stuff out. I once had the opportunity to play with it, and it bewildered me even though I'd seen the numbers involved. Mr. Backofen seems to have a pretty shrewd idea of hollow charge weapons indeed. It is still a field in active development, with two main directions: the Israeli and American military wanting greater perfection, and the rest of the world wanting more bang out of primitive weapons. I'd love to read these articles in ARMOR magazine you speak of. Even though I tried, I've failed to find a mother-of-all optics discussion thus far. I found some stuff, but it didn't go much in-depth. The Soviet Tsh-1~ series of gun sights is very similar to the German TZF-5 and earlier gun sights in optical construction. Mainly the mounting and housing are different. And, of course, the lens quality. Not that strange, since they stem from an era of Nazi-Commie design cooperation. I had only four gun sights myself, but if you collect weird stuff you come into contact with the real nuts who have complete collections, and I spent some time playing with those. There are a lot of parameters that define an optical system, and they all boil down to making a good image. If you keep that in mind, it's really simple to grade their quality. To give an example: From my house it's 2700 meters to a church belltower. I can see the clock with the naked eye, and I can read the time. If I use the Sherman M71G spotting telescope, I can easily read the time, and make out that the numbers are Roman numerals. Using the Soviet Tsh-16, I can see the numerals clearly and read them, together with the motto on the lower dial. With the German SflZ1a I can additionally see some brilliant white points on four locations of the dial, which turn out (on closer inspection) to be the mounting screws. But by day the difference is not greatly pronounced. When light fails, it becomes more important. I visited a collector who had more stuff, and that evening I pointed most of his collection at a road. The road was ~2000 meters away, partly obscured by trees and brush on the shoulder. The sun was down, twilight past, and the moon was three quarters and behind me. With a sight from a Semovente I couldn't even find the horizon. It was like the lens cap was on. With the British scope (from a Comet) I could find the horizon, but every time a car passed, there were a lot of internal reflections from the headlights, and I couldn't tell if it was a car coming from the left or from the right. The whole thing was a bit finicky, and one error could put it out of proper alignment, so maybe I could have gotten a better picture, but I severely doubt anything could have improved the parasitic reflections. I tried an American scope, which was better, but still only showed lights moving along a barely-perceptible horizon. A French sight (from an AT gun, not a tank though) was simple and it didn't magnify much, but it did show a vague car-shape behind every set of headlights, and you could make out if they were trucks or cars. The jump in quality when I then picked up a Tsh-15 was palpable, because I could make out the model of each car, and distinguish the trees separately, also when there was no car behind them. Then a TZF-5, which didn't show a lot more than the Tsh-15 had done, but it was easier on the eye due to more light let through, and one could actually distinguish the reticle against the dark background, which none of the others allowed. All of this boils down to differences in lens quality, no matter what magnification or field of view is made. Great lens quality makes clearer image. And if your life depends on you spotting whether or not a branch two kilometers away has a muzzle brake, you want a good picture.
  20. Comparing Tigers to other tanks' running numbers doesn't make a lot of sense anyway. Tigers were breakthrough tanks par excellence, and were meant to be stuck in the heart of the fighting. If they weren't getting beat up, they weren't being used. A Tiger wasn't just another type of tank doing tank business. There were StuGs supporting infantry, tanks to thrust through the weak points in the enemy lines, and the Tigers for when you were all out of weak points. And they were pretty good at it. Of course, this is all in principle. Application of the above principles was long gone when the Tiger B showed up. There were no longer integrated command structures making such task definitions possible, and the initiative needed was lost forever. Instead of being the tool for the short hard fights, they ended up being the only thing to throw against the enemy initiatives. A task they were singularly unsuited for.
  21. You're not going to get a door-sized hole from a PzF, but it will blow doors off their hinges. On stone walls you should expect a hole 30-50cm across. Perfect for sticking an SMG through.
  22. If you can find the address, I'd love it if you could PM me. Nice info on the runner numbers, by the way.
  23. A bog-standard TSh-16. It wasn't in good shape when I bought it, and I committed some archaeological heresy by fixing it. I never got it completely to spec, but I did get it back in more-or-less working order. I made some profit when I sold it. It was surprisingly good, especially because it looked so cheap and clunky. An expensive hobby, with very little pay-off. Luckily I could sell off most of my collection. I still have an M71G I can't sell off to anyone for the price I paid. Interesting that they thought it was the other way around in '44. I trust they were right somehow, but I'm trying to figure how. Maybe I got a good specimen? Maybe they got a bad one? Maybe the Sherman optics deteriorated with time?
×
×
  • Create New...