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kevinkin

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Posts posted by kevinkin

  1. Could be the core units ... 

     

    Not sure what is occurring but when I was trying campaign design it was tedious at first. I got the core forces, later battles, and script file to work together by starting one "test" battle at a time.  Make sure you follow the steps in the engine manual exactly. Try using the script file that is in the manual substituting your specific text to produce a small but working test campaign. I went so far as to rename scenarios as  "My First Little Battle" and "My Second Little Battle" to ensure I could compile and play a the campaign. Once you have a working script, save it, and do I lot of copy-paste as you flesh out the real campaign.

     

    Kevin

     

    PS I would back up all working script files :)

  2. Are the Russians the AI or player forces? Have you played the the two individual scenarios separately using scenario designer mode.

    to check for any issues? Also, compare the script line by line with one known to work. Let me know if you need another pair of eyes.

    B)

     

    Kevin

  3. After reading the thread again, lets go back to the notion of why writers call tank elements the "spear head". I think it's just because they are sexy. Once they define combined arms earlier in their book they expect the reader to remember the concepts. And TANK Warfare jumps off the shelf better than COMBINED ARMS warfare for sure. US Cavalry filled many roles. Mostly buzzing around outside the sectors where the Germans became fixed and subject to set-piece battle. I guess defining what a spear head is - is semantics - as long as the reader understands that all arms have a role in defeating a well equipped and determined enemy.

    Doubler's point is that the US went to war with sound doctrine. But realities forced battlefield improvisation and throwing the book away

    to reach the next hill by nightfall.  

     

    Kevin 

  4. Here are two passage from the link above which is well supported with end notes. One concept that is repeated often is "economy of force". Grow's quote above is understandable given the written doctrine at the time. But cavalry largely allowed other heavier formations to concentrate and provide their own spear heads.

     

    Kevin

     

    "Europe proved that when employed skillfully, and in circumstances that accounted for their characteristics, mechanized cavalry was more than capable of fulfilling all of the tactical missions of horse cavalry, and was not limited to just reconnaissance. In particular, mechanized cavalry proved very effective in the defense. It also demonstrated that it could provide flank and forward security, and execute attacks. Cavalry proved to be particularly well suited to fast paced, unstructured offensive operations required by pursuit. A variety of special missions, including control of civil populations and convoy escort, were also effectively executed. In its tactical capability, flexibility, and success, cavalry far exceeded the limited doctrinal view envisioned for it by the doctrine writers at Fort Riley, Kansas."

     

    "Post war analysis indicates some startling realities regarding the missions given to cavalry groups in the European theater during World War II. Reconnaissance, the mission originally envisioned for mechanized cavalry made up only 3% of cavalry group operations (as measured in number of days committed to combat). In contrast, defense, probably the mission for which mechanized cavalry was least well equipped and organized, was executed 33% of the time. The analysis also revealed that special operations (29%), offensive (10%), and security missions (25%) were also conducted more often than reconnaissance. In armored divisions the cavalry squadron performed reconnaissance missions only slightly more often (13%)."

  5. Update on victory points (175 in total) and % casualty thresholds:

     

    Objectives/Enemy causalities/ Friendly causalities 

     

    Soviet      100  / 50  (50%)   / 25 (50%)

    German   25  /  100 (50%)  /  50 (25%)

     

    Note the 100 to 25 difference in holding the rail yard. 

     

    Kevin

  6. Based on some interesting recent threads I have been experimenting with asymmetric victory conditions for the summer '44.

    The Soviets wanted ground and to kill Germans with minimizing their own causalities third on their to do list.

    The Germans, on the other hand, wanted to trade ground (at least tactically) and kill Soviets with minimizing casualties being

    high on their list. So for Terrain Objectives/Enemy causalities/ Friendly causalities here are the test ratios;

     

    Soviets: 125/50/25

    Germans: 25/50/125

     

    What this tends to produce is a tactical situation where the Germans move into ground around the object and "snipe" as the Soviets probe into a rail yard (the 125 points). Towards the end of the time limit, the German must decide to contest the rail yard or not. So this yields a fairly quiet battle by CM norms and I ask - is this boring to most?

     

    Kevin 

     

    PS: I have it set for 35 mins right now; Soviet T34s with riders vs, German armored recon supported by assault guns an off board mortars. 

  7. I took another look at  "Closing with the Enemy", Doubler and FM 17-36, Employment of Tank with Infantry. The US used Cavalry primarily as screening forces and not as breakthrough and exploitation forces as we find in the East. Sure there were exceptions like the pursuit from the Riviera to the Rhine. Or screening the Third's pivot into the Southern Bulge. Given that the US knew pretty much knew where the Germans were at the end of each day (i.e. fixed), and the broad front operational mandate, Cavalry assets were mainly used to gain intel and report. Not to punch or pass through tough resistanceCombat for them was mostly on the defense not at the point of attack.  US forward attachments contained considerable strength. They knew they would draw fire soon after jump off. So they led with either armored protection or disperse infantry depending of terrain. The Cavalry helped tie in the flanks of the ever moving formations at sunset. They spent a lot of time securing rear areas with their ability to cover a wide area. 
     
    Kevin
     
    PS  I am a great fan of light mobile forces and they play a large part in my wargame enjoyment. In the ETO there are two lesser known battles to note. The Peel marshes (defence) and in the South, Montrevel (overextended pursuit). 
  8. Started a test and wanted to report an early finding. The only combination that immobilized panthers was muddy ground conditions with muddy tiles on the map. Either alone had no effect on immobilization over 30 turns in this test of "Fast". Perhaps the settings alone have such a subtle effect that 30 turns did not produce immobilization. I did not know you need both to have big impact. 

     

    Kevin  

  9. Interesting thread. Yet another angle. Perhaps scenarios are too often set up in dry conditions. Dry it the default setting in the editor like clear skies during the day. The average movement capabilities of forces might be better simulated by setting wet conditions as discussed above. I know in central New Jersey it's drought  - dry as a bone. But have a day of rain and all cultivated terrain not in direct sunlight will stay wet for 24 to 48 hours, And its mid summer. As the ground drys, mud beneath the surface is difficult to recognize. So an over zealous group of drivers could head out into a field on a perfectly sunny day

    and opps. 

     

    Kevin

  10.  
    panzersaurkrautwerfer sort of started in jest where I was going. The tank weapon system is overemphasized in popular writings on WW2.
    Unless you are really into military doctrine, the reader might get the impression that the tank was the be-all-and-end all of ground warfare. Just mass enough tanks and drive where you want to go. The reader may not realize that without supporting arms used in cooperation, a tank attack becomes a pin pick above the tactical level. So when supporting arms are used in cooperation with tanks do tanks form the spread head? There is no harm in calling them that. The diamond head to the power drill. The power in this this analogy provided follow on troops and logistics en mass to produce an operational defeat. I think the terms tank warfare and tank spearheads are too simplistic however . Authors admonish the early war Soviets for their lack of using tanks in cooperation with all arms. But then tend to elevate the tank weapon system higher than they may intend too. So the phrase "300 tanks to spread head an attack" sounds like a position thing. But without support they become very negative operationally if they get cut off. 
    Tanks are sexy and will remain so think. 
     
    Kevin
  11. I noticed even in post cold war writings giving credit to combined arms doctrine when applied, authors seem to always

    refer to the use of tanks as the "spearhead" of the subject offensive. I just read this again in "Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 41-42". Are tanks so sexy that they still skew the writings of authors who seem to know better? If a spear's effectiveness is via its momentum into a target, why would artillery be any less of a spearhead? 

     

    Kevin 

  12. Perhaps check out Soviet Tactical Doctrine in WWII as part of the US Handbook of Military Forces compiled after the war. Also search for the operation "koltov corridor" and a Google book should be found on Soviet Forward detachments. Jason had a nice write up on these in a thread here back in the Spring. I bring up forward detachments since they are appropriate to simulate on the CM scale and I think operated in a manner consistent with Soviet thinking at regiment and higher levels. Here is that thread with post 21.

     

    http://community.battlefront.com/topic/119379-soviet-doctrine-in-ww2-1944/page-2?hl=jasonc

     

    Kevin

     

    PS I am sure the gang has any number of links as well. 

  13. Assuming the Soviets and attacking the Germans in some form of defensive positions (cover + concealment) what would be the force ratio? For years we have read 3 for the attacker to 1. But that does not mean raw troop numbers. In combined arms warfare it means firepower ratio ie lead given vs what is received over a certain space and time. And if we stick to a firepower ratios it is still critical to think in terms of a point of main effort and the destruction  any defense in depth at that point so the 2nd and subsequent waves don't have to cross open ground covered by automatic weapons. From the attacker's POV, the use of TRPs can model fires into the defense's depth. Local defensive counterattacks can restore the defense. But in '44, the Soviets had the resources and doctrine to poke too many holes in the dam. Spreading out your manpower on the attack must have the net effect on concentrating your firepower ratio vs the enemy. This is in part of the art of maneuver. 

     

    Kevin

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