Narses
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Posts posted by Narses
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The pre-1942 non-mobilization is a myth and the post-1942 production miracle is as well. What we know is that German production never actually got going in the same way that production did in the USA (much, much more quickly), the UK and the USSR. It never got going and it began to collapse in 1943.
It seems to be difficult to realize just how much better Japan did in WWII than Germany. With a much smaller industrial base, the Japanese managed to seize all the essential resources they needed and hold on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor. Germany never got its production going and was completely crushed and divided up. The comparison suggests the fantastic incompetence that it took to take a reasonably good industrial power and wreck it steadily from 1931 to 1945.
Uh, really ? "....Japan held on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor."
Wow! Lets see the US had totally throttled Japanese shipping and resources and food could not get into Japan. The US was in Okinawa !!!! They had lost most of their islands except the ones the US decided to bypass. They were nuked so the US could force surrender and not have to invade and then the US occupied the country and hanged the war criminals.
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The question is as given in the topic. Range of questions to consider:
1. Don't we need to throttle up before going to war? (Speer's reforms)
2. Who needs Roeder's big hulls, why don't we give all Kriegsmarine budget to Doenitz?
3. Why don't we have a strategic bomber yet, Mr. Goering?
4. Do we think our Luftwaffe pilots never die, don't we, Mr. Goering? (The issue of trained pilots pipeline for air superiority and CAS planes)
5. Let's imagine pesky Italians hadn't had their Balkan mess so we could have started USSR attack earlier, couldn't we?
6. Why do we need to waste resources on Tigers, Mouse etc. - let's keep it cheap (Stugs + PzKpfW III + PzKpfW IV + PzKpfW V).
7. Radars are force multipliers, aren't they?
8. If a wise guy suspects something we shall listen, shall we not? (Doenitz and Enigma bombes)
And so on and so on...
Whoever is interested - please keep emotions low and language gentlemanly
Why not just consider: Why declare war against the USA. That was the killer.
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Things are coming back to me as this discussion progresses, and one of them is that as the expansion got underway, a percentage of NCOs—who had been earmarked and trained earlier—were automatically promoted to officer rank.
Michael
Correct. In Millett & Murray's book, Military Effectiveness, Vol II, The Interwar Period, pg 245 it talks about the great expansion taking place with the Wehrmacht in the Nazi period and says, "... NCOs and reserve officers being constantly added to the active force as officers, ...".
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I did some research and found that in the peacetime WW1 German Army plt leaders were Lts. Of course the peace time 1914 army was only about 550,000 men (backed up by 6 million trained reserves of which 3 million were older men of the Landstrum).
By 1917 Gudmundsson in his book Stormtroop Tactics, pg 105, (pub 1989) says "By this time most platoon commanders were staff sergeants (Vizefeldwebel), temporary officers (Offizierstellvertreter or Feldwebelleutnants), or very junior 2nd Lts. Most companies were commanded by second Lts, while most battalions were commanded by captains." This statement comes from a page on the introduction of the German LMG in Dec 1916 so I believe he is saying around mid 1916 at least the plt leaders were mostly NCO's or "temporary" officers (NCO).
In the 1918 Germany Army Handbook published by the US it says these Offizierstellvertreter did not receive officer privaleges. I can guess but not sure exactly what that means.
Haven't gotten to the 1930's yet. So if true in VV1 and it was true in WW2 it seems they probably did it under the restrictions of Versailles in the 20's and 30's.
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@ narsis
do you think all these circumstances you listed up in your post are implemented by the programmers into this game ?
i cant beleave that
Well, BF gave you the answer. I would've said "I think so or else what is the point in selecting in QB or Editor the skill level of your units. Its very frustrating of course to watch your unit go to nervous and rattled but **** happens.
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for what someone have to leran aqbout how to use arcs ? i told you that this aslo works somnetimes and sometimes not, if you read my post in complete.
a "hold fire" button indeed makes everything much more confortable, then using features for different issues to help yourself out with other issues.
sure i can shoot into my knee, when i think i am to fast, but that is what i or you want to ?
You are so right - the arcs don't always work and the fausts or schresks will fire from too far away. Frankly, depending on the quality of your unit this is very reasonable. Under the stress of combat this will happen. Many inf units in Normandy were not yet fully trained (even in 17SS) and some of the static units had poorly motivated ethnic Ost troops or whole units of men over age 30 with various issues (medical, training, previously highly skilled and deferred, etc, etc).
However firing your personal weapons does not seem like combat stress to me. More likely the rattled troops would fire the anti tk weapon at too long a range and then try and get away or totally freeze and not fire. It might make more sense not to let them fire their pers weapons while they still have a antitk weapon and rockets to fire. Complicated writing that in the program perhaps.
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Just as an aside, do you think that the first of those videos is a modern re-enactment and the second a real one?
The quality of the first doesn't look very 1940's to me and the camera is surprisingly steady for someone who can actually see an enemy tank. The blast effect on the tank doesn't look right either.
Also in the first one the weapon is fired off the shoulder like the modern M72 is but the second video shows the firers holding it under their arm as I believe was the Wehrmacht doctrine.
?????
I note too the Belon Cooper Video shows a burning Panther from the famous Cologne Pershing video
Your thoughts seem correct especially on the holding of the faust. I note on the first video as you said the clean look. Also no other Germans anywhere in view. Many of the other videos are obviouly authentic like the GI firing one.
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Yes indeed Jason, but they never really tried again after that July attempt....nearly ten more months of bloody fighting before the end came.
No one in their right mind would've tried after July 20 !
There were several good attempts to kill Hitler. The best was the bomb placed on his plane that failed to go off. Then there was the officer wearing a strapped on bomb at a show of new uniforms that Hitler suddenly for no apparent reason decided at the last minute not to go to. And others........
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Rundstedt certainly had the best strategy. "Make peace you fools!"
Great response. Didn't the old gentleman also say something to the effect that he couldn't even change the guard outside his door without OKW (Fuehrer) permission.
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Documentation from where? Propaganda? My recollection is that, particularly the Panther, if you slewed fast you would be spending a week rebuilding the final drive. Fine for 'look how good the tanks you'll be fighting alongside' footage. Not so much when you're in action.
Personally, I'd not be surprised if rather lighter vehicles (as the pre ww2 examples would have been) have somewhat less trouble with their drives. It seems to be generally agreed that the drivetrain was one of the places that the kitties struggled, being underpowered and fragile.
I think you're right on the Panther. It was designed as a much lighter panzer. In Jan 42 the final determination was for a pz of 36 tons. It ended up on the A version (most common in Normandy I think) at nearly 45 tons. The final drive and numerous other components were mostly not redesigned to accomodate that weight (added armor). I would expect crews would be extremely careful even under threat.
I don't see the point of comparing a modern tank (ok a kanjagdpz) with the WW2 tanks. I have seen most of the then modern German armor while stationed in Germany in the early 60s thru late 1979. although not running under stress. They were designed in peacetime and Im sure they were not compromised in design as the Panther was under severe wartime pressures.
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Some really good points here. Yes, an active defense which was von Manstein's choice on the Eastern Front for which he was fired.
Rommel was wrong. A study of Italy would have shown the difficulty of destroying an Allied beach assault in the face of a huge naval and air advantage. Not just superiority but supremacy.
Probably nothing would've worked, certainly not von Schweppenburg idea for a major armor counterattack from units held deep inland and waiting to determine the Allied main thrust. The German units were no longer completely mobile. Yes tank strength was impressive and qualitatively very good but trucks and SPWs were lacking and could not move because of Allied air supremacy. And qualitatively the infantry was a mixed bag in 1944 with many units in France being restored from the East Front losses while the permanent units based in Franch were in many cases not well trained, equipped or mobile ( no transport and often in the static divisions no towing vehicles to reposition PAK's or artillery).
Perhaps instead of all that wasted concrete and rebar on the beach making impressive Wochenschau newsreels of the 14" guns a 100km deep successive defensive positions ala the Soviets at Kursk would've worked better along with small mobile all-arms brigades.
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You certainly have a point about Grofaz even in the summer of 41 you will recall he refused to release newly manufactured tanks in Germany for the panzer units fighting in Russia so he could build further new panzer divisions. Guderian had to plead for engines for his 2nd Pz Group and received 300 but actually needed more.
But after the bad winter of 41 the writing was on the wall. In order to make the 42 offensive in southern Russia effective the Wehrmacht had to strip the units of Center and North especially the armor in order to fit out the units in the south. The second pz bm of most pz divs in Center and North were withdrawn to South (actually Army Groups A and
.But another issue was Gofaz's strategic planning as you will certainly recall. The Barbarossa campaign was to be over in the fall of 1941 and Hitler's strategic planning had already put in place a reduction in army forces, ammunition and material (all which was felt by fall and winter) to switch Germany's industry to a build up of the other services (Luftwaffe and Navy).
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I didn't intend to compare German panzer production rates against the allies, which they could never achieve. What I was trying to point out was that the Germans maintained a reasonable production rate (for them) throughout the war. Due to the bombing, production became decentralized but still effective.
If you look at the OOB for "Wacht am Rhein" which was six months after the Normandy battles, most SS formations were completely reconstituted.
A failure of Strategic Bombing by the allies, or something else?
You are certainly right about panzer production in 1944.
My point is for a country attempting to conquer all of Europe and GB the panzer production (tanks, assault guns, SP guns) figures for 1939 thru 1941 are shocking ( roughly 247, 1643,3790, 6180). In fact the UK alone outproduced Germany through 1942. For 1943 and 44 you are correct, they are very respectable at 12,063 and 19,002. The figures are from The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Sept 1945.
Another factor was industrial capacity. Expansion was very difficult and workers were in short supply. Recall in 1943 Guderian as Inspector General of Armored Troops stepped in to stop the halt in production of the PzIV in favor of the Panther. Yes, he would've rather had the Panther but to stop production in PzIV plants to retool for the Panther would mean the loss of 4-6 mos production of Pz IV by industry's own projections - a loss the panzer divisions could not afford even for more Panthers. Hence the PzIV soldiered on.
Not sure I want to open a discussion on Strategic Bombing here but the SB Survey I quoted does say (pg 66) "Only a few sporadic attacks upon the panzer industry were made before August 1944." Most of those were RAF strikes: Oct 43 at Henschel ( only Tiger producer) at Kassel, April 44 on the ZF gear box factory and the Mayback engine plant, etc. This Survey calculates from interviews with the Germans that the attacks of 1944 cost a loss of about 2200 panzers.
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the subject is a bit complicated. while you can get US tank & SP losses up till the US definition of Normandy (e.g. anything starting with the break-out is not part of it -- so up to 20th August US loss reports), which is about 1200 IIRC, it's quite impossible to get the numbers for the other Allied armies and Germans.
if one would use the US definition, and blindly accept available loss reports of various sides, the German losses would be ridiculously low, around 500 tanks & SP. it's simply not credible and it's senseless regarding the true effect of Normandy battles on the German tank fleet (destruction of). likewise the British army losses for the period are not credible (obviously lagging).
my 3300 (IIRC) number was one based on the end of August or possibly even partly September (because some German and non-US allied reports for August or September simply do not exist, and they contain obvious lagging from the previous periods). it would also better fit my interests on evaluating the effects of the Normandy battles, as for example Falaise would be included, and the loss reports for various sides would match better. i strongly suspect Zetterling's number is based on similar time period and IIRC it was just some hundreds above my number (perhaps 3700, i can't remember).
anyway, the actual period chosen does not really change anything. Allies can lose thousands of tanks and it doesn't matter. no matter what sector the Germans would send their armor, they will never defeat the Allied armor arm in Normany.
I agree and almost didn't post those numbers. Claims of tank kills are even more suspect like bomber crews reports of fighters shot down.
One of the interesting things about several Allied examinations of German panzer losses in Normandy and France reflects the highest numbers, if I recall correctly (I think Zetterling for one quotes them), came from abandoned vehicles either destroyed or otherwise left by their crews - possibly a result of lack of fuel or breakdowns. Of course these kinds of losses happen when you don't control the battlefield and fall back. Then even minor damage or breakdowns can cause a loss that should not happen. So ion most cases the allies would be able to recover lightly damaged bu nonmobile armor.
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Once we are out of the bocage, yonder StuGs will shine like the stars they are at range.
Hilly semi-wooded terrain with long shots. The StuG is a bush until the Amis get the "flaming datum" of a Zippo going up. Then try to hit the thing at 800+ meters as it backs away to take up another position 200 meters even further down the line.
In any non-constricted defensive battle, I would choose a StuG/JPzIV over almost any turreted vehicle.
Probably why the Stug did so well on the Eastern Front where ranges were usually much longer. Another important advantage for the Stug was it had better sighting equipment from what I've read.
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I read that SS Armored formations in the East, namely Viking and Totenkopf were filling out their tank battalions with StuGs because of a shortage of actual tanks in 1943-44. Also SS formations were being transfered from East to West in anticipation of the invasion, and taking most of their tanks with them.
If you look at German tank production throughout the war, for the most part German industry maintained a reasonable production rate, even under air bombardment. So Waffen SS formations in the West did not initially suffer from lack of armor, they were really short of qualified infantry.
17 Pz Grd Div had a pz abteilung but it was only equipped with Stugs. It received only 3 PzIV Befehlswagen and no Stug or Marder replacements during Normandy. Both 9 and 10 SS Pz Div had some companies in their Panzer Rgt equipped with Stugs. 21 Pz Div had only Pz IV, no Panthers and some captured French tanks. 116 Pz Div had 76 Panthers and 86 Pz IV but received no replacements during the summer ( but the Pzjaeger Abt did receive 21 Jagdpanzer IV in July).
Actually panzer production was low compared to their enemies and was overwhelmed by Soviet and US production. Very roughly 50,000 each of Shermans and T34 (76 and 85) alon not even counting M10, 18, 36 and all the Sov SU types. Many pz divisions in Normandy didn't receive replacements for losses and/or had on hand less than authorized. Some of this was because the one thing Allied air supremacy did well was to tie-up, dislocate, hinder and slow down German rail movement.
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it's good to keep in mind that the Allies pushed 9000 tanks and SP TDs into Normandy.
it doesn't really matter what the Germans do, the Allies have all bases cowered (they lost 3000-4000 of the 9000 and it didn't even make a dent).
initially Germans concentrated armor on the sector because they wanted to split the Allies in two.
then they concentrate the armor on the sector where the Allies are putting up a fight.
they also expected Allies to breakthrough and exploit towards east-southeast and did not expect a breakout shouldering the sea at west.
--- offtopic warning ---
personally i think this Allied plan (hold Germans at east and breakout at west) is strange. if it's existence wasn't somewhat proven by wartime documents i would say it's absolutely ridiculous to claim someone would make a plan like that.
I have a report showing during June, July, August the US lost 895 tanks (all types) and the British/Canadians 1535. Cannot verify this but it would seem legit that the Brit/Can lost more faced as they were around Caen by the main German armor. I'm assumig these are total write-offs - maybe but report doesn't say.
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Only time I would take a pz iv over a stug is when I know I'm going to have to do a lot of fighting on the move. The turret is an advantage in some ways but it's also a liability. Going hull down in a pziv is usually just inviting a shot through the thin turret, put a stug hull down and its hard to hit and has a better chance of surviving frontal hits from 75's. Maybe its just a playstyle thing though, I am more of an overwatch and sniping guy when it comes to afvs.
According to German reports from Normandy and the Bocage areas the troops did not like the Stug as it was very difficult to use effectively they said in the Bocage - profile too low and without a turret it was difficult in that restriced area to bring the gun to bear. This was in Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2.
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Yes, but they grossly over- and under-estimated their capabilities. The Germans had ... twelve? panzer divisions in and around France. They were all different in terms of OoB and ToE.
Yep. Allied intelligence in 1944 was astonishingly good, but compared to what we know know they were fumbling around like a blind man in a locked room listening to white noise at 120dB.
Another issue is those "elite" divisions were in bad shape. France was used as the R&R location for East Front units. Only 21 Pz and 2 Pz were just about fully up to speed on personnel, training and equipment. For example 2SS Pz on 15 May was short 2000 trucks, all its authorized SPW (326) and 90 PzIV and 72 V's. By 1 June for this divison some things improved like receiving 235 SPW and having a few more panzers but still only 617 trucks.
1SS Pz was only transferred from the East Front in April 44 and like 2 SS was short of everythhing . On 1 June it had only 38 Panthers and 42 Iv's but did have 44 Stugs and over 1000 veterans were in Germany for training.
Even Fallschirmjaeger-Rgt 6 with a mostly veteran cadre had only 70 French truck of 50 different types !! But it did have 4000 men - a big rgt - but a bit weak in artillery.
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it the topic of the 17ss PGs, and the author of the thread seems to have a book on them.
do you by any chance know what recon assets the division had as of 10-11 june ?
The SS-Panzeraufklaerungs-Abteilung 17 was organized with 5 companies:
1 (PzSp), 2, 3, 4 (Aufkl), 5 (schw).
This unit started moving on 7 June and was past St Lo by 8 June.
Since this division did not seem to have SPW (250 or 251) haltracks and the Marders and Stugs were on flatcars as part of the PAK Abteilung I don't know what was in the 1st or 5th company of the Aufklaerungs Abteilung. But CMBN has a correct Aufklaerungs set of units.
It seems to me the 5th Co should have mortars or towed 7.5cm le.IG at least.
Hope this helps.
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But, in the initial stages of the campaign the Commonwealth units were pitched up against the most combat effective German units, at least on paper, why was this? Was it the Allied plan that they fought the armour (they had more effective AT capabilities with the 17lber, experience etc, were these factors, not realities but factors in the initial planning?), or did the German response just mean they were the poor sods who suffered the attentions of the majority of armour?
I do feel some on this forum are overly sensitive to any suggestion that 'their side' did less at any particular time during an operation and seem to forget it was a joint effort. Robust debate should not needlessly antagonise, but surely it should not have to have every statement qualified. If offence is given and there was no malicious intent a swift apology or clarification should be all that's needed before resuming the main thrust of the debate.
To repeat my earlier post the positioning of the invasion forces were done based on the location in England of the forces. Ike's Chief of Staff (Bedell Smith) is referenced as saying it was because the US Forces were in cantonment ares in southwestern England and thus in position to take the Cotentin area. This could not be changed given the huge size of the forces and material.
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Was it planned, or did it just pan out that the British, Canadian etc did most of the initial heavy work against the German armoured formations?
The British and Canadians took the left flank of the invasion - Gold, Juno, Sword - and the Americans the right flank - Utah, Omaha - simply because of organizationl reasons. When US forces arrived in England they were placed in southwestern England and that directed they should come in on the right (Cherbourg to St Lo). Any movement of the US to the east of England and the British/Canadians west would have create transportation chaos.
Monty was the invasion's ground cdr (21st Army Grp) and did anticipate having to secure his left flank around Caen ( Dempsey's Second Army) against heavy German armored counterattacks ( 47th Pz Korps and 1st SS Pz Korps) while his subordiante army cdr Bradley (First US Army) took the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg establishing ports and a logistical base for the Allied forces.
( Reference: Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'Este, pg 72 - Why the US was on the right flank, etc.)
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I truly enjoy this game and the great effort by Battlefront and yes, even akd. I realize that at this time in the games life the game and interface, problems, etc stand first.
When I get a great game like this (and thanks akd for all your hard work testing) I usually immediately start rereading about the events (and playing). When I relooked at 17th SS - one of the first large scale better units to engage (before 2ndSS Pz arrived) - I was amazed to see they had to no fausts and then saw the other problems so I thought I'd share. I choose the title as 17thSS thinking guys would realize it was about history not the game.
Thanks JasonC, yes 12, 15cm SP.
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This division which figures importantly versus the US and especially the US 101 Airborne Div mostly arrived near Carentan around 10 and 12 June 1944.
The unit history of this division by H. Stoeber pg 64 (Die Sturmflut und das Ende) claims the division had no Panzerfaeuste and only received that weapon in mid-July.
Another online site indicates it had many Germans from Romania serving.
In addition Zetterling in Normandy 1944 ( pgs 363- 369) shows the division's manpower and weapons and records that the unit while having a strength of over 17,000 men was very short of officers and noncoms (40%).
In addition, like many German units in France the 17th was critically short of trucks, prime movers and vehicles of all kinds. In a 15 May report it indicated it had only 257 trucks and towing vehicles this being short over 1600. It had no SPW (250 or 251).
Otherwise it was fairly well equipped with 42 Stugs and 12 Marders (on 1 June). It also had 44 2cm Flak guns and 7, 2 cm Flakvierling as well as 99, 8cm mortars and 12, 8.8cm Flak. It also had 22, 7.5cm Pak and 37 tubes of artillery in its arty rgt.
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Multymegaton ****storm :) Could the Germans win the war?
in Combat Mission Battle for Normandy
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Great a little bit of contested China. Kicked out of Burma, about to be totally beaten by the Soviets, no longer in the Philippines. In addition no navy and the entire country open to B29 strikes. Only islands controlled those we didn't care about.
Japan was starving, no oil was getting in, no coal from Manchuris. They were handing out bamboo sticks to the population to kill the invaders.
US subs, surface ships and aircraft sunk 2,534 ships of 8,897,393 tons. They had no merchant marine. Subs got 1178 ships of slightly over 5 million tons and another 214 naval craft of 578,000 tons.
Nukes were used to avoid US casualties and Japanese casualties and wind up the war. The point here is we could've done nothing but blockaded Japan in 1945 and waited for them to beg for peace after millions died of starvation. In addition we wanted our few still alive POW's back that hadn't been murdered already.