Dietrich

The implicit assumption in this discussion as regards uncons (especially uncon combatants rather than the psuedo-uniformed and somewhat-better-equipped fighters) seems to be that any given uncon fighter has little if any experience using his weapon (whether it's an AKM or an RPG-7). Compare that assumption with the facts about a not insignificant number of, for example, Taliban fighters and mujahideen in Afghanistan. They wear nothing resembling a uniform, and their weaponry varies one from the next, yet many of them have been fighting for longer than the Marines (and such) they face have been alive. Some have been fighting since before even the Soviets arrived. Taking this into consideration, an uncon fighter isn't necessarily a couldn't-hit-a-barn-door-with-a-shotgun-from-10-yards-away conscript. As such uncon fighters could vary in skill from the obvious Conscript all the way up to even Veteran, depending on the veteran-ness of the fighters which the scenario designer needs in the scenario. That said, and to submit my "final answer" in this discussion, I say: If you want hordes of uncons putting out gobs of unaimed ("suppressive") fire, make 'em Uncon Fighters with Conscript experience, vary their Motivation between Normal and Fanatic, and set their equipment to "poorly maintained".

Sounds like a plot device to me. I'd find it less implausible if the weapon used by the anti-immigrant whites was a bazooka (M1, M9, or even M20), i.e., an American-made weapon. Speaking of inaccurate but convincing technical stuff in movies and TV shows, has anyone ever seen a movie or TV show which depicted the view through binoculars accurately? (In other words, contrary to what one actually sees when looking through binoculars, in movies and such the view is depicted as being framed by a symmetrical Ven diagram, similar in silhouette to this http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Venn-diagram-AB.svg.)

In all my playing of CM:SF (I've had the game for about six months), I can count on one hand the number of times an armored vehicle of mine has taken a disabling hit to the engine. Many times an armored vehicle of mine has been "knocked out" by a hit which did not render inoperable any of the items on the damage tab, but someone pointed out that a vehicle can get knocked out even if the engine and tracks and none of the crew are WIA/KIA. Perhaps because it's relatively cheap and plentiful? I recently read (in a book while browing at Borders) that the RPG-7 can be used as "poor man's artillery" (evidently by firing at a steep angle) up to about 900 yards, though it would be perhaps even more inaccurate than in direct-fire mode. I suspect the relative ineffectiveness of the RPG-7 may have something to do with the velocity of the RPG itself. The RPG's muzzle velocity is about 110 meters per second. (For comparison, the also fin-stabilized AT4's muzzle velocity is 280 meters per second.) Also, according to Wikipedia, the RPG responds counter-intuitively to crosswinds:

I did not mean "the Japanese have a highly developed sense of shame because they started the PTO half of WW2". I meant that an acute sense of shame in intrinsic to their culture, and evidence of it can be found throughout their existence as a people. Ever wondered why Japanese have a reputation for suicide? (And no, I'm not referring to kamikaze-type attacks.) If an American high-school got Ds and Cs, he probably wouldn't sweat it. If a Japanese high-school student got Ds and Cs, he would be so overwhelmed with shame that he would quite possibly kill himself. Also, I did not mean to imply that the Japanese feel shame only about being defeated. But now that you mention it, what particular "unfortunate events of the past 8 years in the US of A" were you referring to?

Speaking of Audie Murphy, I recall reading an article in Military History magazine a few years ago about a certain American soldier (sorry, but I can't remember his name and the unit he was in and how many enemy soldiers he "accounted for") whose numerous exploits -- at least six instances of taking out machine-gun nests singlehandedly, inducing the surrender of entire enemy platoons, that sort of thing -- somehow failed to earn him the Medal of Honor. He was decorated, but many felt he had more than earned the Medal of Honor. Also, he met Audie Murphy at a reunion event a few years after the war and was disheartened that Murphy preferred to talk about his movie career than about soldierly experiences. I'll dig out that magazine and get back to y'all with specifics (name, birth place, unit, combat record, etc.).

Many Americans know and marvel at the Doolittle raid, at what a remarkable technical feat it was, and at the daring of pilots who pulled it off. But how many Americans know that 15 of the 16 B-25 crews involved crash-landed in or bailed out over eastern China (in accord with the raid's plan) and that the Japanese, in the course of searching for the crews (most of whom escaped to safety thanks to the Chinese), killed as many as 250,000 Chinese civilians? Compared with the little material damage the raid itself inflicted (on military and industrial targets in Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Nagoya, Kobe, and Osaka), seems to me that the Chinese suffered rather more. My research has indicated that only 1/8 of the German armed forces was ever deployed against the Allies in the West post D-Day. How many troops and tanks did the Americans and British and Commonwealth and such have in the West, and it still took them how many months to bust into Germany? Not to denigrate the courage and tactical achievements of Allied troops in the West, but whenever I read some battle during Normandy or the Battle of the Bulge described as "the toughest fighting of the war" or "the bloodiest battle of the war", I think to myself, "Try telling that to the defenders of Brest-Litovsk or the troops in the Velikiye Luki pocket." (Not that it's in any way comparable, but on the forum for a mod of a different WW2 game, a couple of the forum members -- both punks, admittedly -- were batting about heinously ignorant statements like "the Spitfire was a piece of junk" and "the only thing good about it was how cheap and easy to make it was". I pointed out to them -- to no avail, of course -- that saying such things to a British person would likely earn them a chewing out, if not worse. I also clarified that the Spitfire was quite a piece of genius engineering -- witness the leafspring-like construction of its shapely wing. )

Indeed -- a Hindui pantheon module would consist of upwards of 200,000 units.

In my understanding, the Japanese have a much more highly developed sense of shame than people from other regions (i.e., the West). In the case of Mr. Yamaguchi, I reckon it was a matter, not of ignoring him out of disdain or carelessness, but rather of the implicit shame. Being so roundly defeated -- how can one hope to prevail against an opponent that can destroy an entire city (or most of it) with a single bomb? -- would, I suppose, make them disclined to recognize reminders of that defeat.

When playing as Blue and taking fire from two or more RPGs, it seems to me too that the RPG-7 is plenty deadly against even Strykers (the Bradley, even without ERA, is evidently somewhat more survivable). Thirty-nine times out of forty, an RPG-7 hit on a Humvee is a matter of "good night, nurse" for all passengers. In my most recent experience playing a "Thunder Run" type of scenario (it was probably "Violet Road", though I can't quite remember), almost all my Humvees were knocked out -- rendering all inside WIA/KIA -- while "pause"-d so as to maneuver around other Humvees which had been knocked out. IIRC, the Uncons in that scenario were Combatants and thus had RPG-7s (rather than Fighters, who would have likely had RPG-29s). In a short series of tests with a Combatant RPG-7 team firing against (alternately) an M1126 Stryker and an M2 Bradley (without ERA) from the front and from 90 degrees to one side, I noticed that several times (I can't remember how many, so I can't report a percentage) the RPG failed to detonate, seeming to pass into the target vehicle. The rounds that did detonate caused or two casualties and inflicted light wounds on several others inside the vehicle, with hits to the side being a little bit more apt to cause casualties. Is the Humvee in CM:SF (regardless of armament) what most would call "up-armored"? You may have hit on the key to making scenarios with multiple uncon RPGs survivable for Blue. (Not that Blue doesn't have a not-all-that-hard enough time of it already. =P) In watching several shows (such as "Situational Critical"; I forget which channel) that have recreations of combat situations, I noticed that the actors they have playing uncons/Taliban/AQ/etc. almost never fire their AKs from the shoulder or otherwise look much like they're aiming. It seemed to me that this was "stacking the deck" (so to speak) of the dramatization in favor of the Blue forces. Red uncon forces would certainly benefit (and seem more realistic from the Blue perspective), were the AI able to execute this tactic. I can see how a Blue conventional versus Red unconventional scenario would be all the most interesting, at least tactically, if it were played H2H. Any ideas on how to set Experience and Motivation so that Red uncons are inclined to fire briefly then displace? This discussion has reminded me that I've considered making a " Humvee patrol ambushed by uncons who deluge them with fire for less than a minute and then disappear" but figured that the AI would make the uncons stand and fight till they either were WIA/KIA or were driven off by the amount of Blue return fire. A reasonable deduction. But if this inaccuracy-as-a-result-of-suppressive-fire were already modeled, wouldn't we be encoutering greater inaccuracy from RPGs, at least in MOUT situations where the fire from Blue is apt to be more concentrated?

There are plenty in documented instances in the past eight years or so (since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan) of uncons using mortars. In most instances, the type of uncons using said mortars were of the sort which (in my view) would be better simulated by Fighters in CM:SF than by Combatants. Also, in many cases only one mortar was used (sometimes two, depending on the size of the engagement) and they fired a relatively few 'bombs'.

To introduce a topic not yet discussed in this thread: What about snipers? Will a sniper unit actually be (unlike in CMx1) a two-man team of marksman and spotter? Will soldiers in sniper teams be coded to be prone when stationary more often than other infantry?

The MG34 could also use a 75-round double-drum magazine. The MG42 had an even higher rate of fire. Though it was typically fed from 50-round belts connected to make 250-round ones, even when the MG-Schütze was on the move, photographs show that it was also sometimes fitted with 50-round drums.

(Pardon the double post. Thread-editing time limit, you know.) Further testing with Normal Dude's Firing Range Infantry map revealed that with Army as well as USMC rifle squads given Target area-fire orders to 200m, riflemen fired either in single shots, two-round bursts, or three-round bursts. The shots of the two-round burst are close enough together to suggest that this is meant to simulate a "double tap", squeezing the trigger twice in quick succession with the selector set to semi-auto. That begs the question: Are double taps used beyond close range? (The squads in this test were firing on an area 200m away.) If no, I wonder why Blue riflemen firing patterns are coded thus.

If not realistic gun elevation overall, why not leave depression as is but impose realistic (or somewhat realistic) limitation on elevation? That way, hull-down wouldn't be made problematic, and firing at the upper floor of a building from the street below would be disallowed.

As regards the ROF of the small arms (including "medium" MGs) in CMSF, I've noticed a couple things which strike me as odd. IRL, both the M4 and the M16 fire semi-auto or in three-round bursts. Yet quite often I see (and hear) the M4 and the M16 fired in a way which seems to be neither clearly semi-auto nor burst fire. A common firing pattern is a single shot followed up almost immediately by two more, as if the soldier squeezed the trigger momentarily, then squeezed it again for just enough longer to fire two shots; it sounds like "bang, ba-bang". This implies that the soldier whose fire comes out thus has his weapon set to full auto and is just squeezing the trigger or squeezing and holding it just briefly. I've seen this incongruous-seeming firing pattern with Syrian AK-type weapons as well, though it is somewhat less incongruous with AK-type weapons, since generally such weapons fire semi-auto or full-auto.

I concur. I referred to the subplot of Luger-collecting in Band of Brothers because the search for a Luger was for the purpose of collecting rather than for the purpose of using it in combat. If by "effectively" you mean "as good as the gunner in a heavy machine-gun team", I would concur that no, a regular GI/Soldat would not be able to operate a "heavy" MG42 effectively. However, the situation I was thinking of was that the crew of an HMG becomes WIA/KIA, and a couple rifleman nearby hurry over to the MG and bring it back into action. The rifleman won't be able to provide accurate long-range fire like the weapon's original crew could, but they will be able to keep the MG in action and maintain fire on the enemy (assuming that the enemy is attacking and thus is getting closer, so that problems resultant from range become less and less). As for effectively operating the MG42 on a tripod for fire within 200m or so, check out this video -- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p111nO1jIh8. As you can see from the footage, elevation is adjusted by a small hand crank, while traverse is adjusted by slewing the mount horizontally. The reenactor (Kurt Suleski) is able to deliver fairly accurate fire out to 100-150m and to adjust aim quickly. The M2 really is a heavy machine gun. A more appropriate comparison would be to the M240. Besides, the basics of operating even such a large and powerful MG as the M2 are pretty much the same as the basics of operating a "medium" MG like the M240. It's reasonable to figure that a rifleman wouldn't get behind an M2 and take aim at targets 1200m away. If the M2's gunner were WIA/KIA, it would more likely be at much closer range; and at relatively close range a rifleman could, I reckon, use an M2 with enough effectiveness to make it worthwhile. Is that the point? I've been operating under the assumption that the point is not that any given weapon or vehicle can be re-crewed and operate as effectively as with its original crew, but that a de-crewed weapon can be re-crewed to keep it in action longer, albeit with not as much effectiveness as with its original crew. An M4- or M16-armed rifleman would be able to man a de-crewed M240 on a tripod mount and put it to reasonably effective use; but (I suppose) he wouldn't be able to deliver accurate fire at extreme range like an actual machine-gunner could.

Have you considered the possibility that I may well be this "no one" to whom you refer? German is often labelled "guttural". As someone who has studied both German and French, permit me to offer the viewpoint that German is no more guttural than French. German, however, has more definite consonants. But I don't discount the possibility that you are at least partially correct. I would have been more accurate to say: "I enjoy conversing in German and in Finnish with others [who also speak said languages]."

If an ATG were to be de-crewed but not actually destroyed, presumably the only troops available to re-crew it would be nearby infantrymen (riflemen as well as machine-gunners). Thus, it would be reasonable for there to be definite penalties in accuracy, rate of fire, etc., in using infantrymen to re-crew an ATG. In the German Army (I know rather less about the US Army or the Commonwealth armies), the Grenadier-Regiment TO&E included a company of infantry guns, which were manned by infantryman with special training, rather than actual artillerymen. I'm not sure, but this may have likewise applied to the ATGs (5cm/7.5cm) in the regiment's anti-tank company. Just because I live in northern California does not necessarily mean I am or am not Dutch. ("We may or may not be philosophers....") Actually, I'm a native Californian of North German ancestry via Michigan and Iowa, and I enjoy speaking German as well as Finnish. (I know virtually no Dutch.)

Hmmmm . . . a good point, Sergei. That hadn't occurred to me -- I guess because I'm not an infernally gamey player. Okay, fine. I see the reason(s) to not argue for vehicle crew swapping. What about re-crewing of "de-manned" HMGs? While a rifleman may not know how to operate an ATG, surely he would know how to make use of a tripod-mouted MG, right?

I understand your point(s) and agree. However, "fancying [if I understand you correctly] another tank to ride" or "get[ting] more chmeissers" is not what I am (or would be) arguing for. I concur that yes, a typical grunt or tank crewman is worried much more about his own survival than about snagging a snazzy piece of enemy weaponry (contrary to the impression Band of Brothers might give about the keenness of certain Airborne soldiers to acquire a Luger) or of climbing out of his tank (which would afford relative safety) and getting into another one. Consider this: If (while playing CM:Normandy) you were commanding a German infantry platoon defending against an attack by US Army infantry company and the MG42 gunner in one of your squads was wounded/killed, would you care or would you not care if a squadmate of his picked up the MG42 and put it back into action? Likewise, what if you were commanding an Airborne platoon in defense against a heavy German counterattack and the soldiers manning one of your few M1919s were wounded/killed -- would you care or would you not care if you could get that MG up and running again? In the vast majority of scenarios, having a crew get out of one tank and climb into another one would not afford any tactical advantage, unless the first crew's tank has been immobilized or suffered damage to its cannon. Besides, it's not like whenever a tank got immobilized, the crew climbed out and 'commandeered' the nearest friendly tank of the same type. This happened most often when the tank of a commanding officer (who in some instances was also an ace) suffered damage which affected mobility or "fightability".

In CM:SF -- and, I suppose, in the real world -- "hull-down" isn't necessarily what it seems to be...or what it's cracked up to be. In an optimal situation, at the top of a hill would be a steep-sided five-feet-tall berm which the tank could hunker down behind and have LOS/LOF to the opposite hill as well as to most of the valley below. In CM:SF, at least, the slope leading to any given crest is long enough and shallow enough that to have LOS/LOF to any area lower in elevation than perhaps an opposite crest, a tank must move far enough forward that its hull is exposed, thus making its position not actually hull-down. I actually think that the problems resultant from full modelling of gun elevation limitations would not be all that unrealistic. Is any given crest or hill suited to furnishing a hull-down position for a tank? I would say yes. To cite a particular tactical situation, the first few times I played "Crossroad at El Derjine", I moved my Abrams forward from cover into what I thought were hull-down positions so they could engage the onrushing Syrian MBTs and BMPs. Within 20 seconds of moving into "hull-down position", two of the Abrams took hits from AT-14s which penetrated the lower front hull and wounded/killed the drivers. The Abrams' orientation relative to the horizontal was not so steep as to expose the "ventral" armor, but in this case what I thought would be a tactical advantage was actually a disadvantage. (Taking an ATGM hit on the turret front would, I reckon, be at least slightly less dangerous than a hit to the lower hull.) Had the slope been steeper and had I moved my Abrams farther up the slope, their belly armor may have been exposed. I would also say that nose-up hull-down isn't really hull-down, since the hull is exposed. When the terrain makes it so that you don't have LOS/LOF to the enemy without the hull being exposed, then you just can't get hull-down. Better to avoid cresting the rise and go around to either find a spot which will afford actual hull-down or just flank the enemy. On a related note, is turret-down simulated? (I admit, I have not done any testing to see if this is already modelled in CM:SF.) Turret-down position would be handy for spotting before moving into hull-down position or otherwise exposing the tank; and such would provide even better protection against ATGMs, since the missle would be even more likely to hit the terrain in front of the tank.

"Direct lay"? Pardon my ignorance; I just haven't come across this term before. On-map indirect-firing IGs sounds good. =) Can you give us any more about the above-mentioned restrictions on on-map indirect fire? "Generally speaking" only actual FOs? Would an exception to this perhaps be a US Army company CO with radio C2 to battalion, a la Captain Winters in that one episode of Band of Brothers where his company runs into two companies of Waffen-SS and he gets on the radio and calls for artillery which decimates the Germans? (I'm not saying BoB is realistic or strictly historically accurate, but I figured company commanders could radio battalion for artillery support without an FO being necessarily present.)

Really? Good to hear. I've been hearing about that game for so long that I thought they had eventually given up on it. In assaulting the SdKfz 251/1 near the artillery battery, one of my GIs ran over the grenade he had thrown at the halftrack two seconds earlier. Ouch. Good point. Using the scenario in the demo as an example, would two understrength platoons of Shermans (six tanks) and a severely understrength company (five rifle squads and a single HQ squad with a 2nd lieutenant in command) be sent to attack a village defended by multiple AT guns (including 88s), a couple platoons of infantry, and at least two Panzer platoons counter attacking from different directions? Of course, if the US commander who ordered the attack didn't know about the strength of the German defending forces.... ToW and ToW2 seem best suited to scenarios including forces of at most a reinforced platoon per size. Any more than that, and it seems crowded, and the numbers of units becomes a bit hard to manage. I thought it was a bit odd that the Kar 98k's range was listed in ToW as 2000m. Sure, a Kar 98's bullet could hit something that far away, but even a crack sniper with a scope-fitted Kar 98k operating in optimal conditions (no wind, no incoming fire, etc.) would be something resembling lucky to actually hit his target beyond, say 1000m. In most cases, the range from sniper to target was more in the realm of 400-800m. Contrary to popular opinion (as far as I understand, anyway), sniping is not all about headshots at extremely long range.

All the more reason for me to continue refraining from using Javelins except against actual MBTs and in scenarios where I have no armor of my own. =P

To quote the rather ignored "CM:Normandy wonderings" thread I created last month: