Lethaface

Why Hamas doesn't use drones? Tsk, easy answer: they were all shot down by APS. Silly question.
Joke aside: Gaza is a small territory, and the IDF doesn't need to destroy Hamas tanks or pry Hamas soldiers out of their trenches. So Israel has no need for FPV drones. That means, that they could drown the whole necessary spectrum for FPV operation to make them inoperable without hurting themselves.
I guess Hamas knows that, and so they never tried.
Or: they tried, and the IDF easily triangulated the source and bombed the crap out of them. Thus, they learned.
OTOH, if there was a war with Lebanon or Syria, I guess we would see lots of them.

Yea thats not how this works
The issue is more the manufacturer has no incentive to send it to generate sales as theyre already coming and the governments dont because its new gear and we dont really sent much top of the line kit there

The IDF introduced trophy on a single btl. Evaluated it including active combat. rolled it out to an entire brigade and fought some more. Then rolled it out for every MBT and heavy APC.
We have germany and the us independently evaluate it aswell and decide to buy it with britain still evaluating.
It can currently deal with rpgs and atgms that are direct attack or overflying but not diving so currently no javelin interception. It also gives the origin of the detected projectile so a good chance that if you shoot at a such equipped vehicle youre going to catch return fire unless you ko it.
Defending against diving atgm should be quite possible with simply adding another radar panel + interceptor facing up but with those being so far only in use with western armies and maybe china there hasnt been any incentive to cover that angle.
It should in principle also be possible to get it to shoot down FPVs by adjusting its code. Now I wouldnt rely on it alone as the debris from intercepted drones can still damage the radars so if youre getting attacked 10 times you might intercept the first 5 but then youre probably done. But as a layer in the defense it can do quite a bit.
 
Yea i dont fundamentally disagree with this assessment. The question is what exactly needs to change in technology and doctrine.

This is really a big part of the problem here...some people think that war is fair.  This has to be a young person thing.  A product of 30 years of Great Peace.  War is never "fair".  "Fair" f#cks off once a real war starts. One could call the entire exercise of warfare as the Great and Horrible Symphony of the Unfair.
Should war be fair and equitable...absolutely.  Has it ever been...nope.  Will it ever be...nope.
 

Timely paper from RUSI by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds
Tactical Lessons from Israel Defense Forces Operations in Gaza, 2023
The sporadic anti-tank guided missile and persistent RPG threat – often manifesting from a 30–50-m distance from IDF vehicles – posed a challenge for active protection systems (APS). Where APS had either been turned off, did not have a sufficient line of sight between the sensor and the threat, or had already been expended, hits were achieved on IDF vehicles. Nevertheless, while Hamas believed that APS could be defeated with close engagements, this problem was resolved through software updates. In most cases, APS proved effective, although the distance between armour and infantry for APS to be fielded safely also offered Hamas fighters the opportunity to come in extremely close proximity to some vehicles. Nevertheless, it was found that having pairs of vehicles operate in intimate support helped to increase their survivability, as the APS could often overlap and thereby increase the magazine depth to protect the vehicles.

You know this is a fair point.  However, the scale of conflict is not even close and that has to count for something as well. The IDF is fighting a terrorist/insurgency.  It has done so for a long time, however by definition the intensity is much lower.  Ukraine is in the largest conventional peer war since Iran-Iraq, and the largest in Europe since WW2.  One has to accept the sample data is reflecting reality. The UA has put hundreds of thousands of FPVs into the field. Proportional to their field use we are probably seeing a small fraction on social media.  The IDF may be more restrictive, but Hamas and Hezbollah are not, neither are civilians so other data sources exist.
It is simply not credible to try and equate the use of Trophy to the use of FPVs (which was the crux of the situation) based on video evidence.  Or to suggest that the IDF is suppressing the effectiveness of a defensive system to such a degree that we are somehow not able to really understand its potential. The reality is the system has seen use, in a low intensity war. The reality of the unmanned space in Ukraine is a mountain of evidence from both sides, including an entire operational phase last winter.  To point to Trophy and selectively declare it a wide scale success, while saying “hey wait a minute” on FPV use in Ukraine is inconsistent and disingenuous.

I am sure the big space powers (US, China) can shoot down satellites all day, possibly even faster than they can be replaced. The issue is that debris cloud starts to destroy everyone else's satellites too so they will be really upsetting their allies if they do it. Even China needs to consider what the EU would think if they accidentally destroyed a bunch of European sats in a Pacific war. 
So by the time you are destroying satellites it is effectively WW3. 

The math supports that Ukraine has moved from a traditional (and heavily soviet influenced) artillery-based doctrine to a drone based special delivery doctrine.   Largely because they quite literally used up all the 152 west of the Russian border and most the 155 that anybody was willing to spare.  
They're replacing it with plans to build at least 1M drones in 2024.  While few of the drones have more explosive power than an RPG7 or maybe four M77 bomblets, the precision of delivery makes up for it.
Some statistics that showed up some large number of pages ago suggested that it takes fewer than 10 drones (and likely fewer than 5) to produce 1 russian casualty.  And the drone drivers get more and more experienced because they're at much lower risk than if they were in a trench at the front edge, or even crewing a gun that needs a clear path to shoot.  
So at 100K drones/month, and an efficiency somewhere between 2 and 10 drones/casualty, they can inflict somewhere between 10K and 50K casualties/month on Russia. Even at the low end, drones are causing a significant number of russian casualties.  It's also consistent with the transition we've been seeing of fewer Ukrainians in trenches defending against assaults, or clearing russians out of trenches, and more Russians getting blown up in convoys in drone attacks far from the front lines.  If drones were costly to Ukraine, we wouldn't be seeing lots of videos of drones chasing individuals.  Or a drone being used to destroy a single abandoned PKM.  Or sent as self propelled grenades to clear out blind holes in trenches.
They have a *way* smaller logistical tail than a similar amount of combat power in artillery, tanks, or aircraft.  A suitcase full of drones that weighs less than a single 155 shell (not including propellant) has combat power comparable to somewhere between 10 and 50 conventional 155 shells.  And the drones just need to travel with a battery charger and some coax to run their antenna far away, rather than an M777 and a truck load of propellant bags.
Until someone comes up with effective counter drone and gets it into the field, drones are going to continue to make traditional maneuver elements obsolete at a rapid rate.
 

Like the Sherman in WW2 it was lighter and cheaper and there were a lot more of them. Nowadays tanks require a very skilled crew to man them and attrition warfare with them is not an option. Cheaper and lighter with no crew is the option I think. 

Initially I thought this was close interception and the building was hit by fragments of the missile. But on next day I've seen this video with this strike. There wasn't interception. This was deliberate strike by Kh-101/Kalibr. What they targeted there? Open subway line? But no. They targeted this area of small clinics and offices.
I've visited a doctor in the small clinic in neighbour building. I went off for 20 minutes before the strike from there. I watied city train in 1 km from there, heard air raid alarm sound (1,5 hours already passed after morning heavy strike) and since 3-4 minutes loud explosion. Before this I read Russian UAV was spotted over northern part of the city and thought this was a missile launch on UAV. But it was a strike. In this clinic "Adonis" were killed 7 people - 5 medics and 2 visitors. Probably somebody was killed or injured on the street - there are many open caffees there.  
Before I've seen this video, I thought Russian strike on Okhmadyt happened because of missile flight programm mistake with coordinates - the building of Infrstructure and Transport Ministry is in 100-150 m from the clinic and was a suitable target, espacially since the missile hit the place on clinic territory almost closest to ministry building, destroying a part of 2-storey building of toxicologic department and unique oncohematologiuacal labioratory for kids treatment, though could hit one of several main clinic buildings.
But after the video on strike on Adonis clinic and what happened on next day - I am sure this were deliberate sanctioned attacks which had to cause not only some victims, but heavily strike on public opinion. And yes - suddenly dozens of our insta-bloggers, with huge auditoiry (in hundred thousands and millions of subscribers) like on command became to post "We need a peace for any coast! We must stop this war immediately! Peace will be our true victory! Enough childen's deaths! Ukraine hasn't a chance to win this war! Our corrupted authorities led us to Paraguay war scenario to last Ukrianian!" (I bet these stupid luxury blondies even don't know where is this Paraguay and about which war they write)
Simultainously army of anonimous bots and MAGA idiots had started a message "Ukraine hit own children hospital with AA-missile and blames Russia!" 
Yes, Russians now more skilled in huge-scale information campaigmns, than in war on the ground.  

Two additional screenshots showing the terrain and conditions of the upcoming battlefield. Starting soon on the last mission of the campaign and after tweaking I will be ready for some testers to give it a run through if interested.
 
http://www.mediafire.com/folder/a0sq5mftz8y05i8,8fwcc22ry8jy4v3/shared

Couple of new screenshots from the first 3 missions in the campaign. Reworked the master map some, added new tagged mods, doctored flavor objects and map details.
 
http://www.mediafire.com/folder/qk1u3d5ep9073a9,aal4cg7enc8hk0w,97s2ypm5d7b26b7,28thsxiys6btx0m,8ifjgqfta1pev1q/shared

FWIW a while ago I also tested Oplot-M against 152mm guided and 203mm artillery and its basically not impressed by direct hits. Some subsystem degradation after multiple hits, bit like hitting it with a HMG ;-). I was able to KO one after like 6 direct hits. 

I know there has been talk of this but I am skeptical about the American protest being the real reason the Ukrainians dropped their Patriot roving battery stunt. They were also hit by an Iskander strike when displacing and lost at least 2 launchers, possibly the radar as well. I suspected that might have been the more important motive.

But why.
A tank makes things go boom.
There now many things that go boom which are not as heavy.
Passive armor cannot keep up with the things that penetrate it.
This is just a continuation of a very long historic development that was protracted by the emergence of engines.
It was first abandoned by the people with 2 feet power. Later by people with 1 horsepower. And it will be abandoned by people with 1.000 horsepower as well, and pretty much for the same reasons as their predecessors. 
Their replacements will be smaller, cheaper, lighter, but more numerous.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/09/joint-statement-on-strengthening-ukraines-air-defenses-by-u-s-president-joseph-r-biden-dutch-prime-minister-dick-schoof-german-chancellor-olaf-scholz-italian-prime-minister-giorgia-melon/
 
 

I have been busy so only able to partly lurk the updates overhere and elsewhere. I have an observation on the whole tank is dead topic (linked to the infantry screening, density and Russia's CA capability assessments) which I felt like sharing.
Not to light a fire under it again, but imo there are separate area's of interest which keep continuing to mingle in discussions. 
A) One has a perspective of analysis in order to explain the current war and how things happened the way they did -afterthoughts and analysis which will continue for a couple of decades when more info becomes available.
B - Another has a perspective of 'where to go next' and how to get there (policy and vision development, incl doctrine & procurement). Lets call it future strategy.
C) The last perspective is operational as in what to do with what we have now / are doing at the moment? Do you throw all tanks in the bin and send the crew home, replacing them with what exactly?
This is perhaps not a complete or completely accurate list, but the answer to 'the tank is dead' isn't going to answer any of the problems in those area's of interest. A) doesn't decide that. And while A B and C should ideally be 'in sync' chronologically, we are now in a quantum position where everything is happening at the same time and that causes friction. Interesting friction, but it's good to keep in mind that the answer to whether 'the tank is dead' might be different for all area's but not necessarily logically incoherent. The correct question to ask oneself is 'what issue is actually on the table?'.
Imo the 'battlefront doctrine' is mostly inside B spectrum. 

Two points:
I wouldn't use the control tower at all. Perhaps if it'd been a large airfield with a few kilometres distance between it and the closest enemy. It's singleplayer with dumber AI enemies, but it's still a heck of a risk, and you can get perfectly useful vantage points for calling in artillery or airstrikes just by using the upper floors and roofs of buildings you've secured and which aren't in the firing line any longer.
Explosives are toned down in CM because sticking to what the official manuals stipulated apparently meant that everyone died really quickly. I don't think it's unreasonable though: you have to take into accounts that many buildings are quite large and Combat Mission can't really do local damage (either the floor of a house is intact, or all of it is damaged. There's no "the bomb took the corner off the house"), and if it's die hard enemies you're fighting, so just look at jihadis in Fallujah or Japanese on Iwo Jima, reoccupying pillboxes and bunkers that had been cleared with grenades and satchel charges, at times within literal seconds.

I had the same views in the early days of CM2 thinking maybe all tanks are glass cannons. My views have changed over the many years from "CM is just cruel" to "they may actually have this right" because:
- Modern (post 1945) titles it's usually a mute point as every AT weapon has a decent chance at killing any other armoured vehicle they are up against. Who shoots and hits first is probably the winner. Some minor exceptions there in very specific circumstances but even when my M1 Abrams comes under fire from a T-72 in CMSF, I take note.
- WW2 titles have a bit of variance given the broader amount of weaponry and armour value combinations in play.
- Reading some campaign specific history books from WW2, including one right now  , it's actually quite common to read oral histories and mechanical repair commentary about how many armoured vehicles are out of the front line at any given time in WW2. You can never trust comments like "Company A of the 13th Tank Battalion took village ABC" to mean a full company of tanks took part. I think some of the older histories like the official histories released soon after the way generally skip this kind of info.
My two cents plus sales tax.

So the answer to a dramatic increase of smart precision weapons on the battlefield...the result of which we are seeing daily on this board...it to hang onto older technology and lean into dumb mass?
After we saw just how badly mass dumb fires performed at Severodonetsk?  I mean the RA turned fields into the moon and gained inches.  Why would we go this way...that is not pragmatic in the least. 
The smart play is to mass produce precision weapons.  If we can produce millions of cellphones why can't we produce millions of smart munitions?  I mean it is 2024 here, AI is being added as a free update in Windows.  The UA on a shoestring is holding off a force much larger with hundreds of thousands of FPVs being produced in peoples garages.
There is conservative, and there there is regressive.  Why on earth would we spool up dumb artillery stocks after this war?  We should definitely ramp up production, but of precision and smart systems.  Mass precision beats everything.

I do not disagree that the RA had counted on one war but got another.  Nor that the lack of dismounts and infantry hurt them as the BTG got pulled into a fight it was poorly designed for.
However, my point still stand...how many infantry are enough?  Further, this lens really misses how badly positioned and spread out the UA was along a front over 2000km long at the opening of this thing.  They were thin and strung out as well, in fact it was likely a core planning factor for the RA.
Read this for an idea of just how chaotic and close run a thing the fight was:
https://chacr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/BAR-187-compressed.pdf
My point is that trying to clear ambushes along 100km when the ambushers can stand off 5000m instead of 500-1000m makes a major difference.  Once you add range the infantry bill goes up dramatically.  And the UA was not optimized for this sort of work in those initial days.  They were plugged in and had effective ISR but they were caught wrong footed north of Kyiv.
My problem with "well the RA needed more infantry" is that it does not recognize that the RA were going to need an unsustainable amount of infantry...and so would we.
How does one screen a Combat Team when the effective small team threats are now 5km out?  How about 20kms out with NLOS Spike? I am not sure why people keep thinking that we can somehow screen against this.  Or maybe they do not understand what screening and defile drills really mean.  It means dismounts screening and sweeping ahead of vehicles in close terrain to sweep AT teams and protect vehicles and armor. OK...so what is "close terrain" when an ATGM or FPV team can see, fix and hit at 5-10kms?
The reality is that ISR and range have changed the game.
 

I think a lot of the difference of opinion here is coming from what sort of scenario we consider the tank (or other vehicle) to be in. In a CM style battle the APS will be super useful and allow you to be much more aggressive with your tanks, while reducing attrition. 
But a tank is spending 99% of it's time behind the front line. It might drive to an assembly point, wait for the right moment, then drive to engage the enemy. During that whole time, which might be hours, it can be under indirect fire or drone attack or whatever. And all of its support vehicles too. So even if it defeats 95% of threats with it's expensive and heavy APS and armour it will be neutralised one way or another before it even has a chance to apply utility to the battlefield (i.e. shoot stuff). 
Agreed that this affects all vehicles, but tanks tend to be particularly expensive and fuel hungry. A wheeled APC not so much (ideally). 

If we concede that the tank is dead then is not the IFV and APC also dead by the same measure? What about infantry? 
The challenge for planners isn't getting rid of the tank, it's remaking the ground forces top to bottom into something fundamentally different. That may be the correct path but it's not a cheap one or without it's own risks.
BTW, Trophy can reliably intercept top attack munitions in Black Sea and I presume in CM Professional, so the growing popularity of that bandage is probably your fault 😉
 

You could use the Drone based system I described above to lay charges on mines and only set them off at the moment the assault begins ... which would provide a degree of surprise. A considerable degree of surprise.
Given the general sluggishness of Russian responses to ... anything ... coupled with the degradation of their artillery systems (heck, how many trained artillerists do they even have left?) plus, I would presume, a lack of artillery launched mines ... such a surprise might work. Especially if you separate the attack lanes beyond the effect range of artillery delivered minelets and didn't trigger all of the lane clearing charges at once ... so if the Russians did manage to get their act together and hit one set, simply blow another series of lanes and hit there.
Of course, Friction would be the problem to beat, per Clausewitz.

These are features of tank as a weapon. But what is more important are the effects and functions that the weapons gives you. If you can replace the effects and functions in your toolbox, you do not need to recreate the exact features mix.
IMO These features allowed the tank to fulfill 3 functions: 1) it could break through; 2) it could exploit; 3) it could fight other tanks. Function 3) is easily replaceable by NLOS ATGM and drones, in fact tank is not longer the best AT weapon. Function 1) is also replaceable, by application of sufficient amounts of artillery you can level the trench and bury the people in it. Same principles as Bruchmuller used, just substitute PGMs for gas shells. 
Where I see a problem is function 2). The tank allowed forward movement at vehicle speed and relative immunity from indirect HE and machine gun fire, i.e. the killers of extended advance on foot/horse. Tanks limited the threats to AT assets which, when they were AT guns and early ATGMS, could be overloaded and outshot by massing tanks against them, whereupon the advance would resume at tank speed. The enemy had to countermass vs your mass by creating a Pakfront, and a Pakfront usually could not be everywhere. Not anymore. The NLOS AT assets, drones and artillery PGMs can instantly be concentrated from a wide area,  without having to locate them physically close to one another. Having eliminated the tank from the equation how to transition from a breakthrough to an extended advance at vehicle speed? I don't know. In other words, the only advance possible looks like a constant series of breakthroughs with the enemy always able to retreat and recreate a new defence line in front of you, and you always frontally assaulting. Which seems a fair description of the Zaporozhe offensive 2023. In yet other words, over a 100 years of warfare has just been erased, and conceptually we are back at the Kaiserschlacht exactly. We are unable to recreate Amiens or any later battle of movement.