wokelly
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Posts posted by wokelly
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You think that 85% of TOE after the race across France and 80% of TOE after the Bulge count as a "shortage" and indicate the US didn't have enough Shermans in the ETO. I think the same facts prove to a demonstration that the notion the US suffered from any "shortage" of Shermans in the ETO is laughable, and that anyone claiming that doesn't know what a "shortage" is.
In Normandy, 81mm ammo actually had a shortage. In early September, gasoline actually had a shortage. From September through the end of November, 105mm ammunition actually had a shortage. During the westwall fighting from October through early December, rifle replacements actually had a shortage.
Shermans, not even remotely. Words mean things.
Yes words mean things, here is the definition of shortage:
shortage [ˈʃɔːtɪdʒ]a deficiency or lack in the amount needed, expected, or due; deficit
The US has a "lack in the amount needed, expected, or due; deficit" of Sherman's. There was a shortage, regardless of if you feel it constitutes one. Was it a severe shortage, as you have pointed out no. Was there a shortage, yes. In fact enough of a shortage to dictate US policy on Sherman, for example causing the US to reconsider having some Sherman converted to 17 pounder armed fireflies since an additional 150 tanks would be unavailable.
Your issue seems to be that the US shortage of Shermans was not anything atypical of say the Germans who were in a worse situation. Fair enough, that still means the US was suffering a shortage and units could not be brought up to full strength. In regards to the context I brought up the shortage in, I severely doubt the 3rd AD would have been more liberal in writing off tanks than other units given there was a lack of fresh shermans to make up the losses throughout much of the ETO fighting. You do not throw away reusable tanks when there is a lack of replacements.
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"The Churchill was the most heavily armoured tank in Normandy and had excellent mobility,"
It could certainly climb very steep gradients that other tanks couldn't. It wasn't very quick though; wasn't its top speed around 15m.p.h..
That is more of an issue of speed. Good mobility, poor speed is how to characterize the Churchill. The British during the Rhineland Campaign actually managed to push a regiment of Churchills through the waterlogged forest with infantry to come out behind the main German defensive line.
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But I find it wrong to simplify the WW2 and everything in it to a one-dimensional battle between good and evil. The US, British, Canadian, Polish, French and other Allied soldiers who died in Normandy on 6th June 1944 died for their countries, but they also died for Josif Stalin who was just as brutal as any of the Nazis, but who happened to be in war against Germany at the right time. Meanwhile, democratic Finland, which Stalin invaded without provocation in 1939, had taken her chances of taking back the lost territories in 1941, but the western Allies gave their pledge to this land grab, just like they let Stalin occupy Czechoslovakia later.
The western allies did not give their pledge to the Russian land grab of Finland, given this is your history you should know better. The Allies opposed Russia's actions in the Winter war in 1939 and were ever pondering intervention (more so to cut off the iron ore from Sweden to Germany than anything else). In 1944 Finland, regardless of reasons, was fighting on Germany's side and thus was an enemy nation, few were going to speak out on the issue when more pressing issues in regards to the future of Allied countries in Soviet liberated territories (ie Poland). Relations between Finland and the west were kept open initially, the relations with the UK was kept open until the Fins closed the British Legation (nor quite an embassy) which resulted in a termination of relations which eventually led to a declaration of war in December 1941.
Again on Czechoslovakia, the allies didn't "let" Stalin occupy any lands. In fact Czechoslovakia was not occupied after the war by the Soviets, held a democratic election but a communist coup in 1948 brought it under the iron curtain. The only land ceded to the Soviet Union was the Subcarpathian Ruthenia, a territory that was frankly in despute long before WWII, having been granted to the new country Czechoslovakia at Versailles because:
1) Hungary, one of the claimant nations, had been an enemy nation and thus was given nothing.
2) The Soviet Union, another potential claimant nation, was not liked by the west either at this time so got nothing.
3) So that left only Czechoslovakia, which had to give the region autonomy anyways since most people didn't care to be part of it.
All I'm saying is, it's not as simple as what you think. People fought in the war, some honourably, some disgraced themselves. But when we are judging them as men, it shouldn't matter if they were fighting for a 'good' cause. I refuse to accept that my ancestors were evil just because they were Finnish patriots, which seems to be your point. Meanwhile Red Army soldiers, even the commissars executing their own men, would get a free pass? Or the US and other Allied soldiers who wilfully ignored Stalin's crimes while they were assisting him?For starters, this is a D-day thread so the Fins, the Russians and whatnot in the east has little to do with what I said. You are making an issue out of stuff that was not even referenced by me. As far as I am concerned the Soviets are not much better, but I give the soldiers more credit because they were legitimately fighting for the existence of their people. As for Allies ignoring Soviet crimes, at best you can point to Katyn, which was basically the Soviets words against the Germans and the Germans were the bad guys. While Churchill may have assumed the Soviets were to blame, they had no evidence either way. And I doubt your average allied soldier knew a thing about what was occuring in the east, let alone about red army crimes so trying to make a moral issue out of it is futile.
A recruit doesn't have a say on what their government is doing. They likely don't even understand all of its implications. And it can't be understood because historians argue about such matters even today. But what they can do is act humanely, be responsible of their own acts. War and humanity can be self-contradicting terms, so it's vague what that actually should mean. But surely, knowingly murdering people who are at your mercy is evil. If we take the acceptance of that to mean that someone is a good man, then we can say that a good man dying for a good cause is not an inch higher than a good man dying for a bad cause.This is my problem, saying that one recruit has no say demeans those spoke out and suffered because of it. It excuses those who did not have the morale courage to speak out against a government that engaged in clearly morally dubious actions (racial laws, illegal pogroms, removal of citizens rights etc during the 30's). A small portion of the population stood against what Nazism stood for, many ended up murdered or in camps because other were willing to go along and support the government. 130,000 German Political prisoners perished under Nazi rule. Because people went along with it, the war occurred, not because the Nazi's said so. Because they allowed for the preconditions to be created by waging wars of aggression, tens of millions died. People did have a choice, many Germans made the right choice but more made the wrong choice to go along with the Nazi's.
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The German soldiers in my mind are worth as much remembrance as anyone else. Particularly on the Eastern Front their story drives home the dangers of what can happen when government runs amok. One of my biggest peeves in the world is when people refer to wehrmacht soldiers as "Nazis", as if Hans from Munich or had any say in the matter. I think that's one of the reasons I study the ostfront so much, apart from being the largest war in history it really is a case study of two evil governments fighting each other to the death.
Anyway, no matter which perspective you see it from it's all one of history's great tragedies. D-Day is worth remembering, a lot of people from my country (U.S.) and other Allied nations were killed in Normandy.
I respectfully disagree, at least in terms of remembering German soldiers in the same esteem as Allied ones. I do feel bad that German soldiers fought and lost comrades for a cause that in hindsight turned out to be without honor or morality. However given the tens of thousands of Germans who were rewarded with death or time in a concentration camp for refusing to go along with the Nazi's (ie Sophie Scholl, Konrad Adenauer), I find it hard to hold the men who fought for the Nazi's in the same esteem as those who fought against them, be them men of the allied nations or German resistors.
I have no doubt where I would stand if put in a similar situation, after thinking about it quite hard I do not think I would have the moral courage to stand up against an evil government widely accepted by my country. That is what makes me respect those Germans who did resist so much, because I know I probably would be unable to do so if put in the same situation. Those who went along with the show don't score well (regardless if they were really nazi's or not), even if I probably would have been one of them in similar circumstances.
I'd go on but this thread is not about Nazi ideology and its acceptance to the German people (even if I have a strong view on the subject), so I do not want to hijack the thread about D-day. This rationale is however for why I will pay my respect to Allied soldiers of D-day, and probably even more respect for German resistors, but I will not give similar respect to the German soldiers. I do pass on my sympathy for those Germans who suffered and lost comrades or loved ones on this day, quite an unfair situation many of them found themselves in. Still I personally feel it demeans the sacrifice of those Germans who had the courage (and who often paid the ultimate price) to resist Hitler by commending those Germans who went along with the Nazi's (maybe not their crimes but still "fought for their country"). That's my opinion anyways.
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Interesting video on the BESA machinegun in British tanks here at the Churchill Restoration Project website:
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What is with the imbalanced killed/wounded ratio for this game? I know with buddy aid you can keep the ratio pretty sane on your side, but for the enemy to suffer 2x as many dead as wounded, this isnt the Russian front.
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wokelly - laughable. A "shortage" of 335 Shermans in September, you say. Meaning, the units had that many fewer tanks on hand than their total TOE, yes? By that date, there were 2 heavy ADs (2nd and 3rd) and 4 light ADs (4th through 7th), plus the 2nd French AD (which I will ignore because it might not be covered in the 335 figure); the 10the AD entered combat during September and may or may not be included. That is a minimum of 20 divisional medium tank battalions, and I count 19 additional independent battalions recorded as attachments to one or another ID in combat through September. Total, 39 battalions, to 45 if 10th AD and 2nd French are included. The TOE of mediums for a medium tank battalion was 60 (counting the 105s), so we are talking about a TOE of 2340 tanks, with a "shortage" of 335. Meaning they "only" had 2005 on hand - after the race across France. 85% of TOE. Some "shortage".
(The post Bulge figure is comparable, as additional ADs and independent battalions arrived in the fall. It might have touched 80% of TOE at the lowest - a figure the Germans would have killed for as a highest across the force on any date, not a lowest).
For comparison, a typical German PD in Normandy was down to 60% of TOE as runners *within a week of being committed to combat*, and never rose above that level again.
As I said, there was no lack of vehicles for the US. When the burn rate at the front rose, the pipeline refilled them rapidly, but not rapidly enough to stay literally pegged at 100% of TOE after the most intense tank-used-up periods of the war.
Losing less than 10% of the tanks you produced over the entire war in combat, it is extremely hard to run out. When LL and losses by allies are included, the figure might rise to 25%. Barely that many were in units at TOE. All the rest were over supply, in the depots and replacement channels or still stateside, even.
Given the United States Government had to ask the British to lend back lend-lease shermans to help make up for the shortfall, I would hardly consider the issue laughable for the men at the time did not seem to feel it was a joke.
I'm not exactly sure what the you are trying to prove with your responses. If it is to make a point the US sherman shortages were never as bad as German shortages than frankly that had nothing to do with what I was talking about when I first mentioned the Sherman shortages.
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wokelly - you wrote "the US suffered a severe shortage of Sherman tanks throughout much of the ETO fighting". I deny it. The average field strength of armor battalions in the armor divisions was 90% of TOE, averaged over the entire campaign. The average strength of independent armor battalions was 80% of TOE over the whole campaign. The Germans would have killed for those numbers; they were frequently at 50-60% within a week of being committed to action and then ground lower until there was nothing left.
The US lost only about 3000 mediums in the entire campaign. Um, they made 86,000. Some went to the Brits to be sure, and there was losses in other theaters, etc. But US tank losses never got even within an order of magnitude of the number produced and sent overseas. There were acres of the things in rear echelons. By the standard of every other power in the war, the US had tanks coming out of its ears.
The fact is, trained crews and the shipping space for full armor divisions with all the rest of their equipment were the rate limiters on tanks employed - not tanks themselves. In action, it was the AIBs that burnt out first, always - even the later pattern ADs were too infantry light and casualties to the 3000 men in the AIBs that had by far the highest loss rates in action, determined the length of time a US AD remained effective in combat, before it had to be withdrawn to take replacements and refit. They regularly cross attached infantry regiments to extend this life but it still wasn't enough.
A few formations in the Bulge took high enough tank losses that they needed to be re-equipped to go back into action - but this was purely a matter of getting the tanks forward and finding crews for them. Not of having tanks for them to be issued.
There were genuine shortages in the ETO - of gasoline in the race across France, of 105mm ammo throughout the fall, of rifle replacements at the west wall. Sherman tanks were not one of them.
Problem was not Sherman production, it was reserves. The US went into Normandy expecting a wastage rate of 7% per month and with reserves to match that. They ended up getting more like 15% in June and July, and 21% in August. By September 1944 the US forces in France were short 335 Sherman's, almost two entire Armor divisions worth of tanks. As a result of losses during the Battle of the Bulge, this deficit grew to 865 Medium tanks as of January 1945. The US actually had to borrow back Sherman tanks from the British as the British had expected higher monthly loss rate (up to 50%!) and thus had adequate reserves.
This is why I don't think the 3rd ADs armor losses were due to a more liberal interpretation of what constituted a destroyed or damaged tank. With a shortage of shermans you would not be picky with what wrecks you recycled. Zaloga puts Sherman losses at 4,300 in the ETO. Since he gives 3rd ADs losses as 630 and Cooper claims that around that number were permanent losses, than I think Zaloga's figures give 4,300 permanent losses, probably double that number to include those repaired and put back into service.
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The only thing I have read about troops not firing (beyond Marshalls questionable conclusion) is that troops tended not to fire unless they saw a target. Too much training on the range and the idea of not wasting ammo except on a clearly seen target, troops were reluctant to blast away at a target which would at least suppress the enemy.
I remember reading one Veterans response to Marshall's conclusion was something like 'How the hell did he think we killed the Germans? Beat them with our rifles?'
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I believe you are in error there. The OR report (No.12) did NOT just look at tank cas from 2CAB. Also, No.2 ORS was not even a Canadian unit, although it was commanded by a Canadian, and did have a reasonable number of Canadians.
Jarymowycz's book (and thesis) read to me like a conclusion in search of suitable facts.
Hmm, you may be right. Looking through the report nothing states its Canadian losses, now I am wondering how I came to think it only examined Canadian losses. Forum wont let me go back and edit the post though
Anyways this was the qualifier the report included that Jarymowycz neglected to put in:
1. The proportion of brewed up tanks is high and it is therefore important to know whether or
not this must always be the case. A more recent examination of later battles, which is not yet
complete, has shown that the 1st Bn Coldstream Gds (5 Gds Armd Div) have suffered fewer brew
ups than other units, e.g., during operation "BLUECOAT" only 1 in 20 casualties, of which casualties
at least 12 were due to penetrations. The unit concerned attributes this to the fact that they carry
no extra ammunition outside the armoured bins. It should be recognized that in no recorded
case in our sample has the extra outside applique armour resisted any hit, and therefore the
protection afforded by keeping all ammunition in the bins is almost certainly due solely to the
internal flying fragments failing to penetrate the ammunition.
Would be interesting to find that report.
EDIT: here is the rest of the report not quoted by Jarymowycz:
2. The small number of A.P. hits failing to penetrate is noticeable. This small number has
been confirmed by the opinions of technical adjutants, etc., who agree that the proportion was
probably not above 5%. This opinion is in keeping with the calculated expectations of failures
based upon penetration figures for 75 mm and 88 mm guns at the ranges of engagement estimated
by tank crews. There have also been complaints at the apparently low resisting power of the
present Sherman armour. REME, 5 Gds Armd Div state that an AP.300 and an AP.500 Browning
both fired at 100 yds range, penetrated 1/2 and 1 1/2 inches respectively into the turret armour'
Added to this, it is at present the practice to recondition for service partially brewed-up tanks
whose quality of armour might often be low.
3. From the data collected, it will be seen that the proportion of hits on the sides and front of
the 75 mm Sherman tank is more or less equal and therefore, for up-armouring to be effective a
large area would need to be strengthened. For instance, up-armouring the front of the tank so
that in the cases considered it would have given 50% protection on this face, would only have
decreased penetrations by 15%. In consequence, if changes are required it would appear wiser to
use the extra weight-carrying of the 75 mm Sherman to take a better gun; ie., to make German
tanks more vulnerable rather than to attempt to decrease our own vulnerability. This suggestion
would appear to be in keeping with present policy.
4. Requests have been made by DTD for any additional battlefield data to assist decide [sic]
on the optimum thickness of individual armour plates and on their optimum distribution On the
evidence of this report, where tanks are expected to attack in country as, or more, enclosed than
Normandy, it is recommended that an almost homogenous defence be assumed (a homogenous
defence being defined as a defence where the enemy are able to hold their fire so long, they are as
likely to hit from the side or rear as from the front: for the use of this convenient term see DTD
armour reports). Therefore, for optimum armour distribution, etc., a "p.d.v." (probability directional
value) for an almost homogenous defence should also be used.
It is considered that present homogenous German defence is due to ease of concealment and
that, until better methods of spotting tanks and A/T are found, such a form of defence will
continue and can safely be assumed for similar terrain. It should be carefully noted however
that the present sample of tanks has been taken from a series of battles where our forces were
nearly always attacking, and it may well be that, in defence, more frontal hits will be recorded.
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Nothing much wrong with that, because tanks were actually in significant oversupply throughout the ETO.
From my understanding the US suffered a severe shortage of Sherman tanks throughout much of the ETO fighting. If anything such a loose policy of what could be written off and what could be repaired would compound the issue, especially for a heavy armored division which requires so many tanks. I wonder if the 3rd could really have gotten away with tossing away Shermans like that given the shortage that existed, those numbers must have raised eyebrows further up the chain of command.
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For this decision we have the hidebound army brass at branch level to thank. These were the same hair shirts who in their wisdom decided that tanks were not for fighting other tanks, that one needed tank destroyers for that purpose. So the army went into the war with a mish-mash of lights, mediums and towed and SP TD's. Some efforts were made to design a workable heavy tank (the M6) but even though hundreds were produced, the decision was made that they took up too much space on the cargo ships and it was considered best to just keep shipping Shermans and TD's. The GI's at the pointy end of the stick made do with what they had, but a more rational development and procurement approach would have served the GI far better than the rigorous adherence to this now disproven doctrine that restricted what could be designed and fielded for far too long. The army finally wised up after the war and redesignated the M26 from heavy to medium and then finally just decided to call it's grandsons (M48's and M60's) main battle tanks by the 1960's.
The M6 was a poorly designed tank which would not have increased survivability or firepower over your upgunned Sherman. It had 83mm of frontal armor, not that much more than the Sherman actually had. Not to mention it only mounted a 76mm gun which proved ineffective against the frontal armor of a Panther or Tiger. The US military made the right decision not to waste space shipping those over, but the wrong decision with Sherman armament.
I recall seeing pictures of a Pershing like turret on an M4 hull. Also, the M36B2 was basically a 90mm gun turret on a Sherman hull. Put a little top armor on that, and you have a tank that can go up against a Panther pretty well.
But make no mistake, any tank or AFV will burn if the ammo, hyraulic fluid or fuel ignites as a result of a penetration. And, has been noted, post war analysis showed the Sherman to be little worse than its opponents as far as fire risk went, particularly as modernized ones went into service.The big British/Commonwealth report on the Sherman was an examination of Canadian Shermans KOed from June 6th to July 10th. This is a partial copy of that report from Jarymowycz's book Tank Tactics: From Normandy to the Lorraine:
Of interest is the huge number of penetrations to the side and rear armor vs the frontal armor (46 vs 19). The British OR men felt that increasing the frontal armor to withstand half the hits would only result in a negligible increase in survivability as most shots were going through the side armor, and that the extra weight should got to a better gun.
From the report, 33 penetrated shermans brewed up from the 40 penetrated shermans examined, so about 82% brewup rate. I do not have a copy of the German report but I have read it (Copp's Montgomery's Scientists. The 60 panthers examined had a brew up rate of about 62%.
It would appear the Sherman was 20% more likely to burn, but there is a problem with stating this conclusion (as some authors have). Many tankers carried extra ammunition within their tanks outside the armoured bins, which increased brewup rates. The OR report is rather selective in its examination, there was only ONE Canadian armoured unit in action from June 6th to July 10th, and that was 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. Perhaps as many as 2/3rds of 2CAB's lossed from June 6th ot July 10th occured during June 6-11th (With the disastrous attack on Le Mesnil-Patry on June 11th alone costing some 50 tanks). 2CAB did not see action again until 4-5 July for Operation Windsor and 8-9 July for Charnwood, but they only suffered some 40 losses over that period compared to well over 80 from June 6th to 11th.
Its a rather selective time period and we don't know the extra ammunition policy for 2CAB was during that time. The same report on Canadian losses state that during Operaiton Bluecoat, a British unit with a strict no extra ammunition policy had a much lower brewup rate than 2CAB. The Panthers were KOed from June 6th to August 11th, and 60 Panthers represents around 10% of all Panthers deployed to Normandy during the battle. IMO it is a good representation of Panther losses and brewup rates, unlike the Sherman report.
What I am saying is that a definite conclusion should not be drawn from these reports in terms of individual percentages. It can not be really argued the Sherman was 20% more likely to burn because of the selective nature of the report. It is safe to say through that Allied and German tanks brewed up more often than not (above 50%).
"the 3d armored division entered combat with 232 m4 sherman tanks. During the European Campaign, the division had some 648 sherman tanks completely destroyed in combat and we had another 700 knocked out, repaired and put back into operation. this was a loss rate of 580 percent. In addition to this staggering battle loss rate of 580 percent in our main battle tanks, we also experienced extremely heavy wear and tear due to the everyday operation of the equipment."The 3rd Armoured Division had the highest loss rate of ANY US armored division in WWII by far. For example 2nd AD (also a "Heavy" Amoured Division), which was in combat for a month longer in Normandy (landed June 9th vs July 9th for 3rd AD), suffered some 276 permanent losses from 1944-1945 compared to the 3rds 632. The second worst casualties for a US AD in the ETO was 7th AD with 360 permanent.
I don't mean to demean the men of the 3rd, but frankly it may just have been a poorly run unit. None of the other US ADs come close to the 3rds losses, even those which were in combat longer. The 3rd had about a 270% turnover in permanent losses alone, compared to the 2nd with had the same TOE but only had maybe 120% turnover in permanent losses.
I don't think the Pershing would have changed things dramatically for the 3rd, Coopers book come off a bit to me as the workman blaming his tools. The Sherman was not a stellar tank by this time, but no unit comes close to the holocaust that was 3rd ADs losses. A few units (one AD and two Tank battalions) hover at or above the 200% permanent turnover rate, but no one near 3rd ADs losses both as a percent of its unit strength or in actual losses.
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It was also supposed to automatically re-cock after firing, but often didn't and was apparently a B*tch to re-cock manually.
Its hard to know really how much of a problem this really was. The PIAT is much like the sten, its really hard to separate truths from rumors about its effectiveness. The PIAT would not recock if you did not hold on to it tightly, it needed to recoil of the charge on the PIAT round to recock, if you did not hold it tightly it would not recock (and potentially break your shoulder as well).
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The Sherman gun sight did not have a wider field, however the gunner had access to a Periscope as well as his gun sight which make tracking targets, especially at close range, much easier. The Loader also had access to a periscope which meant you have three sets of eyes potentially searching for targets.
German tanks did not have periscopes for the gunner (or loader for that matter), but the gunisight tended to have a better field of view than their allied counterparts, almost double the FOV with German 2.4x and 2.5x magnified optics compared to the standard 3x magnified for Allied tanks.
Frankly I would generally give the more accurate first shot to the Germans, given their guns tend to be a higher velocity and the German could be used to estimate the range to a target quite accurately since it was a mil sight (kinda hard to explain without pictures)
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WoKelly.
I have only skimmed this thread... so I am not exactly sure if its just rolling pre-planned barrages you want.
But would it not be possible to suspend your dis-belief by assuming that pre-planned barrages had happened just ahead of you loading into the map. Broken buildings and damaged vehicles being placed on the map for effect?
Steve is their any kind of marker that indicates pre-laid arty fire zones. That can be called in at any time?
Massive preliminary bombardments can be simulated by broken buildings and craters on the map when you start, but rolling barrages can't. Rolling barrages are not even meant to really kill and destroy, its suppressive effect and concealment which are key. You can't simulate that with a pre-map barrage, the suppressive effect will wear off within a minute before your troops have moved more than 20-30 yards. You basically simulate what did happen when troops missed their barrages or fell behind, the enemy recovers and inflicts heavy losses. The barrage only works if the troops are on its heels. The barrage hits the Germans for 4 minutes while the infantry move up behind it, it lifts and the infantry move in and occupy the ground while the defenders are still dazed and confused (ideally). You need the barrage present during the battle for the effect to work.
I understand battlefront has limited resources, but rolling barrages were a big part of CW arty doctrine. You have rolling barrages leading the Canadian Scottish's counterattack on Putot-en-Bessin on June 9th against the 12th SS, you have rolling barrages in the British battles around Tilly vs the Panzer Lehr, you have rolling barrages leading the infantry attacks during Epsom, you have rolling barrages covering the Canadian attack on Carpiquet airfield and town as they crossed a mile of flat open ground, you have rolling barrages covering the advance of the armoured units for Goodwood and Totalize. This was a common tactic in major operations for company and regimental sized attacks, depending on the map size and battle size it should be available for use. Again the user should not get unlimited rolling barrages, only one and they plan it during the setup phase and lose control over it after like in real life for the most part. The CW module is not finished obviously, hopefully something can be done.
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Using 5 to 100 FOs to create a like effect is kinda placing the burden on the player to go out of his way to represent a common tactic among CW forces IMO. Some kind of option to dictate the width of the barrage, direction, speed per 100 yards (ie barrage moves 100m after 4 minutes) and where it should pause, would be the more user friendly option. Personally I would hope for the Devs to do something for the CW module.
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Remember that "scope" is important to keep in mind. A rolling barrage is something that requires two very important elements:
1. A LOT of planning
2. A LOT of guns with a lot of ammo
1. I agree with a lot of planning, in my mind the rolling barrage would be something your organize during the setup phase of the battle. For example in CMA there was an option to drop artillery in a rectangle shape, with the user being able to dictate how wide that rectangle was. A similar system, dictate the width of the barrage and the direction it should go, input when pauses should take place for it to resume.
Rolling barrages were not flexible, so once the setup phase is over your control over it would be non-existent, if you can't keep to the schedule you are boned like in real life.
2. Lots of arty and ammo was not something the Allies had problems with. It depends on what the battles are. Major operations saw huge stockpiles of arty ammo available for use, while minor attacks were often affected by arty rationing for larger attacks. If the battles we face in game are major attacks, arty ammunition should not be a major factor in limiting the use of artillery. For example I recently read a great account of a single day battle by an British infantry regiment at Rauray at the end of the Epsom battles. Over 10,000 rounds of Artillery ammunition was spent during the defense against 2nd and 9th SS attacks over a 12 hour period, including 3000 rounds by the regimental mortars (5 guns each firing 600 rounds).
And it was usually preceded by a fairly big, long general barrage. We're talking about hours of artillery fire.CMO and CMAK had scenarios which represented this with lots of craters and understrength units which simulated this without actually doing it.
It's outside of our scope, though of course a couple of times it could be argued it was within the scope. It's not important enough to cater to.Having said that, you can do it in the game fairly realistically as it is. Buy a ton of artillery, plot it all during Setup with delays, limited number of rounds fired, and bingo... you've got yourself a rolling barrage. You can't change how it fires off or where during the battle either, which is completely realistic.
Steve
Well I disagree its outside the scope of the game, especially for the CW forces which used rolling barrages extensively for their set piece operations, your answer tells me it is not on the drawing board. For the CW module I would hope the devs at battlefront may reconsider. If the game focuses on platoon combat it is outside the scope, but if we are doing company and regimental sized attacks (stuff which CMAK and CMO had) it is within the scope.
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CM is a TACTICAL game and therefore tactical artillery usage is what scenarios should have. Anything else is outside of the scope/scale of the game and is as inappropriate as having massed B-17 strikes.
Rolling barrage is not something that happened on the operational scale or strategic scale, rolling barrages were tactical level artillery plans. The CW forces regularly shot company and regimental sized attacks onto objective with rolling barrages, which based on CMAK and CMO are not battle sizes that were uncommon. If this game is only going to do platoon level battles than yeah rolling barrages may be out of the question, but I was expecting CMBN was going to have larger scale battles than previous CM2 titles had.
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I always found artillery to be modeled poorly in previous WWII CMs, to the point where I rarely used it with any flexibility other than pounding a town. It was especially annoying when playing with CW forces which were generally the lightest on squad firepower of all countries, artillery always played a major role in compensating for weak squad firepower in real life but rarely in game. So I have a few questions:
-Will we see rolling barrages for soldiers to advance behind? This was certainly not something that could be repeated several times, it usually led the solders into an objective but if they fell behind they had to make due with their small arms or they fell back and organized a second barrage.
-Will we have the ability to lay smokescreens on the flanks of the barrages as well as use rolling barrages with a mix of smoke and arty? Both were oft used tactics for the CW forces, often a continuous smoke screen was laid on an open flank to keep the Germans away who did not know what was on the other side.
-Can we expect decent ammo for the artillery, because it was rarely there in CMO or CMAK. I know the devs dont want people arty spamming but the Allies stockpiled great amounts of arty ammo for their forces prior to major attacks, enough that artillery requests were rarely refused due to ammo being exhausted. I have been reading a great book about a single days battle at Rauray on 1 July 1944 where a single regiment saw tens of thousands of artillery rounds fired in its support including over 3000 rounds from the regiments five 3 inch mortars (that is 600 rounds per gun). Most CMO or CMAK missions you get maybe 300-400 rounds total in support fire for scenarios which represent major allied attacks which is quite limited.
Artillery played a major role in Allied doctrine, and even the Germans unleashed at times very heavy barrages on the Allied lines during counterattacks. Yet in the previous CM games artillery has generally taken on a pretty secondary role which I think ignores its actual significance. I am really hoping the new CMBN will properly represent artillery and make it flexible enough to use as it was at the time.
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Mission is fairly straight forward, wait until enemy are withing kill zone than open up. Issues is the Muj keep seeing my guys despite them hiding. Essentially what happens is they get within 200 yards of my guys near the T intersection, and just open up on my men. Heck when I first spot them they seem to know what is going the way they are making leaps and bounds forwards.
Now it would not be a terrible thing except my MMG's have balls ammo (seriously an ambush and they bring 250 rounds per gun? Thats like a single belt) and in nor short order my guys are out and the Muj are overrunning my guys. Artillery is once again feeble in power as well as ammo so no salvation there. I am at a loss on how to do this mission right with the AI apparently possessing superhuman sight and my lack of ammo, because right now the mission is broken, or at least the Devs never intended the Ambush to work out and never made any mention of it.
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Nevermind, I just saw the run as admin thing if you run vista, and once I tried that I was able to make a profile.
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Before I install uber patch I can make profiles, but after I am unable to. I type in a name for a profile I want, click okay, but nothing pops up. Have uninstalled and reinstalled the game and patch a few times, still there. Would rather not have to redownload the patch to see if something got corrupted simply because it takes so freaking long to download it.
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Okay so I bought the game when it first came out, both an online version and a mail order version. Now I put the game away for a few months, some glaring issues with the game made me do so. Now with the Uber patch I want to try the game again.
Only problem is I have no idea where the License is. As it was not a mail only order, I got nothing on the box or manual to tell me the code, and the e-mail with it has long since been lost.
So what am I suppose to do at this point?
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Okay got it. Great thanks for helping.
June 6, 1944
in Combat Mission Battle for Normandy
Posted
Because Finland was a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany and at war with the UK by 1944. What exactly did the west owe Finland exactly on this issue? Maybe in 1939/40 I could see an argument being made if the west had condoned Soviet actions, they were not at war at the time.
At the Terhan conference the west did separate Finland from the Axis, did not impose the unconditional surrender ultimatum on them and did press the USSR to acknowledge Finish independence.
Yep everyone it entitled to their opinion.