Der Alte Fritz
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Posts posted by Der Alte Fritz
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"The recipe for 4BO is ".....RKKA paint mixing instructions from 1941 specify that Protective Green 4BO was a mixture of 40-60% yellow ochre, 15-20% zinc chromate, 10% ultramarine and 10-20% white.....""
http://www.militarymodelling.com/forums/postings.asp?th=66822
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.711026648926400.1073741869.267763626586040&type=3
pulls pin, retires to a safe distance with hands over ears
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Sure it is not a 6-PK radio
This is a battalion level set and you get a box with the radio in and another box with the batteries in.
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taken from TM 30-430 Manual of USSR Military Forces 1945
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My Soviet infantry are dressed in oliver drab, has anyone seen them in brown yet? I want to know if it is my set up of the actual game.
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I think this is a better version of 4BO than the one provided in the game which is defintiely olive drab on my screen.
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I would certainly agree that you cannot play the Soviet infantry in the same way as Western infantry. It is the Command Penalty that is important,
An alternative view to the 'send a platoon to do the job of a section' is to regard the Soviet section as being as strong as a Western section but with a limited working life. This reflects both the high fire power but limited ammunition supply especially of SMG sections. So lead with a section and the HQ behind it and then trailing along behind are the rest of the platoon, perhaps in cover. After the first stage of the attack, cycle through a fresh section for the next leap forward.
This gets round the HQ command penalty of the Soviets but allows you to spread out more and avoid artillery losses and spread you ammunition out for a longer time.
But then it makes a change that playing the Soviets is very different from the pretty similar Americans, British, Germans.
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Might be because there are new types of trees in CMRT and so not all are modded?
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It lights up if the unit is BRITTLE ie has been broken or panicked and then recovered.
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The idea of a Soviet soldier not having the wherewithal to open a hatch to get a better view of a very dangerous opponent is sort of mind boggling. No, sir, it's not gamey at all. It's what any smart person (including Soviet-type human beings!) would do when posed with such a situation. A risk? Certainly, but relative to what?
You assume that the main risk was envisaged as coming from enemy tanks whereas the Regulations assume that enemy tanks are dealt with by AT assets (AT guns SAU aircraft) and Soviet tanks are fighting enemy infantry protected by direct fire guns and artillery who suppress enemy AT guns.
Given that these Soviets tanks were attacking German infantry who were trained in close assault against tanks, the Regulations seem more worried about them and grenades, fire bombs etc going in through the turret than about enemy tanks.
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DAF - sure they fired on the move. The coaxial MG, that is...
The main gun? Short halts...
You are right.
This is a direct quotation of the Regulations (and the implication is that they are firing everything).......but then again I have read personal accounts by tankers who sad that they made short halts to fire the main gun .......so that is the difference between the 'rules' and actual events.
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According to Charles Sharp by start of 1943 platoon commanders and upwards had full RT (able to receive and send messages) while most tanks had a RR (radio receiver) by the end of 1943.
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This gives 3 states of Combat Readiness:
35. Combat Readiness 1:
The entire crew is in the tank and prepared to fire. All hatches are closed, the engine prepared to start instantly. The crew goes into combat readiness 1:
- in the Start position (ie just before attacking)
- in rests and halts, defence positions and on the march at the signal "Battle Alert!".
(CR2: has one man in the tank and the rest outside while CR3:all the crew are in trenches outside the tank)
Part VIII The Individual Tank
A) 250. The entire crew must observe the battlefield constantly. to orient themselves, search for targets so that these are not lost to sight and report them to the tank commander immediately. If orientation is lost it is permissible to observe the terrain through an open hatch.
257. The tank attacks at top speed , suppressing enemy artillery, mortars and machine gun crews and infantry by effective, intense fire from the move and making skillful use of the terrain to beak through into the flank or rear of an enemy and avoid a frontal attack.
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A new movement command that would cut out a lot of extra work would be "FAST - FIRE FROM HALT" which would be a great aid to Soviet style tank attacks.
Tanks need to advance on FAST and then HALT to fire 1-2 rounds and then move off on FAST again. The current problem is that Soviet tanks fire on the move unless small covered arcs are added and then are 'empty' during the planned halt unless it is made quite long (15 sec for a T34/85). Of course in real life, the tankers would halt when they could see the target area but this is more difficult from CM players who can put a halt in a location that is blind to the proposed target area.
Or is this already coded behind the scenes? I do not think so.
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The mod I am looking forward to is the Russian infantry "Brown" uniform mod - I think the current uniforms are far too green in hue.
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This may not be as big a problem as you think.
GATVU defined the Lend Lease 2.5 tonne lorries such as the Studebaker, International Harvester, etc as Prime Movers and so any decent scenario designer would only ever have these lorries to haul guns.
The standard Soviet Supply or Troop Carrier truck was the GAZ-AA (MM) or Lend Lease Ford 6 which would be used by Mech Corps as troop transports.
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I think you have hit the nail on the head Mad Mike.
The first use I thought of was [snow], so you have a set of mods for terrain, horizon, trees, vehicles, etc and when the [snow] tag is used in a scenario, everything goes snowy white.
Likewise for [city] then you would get rubble, telegraph poles instead of trees, different horizons, etc, etc.
Similarly [ukraine] would get you a set of terrain, trees and houses that looked for suitable for Lvov Sandomier than for Bagration which could use the [belorussia] tag.
The other use I forsee is if you like a particular designer and want to use all their vehicle mods. Say [mikeyd] tag would replace all the vehicles with the new mods.
Using mods becomes quite easy because you just need to open up the scenario and add your favourite list of mod tags into it. You could hold this list of tags in a text document and then cut and paste.
But I can also remember from transferring over 1,000 mods to GaJ CMMODS site that designers all used different file naming conventions and what a nightmare that proved to be in cataloguing all of them.
So what is needed is a naming convention that designers adhere to, so that these tags can be used easily without having to rename whole folders worth.
So proposed groups of tags would be:
experience mods: explosions, smoke, tracer, etc
terrain mods: snow, dusty, mud, rain, city, ukraine, poland, belorussia
specific units: 260id (for German infantry units) 260rd (for Soviet units) 3pz, 2tc, 2pzgr, 2mech etc. (cavalry -could get confusing since both Germans and Soviets used cavalry in Pripet Marshes so maybe sovcavalry and gercavalry)
specific vehicles: (I am assuming that people would prefer several different Panther A mods to be used so we could use the same convention as for units ie PantherA[3pz] or a more useful convention might be colour - date - region)
gelb, grau, splinter, ambush, green, bluegreen or gelb-june44-belorussia
and I think to make the mod catalogue easier it would help if designers included the tags in the design name. So "MikeyD's Dusty Ambush Camo Panther D [pantherD[ambush-june44-belorussia][dusty]"
There tend to be quite a lot of vehicles mods and people tend to use a number of different ones so it is bound to be a bit more complex.
Just an idea.
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Soviet artillery was a precision weapon given the depth and extent of these kinds of defences and that each gun only had 2-5 combat loads to fire off during the whole of the preparation, support of the penetration and exploitation of the depths.
Soviet scout squads often identified as much as 80% of German positions before offensives and fire would be targeted on headquarters, strongpoints and heavily defended locations leaving a creeping barrage of 76mm and 82mm/120mm mortars to deal with the average infantry defence position.
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The kind of German defensive lines this kind of fire was directed at would consist of an outpost line behind which would be the HKL of three continuous lines of trenches 200m apart all wired into strongpoints.
Behind this was the 1500m of the HKF which contained individual strongpoints and short stretches of trench, AT guns, Infantry Guns, etc.
At around 2500km behind the HKL forward edge was the BARBARA position or B-STELLUNG (named after the patron saint of artillerymen) a single trench with strong points behind which was a 2km deep zone of artillery gun positions, AT guns and armoured support.
2-4km behind this zone was a Second Defence belt - same as the first (only with less well developed engineering) and then behind this was a Third Defence Belt usually of the HKL only.
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As far as Rockets are concerned, 27 GRD would get 15 x M30/31 ground launchers and 24 x BM13 truck launchers (per km of 8 Guards Army assault front of 7km) and the 27 GRD attacked on a 1.7km front. They would get ONE launch of 12 rockets per launcher.
But this weight of fire was spread across the whole DEPTH of the German first position which was 3km deep. Rockets were used to target specific strong points or reinforcement points or headquarters often in the second or third lines.
Into this 1km wide x 3km deep area 5 BATTALIONS of Soviet Infantry would assault.
So a COMPANY might expect 1 x M30 launcher and 1-2 x BM13 strike somewhere along its 3km route.
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Table 10 is copied directly from the article
Table 11 has been 'rotated' so that it matches table 10
I have added some calculations about the number of shells fire and the weight of shells at the bottom.
As you can see this GRD was planning to fire over 1,000 tonnes of artillery ammunition, the vast bulk of it as part of the preliminary bombardment.
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"The Commander of the 29th Guards Rifle Corps, Major General AD Shemyonoks gave the ground commander of the 27th Guards Division following a combat mission's divisions to be ready to break through the German defenses on a 500 m south Genrykuv-west of the center, Moniohi (the width of the breakthrough 1750 meters), with the immediate objective to reach the line, soft sand hills north-west of Will-Lukowski (depth of the attack 6 km). In the subsequent division was to break through the enemy's second line of defense on a 500 m west Zelenets (excl.) Vulchina and developing the offensive in the direction of the forest south-east of Bervtse Shlyahetske, Vytsisluvka, by the end of the first day of the main forces to leave the area of forest southeast Bervtse Shlyahetske and advance units to capture Zawada Nova nameless height of 500 m to the south of this point (the depth of the attack of the day 15 km).
When you consider that division advanced in the area 1,750 meters wide, centered in its lane capabilities let you create the following tactical density of 1 km front: 5 infantry battalions, 108 light and heavy machine guns, 144, 82 - and 120-mm mortars and 133 guns (76 mm and above) and 17 self-propelled artillery. Given attached and supporting tools division had a significant advantage over the enemy, allowing her, with proper organization of the offensive, successfully complete the task.
Artillery commander of the division were as follows:
1. the destruction of manpower and fire weapons at the forefront and in the short depth of the defense,
2. suppression of artillery and mortars in areas south of Lipa, Mala whole, the May Dombrowa;
3. prohibition approach of enemy reserves by Lipska Will, a May Dombrowa , m Glovachuv,
4. suppression of enemy strong points in Lipa, Klementynuv, Mala whole, the May Dombrowa
5. interdiction and counter enemy infantry and tanks on the part of these settlements.
In terms of the use of artillery developed provides two variants of the artillery barrage.*
1) According to*the first embodiment of the artillery preparation was planned for a period of 25 minutes.*This reduced the time artillery preparation was planned to provide advanced attack battalions to capture the first position of the enemy.*In the case of successful actions forward battalions, advancing them to the depth of the enemy defense was to be accompanied by an ordinary shaft until the turn of Lipa, the doors.*Lipa.*Putting into action the main forces regiment of the first echelon is to bring all the artillery fire division.
2) In the case of the failure of the attack forward battalions artillery preparation was to be held on the second version for 80 minutes (including held a 25-minute artillery preparation).*
Infantry attack in this case, it was planned to accompany the double barrage to the highway Lipsk Buda - Glovachuv m (at a depth of 2.5 km) and in the future - a serial concentration of fire over the sites of resistance.
With the approach of parts of the division in the second position of the enemy in the plan provides a 20-minute fire attack all the artillery division at that position and a volley of rocket artillery from the artillery of the body strong points Klementynuv the Mining and May.
On the first day of the battle for the divisional artillery was established the following expenditure of ammunition in combat sets (Table 11). Table 11 See Spreadsheet Vistula Oder Artillery"
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The fighting Infantry Division: Collection of tactical examples of the Great Patriotic War
Military Theory
27-я гвардейская дивизия усиливалась
24-й минометной бригадой,
1200-м легким самоходно-артиллерийский полком
1154-й легкий артиллерийский полк
двумя батареями 351-го тяжелого самоходно-артиллерийского полка
372-й истребительно-противотанковый артиллерийский полк
три батареи 67-го истребительно-противотанкового
из состава корпусной артиллерийской группы -
1154-й легкий артиллерийский полк
из состава армейской артиллерийской группы —
32-й отдельный артиллерийский дивизион особой мощности,
1-й и 3-й дивизионы 43-й пушечной артиллерийской бригады
два дивизиона 184-й тяжелой гаубичной бригады большой мощности.
27th Guards Division supported by following units:
24th mortar brigade, (14 Breakthrough Artillery Division)
1200th Light self-propelled artillery regiment (SU76)
1154th Light artillery regiment
two batteries of 351th Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (ISU 152)
372th antitank artillery regiment
three batteries of the 67th anti-tank artillery regiment
from the Corps artillery group -
1154th Light artillery regiment
from the Army Artillery Group -
32nd separate battalion of special power
1st and 3rd battalions of the 43rd cannon artillery brigade (probably 43rd Guards Gun Artillery Regt from Army)
two battalions of the 184th high power heavy howitzer Brigade. (29 Breakthrough Artillery Division)
The 27th GRD was part of 29th Guards Rifle Corps and 8th Guards Army and its assault role gave it direct fire support from 2 SAU Regts, artillery supplied from the second echelon Rifle Division and from Corps and Army Artillery Groups. It had 3 Regiments with 130 manual and 60 heavy machine guns, fifty four 82-mm and eighteen 120-mm mortars, eighteen 45-mm guns, twelve 76-mm cannon artillery regiment, thirty six 76-mm guns divisional artillery and twelve 122-mm howitzers. Companies were 80-85 men strong.
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Broadsword56 - some follow up on Russian logistics, just because I was reading about it today and found it interesting...
The main logistical build up for Bagration involved moving 3 million metric tons supplies, using 5000 trains averaging 50 freight cars each, over the course of about 2 months. The rate of trains to the sector was 90-100 per day during the build up. 40% of the trains carried men and the major equipment of the units to the front, 60% carried the supply total above. The largest single item was POL at 1.2 million tons; artillery ammunition was 900,000 tons and was the second biggest item. (Food was 150,000 metric tons and provided 14 days rations for the assembled forces, by kick off day).
The ammunition supply amounted to 5 units of fire with the units, and the POL supply provided between 10 and 20 refills for first line transport, depending on the unit.
That was the stockpile - the ongoing supply requirement was 45,000 metric tons per day, averaging 275 per attacking division per day.
Although you are correct in principle, the actual numbers used are not very sound. They look like Walter Scott Dunn's figures from "Soviet Blitzkrieg The Battle for White Russia 1944" and he based them on a) FHO reports
Gerd Niepolds book "Battle for White Russia". However a quick check of Niepolds book (and as a staff officer with 12.PzD he had practical experience) shows that he quotes a Soviet military train having a gross weight of 825t where as Dunn calculates 2,000t. Neipold agrees with Russian sources such as Antipenko and Holland Hunter where Soviet trains weigh 1,000-1,200t gross (weight of cargo plus the wagons but excluding the locomotive) and a net weight of 750t (weight of cargo alone). Given the average gross weight carried by a railway wagon was only 18t (NKPS figures for 1944) and the typical train was 45-60 cars long, all of these sources agree. The effect of this is to make Dunn's figures about double what they should be for the weigh of a train and since he used trains as his measure, of everything else. However this is balanced by the 275t per day Division figure which is too high and should be nearer 120t average per Soviet Division. These two things cancel each other out and make his figures add up.
There is a discussion here of supply for 1st Belorussian Front http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=133563&page=5
You are quite right of course about the limited extent of the original Soviet plans, Antipenko only planned for an advance of 12-14 days and 140 miles which is just enough for capturing their first objective Bobruisk not Minsk. No doubt STAVKA expected AGr.Mitte to put up more of a fight but had in reserve an advance to Minsk of 300km if things went better. (You see the same pattern in the Vistula-Oder offensive only this time it was 300km and then 650km).
The fuel reserves of 10 units of POL was a failure since it was rapidly left behind and there were not enough special trucks to move it forward at the speed of advance, so future Soviet offensives replied on 3 units of POL in the depots and then immediate delivery by railway trains to as far up the line as possible.
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Don't you know that George lives next door to Ridley Scott!
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Gerd Niepolds book "Battle for White Russia". However a quick check of Niepolds book (and as a staff officer with 12.PzD he had practical experience) shows that he quotes a Soviet military train having a gross weight of 825t where as Dunn calculates 2,000t. Neipold agrees with Russian sources such as Antipenko and Holland Hunter where Soviet trains weigh 1,000-1,200t gross (weight of cargo plus the wagons but excluding the locomotive) and a net weight of 750t (weight of cargo alone). Given the average gross weight carried by a railway wagon was only 18t (NKPS figures for 1944) and the typical train was 45-60 cars long, all of these sources agree.
East Front literature!
in Combat Mission Red Thunder
Posted
Scott
Where did you buy it from? Because buying books from Russia is torturous!