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Dennis Grant

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Everything posted by Dennis Grant

  1. I'm going to put in a request too. I have been using CMAK as a way to practice current drills and tactics, and have been planning on introducing it as a training tool at my unit. There is an opportunity here, with the welcome move to a modern timeframe, To practice and teach with the actual equipment used against an OPFOR equipped as they could be in reality. Wow! Furthermore, the Canadian Army is moving to an ORBAT that looks to be very similar to a Yank Stryker brigade - infantry in LAVIII, armoured recce in Coyote (LAV 25 with a sexy mast-mount surveilance system) Armour in either the last of our Leopard 1 or (God help us all) LAV MGS. It would take very little to be able to offer a Canadian force in the game, given that so much of the equipment is common - and much of what isn't common is very similar. Add a Mercedes GWagon and GWagon Recce, add the Leo 1, add some Canadian skins, and you're there. I'm not asking to see Canadians take part in the single player campaign (I doubt we'd take part in it) but having a Canadian option for scenarios would have powerful training value. Provide some way for the scenario editor to pull in actual topo map data, and you've got a planning tool too... Pretty please? DG
  2. According to the regimenal history, the SAR started getting their Fireflies in Sept 1944. And yes, the individual sabre squadrons were normally attached to the individual infantry regiments of the 10th Infantry Brigade. But it seems that the CO of the SAR was big on recce, agressively using his regimental recce troop and the AA troop to act as brigade recce. It appears that the SAR was a fairly flexible organization, and that flexibility was prized over a literal adherence to a paper ORBAT. One would hope that a game that aims at historical accuracy would allow for similar flexibility. DG
  3. Lemme second that. Despite the existance of paper standards for ORBATS, actual units could differ quite a bit from the standard loadout. I have documentation here for the South Alberta Regiment (ostensibly a Armoured Recce Regiment) whose ORBAT is: RHQ: 4 X Sherman V 1 X White Halftrack 1 X Humber scout car HQ Squadron: 2 X White Halftrack 11 X Stuart VI (Recce Troop) 7 X Crusader III AA (AA troop) 9 X Humber scout car (Intercom troop) A, B, C Squadrons: 4 troops 3 X Sherman V, 1 X Firefly 3 X Sherman V (SHQ troop) 1 X Humber scout car 2 X White Halftrack 1 X Sherman Recovery And then the echelons, normally not gamed Note that the 7th Crusader AA and 5 of the Humbers in Intercom troop exceeded the paper strength of the unit, and were apparently knitted while in theatre. This sort of thing happens all the time, so some sort of ORBAT editor really is necessary to create actual units (and command relationships) as they existed on the ground, rather than as they are "supposed" to have existed by the book. And that's just with nice simple large units like vehicles. That doesn't even begin to cover infantry section loadouts..... DG
  4. I've cooked up a scenario using CM:AK to use as a training aid for an armoured recce troop. The map contains examples of each type of terrain encountered in a "held up" drill, and is intended to teach the execution of those drills. There is, however, no unit that matches a modern recce troop, so I'm using 8 "independant" Stewart Recce vehicles. I can change the names of the vehicles to their callsigns easily enough, but the rank of the commander seems baked in, and fixed at Corporal. Is there any way to change the rank of the vehicle commander, and ideally, set the reporting structure? What I want is something like this: 42 Lt 42A WO or Sgt 42B Cpl 42C Sgt 42D Cpl 42E L/Cpl 42F Cpl 42G L/Cpl Where either everybody reports to 42, or alternatively, A, C, E, and G report direct to 42, and B reports to A, D reports to C, and F reports to E Any way to make this happen, either direct via the scenario editor, or indirect via hacking the scenario file? DG
  5. I've cooked up a scenario using CM:AK to use as a training aid for an armoured recce troop. The map contains examples of each type of terrain encountered in a "held up" drill, and is intended to teach the execution of those drills. There is, however, no unit that matches a modern recce troop, so I'm using 8 "independant" Stewart Recce vehicles. I can change the names of the vehicles to their callsigns easily enough, but the rank of the commander seems baked in, and fixed at Corporal. Is there any way to change the rank of the vehicle commander, and ideally, set the reporting structure? What I want is something like this: 42 Lt 42A WO or Sgt 42B Cpl 42C Sgt 42D Cpl 42E L/Cpl 42F Cpl 42G L/Cpl Where either everybody reports to 42, or alternatively, A, C, E, and G report direct to 42, and B reports to A, D reports to C, and F reports to E Any way to make this happen, either direct via the scenario editor, or indirect via hacking the scenario file? DG
  6. I've cooked up a scenario using CM:AK to use as a training aid for an armoured recce troop. The map contains examples of each type of terrain encountered in a "held up" drill, and is intended to teach the execution of those drills. There is, however, no unit that matches a modern recce troop, so I'm using 8 "independant" Stewart Recce vehicles. I can change the names of the vehicles to their callsigns easily enough, but the rank of the commander seems baked in, and fixed at Corporal. Is there any way to change the rank of the vehicle commander, and ideally, set the reporting structure? What I want is something like this: 42 Lt 42A WO or Sgt 42B Cpl 42C Sgt 42D Cpl 42E L/Cpl 42F Cpl 42G L/Cpl Where either everybody reports to 42, or alternatively, A, C, E, and G report direct to 42, and B reports to A, D reports to C, and F reports to E Any way to make this happen, either direct via the scenario editor, or indirect via hacking the scenario file? DG
  7. Regarding the Ak/M16 debate: I carried an FN-C1 (FN-FAL) for a little while, then the original C7 (M16), then the version with the optical sight, plus the C9 SAW (Minimi) both with iron sights and with the optical. I've also fired an AK-47 ( a captured Gulf War weapon) on the range. The FN was heavy and long, with a good bayonet. Of all the weapons to have in hand when out of ammo, this was the one to have. As a rifle, it was very accurate out to stupidly long ranges, and I never saw one jam. It was also really easy to clean. But you couldn't carry much ammo for the weight, it kicked like a mule, and those of us with the wrong cheekbone structure would get cut by the flip-up rear peepsight right above the eye socket every time it fired. Accordingly, the first 5 rounds were aimed, the next 5 were pointed, and the following ten were "just stop beating me up!" Also, being as long as it was, it was a constant danger to everybody around you. Slung on your back so you could carry stuff, it would get caught in branches, vehicle hatches/doors, and (usually) other soldiers. I lost count of how many times my steel pot saved me from getting speared by the muzzle of somebody else's FN. It was nice as a drill stick; looked good on the parade square and the long length made it easy to do drill with it. That was really its only redeeming feature. When we got issued the C7, we had a hard time taking it seriously - it was light, short, had no kick at all, you could carry a ton of ammo for it... but it was hard to take that little bitty bullet seriously, and we'd all heard the stories about how easily it jammed. Well, the first time on the range fixed that. Firstly, everybody (with the iron sights) dropped an easy 2" off their groupings at 400m compared to the FN. Not beating beat up by the weapon meant that it *stayed* accurate too. And we did some... experiments... and discovered that the little bitty bullet hit a lot harder than expected. As for jamming... nope, never really an issue - with a couple of exceptions. Firstly, the weapon likes oil - if you try and run it completely dry, it'll get cranky - but it'll come right back if you squirt some oil into it. Secondly, we had "disposible" plastic mags that were never used as disposible. After contined use, the feed lips would break off and it'd multiple-feed on you all the time. When the plastic mags were taken out of the system and replaced with metal mags, the jams went away. When the optical sight came out, all of a sudden everybody was a marksman. Hand a clerk a propery-sighted C7, and he'd shoot the centre out of the target at 200. Plus now every rifleman could see better out to a distance, making target differentiation easier - and the rifle is accurate enough to match the definition on the scope. It's an awesome package, and I'm stupified that the Yanks still use iron sights. But my all-time favourite is the C9 Minimi with the optical sight. Most of the accuracy of the C7 with the ability to put down and sustain (thanks to the 200 round belt) large volumes of fire. Yeehah! A little heavier than the C7, but not bad in the bulkiness department - certainly not as bad as the FN - and easily slung for carrying. I adopted the C9 as my personal weapon, I loved it so much. Besides, it cut down on the bitching during rifle PT when everybody else was carring C7/C8, and the troop leader was humping a C9. It also made me identifiable to the kids - I was the officer with the C9 The AK-47 I fired felt like a cheap piece of **** in my hands - it wasn't so much a rifle, as a collection of rifle parts in loose formation. But that impression went away when I fired it. It kicked pretty hard (brought back FN memories, although it didn't cut my eye socket like the FN did at least) but it was reasonably accurate at 400m - not the scalpel than the C7 was, but more than enough to get the job done. Firing full auto was a little bit like wrestling an alligator in extended bursts, but if you kept burst discipline it was controllable. Not as nice as a C7, but not as evil as the C2 (the full-auto FN) had been either. Given the choice, I'd take the C7 with the optical in a heartbeat. It just a nicer, easier to live with weapon, and the optical sight plus the accuracy is a real advantage in situations where you have the sightlines to make use of the longer range. But I don't consider having an AK-47 a handicap by any means. At 200m or less, both weapons are pretty much even footing, and the only real advantage to the C7 is the lighter weight of the ammo. So to summerize, I disagree that the M16 family is a fragile, tempermental, "firing range" weapon because that doesn't match my experience. But I also disagree that the AK-47 is either vastly superior or vasly inferior. I think it is slightly inferior, but not enough to where the inferiorities would tip the battle against a unit so armed. DG
  8. I'm actually with Ken c3k there. Don't make things so complicated. If you want to add new stuff: 1) Formations. Double-click HQ unit, selects him and all subordinate units. Right-click to get flyout menu, select "Formation". Opens little window with a list of formations, probably "Extended Line, Arrowhead, Box, Ech Left, Ech Right" Units are now in "Formation Mode" and act as a single entity with regard to movement orders, fire orders etc. When in "Formation Mode", new right-click option "Break Formation" that ungroups units and returns them back to classic CM control. Why bother? Housekeping and click reduction. 2) Map overlays in scenarios. Allow scenario designer to draw typical map trace objects (boundry lines, objectives, phase lines) that player can toggle on/off. When on, allow them to be used as movement targets (ie, drag-select all units, "Move", mouse over phase line, phase line highlights, click on phase line, all selected units now move to phase line and stop on it. Allow player to add/delete map trace objects during setup phase. Make AI "aware" of its own map overlay objects and attempt to respect rules implied by them. Why bother? Map overlays are THE language of the battlefield, and are fantastic for conveying intent. They also help make for easier houskeeping. Would also be a great tool for programming AI to act in a realistic manner. Do NOT foist the controls that the overlays have on the AI on the player though - give him the opportunity to digress from the plan if he wishes. 3) Change the movement commands slightly to better represent an implied posture ie, for infantry: - March: fast move, poor spotting, no fatigue, some penalty for coming under fire, follows roads. - Advance: slow move, excellent spotting, no fatigue, no penalty for coming under fire - Contact: as Advance, but stop on contact and return fire if fired upon - Bound: fast move, good spotting, medium fatigue, no penalty for coming under fire - Run: very fast move, poor spotting, penalty for coming under fire, no return fire, high fatigue - Assault: a move plus a fire order (ie, needs a target) Medium speed, fires on target during move, uses grenades, etc when close enough, very high fatigue The game could use a few houskeeping improvements, but I see little need to change its basic nature. DG
  9. Or a Staghound. Or a Humber. Or a Daimler. Or many times, just a Jeep. Recce is flexible, and its primary offensive weapon is the artillery. You normally don't use intergral weaponry except for self-preservation, or if the opportunity is just SO good as to not pass up. On the contrary, I think a Bradley can be expected to die every bit as gloriously if it bumps into a T80 as a Staghound would if it bumped into a PanzerIII. The one exception is that Bradley carries TOW - but when I was using it the missiles didn't enter into the picture. We didn't use them. We certainly normally didn't expect to engage tanks. With something armed with a 25mm chain gun, I MIGHT engage a tank or two with an entire troop (with half the troop flanking) but you sure don't go toe-to-toe with tanks. Recce lives on sneak 'n' peek. But I have a WW2 story for you about this very thing: The lead element of a recce troop, (I think it was a Staghound) was moving forward on his next bound when he encountered a PanzerIV coming his way. Faced with the choice between reversing back up the slope he had just come down (presenting a wonderful target all the while), or charging forward, he chose to charge, gunning past the tank (and gunning ON the tank as well) and cresting the next rise. Over the rise was a column of marching infantry, along with another tank. Committed, he fired on both while roaring forward over the next rise. Over THIS rise was an anti-tank gun crew hurryedly attempting to set up their gun. They too got a burst of fire and the car raced forward over the NEXT rise. Thankfully, this one was clear, as was the next one - and then the car hid in a woods to catch their breath and call in the contacts and figure out how to get back through 10 km of enemy held territory. While they were waiting, the rest of the unit showed up. It seems that they caught the first tank by suprise; the driver jerked hard to avoid getting hit and the tank rolled over into the ditch. The second tank had had a fuel drum strapped to it, and it had been burst open and set afire - the tank was toast. The infantry who had been with it had been so shocked that they thought they were being hit by an entire regiment, and surrendered to the next vehicle to arrive on the scene. And the anti-tank gun had been damaged by a lucky shot and the crew were nowhere to be found. Typical? Hell no. But _possible_ Dash, verve, and initiative can act as a force multiplier. DG
  10. While I agree that there are _portions_ of this experience that don't apply very well, there are a few lessons to be learned from that little story. 1) Soldiers will seek maximum advantage from whatever situation they are placed in. They are out to win, and will act according to the possibility to exploit opportunity, balanced against risk. 2) Subordinates can and will take actions based upon their own initiative, occasionally without the explicit knowledge of higher commands, but usually in accordance with the outline of a higher command's plan. "Actions" taken by units do not necessarily flow from explict commands made by higher commanders. 3) Subordinates can make decisions on the tactical situation without needing much in the way of information. In this case, I had a paper map, a radio (an actual honest-to-god radio, that worked about as well as the real thing; which is to say, poorly) and what I could see out of my cupola vision blocks and the gunner's sight. NO GPS. NO uber top-down maps. No way, for that matter, from determining my OWN position aside from referencing terrain features via the vision blocks and the paper map. And yet, despite the lack of tactical information, was still able to formulate a plan and carry it out to a successful conclusion. I had access to nothing that would have not been availible to my counterpart in WW2, save maybe a radio in every callsign under my command. And lest anyone think I'm trying to make myself out as some sort of uber commander, these are skills common to ALL troop leaders. My behaviour wasn't in any way exceptional; it was what was expected of me. And as a further BTW, I found the simulator extremely limiting. I couldn't do turret downs and peer out over terrain with my binos. I couldn't use hand signals. I couldn't back into woods and uses them as a covered OP. I couldn't dismount JAFFO and have him do his dismounted drills. Half of my usual bag of tricks was denied me (although on the plus side, I gained a secured map edge, easily traversible woods, and the knowledge that boldness wouldn't physically kill me) 4) #1, #2, and #3 add up to situations that get labelled as "borgish" or "gamey" in CM that wind up being very close to what could actually happen in real life. 5) We had an associate member of my mess who had been a Sherman troop leader in WW2. The man had 6 tanks shot out from under him, and he was full of stories - and advice. Aside from the ranges at which engagements can happen in modern battlefields (he had a hard time believing that you could hit anything beyond 1000m) not ONCE did I ever here him say anything that I thought didn't apply to me. Further reading of other material has confirmed that impression. DG
  11. I'm on board with this idea in theory (although in theory, there's no difference between theory and practice, but in practice, there is The trick to making this effective is going to be taking into account all the communication paths that exist on the battlefield. There's a lot more to it than just radios and runners. Furthermore, sometimes you can communicate battlefield information without needing to actually intend to communicate it. Consider an infantry advance with tanks in support in reasonably open country. The tanks are ~200m or so back of the infantry. Crew commanders and drivers are unbuttoned. Crew commanders are scanning with binos, gunners are scanning with optics. Suddenly, the tank crew hears MG fire, and the infantry ahead of them hit the dirt and start carrying out their reaction on contact drills - which involves them shooting back. The sound of the MG and the sight of the infantry chewing dirt draw the attention of the crew commander - he now knows there's a contact to his front, pretty much instantly. This intensifies the scan, and between the sound/sight of the actual contact itself, plus the reactions of the other units (ie, they're all shooting at a particular place) this helps him locate the contact on his own. Then, because his standing orders are to support the infantry, he opens up on the contact. There's a delay there, ranging from "instant" (MG was directly in front of him in LOS and in the open) to some other value (a bush was blocking LOS and the tank had to manoever a little bit to get LOS) but the net result was a contact established without having to get information directly from anybody else. Agreed, but where _this_ gets slippery is trying to accomodate subordinates using their initiative. Every subordinate has some degree or another of freedom, and within the limits of that freedom they are free to act as they see fit. In my simulator example, I had pretty much total freedom, with the only real limits being the physical ones imposed by the danger of approaching the sabre squadrons whilst they were embroiled in a firefight. In most other cases, my command freedom was much more restricted. So in game terms, the act of clicking on a squad and giving it new instructions doesn't necessarily mean that it is getting new orders from some higher HQ - it could be acting on its own initiative, or (in the case of infantry sqauds particularly) it might be carrying out orders from the platoon commander based on HIS initiative (platoon commanders are usually in intimate contact with their sections) Agreed. No platoon should ever lack an HQ. Neither should any company (a platoon HQ should be promoted to company HQ if the company HQ is eliminated) There does have to be a delay here though. This is one decision that doesn't happen instantly. Furthermore, if a HQ crew bails out, it should be able to commandeer a vehicle from its own unit and resume its duties. One of the biggest real-world messages that my time in the simulator communicated was the VITAL importance of Recce always staying at LEAST one tactical bound ahead of the LOS of the sabre units. Recce is always under a lot of pressure to keep up the rate of advance with dire threats about what happens should the zipperheads start to catch you up. This was always sort of a vague academic concern, until I started getting my ass smoked by zipperheads whose gunnery skills exceeded their AFV recognition skills. Get shot out of enough vehicles and the lesson starts to take hold.... Actually, there was. When D Squadron pulled out, and when I realized that they weren't just taking up defensive positions near the start line, I was on the radio to the overall force commander to. uh... express my displeasure. He then made the command decision that attempting to reign in the sabre squadronds and get them formed back up on the startline (and all the chaos that such an order would create) would be more effort than it was worth, and in the worst case, mught wind up the the enemy bumping them while still disorganized. Sometimes even commanders have to ride the wave. But in retrospect, this was the correct decision. Plans go wrong all the time; it is the nature of plans to do so. Effective commanders adjust their plans to fit the situation, adapt, and overcome. The game must not prevent this. DG [ October 25, 2004, 06:43 AM: Message edited by: Dennis Grant ]
  12. And I would hope that in so doing, they installed the desire to accomplish the mission above all else. The point is to WIN. You don't soldier to lose. DG
  13. Oh I agree that I shamlessly manipulated my knowledge of the enemy (I knew size, TO&E, and enemy goals - and from that, a likely plan)I manipulated the limitations of the simulator (the secure flank on the edge of the map, the nature of "woods") and I manipulated the scenario victory conditions. But the point, gentlemen, was to WIN. To accomplish the mission I was given to the best of my ability given the tools and conditions provided. Subordinates do that. BTW, I don't agree that jumping out of a dead vehicle and taking control of new one was "cheating". There's plenty of historical precident for this - as there is for AFV crews carrying on as infantry. As far as the adventure goes... yeah, it was a bold move; made bolder by the fact that I knew there could be very little in the way of negative fallout, given that ultimately, it WAS just a game. A very realistic game... but a game nonetheless. Incidently, I wasn't "disobeying orders" - I was completely within my authority to do what I did - and it worked. Anyway, the point of all this is, ideally, every subordinate on the battlefield is doing everything he can to contribute to the success of the mission. The purpose of the game is to allow someone to play out combat scenarios and to essay to duplicate the best that a mission can go. That control is a FEATURE, not a bug. Without the control... why bother? As far as the "you think you're good at CM crack" I really don't know what brought that on. I don't agree with you that the current command system in CM is in any way broken. I don't think that "borg spotting" is anywhere near the big deal that you make it out to be. And I have a certain amount of RL experience to back up those opinions. Does disagreeing with you constitute an ego? DG
  14. I hate to break this to you, but if you DON'T want to win at all costs, then I sure don't want you anywhere near any army I'm a part of. I'm not in it to lose. I'll give you an example. My unit was in Knox on the big armoured simulator rig. If you've never seen/heard about this, it's a huge game deal with individual vehicle simulators all wired into the big 3D battlefield. You see through the sights and vision blocks what you would see in the real vehicle. I've been told that the latest upgrade is displays that left crew commanders go open hatches, but when I was there it was all hatches down - sure 'nuff taught you how to navigate out the vision blocks! Anyway, we've been there a week, and the culmunation of the deal is a big fight between our regiment and another regiment. It was set up as a "capture the flag" scenario, where the first side to capture the other side's flag (which followed similar rules to CM) won. The biggest difference between my regiment and our erstwhile opponents is me - I've got command of 60, Regimental Recce, a 7 car Bradley troop, whereas everybody else on the battlefield is in M1A1s. My job is to go out, make contact with the enemy, force them to deploy on ground that may not be to their advantage, and then relay info back to the sabre squadrons so they can hit 'em from an unexpected direction. Unfortunately the commander of D squadron has never worked with recce before, and is a little unclear on the concept of waiting on the start line while recce goes forward to find the bad guys. So at H-Hour, his squadron goes roaring forward, and the other squadrons follow suit. I try and race him for about a minute, but Bradleys are slower than M1s, and I can see I'm going to get left behind. So I put my guys into a flank defense position and start thinking about what to do next. While I'm busy fuming, I hear our sabre squadrons smash into their sabre squadrons, and pretty soon there's a full-scale brawl going on to which everybody is committed. ....except me and my guys. I get a sudden bit of inspiration. We've left a couple of taks back at our flag to act as last-ditch defense, and I'm willing to bet that the other side has done the same thing. If that's the case, I outnumber the flag defenders 2 to 1, and I'm actually free to roam the battlefield, so long as I avoid the area of the main fight. So I get my guys to advance down the left side of the map - because I know my left flank is safe if I do that. Gamey? Goddamn right. But the gods of battle don't give you a 100% secure flank very often, so when I have one I USE it. As we approach the far edge of the map, there's a section of woods butted up against that edge, with another pair of wooded areas along the left edge with a gap between them. In this game, woods were represented by dome structures with tree textures mapped onto them. Woods didn't affect movement, but LOS was blocked ito and out of them - like being inside a big green tent. I'm moving my troop from woods to woods to keep us from getting spotted. As we cross the gap, one callsign at a time, a tank halfway inside the woods on the far edge starts taking potshots at us. I figure that 1) that's where the flag is and 2) the jig is up; Mr Tank is going to move to intercept us, probably calll for help, and we'll get decimated. I'm last in line, and I get my callsign shot out from under me. I decide that I managed to bail out no worse for wear, and take over the junior callsign (I'm the commander, that's my perogative and my duty, and I'm not going to abandon my guys unless I am physically restrained) But as it turns out, the guy in the tank is the most junior commander on the other side, he has been told to "stay here and protect the flag", and he never puts 2 and 2 together to figure out he's being outflanked. Meanwhile, we circle around behind his wooded tent, out of sight, and come up right behind him at point blank range. 6 Bradleys open up on him, and knock him out after a few seconds of firing. As soon as he is knocked out, Bingo! Game ends. Recce wins. Gamey? Sure it was. But a subcommander took an opportunity, used his initiative, and carried out the intent of his commander's plan (capture the flag) And as far as all the sexy modern technology... man, you'd be amazed at how often in breaks down or doesn't work. My troop operated 100% on hand signals in the advance, specifically to break reliance on radios - and because it was assumed that enemy RDF equipment would be in operation and overuse of the radio would get you killed. We could operate incredibly efficiantly using nothing more than hand signals and gestures - when you all have binos, hand signals can be VERY specific. DG
  15. But I don't think it's necessarily unrealistic. You don't need radios to co-ordinate this sort of thing in RL. You'd be amazed what you can accomplish by shouting, hand signals, exaggerated gestures, and so on. And as we have been discussing, a leader with a good concept of how he fits into the overall mission plan and with good situational awareness may, on his own initiative (and especially if he has guidence in orders) choose to do the "right" thing instead of the "obvious" thing. A simple order of "unbuttoned tank crews are priority tagets - shoot at them before all else" and suddenly it's no longer gamey. Yes, because the player is the single mind inhabiting the minds of all the units on the map, the in-game commanders all have the same level of situational awareness, and if the controlling player is any good, that level of situational awareness can be very high. But while having everybody in an operation that switched on was undoubtedly very rare from a historical perspective, it IS possible for units with good leaders and a lot of experience to act as is they had one single controlling mind. That whole initial planning stage goes a long way to making that happen. That mean, in game terms, that it needs to be _possible_ for everything to go right - and as soon as you have the AI intude itself into the operation of the plan, you loose that ability. As it stands now, we already have some of that with the morale model. It sure 'nuff doesn't need to get MORE intrusive. The only way to get fully realistic behviour the way you seem to want it would be to either give the player control over one and only one unit, and let the AI drive everybody else, or to make the game multiplayer with one actual human for every in-game unit. Where's the fun in that? I don't know about you, but I play to win; I don't play to watch my plan go all FUBAR and watch my guys run in ever-diminishing circles. I get enough of that when the plan is flawed - don't force it on me when the plan is good. DG
  16. That's not gamey at all. That's properly co-ordinating your forces for best effect. And I assure you that infantry are not above taking potshots at crew commanders with their heads poking up. A section popping away at a tank like that is entirely appropriate RL behavior. DG
  17. OK, I agree that once the shooting starts, plans get modified - in fact, the chaos that contact turns loose is actually part of the plan. But subunits have a certain amount of leeway, and they have an understanding of the operational concept of the plan. The plan, for example, can survive the death of the company commander, or platoon commanders, or section commanders. 2IC, take over! A good deal of what happens once the shooting starts is based on drills and practice and SOPs. Sections know what to do when they come under fire. Platoons know what to do when they come under fire. Companies know what to do etc etc etc and a lot of it is the same thing, scaled up. And a lot relies as well on the judgement and initiative of subcommanders. A section commander may try and take out a trench on his own, or he may feel it's too tough and the platoon commander may do a platoon attack instead. Or maybe it's too tough for a platoon, and it winds up being a company attack instead. Weither or not a given objective is "too tough" or not is a combination of experience, assesement, and orders given previously - plus the operational state at any given point in time. A LOT depends on the individual leadership skills of subcommanders. In game terms though, the player "inhabits" the minds of each and every subcommander - and this is always going to be so in a game of this type. As such, the unit (taken as a whole, ie, all the player's forces on the battlefield) is supremely well intergrated; perhaps better than is strictly speaking historically the case. But speaking from experience, a well-drilled, well-led, experienced unit, when everything goes right, can seem to act as if it were controlled by one mind. This rarely happens in RL, but it can happen on occasion, and everybody involved is trying very hard to make it happen that way. Last night I played the "Tiger, Tiger" scenario in CMBB as Axis. I set it up and played it as an infantry company attack with tanks in support, right flanking. I did platoon-level overwatch, meaning that no platoon moved until the movement platoon was fixed and arranged in formation - so there was usualy a turn or two or three between platoon moves, as the pongoes move slowly when they are walking. Result? Total victory, 87%. It would have been higher, but I lost three of my Panzer 3s in my reserve troop to a T34 who snuck down the left side of the map, and I didn't see him because I never needed the reserve and didn't notice that they got picked off until the end of the scenario. That attack played out as THE perfect company attack. It was absolutly textbook. Is that realistic? I think it is. Rare, yes. But nothing happened that was outside the realm of impossibility. And part of wargaming in general is to see how well you can do if things go perfectly (from a command and control perspective at least) I think that taking away that control would reduce a great deal of the fun factor of the game. Where it falls down a little bit is lacking some houskeeping shortcuts (like formations, road following, etc) but on the realism front, I think it does exceptionally well. In particular, I think y'all make way too big a deal over "borg spotting". I like the idea of a toggle-able map overlay view - I really like it, in fact. A well-practiced unit can derive 90% of the plan just from looking at the trace map. The trace is a VERY efficiant way of transmitting information. But the trace isn't the battle, if you follow my meaning. DG
  18. ...except that isn't how it works in RL. The sort of actions that you need to take to make CM units act like they would in RL represent the units acting (mostly) on their own initiative, not via direction for some overachieving commander. Let's see if I can give you an example. OK, so you've got an infantry company assigned to advance up a given corridor and take an objective - let's say a hill. Country is open ground, gently rolling. The company commander is given a map overlay that has his objectives marked on it, his unit boundries (ie, his company left and right flanks) and the locations of any administrative info he might need - MIPS, GIPS, TRPs, phase lines, whatever. He gets a briefing as to what he is to accomplish, what resources are allotted to him, what the enemy is expected to be, his timings, and other command/control/admin info he needs. In game terms, we can consider his left and right boundries to be the edges of the map. OK, so then the company commander goes out and studies the map, does a recce of the ground as best he can, comes up with a plan, draws up his own map overlay, and then issues his own briefing - which is a variant on the briefing HE received earlier, but drilled down to his subunits. Assuming a 4-platoon company, he might have decided to advance 3 up, one back - so now his map overlay has platoon boundries on it. Maybe there's 3 roads that cross his corridor - maybe now they have phase lines on them. Etc. Each platoon comander has a certain amount of leeway as to what he can do within his corridor, and he has certain contraints placed upon him (like maybe he can't cross a phase line until ordered to do so) He will then do his own map recce, his own ground recce, and issue his OWN orders to his platoon - which, in turn, are drilled-down versions of the orders he got from his company commander. Normally, these orders are delivered to ther section commanders only, and then THEY go out and do their recce etc and give those orders to their sections - although with experience behind them, these section orders are likely to be very brief, and will probably concentrate on what is different about this advance versus the previous hundered. A squad leaders' orders might wind up something like this: "OK 1 section, we're advancing on Hill 123 tomorrow. The company is advancing 3 up, one back, and we're the left flank platoon. We're going 3 sections up with heavy weapons back, and we're the middle section. 2 section is on our left and 3 section is on our right. We're going to move in successive leapfrong bounds by section with 2 section moving first, then us, then 3. These three roads are phase lines, so don't cross them until the Lt tells us to. If we make it to phase line Apple here without contact, the arty is going to fire on the objective for a little bit and then switch to smoke, and then our platoon is going to move up on the left flank and assault the hill from the side with the other 2 platoons supressing. If we make contact before then, carry out the usual action on contact drill and supress, and the Lt and the Major will figure out if we'll take out the contact ourself or use one of the other platoons to do it. We cross the LOD at 06:00 tomorrow, inspection at 05:00. Any questions?" OK, so at 05:59, everybody is lined up at the LOD, which in game terms is the setup phase. At 06:00, the leftmost squad on each platoon (assuming the other 2 platoons had the same plan) steps off and moves to the next little batch of high ground, drops on their bellies, has a look, and then waves the next section forward. They move past the first section up to the next bit of high ground forward, drop on their bellies, look around, and wave the next section along. When they reach a phase line, everybody moves up to the line until everybody is caught up, the platoon commanders rep[ort to the company commander when their guys are all in place, then the CC orders them across the phase line, and it all repeats. Etc. That's how it works in real life. Now in game terms, in oder to make that happen you wind up having to click on each squad, drop down into ground view, slide forward to the next little rise, do a "move" command to just short of the crest, a "sneak" command to the crest, yadda yadda yadda. You are giving each squad a pretty detailed set of commands. But those commands DON'T represent the company commander shadowing each squad and telling them what do do at each step. Instead, each section is carrying out a PROCESS "on their own initiative" and reacting to the ground ahead. The amount of GAME COMMANDS required to make the in-game units follow this process is not indicitive of how many commands the COMMANDER issued. See what I'm getting at? DG
  19. The problem is that so much depends on so much else. Let's say that Germany leaves Italy out to dry, avoiding the Balkans. Barbarossa starts on schedule. Moscow is captured. Stalin surrenders. OK, now what? Would the Red Army respect that surrender? Would the Soviet Union remain intact? Suppose, for example, immediately following Stalin's surrender, the Ukraine declares independance from the Soviet Union (a reasonable thing to happen) Does Ukraine attempt to liberate Russia, or do they declare neutrality? If they go neutral, does Hitler respect it, or does he invade ? Etc etc etc. DG
  20. Slightly off topic.... do you suppose you could post an excerpt from the radio trasmissions the site talks about in Steel Victory? I'd love to see how things have changed since then. DG
  21. Does it actually make any difference in game terms though? DG
  22. Nope. In fact, we're equipping them with new sights. A 1960s-era fictional WWIII game could be cool. Centurions vs T-52s! Woot! And I want my Ferrets! DG
  23. I agree with Capt Pies here. Anything that stops me from clicking on an individual unit and making it do something - no matter how smart or stupid - is counter to the purpose of the game as far as I am concerned. I think there are improvements that could be made to reduce the amount of micro-management required (things like formations, group waypoints, and so on) but these don't change the underlying nature of the game; they just change the amount and pattern of mouseclicks to get the same thing to happen. It might be interesting, for example, to have an "overlay view" that turned on/off markings from the trace (unit bounderies, phase lines, objectives, MIPS and GIPS, etc) but I'd hate to see those overlay objects actually affect gameplay ie a squad from 1 Platoon refuse to cross the 2 Platoon boundary. DG
  24. Your first premise I agree with, but I disagree with the second. The infantry don't need to actually talk to the tank to get it to do anything. The tank is populated with a fully-functional crew entirely capable of making its own decisions and taking it's own actions. It's _nice_ (and where possible, such as modern times where everybody has a radio, common practice) to quickly touch base with each other to help co-ordinate actions and avoid fratricide. But where that is not possible (for whatever reason) you fall back on established SOP and the personal initiative of the commanders. Furthermore, missions don't spring out of the vacuum. An advance to combat with infantry leading and tanks in direct support would have been preceeded by a serious of orders groups where the concept of the operation would have laid out and a number of co-ordination actions would have been explicitly spelled out. Details vary nation to nation (and commander to commander) but you can count on all the subalterns having a map with the trace on it and (time permitting) they would have gone up to the start line to recce out the ground as best they could before the fact. The quality of this is going to vary a lot, and so is hard to quantify in game terms... but there is a lot more pre-H-hour preparation going on than seems to be realized. During the actual advance, the tanks will have orders as to what to do on contact, and will (if the mission commander has any brains at all) will be positioned such that the limits of their forward LOS correspond to the limits of LOS of the main body of the infantry. In open country where visibility is good, the separation could well be upwards of 200m. In close country, separation is going to be far closer - terrain dictates. On contact, the infantry is going to chew dirt and return fire. The act of everybody hitting the ground is going to draw the CC's attention (assuming he doesn't see the initial contact at the same time as the infantry) He gets further clues as to where the contact is coming from via the way the infantry position themselves and from watching where their tracers are going (and from rifle fire, where the dust is being kicked up) He _should_ be able to spot where the fire is coming from in short order, and if he cannot, he'll move around until he can. Once spotted, he'll (probably - depends on SOPs) engage. This isn't the same thing as "borg spotting", but a trained crew properly positioned should be capable of spotting and returning fire as fast or faster (they aren't chewing dirt) than the infantry they are supporting. If they are NOT capable of such, then they are being mismanaged. Here's the problem with that: you, as the player, "are" that squad. Your invisible, all-controlling hand inhabits that squad every bit as much as you do the commanding units. You have to be; the AI is not sophisticated enough to be able to duplicate the potential of an enterprising squad leader acting under his own initiative. In RL, sections do not just pin and sit around waiting for someone to tell them what to do; they actively seek to carry out their last orders and/or destroy the enemy. So in this case (in RL) the section commander is going to attempt to get fire on the enemy to supress him, ir if he cannot, withdraw to cover. Then he is likely to send a runner to the platoon commander to inform him of the situation, and then come up with a plan as to what to do next. He might choose to assault the enemy directly. He might choose to supress and wait for further instructions. He might choose to break contact, and attmpt to find another route to carry out the originally intended flanking attack on the first position. He might even choose to break and run. But just because he is temporarily out of contact with a higher HQ doesn't make him hors de combat. DG
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