752ndTank

Enjoyed seeing this interpretation of the Cecina Tiger vs. Sherman engagement. For anyone interested, the accurate historical details that RawRecruit based his cartoon on can be found on my web page: http://www.752ndtank.com/cecina.html This page now includes some new Signal Corps film footage of GIs inspecting the wreck of Tiger 221 a few days after the battle. Bob

In case you're interested, there's a pretty decent photo of a Bren/Universal Carrier with a Vickers gun on my web page: http://www.752ndtank.com/SpecialDGPage2a.html Photo was taken in Bologna, Italy on 21 April 1945, and I believe it is from a Polish unit. The same web page also has a photo that might interest some of you. It shows an M4A1 of the 752nd Tank Battlion with an exit hole from an 88 that went in one side and clean through the other. Ciao!

Rob, The 16.SS-PzGdr (RFSS) fought in the battle for Cecina, as well as Rosignano, to name just two that I'm pretty familiar with. For a description of the Cecina action, I have a very detailed web page that references the 16.PzGdr: http://www.752ndtank.com/cecina.html In addition, I have a much more detailed account of it and more details on the German defenders in an English-language article I co-authored for After the Battle (Issue 114). For my Italian friends, I co-authored an earlier version of the article in an Italian language magazine called Storia e Battaglie (no. 4, Settembre 2000). Finally, I have a copy of the extremely well-detailed History of the RFSS called "Im gleichen Schritt und Tritt." It's 784 pages of highly detailed info, with tons of maps and photos, as well as copies of historical documents. If you can locate it, it's a great resource even though it is all in German. In addition, if you can get a book called Cecina Anni di Guerra, it will be worth your while. It's in Italian, but it contains references to the RFSS, as well as a few photos. Ciao.

A while back there was a thread going on here about my web article about Tiger 221 of the sPzAbt 504. My web article served as the basis for "Knife Fight in Cecina." Thought some of you might be interested in seeing a 20-second video clip that I posted of some GI's inspecting 221 after the engagement. The film footage was taken from the same angle as the well-published still photos. However, it provides some interesting close-ups of the 75mm penetration and the track damage. Besides, it's just real cool to see those 3 GI's in that famous still photo suddenly start MOVING! Video clip can be found at: http://www.752ndtank.com/cecina.html Ciao!

The ratio of enemy tanks destroyed per Tiger tank lost has been analyzed in an excellent book called "Sledgehammers," written by Christopher Wilbeck and released just a couple of weeks ago. This book is a very well done analysis of the strengths and flaws of Tiger tank battalions. In it, Wilbeck analyzes Tiger kills and losses for each Heavy tank battalion. He calculates kill ratios based on Tigers actually lost in combat, and also for total Tigers lost (including those Tigers lost to road accidents, fires, self-destruction, etc.). Kill ratios for Tigers lost in combat range from a low of 5.71:1 (sPzAbt 510) to a high of 50.00:1 (sPzAbt 103/503). The ratio based on all Tigers lost ranges from 1.28:1 (sPzAbt 508) to 13.00 (sPzAbt 502). There is considerable variation by battalion due to a lot of factors such as terrain, enemy, mission, experience, etc. However, this should at least establish a broad range of what's reasonable. BTW, the 50.000 ratio for the sPzAbt 103/503 is a real outlier. The next highest unit comes in at 19.10:1. The overall grand total ratio across all battalions is 12.16:1 based on Tigers lost in action, and 5.44:1 for all Tigers lost. Wilbeck also provides some other interesting statistics. He indicates that of all Tigers issued to the heavy tank battalions, 45% were lost in combat, 41% were destroyed by their crews, and 14% of the losses are unknown or due to other causes. This book is an exceptional piece of work, and provides a whole new perspective on the subject. It includes some very detailed information, plus some new photos and accounts of many engagements fought in the various fronts and campaigns. I wrote half of the book's epilogue, but do not profit from the sale of the book. The prologue was written by Tiger Ace Otto Carius. Hope this helps. Bob Holt http://www.752ndtank.com

None of the rocket launchers in the 752nd Tank Battalion were ever jettisoned. Armored fighting in the Northern Apennines during the winter of '44-45 was very static and indirect, so there was no reason to fire a rocket salvo and then quickly move up to support a direct attack with the 75mm. The launcher itself had to be installed by an ordnance company, and it was quite a time-comsuming project. Not to mention the fact that jettisoning the unit ran the risk of damage, and there were only 8 rocket tanks in the entire MTO at that time. When the 5th Army broke out of the mountains in April '45 in the push to Bologna and the Po River, the rocket tanks were left behind. They were great for use in static conditions, but were totally ineffective in a rapidly moving front. It took a crew of 5 men approximately two hours to unpack the rockets, load the 54 tubes, and wire the launcher. With this kind of time investment, plus the digging of trenches to gain maximum elevation and range, the rocket tanks could only realistically be employed in static situations. Bob http://www.752ndtank.com/rockettanks.html

Actually, the later 4.5 inch T34 rocket launchers in the 752 had a much greater range, and given the terrain in the Northern Apennines, the rocket tanks were used almost exclusively in indirect fire mode using forward observers. The tankers received target acquisition and fire effect information from the FO's via radio, and written transcripts of some of the 752 radio transmissions still exist. On my web page, I have photos of an abbey destroyed by a salvo of 53 rockets, fired from about 3800 yards via indirect fire. http://www.752ndtank.com/rockettanks.html Regarding losses, none of the 752nd rocket tanks were lost in combat. Rocket ammo, which actually was the same as that used by allied aircraft, was normally stockpiled near the rocket tank. In one instance, return fire from a German counterbattery struck almost on top of the rocket ammo dump next to one of the rocket tanks. The blast killed an officer who was standing beside the tank, but surprisingly it failed to detonate any of the rockets. Hope this adds some perspective. Bob http://www.752ndtank.com [ April 02, 2004, 10:28 AM: Message edited by: 752ndTank ]

Agree, but in combat the "right" conditions for employing optimal strategies seldom present themselves. There wasn't much of safe option once a tanker was out in the open in the midst of a raging battle, but the chances of survival were better in the field than in a crippled tank that was certain to draw a killing round. As long as a tanker is under fire, he may as well return fire to provide mutual support to the infantrymen who are trying to protect him. I've intervewed many vets of the 752nd who ended up fighting as infantry for a brief period. As bad an alternative as it was, they felt this approach provided a far better chance of survival than to sit tight in a disabled tank. Plus it was in keeping with their training, which was based on some hard lessons learned by other tankers earlier in the war (particularly at Kasserine). In the 752nd, 52 tanks were lost, affecting 260 crew members. Casualty analysis indicates that only one man was KIA after abandoning his tank in the midst of a battle. To see his story, go to: http://www.752ndtank.com/TheRock.html Bob http://www.752ndtank.com

The model is probably correct, though it may be based on the wrong decision rules. When a tank was hit, the LAST place the crew wanted to be was inside the vehicle manning the MGs without mobility and without an operational main gun. In that situation, the tank would have lost its effective value as an AFV, and the crew would be highly vulnerable. If a tank was immobilized but not KO'd in combat, standard practice on both sides was to pump another round or two into it to ensure that it was in fact destroyed beyond repair. The decision to stay in an immobilized tank or abandon it was obviously made by the TC, if he was still able to give the order. Specifically, FM 17-10 (Tactics and Techniques, March 1942) states: ********** 6) Disabled tanks - If the tank is completely immobilized, the tank commander determines whether the crew will continue the fire fight from the tank, repair the tank, fight on foot, or abandon the tank. He must consider the location of the tank as to concealment from hostile observation, and the field of fire obtainable. In the event he decides to fight on foot or abandon his tank, he and the other members of the crew follow the procedure prescribed in FM 17-5. ********** While technically the crew could stay in the tank and fight with the MGs, the "smart" thing to do in most combat circumstances was to abandon an immobilized tank. Tankers in the MTO were in short supply and they were an expensive commodity to train. As such, they were instructed to get out of a disabled vehicle and fight with the infantry or in another tank until the action was over. Staying inside a tank to man the .30 light MGs, while risking the lives of 5 experienced tankers, was not considered wise. This may not directly answer your question, but hopefully it adds a little technical and historical perspective. Bob http://www.752ndtank.com

How about U.S. Rocket Tanks? For a great web page that details Rocket Tank development and use in Italy, plus technical stats, operation, photos of actual firing, and photos of a church hit by a rocket salvo, go to: http://www.752ndtank.com/RocketTanks.html And how about mountainous terrain to add some Italian Campaign realism? Bob http://www.752ndTank.com

To the contrary, combat in-town was not as safe as you might think, and the "impregnable" buildings were a major liability to tanks. Here's a quote from the Armored Force Field Manual "Tactics and Techniques" Dated 7 March 1942: ********** 61. Combat in Towns. - a. General. - In general, armored vehicles are not suitable for combat in towns, particularly large towns. Towns offer concealment to large forces, observation is limited, fire effect is reduced, and combat deteriorates to that of small groups. Such localities enable the enemy to effectively use antitank weapons, barricades, demolitions, and mines. b. Attack of a town. - Armored units, if practicable, avoid attacking towns. If attack must be made, the town is encircled. A direct frontal attack is resorted to only when encirclement is impossible. ********** Attacking a Tiger in-town was no easy feat, and in fact it was considered deadlier than attacking in more open terrain. As for the safety of "impregnable" buildings, a German 88 could easily penetrate the stone wall of a building and take out a Sherman hiding inside or on the far side of the building. This is precisely what Cecina's Tiger 221 was attempting to do between the first and second engagements -- blindly firing into the surrounding buildings, hoping to draw out or knock out the hidden Sherman. More importantly, the buildings provided good cover for Panzerfausts and snipers, which caused more casualties in the 752nd than enemy tanks did. I hope this adds a bit of historical and technical accuracy. Bob Tiger Engagement in Cecina [ March 19, 2004, 10:12 PM: Message edited by: 752ndTank ]

Shermans were prone to burning when penetrated by large caliber weapons. The intense heat of the fire changed the molecular composition of the steel, which essentially softened it to the point where it offered little, if any, ballistic protection against future engagements. So if the tank burned, as usually happened, it was not patched because all of the surrounding steel would have lost its integrity. However, patches were used in those rare cases where no fire occured, and the interior damage was not too significant. See my website for a rare view of an obviously patched Sherman in the 752nd Tank Battalion. It's the last photo on the following page: Patched Sherman in Italy Patches were also used on Tigers in the same circumstances. See my web page below for a photo of a patched Tiger. The last picture on the page is Tiger 712 of the 501 sPzAbt in North Africa. Note the rectangular patch on the side of the turret. This patch had been applied to cover a hole from an earlier penetration by a Churchill. Patched Tiger in Tunisia Hope this is of some interest. 752nd Tank Battalion in WWII [ March 13, 2004, 10:33 AM: Message edited by: 752ndTank ]

If anyone wants to bookmark this page or see more details about this knocked out Tiger in Cecina, go to: Tiger in Cecina

Mud was a real problem for armor in Italy, especially during the rainy months in the spring and fall. Sherman tanks had relatively short and narrow tracks, and the relatively small "footprint" created a high ground pressure. This left Shermans prone to sinking into soft ground. In the winter, the ground would go through freeze-thaw cycles, with the tank sinking deeper and deeper into the ground as the cycles progressed. This problem was alleviated to some extent by the introduction of "duckbill" track extenders (also called "floats"), which added more surface area to reduce ground pressure. To see a photo of a Sherman that is bogged down in Italy, see the second photo on the following web page: Bogged Sherman in Italy Hope this helps. 752nd Tank Battalion in WWII

Thanks for your interest, guys. When I designed my website, I was limited by both server storage and bandwidth. As a result, I chose to go with tons of reasonably sized thumbs and lots of historical information, as opposed to fewer but bigger and clearer photos and less information. This also gives me a little more room to add new topics and new photos. I've got more stuff in the works, so stay tuned. 752nd Tank Battalion in WWII