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undead reindeer cavalry

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Posts posted by undead reindeer cavalry

  1. the primary effect was of course things other than destroying tanks. i don't think anyone is saying otherwise.

    arguments become revisionism when "empirical evidence" is distorted to support conclusions about subjects it does not deal with.

    for example none of the studies quoted deal with the subject of CAS probabilities to hit or damage tanks. i would understand some of the arguments if the quotes were from the more detailed studies (for example the similar WW2 era reports in "Air Power at the Battlefront" contain remarks about the effects of 500 kg bombs to tanks at different distances from the bomb craters) or from studies dealing with the actual subject (e.g. theoretical & recorded accuracy & effects of various CAS methods).

    but as is the arguments draw their conclusions from data that does not deal with the subject. it's just like saying that M16 is so inaccurate that your chance of hitting a man size target is 0.001%, because it took x number of bullets per dead enemy in Vietnam.

  2. Firstly as pointed out previously averages can only take you so far.

    that's naturally true.

    What is BF and players are most interested in is what is the likelihood of a single CAS mission destroying a tank and given the Mortain sortie rate the answer must be vanishingly small - but not impossible. :)

    heh yes. the trials and battlefield reports are quite clear that things like rockets are far too inaccurate to hit individual tank size targets. the highest hit % i have ever seen for rockets is 2% (besides the 5% on field trials), and it's usually given to be aroud 0.1-0.5%. though when you have a number of planes firing full salvos at tank concentrations the inaccuracy may not matter that much.

    if someone wanted to have historical CAS effects in CM, the CAS should just make non-veteran crews abandon their tanks. i am sure this would drive most players crazy, so i can't blame BFC if the crews don't behave in that way in CM :D

  3. In short, if you want to compare Soviet 5% loss number to Normandy, it comes out to be pretty close to the revised numbers of the assessment teams.

    i don't want to compare Soviet numbers directly, but i had the same thought that the numbers might get quite close to the assessment teams numbers.

    on the other hand i have never looked at the total numbers gathered by those teams. for example if you look at the numbers gathered by the operations research teams around Mortain (as quoted earlier in this thread), of all found panzers the CAS was the cause of loss in 19.6% and 23.5%. :eek: for ground fire it was 43.5% and 35.3%. so the ratio between CAS and ground fire was 1:2 and 2:3. :confused:

    of course Mortain would be an exceptional case, because of the high number of CAS sorties etc, but those numbers are still very high and i don't understand why they are used as examples of CAS ineffectiveness vs tanks.

  4. War wide statistics hold no value when looking at any one specific period of time. Especially when calculating several years of war on pretty much every type of terrain imaginable with armor concentrations that were at times incredible. Therefore, your calculations aren't very useful.

    And let's not forget... for the first 2 years of the war the Germans had air supremacy. In 1943 it turned to something like spotty air parity. It was only in 1944 and 1945 that the Germans definitely didn't have air superiority

    the percentage remains constant thru the war, even to the very end. i think it's fair to speculate (and the army/front reports i have seen support it, as does the German practice on the use of the air arm) that most of the losses went to large tank formations (armies, corps) of active Fronts. in that way i think it's comparable to Germans in Normandy, as both cases have high tank concentrations.

    the 10-20 figure is the loss figure, not the total write-off figure (so not just 5% of 89 000). that's why your number is different. :) i think i used 4 as the multiplier. you can use other multiplier, but the scale of losses is still very high and IMHO implies tactical relevancy (just like German reports do).

  5. claims are one thing, the other is how the opposing side credits their own losses. for example Soviets credit about 5% of their total tank write-offs to German air. divide it by the number of days in the war and multiple by a temporary : permanent ratio, and you get something like 10-20 Soviet tanks lost per day to German air.

    perhaps antique divibombers operating without airsuperiority were 100 times more effective than Allied CAS in Normandy, but i highly doubt it.

  6. What blows me away is that the German population are expected and DO work hard until 65 when they finally reach retirement age and can enjoy some return on all the taxes they've paid while the Greek equivalent insist it's their right to still retire at 55 and get bailed out by the EU (read Germany mainly) to maintain the privilege. How does that work?

    at least German banks had a part in making those bad calls. there are EU citizens who don't have the luxury of enjoying that excuse. so they pay for both the Portugese etc AND Germans. epic win?

  7. as some of you may remember from past, i am big supporter of the idea of a much stronger EU, though one built on transparity and liberties.

    some of you may also be aware of the results of recent Finnish parliamentary elections, in which True Finns party won a stunning victory. i myself didn't vote them and i still remain a bit skeptical about the party and its policies. however, they are becoming more attractive almost each time i hear them speak.

    while foreign media has often mislabelled True Finns as fascists or nazis, that's not really the case. i won't get to why i think so, but instead would like to provide a link to an article written by the chairman of the party for the Wall Street Journal: Why I Won't Support More Bailouts . i think the article expresses in quite a clear way how the True Finns party rejects the traditional pragmatical "realpolitik" policies practiced by Finland (e.g. in this subject, "we know it's fooked, but the best way to influence it is by supporting it so that we get to have some say over it").

    i know some of you guys posting here on general like to talk about economics, so i would be interested to hear your opinion about the ideas expressed in the linked article.

  8. i think the number 1 problem is the scale. it's hard to keep the game realistic AND keep the results open. you can see this quite well in AARs of this game -- it's as if no matter what you, the end state of the game is still going to be the same.

    while it's great that these games are still being made, and i myself do buy most of them, in the end it doesn't matter if you play East Front in Apple II (created almost three decades ago) or the game in question in this thread. if you consider the amount of work it takes to play the game, especially in games like the HOI series, i am not so sure if it's more wise to paly East Front in Apple II emulator or some modern game of the same subject.

  9. M1 Tank Platoon is one of those games that really set expectations to whole new levels. the sad thing with it, and other ones like Panzer Strike / Typhoon of Steel, is how companies and game designers fall trapped in the nihilistic rat race of computer game business.

    sure, Steel Beasts is a bit like a modern version of M1 Tank Platoon & CM is a bit like a modern version of Panzer Strike, but they both are in the end inferior versions. i do not say this to badmouth CM or BFC, as i hold CM with the highest respect of all modern game series. i just think that if you compare the system specs of late 1980 and the games running on those systems, the modern versions of those games fall flat of meeting the expectations. e.g. if you think of M1 TP, the real failings it has are the weak AI and lack of infantry simulation -- then if you look at Steel Beasts it's still the same.

  10. "Kampfgruppe" ... was fascinated, but did not have a manual (was a kid back then), so I did not get very far with it.

    the manual of Kampfgruppe is quite cool. i still occasionally browse it as toilet reading. i wish modern games had manuals like they had back then. for example Kampfgruppe manual has anything from a tactical level ww2 short story to the actual code used in game's calculations for suppression.

    the field manual style of CMBN's manual is pretty cool.

  11. it would be so cool if by the time CM returns to the east front:

    - individual men would adjust their positions a bit more

    - suppression effects would be increased

    - squad leaders would be simulated (teams dash & duck, bouding overwatch with teams, volley firing -- some of this is up to player but not 100%)

    - platoon leaders would be simulated (seems this is still missing)

  12. i don't mind the losses caused by pushing hard. what bothers me, a bit, is the way those losses are created.

    it looks like it's easy to shoot the enemy dead with small-arms fire, and from quite a range.

    it also looks like the TacAI is a bit weak on self-preservation side, letting men run, stand or kneel when under fire. in general it seems men die instead of becoming suppressed. it also seems like the improvements to the positioning of individual men are still not quite where i was hoping they would be (e.g. crawl 2 meters to be able to shoot while laying down, instead of shooting while standing). hopefully it's something to do with playstyle.

    perhaps the demo will prove it's better than it looks like. and it's still just a game anyway, no need to be 100% perfect. it already looks like Close Combat 3D and the tanks aren't spinning nearly as much! :)

    btw regarding green troops, it's the green troops that should push on and die and the veterans who should call it a day and live to fight another day.

  13. my strategy is blissful ignorance. holding my breath, almost wetting myself, while watching the VAARs. doing my best to not see anything bad, covering my eyes with the fingers of one hand while quickly skipping the movie forward with the other one. then i realize it looks like a facepalm, so i cover my eyes with both hands. but it's great! the pixeltruppen slowly make their way forward, dashing & ducking from one piece of cover to the next, while supporting weapons force the defenders to keep their heads down. then finally, at the end of a short mortar barrage, the assault groups rise up and the close-assault is in its way, grenades flying, smgs burstings, man agaisnt man, URAAAAA!!11 after a short but fierce battle the positions are overrun and the defenders flee in panic. but it's not over yet, a counter-attack is on it's way, but at that point i faint of pure excitement.

  14. Tactically, even when the Germans had superiority, they did not succeed.

    A good example is the defence of Putot-en-bassin and Bretteville by the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade on june 7-10. They were attacked by the 12th SS Panzer division, but by employing proper defensive positions backed up by AT guns and pre-registered artillery, the 7th Bde stopped all the attacks cold.

    The 12th commander, Kurt Meyer, later admitted he had underestimated the canadians, employing tactics that had worked on the Ostfront (basically charging his tanks at the canadian positions) but that were useless against well trained troops.

    on June 7th Putot was attacked by a single infantry battalion of 12th SS. the Canadian battalion defending Putot was encircled and routed. Putot was then attacked by 24th Lancers (a British cavalry regiment). then the tanks of the 24th withdrew. then another Canandian battalion, supported by a company of tanks, attacked Putot. because the German battalion had no AT assets, and had just experienced an attack by a tank regiment, they had to withdraw from Putot.

    the Canadian battalion originally defending Putot suffered 265 losses. the other Canadian battalion that retook Putot lost 125 men. the German battalion that attacked, took and then withdrew from Putot lost 98 men.

    you count which side had superior forces in the battle, and what the odds of the attack were and what the the results look like from that perspective.

    i know this initial battle is not what you are after, but i don't have time to deal with the later battles properly at the moment.

  15. I think there are two reasons for this. The first is that the Germans were caught VERY unprepared to fight in Normandy against any force of any size, not to mention a huge one that was capable of hitting lines of communications pretty much any time it wanted to.

    that's exactly because of the staff. earlier someone commented that Germans had been preparing defences for 4 years, but that's not the case. similarly it was up to the staff how to position the panzer divisions and so forth. it was also up to the staff to consider the initial actions after the landings and by a great extended the latter ones as well.

    even if they can't do something smart, like redo the "backhand blow" after they recognize what the situation is around mid June, the way they run the operations is still their call.

    So the Germans were in a perpetual state of confusion the entire campaign.

    lol yeah, even corps level staffs often don't know what whole divisions are doing or where actually they are. the way they use the units is clumsy and, uhh, confused. it's the same every case. it's systematic failure. just like summer 1941.

    The second reason I see is that when the Germans attacked they faced the same problems the Allies did when they were on the attack. The terrain favors the defender and standard maneuver tactics simply don't work.

    the corps & higher staffs don't organize a single good attack. they just waste the mostly excellent tactical units in confused useless attacks on meaningless tiny objectives. when they try to do something bigger everything falls apart. and in the end there is even no need for Germans to make a single unfavorable attack in the terrain once the situation becomes clear. they failed to adapt and make things work and instead wasted the excellent tactical level material.

    The difference is the Allies had lots and lots of practice to figure out how to attack through the terrain, the Germans almost none.

    it's not about the terrain. the result is similar mess when the terrain is different (for example consider Arracourt or the non-bocage areas in Normandy).

    Then it switched to a more traditional maneuver battle and the Germans were too worn out and shell shocked to respond aggressively. They DID execute an amazingly good withdrawal though, of course aided by Allied supply line problems.

    imagine if they started doing it mid June. :D

  16. I hardly think you can blame the German staffs for the faliure of the German large scale attacks in the ETO.

    they, as an organization, is what did run the show. the organization, chain of command or whatever one wants to call it, was clearly broken and unable to execute offensives of corps size or larger.

    By this time, the Germans were so outmatched that any large scale attack had no chance of succeding.

    i don't buy that. the tactical units on their hands were of excellent quality and in sufficient numbers. they simply failed to play their cards well.

    The allied airpower obliterated any attempt to maneuver with any substantial forces.

    i can't think of any single case where that happened.

    Hitler insisted on the counterattack after Cobra, even though the German commanders told him it was impossible. The forces were too depleted after the Normandy fighting, and there was no chance of any success. They wanted to retreat beyond the Seine to avoind being trapped. Hitler forced them to attack anyway, the offensive naturally failed, and many German troops were as a result trapped in the Falaise pocket.

    no matter what the chances for success, the counterattack was poorly executed.

    Even when the Germans managed to gather enough forces to gain a temporary local superiority (like during the battle of the Bulge, where they had to attack under cover of bad weather to avoid the allied air) the allies could eventually throw in their massive resources to counter and defeat the attack. After the weather cleared the German offensive in the Ardennes was doomed. They also were running out of supplies.

    again, ignoring the potential effect of the operation, the planning and execution was of poor quality.

    The Generals in charge of the forces and the staff officers of course knew all this, and they opposed pretty much every one of these failed attacks, but Hitler insisted on them, and replaced anyone who refused to carry out his orders.

    yes yes, but just because Rundstedt says he hates the idea of Bulge, it doesn't any less mean that the planning and execution of the offensive would not have been far from effective.

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