Jump to content

Rokossovski

Members
  • Posts

    402
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    1

Reputation Activity

  1. Like
    Rokossovski got a reaction from A Canadian Cat - was IanL in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.
  2. Like
    Rokossovski got a reaction from kluge in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.
  3. Like
    Rokossovski got a reaction from Audgisil in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.
  4. Upvote
    Rokossovski got a reaction from Kinophile in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.
  5. Upvote
    Rokossovski got a reaction from Aragorn2002 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.
  6. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to BlackMoria in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Color me confused.  Various factions of liars hammered out a deal to resolve this situation and everyone is taking whatever agreement as gospel.  Color me sceptical now.   How does anyone trust anyone to see this deal through?
  7. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    We are at HQ. 7:30 in the morning. Under [our] control military object of Rostov including airfield, airplanes that [are supposed] take off for combat work are taking off normally [implies they do not block these airplanes], no problems, medical airplanes take off normally, no problems. All we did we took control so assault avitaion [helicopters] do not strike us but UKR only. Main HQ-main point of troops control works normally, there is no problems at all, not a signle officer is taken from his duties. So, when they say to you that PMC Wagner disrupted the work [of HQ] and because of that something at front lines collapsed - [no] something collapsed at frontline not because of that. When we came here we again confirmed [discovered confirmation] a lot of new [things] [he clearly misspoke, it supposed to be - a lot of old thing]. A lot of territory is lost, a 3-4 times more [RU] soldiers dead than it is reported to higher ups [implies Putin], and what is reported is 10 times les than they say on TV [clearly misspoke again], medical losses [losses from all causes] in some days up to 1000 men per day. This is KIA, WIA, MIA + refusniks who refuse not because they are cowards but because see no other exit from situation. There is no ammo, there is no control . Chief of General Staff ran away from here as soon as he heard that we were approaching the building [let a woman pass greeted armed man who I believe is RU soldier not Wagnerite. The soldier impolitely turns away, Pri slightly humiliated turn to camera]
  8. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to dan/california in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Is there a way to do a poll on this forum software?
    I propose
    A actual Putin speaking sense, at least by Putin standards
    B Badly done deep fake
    C Recorded speech about fertilizer production or similar
     
  9. Upvote
    Rokossovski reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    it is the same video. Here are main points
    Evkurov and Alekseyv are old farts who decide nothings Prig - they shoot at us, we down them and will down everybody you would send because you are hitting civilians. You just destroyed a bus with civilians. you have no conscience [looks like they talk about RU helicopter attacks. Everybody is calm, MOD guys are calm and curious] Evkurov [a bit confused] - it is first time i hear it and [inaudible - some thing like let us..interupted as Prig turns toward Alekseyev] Alekseyev [in hilariously theatrical way] - I am not going to talk to you! Prig [slightly confused and humiliated old man turn to Evkurov] We were talking using You [plural - respectable form] why we started using You [singular - not respectable form]. Why do you talk to me using You [singular]?  Evkurov [confused] Nobody talk [to you] like that. I say do not generalize. Do you talk [to me] using You [plural] Prig - Yes, I talk to you using You [plural] Evkurov - so if we say [inaudible] Prig nodes. Evkurov - Let's think what we should do Prig - One more time, we came here to get [saying a bit theatrical] a chief of general staff and Shoigu. While they are not here...  Alekseyev [theatrically joking] take/grab them [like saying they, people of RU MOD, do not need these two, so Prig is free to take them]  Prig - While they are not here, we stay here and [continue to] block Rostov Evkurov [absolutely calmly, softly and politely but bit confused]- then I would like to ask you to get your troops out [inaudible] Prig - No! No way. Guys will stay here.  Evkurov - We also from this point of view... Prig - We do interrupt you from controlling the troops [in the field] Evkurov - Yes, certainly you should not interrupt anybody from controlling the troops [inaudible] Prig [calmly] Guys are dying because you are pushing them to be meat  Evkurov pickups ringing phone while saying to Prig - This is a question... Prig - This is not rhetorical question, because you are pushing them to be meet... no ammo, no thinking, without any plans   Evkurov to phone - hallo, yes [listens a bit, then looks confused and cancels the call - looks like some jornos called him] Alekseyev [calmly] - the biggest thing that upsets me most [inaudible something like you give Kiev something to celebrate with champaign] Prig - Nothing to worry about Evkurov [calmly drinks hot tea as if they are at old farts gathering] Prig - party at Kiev with champaign happens when you abandon Izum, Lyman and everything else. That's when party at Kiev happens for a whole week. And we are not running away from anywhere [Says man who ran away from Bakhmut]. Tha't why we came here to stop the shame of the country we live in. This is first [I  wanted to say] Evkurov [a bit ashamed] - [iaudible] are you were at [or ours something] Prig - Certainly, Yes, for this we Evkurov - [iaudible] why questions [could be to us] Prig [getting agitated] - listen one more time, if we would talk in normal tone, we would not come here on tanks Somebody behind camera - [iaudible something about shells - you promised us shells] Evkurov - [iaudible something like - you think Shoigy and Gerasimov to blame?] Prig [satisfied] - Yes, absolutely right. We save Russia The whole performance remind me old farts from last coupe (GKCHP) in 1991. The old farts pretending they know what they are doing and serving as cover for Yetsin rise. 
     
  10. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to sburke in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    and the long term damage to Russia's economy continues
    Russia's central bank sounds alarms on the economy as the falling ruble and record labor shortage add inflationary pressures (yahoo.com)
     
  11. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to DesertFox in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Looks good
     
     
  12. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to billbindc in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    The thing you won’t hear much in the analysis of the Biden administration is how unlike previous administrations this one is on Russia. For starters, they figured out that Putin was going to invade Ukraine, decided that the US was going to support Kyiv and began relentlessly pushing European allies *in April* of 2021. Why different? It’s not just the level of pre-planning, it’s also that Biden uniquely among recent American presidents had absolutely zero misconceptions about VVP, the strategic understanding of what a fallen Ukraine would mean and what a policy guy I know calls “**** it” old man energy. He’s a 78 year old guy who isn’t trying to set up some post Presidential foundation or get rich or whatever. He is just doing Ukraine right with all the tools at his disposal. 
    He’s certainly an older guy but if this is what old guys who trip on sandbags are like, I’ll take it.
  13. Upvote
    Rokossovski reacted to poesel in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Pentagon buys terminals and services from Starlink for Ukraine. That should stop any shenanigans from Musk (in this area...).
     
  14. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to billbindc in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Oh I don't know. He has been good enough on his feet to arrange the destruction of the Russian military with only 4% of the US military budget, thoroughly pantsed the GOP on the debt limit fight and Americans 25 to 54 are working at their highest rate since 2001.
    If that's not fit, I'll take more unfitness please.
  15. Like
    Rokossovski got a reaction from The Steppenwulf in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Two thoughts:
    (1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
    The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
    Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
    (2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
    Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!
  16. Like
    Rokossovski got a reaction from cyrano01 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Two thoughts:
    (1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
    The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
    Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
    (2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
    Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!
  17. Upvote
    Rokossovski reacted to MHW in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Norman Friedman wrote a 2009 book, Network-Centric Warfare, tracing the idea back through naval examples, starting with the Royal Navy in WWI. A battleship admiral of 1900 could only affect the battle that he could see—maybe twelve miles—but once cruisers started carrying high-powered radios, the Admiralty could direct ships clear on the far side of the globe. By mid-WWII, air battles and antisubmarine operations are all about sensors and tactical data systems.
    To your point: Friedman very much dislikes the term "network-centric warfare," and wishes instead that people had called it "picture-centric warfare." Talk about networks, and the issues immediately collapse into discussions of hardware and technical capabilities. Talking about a picture, now you can discuss the quality of your own picture, and you can plan to degrade your enemy's picture.
  18. Like
    Rokossovski got a reaction from danfrodo in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Two thoughts:
    (1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
    The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
    Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
    (2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
    Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!
  19. Upvote
    Rokossovski reacted to domfluff in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    On ISR as a force multiplier:

    I generally think the term "force multiplier" itself is a bit suspect, because it presupposes reducing combat strength to a single value, and then affecting that value with modifiers, which is a gross simplification. A useful fiction, perhaps, but shrug.

    As to the self-evident utility of ISR though, this (or any other enabler) were described by Clausewitz, in "Operating against a flank"
     
     
    Essentially, any enabler doesn't actually achieve anything by itself. I can put myself on your flank, but if I can't actually do anything with that, I'm not achieving anything. If I have perfect ISR, but no means to prosecute that, all I've learnt is exactly how screwed I am.
  20. Thanks
    Rokossovski reacted to The_Capt in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    So we are talking conventional peer (or near peer) warfare in this context.  How well it translates into unconventional conflict is a very big question.  One of the big issues we had in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan is that our entire ISR enterprise was built for this war and not those ones.  So we brought ISR designed to find an opponents center of gravity and tried to apply it to a COIN setting where centers of gravity are totally different.
    ISIL also found out the hard way that if you fight in the manner we are built for, it is bad.  Now if we meet someone who fights like Ukraine, more distributed, hybrid and unconventionally, we could face similar challenges as we had against the Taliban.  The UA is a far more conventional force than the TB but I can see how future conflict may drive opponents deeper into the unconventional space because they have observed what happens in an fully illuminated fight.
    On our end, we need to learn to fight in that entirely illuminated battlefield, first step will be to take a hard look at our structures, which were built and designed in WW2.  What we take from this conflict as anomaly and what is trend is probably the biggest unknown of this war. 
  21. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to chrisl in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    The RUSI report that was linked several pages ago (here) has a nice summary of what Ukraine did from 2014 to 2022 that helped them enormously (and sometimes inadvertently), as well as how both home grown and wester ISR helped them at the start.  I'm only partway into the report, but it's an excellent summary.  They're often more generous to the Russians than we tend to be here (and I think they're accurate), but they also highlight the major failings of the Russians very well.  One thing about what Ukraine did from 2014 to 2022 that I marvel at is that Russia had *exactly the same opportunity* and squandered it. Russia was on the opposite side of the lines the whole time and gained far less from the experience.
  22. Upvote
    Rokossovski got a reaction from dan/california in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Two thoughts:
    (1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
    The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
    Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
    (2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
    Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!
  23. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to Vet 0369 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Perhaps the lack of “live” patronage is simply related to men who fear being “snatched” as it were in those places just resorting to “safer” modes of entertainment?
  24. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    It's going to be a long and tedious post, but I believe it's vital to address all points. 
    Bakhmut's is somewhat different from norm since Wagnerites' leadership is moderately competent and they are used to shooting a week's worth of ammunition in one day. 
    Vuhledar is somewhat different from norm since the RU command there is more obsessed with the result. These are RU marines who are envious of VDV's reputation and are determined to prove that they are superior to VDV.
    Svatove-Kreminna is somewhat different from norm becasue RU army regulars there are not especially keen on dying or showing off. (RU Nats specifically accuse them of sabotaging offencive)
    But, the overall situation is the same everywhere - RU are experiencing high (and in many places terrible) losses as a result of an explicit order for non-stop assault. 
    Let us examine how fighting happens in urban areas (and why UKR are keen to hold them). The UKR defense is based on concealed firing positions with pre-planned killzones. Subterranean passageways link the fire positions through subterranean infrastructure. The Soviet-style buildings contain basement levels, which UKR soldiers connect to form a system of passageways to maneuver between fire positions.
    A RU meat aka assault group advance until getting in to a killzone. Then it dies. Now the crucial difference between Wagnerites and RU regulars - RU regulars do not have a lot of drones so it takes them a few more meat groups to figure out what has happened. Wagnerites have drones and they watch progress in real time. As soon as the group dies they know where and how it died and more importantly what building to hit with arty to push UKR troops out of firing position. Then the next meat group goes out and dies in the next killzone and so on and so forth.
    The only time when RU can get 1:1 ratio is when UKR get out to counter-attack a RU penetration - RU can hit UKR attack with overwhelming arty (sometimes).  But UKR counter-attack are not a main part of battle. They happen but not that often. 
    So, my question - how exactly does RU archive 1:1 ratio?
    Their tactics are not better than during summer offensive. In fact, the current Wagnerite tactic is nothing more but LDPR hardcore volunteer tactics used during summer offenicve Their arty is significantly weaker Their zek supply does not exists anymore (well, for Wagnerites at Bakhmut) That's my first concern with the experts opinion - they are unable to describe how exactly RU got significantly better. 
    This is my second problem the experts - they seems oblivious to the Ukrainian cultural thing.
    What do you get when talking to two Ukrainians? Dozens stories about how everything is f*cked up. What do you get when talking with three Ukranians? Millions of stories about how everything is f*cked up.
    This is how RU intelligence got messed up - RU cultural thing is exactly the opposite. Therefore, when RU operatives spoke with Ukrainian contacts, they heard true stories of how everything is f*cked up in Ukraine. Rest is  history.
    Let me reitterate - my second concern is whether the experts used a cultural filter when listening to what their UKR contacts told them. Because it does not appear that they did.
    Just in case - I've been reading straight from UKR sources about how everything is f*cked up with dead corpses everywhere, beginning from Severodonetsk (that when I started reading UKR sources), Lysichask, and then Pisky. A few weeks before Izum collapse, I read about how UKR is suffering on the frontlines at Izum.
     
    My impression is that nothing serious was put in favor of 1:1 ratio. So far I have seen only one explanation that when both sides shoot out of buildings UKR do not get an advantage. Since this is not how the fighting occurs, I do not buy it.
    It does not mean somewhere sometimes UKR do not suffer bigger losses (see my explanation about UKR counter-attacks). It does mean on average 1:1 ratio is highly questionable.
    While I am not fan of 1:7 or 1:5 ratio (we have no firm independent data to confirm it) I must reiterate that the following is not a general sentiment but facts. 
    Vuhledar is not exception Meat assaults (previouslyzek rushes) is a norm (this winter and spring) Institutionaly RU military is orc stupid (it is cultural thing). Wagnerites like to think they are smarter and they certainly are.. to a certain extend, but not by much (it is cultural thing).  
    In reality, based on RU Nats conversations, I see RU suffering horrendous losses starting from January. Over the same time period, Wagnerites lost zek sources, were cut off from arty supplies. 
    Despite this, I've heard from experts that RU are doing better currently.
    Just some clarification - In March 10 post Mashovets said the RU Center group cannot simultaneously fight for Bakhmut and conduct an offensive toward Siversk. The most combat-capable units are engaged in Bakhmut. After the fighting in Bakhmut stops, RU Center will turn them north and attack Siversk to threaten the UKR salient (Belohorivka). So, this is the military reason (not attriting RU) to hold Bakhmut according to Mashovets.
     
    Initially, they intended to seize Bakhmut as a prelude for the battle for Slavyanks-Kramatorsk. That's how they got engaged in Soledar-Bakhmut battle. But, the Izum line collapsed at some point, and the UKR gained a salient at Belohorivka [toward Lysychansk], which seriously alarmed the RU (not Wagnerites) command. As a result, the RU High command intended to destroy the salient during the winter offensive by striking it from multiple directions, including from attack from Bakhmut sector.
  25. Like
    Rokossovski reacted to Kinophile in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    But that still underlines my first point- democratic societies can adjust, its systemic to the concept. Autocratic systems find it extremely hard to do so, also systemically. Repeated military defeats will stress any society, with democratic ones better able to release the pressure and shift form/priorities. They are also able to shift priorities without military disaster, often avoiding the geopolitical pitfalls that autocratic societies often back themselves into.
    WRT Russia, I'm deeply skeptical that any replacement system, arrangement of regions, coalitions, whatever will be democratic in nature, or if starting out so will last very long in that formatting.
×
×
  • Create New...