CalifVol

“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” the motto of France In another thread it was discussed how the Vichy Government did the best it could under difficult circumstances. It was further discussed that Vichy was a neutral, albiet conquered, state rather than a Nazi stooge. I do not support these view points. To me Vichy is the epitome of a stooge and an example of personal agendas, exploitation of fellow countrymen, and even good intentions run dangerously amuck. The damage Vichy did to France was greater than if no government had been created and the Nazi's had to run France themselves. The motto of France shows succintly everything the Vichy Government was not; “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” What follows is an excellent short article by Tony McNeil that speaks directly to these points. My biggest failing with this article is that he does not speak in depth about the Allied attacks on Vichy. These attacks are relevant when discussing the support Vichy had within France. However, that issue aside, he does capture the very perspective I am attempting to bring forth. State Collaboration COLLABORATION, n.f. Travail en commun. Association. Aide, appui, concours, coopération, participation. Le Petit Robert Defining Collaboration The dictionary definition of collaboration above has positive connotations: cooperation, working together, reciprocal support, mutual assistance. This, of course, was the spin that Vichy ministers put on the word during les années noires. The Vichy régime were convinced that a favourable relationship with a Germany that was going to conquer Europe would be secured through collaboration. German and France, two independant states working together to secure a better tomorrow for Europe. The dictionary definitions above express little, however, of the connotations of the word collaboration for many during and after the war. For much of the French population, the term became synonymous with betrayal, selling out to the enemy and supporting its cause and interests over those of France. The word collabo (collaborator) - frequently prefaced with the adjective sale (dirty) - was the worst insult. The different connotations of collaboration get to the heart of issues that historians have been debating since the war. To what extent was collaboration a genuinely reciprocal arrangement between France and Germany? What was the specific nature of Vichy collaboration? Whose interests did it serve? These lecture notes will consider these very issues. -------------------------------------------------- State Collaboration and Collaborationism Historians of Occupied France generally make a distinction between two different forms of collaboration: what Stanley Hoffmann called `State collaboration' (collaboration d'État) - a pragmatic political and economic cooperation with Nazi Germany with the immediate aim of safeguarding French interests and the longer-term aim of securing a better position for France in a post-war Europe dominated by Germany; what Stanley Hoffmann called collaborationism (le collaborationisme) - an ideologically-motivated cooperation with a Nazi Germany seen as the only bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism in Europe. -------------------------------------------------- State Collaboration Shortly after taking over from Paul Renaud on 17 June 1940, Pétain set about establishing a longer-term political relationship with Nazi Germany. The armistice was a necessary first step in both avoiding further bloodshed and in establishing a better relationship with a Germany that would, according to Vichy's ministers and Pétain himself, soon defeat Great Britain and become the dominant power in Europe. Some spoke, in fact, of une Europe allemande, a Europe dominated by Germany. Pétain and his ministers thought that France, as a colonial power and a major influence on Europe between the wars, would be well placed to become an important ally to this powerful nation in the heart of a new European order, un nouveau ordre européen. A strong government - L'État français, the French State, was created on 12 July 1940 - and some form of cooperation with Germany would be a necessary precondition for this. On 11 October 1940, Pétain made a speech on the radio in which he alluded to possibility of France and Germany working together once peace in Europe had been established. In this speech, Pétain used the term `collaboration', linking the word to the idea of peace with Germany. Later that month, on the 24 October, Pétain conducted an historic meeting with Hitler at Montoire. At that meeting Pétain and Laval discussed the possible directions of Franco-German collaboration and is a key symbolic moment in Franco-German relations during the war. For Pétain and Laval, collaboration with Germany was the means by which France might secure a better place in Europe once peace had been established. It would be a sign of France's good faith and willingness to accept Germany as the dominant force in European affairs. Pétain and Laval also hoped that collaboration would lead to more immediate improvements: the return of 1.6 million prisoners of war, the continuing safety of the French population, a decrease in the war indemnity France was obliged to pay and, of course, assurance that Vichy's sovereignty over Occupied and Unoccupied zones would be respected. The issue of sovereignty was the most consistent concern of both Pétain and Laval and the desire to safeguard it informed many of their negotiations with Germany. Collaboration was also essential in ensuring that Vichy was given the time and space to reconstruct France along the lines of the National Revolution. With the French population stunned by defeat and invasion, and the politicals of the Third Republic discredited, Pétain and his allies seized the moment to conduct their own ideologically-motivated reforms. To complete their National Revolution, Vichy would have to buy time from Nazi Germany through a policy of collaboration. Although Vichy volunteered to collabrate for its own reasons, there was, it should be remembered, a degree of compulsory collaboration too. Under Article 3 of the armistice convention, France was obliged to cooperate with the Nazi military authorities who had full rights and powers over the Occupied zone. The French authorities in the Occupied zone were obliged to comply with the requests of the occupying forces, whatever that might entail. The German military authorities had a right to veto any appointment or policy with which they disagreed making a mockery, in essence, of Vichy's claim to sovereignty. Vichy collaboration with Nazi Germany, therefore, was something of an inevitability. German military presence and the 1.6 million prisoners of war who were de facto hostages helped ensure this collaboration and force Vichy's hand. Vichy was quick to conceal this dependance. On a number of occasions, Vichy gave the appearance of sovereignty by anticipating Nazi demands and making them appear to be French initiatives. Vichy's anti-semitic legislation, and in particular, the notorious Statut des Juifs, can be seen as an example of this. Collaboration, therefore, was a reality for the French authorities as early as the 25 June 1940 when the terms of the armistice came into force. -------------------------------------------------- Germany's Attitude to Collaboration Although Vichy had high hopes for a genuine partnership with Germany, the Nazi authorities were more circumspect. Although there were a few francophile Nazis like von Ribbentrop and Otto Abetz who were more favourable to this proposal, the majority of high-ranking Nazis had no intention of treating France as an equal. Most perceived France purely in terms of her potential as a supplier of raw and manufactured goods, and of labour. This was the view of Herman Göring, after Hitler the most influential man in the Third Reich, who advocated the systematic economic exploitation of France. There was a feeling that France, as the conquered nation, should pay the price for its defeat as well as meeting the costs of military occupation. Many Nazis still bore a grudge against France for the punitive peace settlement it had helped impose on Germany after World War I and were more than happy to see France suffer. Josef Goebbels, the Nazi Minister for Propanganda, was quick to seize on the propaganda value of France's humiliation in Germany. It is claimed that his desire was to see France reduced to an `enlarged Switzerland', an agreable destination for German tourists as well as convenient source of high quality couturiers (Hirschfeld: 1989 p.6). Hitler was happy to see France willing to collaborate as it both kept France out of the war - this was a priority as France's military potential was still considerable - and incurred lower demands on Germany's own military resources. Nazi Germany had no real interest in helping establish a sympathetic ally or even an independant fascist state in France. In its relationship with France, all other concerns were subordinate to the realization of its own agenda (Hirschfeld: 1989 p.11). -------------------------------------------------- Economic Collaboration Perhaps the most widely practiced and significant form of collaboration to take place during les années noires was economic. This form of collaboration was not so keenly sought after by Vichy as others. However, from the German point of view, it was the most attractive. Nazi Germany had, as I have mentionned earlier, no intention of treating France as an equal; it perceived France purely in terms of its potential as a supplier of raw and manufactured goods and of labour. Many private companies, particularly those in industrial sectors important to Nazi Germany's war economy (e.g. the coal and steel industry, aircraft and motor vehicle manufacture) found themselves forced into economic collaboration with the Germans for survival. Many companies feared bankruptacy, or the seizure of their assets by the occupier, or else the growth of German companies at the expense of French ones. Many companies, then, saw economic collaboration as an unpleasant necessity to ensure their own survival. Others for example, were more than willing to work for the Germans in the expectation of higher profits. In 1941, for example, the French photographic company Photomaton, without any prompting, offered to produced identity photographs for Jews in Germany's concentration camps. `Research published in the 1980s (see Hirschfeld: 1989 p.9 for overview) has indicated that industrial output and profits increased during the first two years of the war as opportunities were siezed and lucrative contracts with the Germans were signed. Although the post-war years are seen as those of economic modernisation, recent research has also indicated that it took place during the war years too. Collaboration with the Germans on a number of projects was, for example, particularly beneficial to the French aircraft industry. David Pryce-Jones estimates that some eight or nine million worked directly for the Germans on roads, military defences, aircraft, armaments and food production. By early 1942 there were concerns that Germany's supply of foreign labour - mainly from Russia and Poland - was beginning to run out. Fritz Sauckel, a long-time Nazi was given responsibility for recruiting new labour and, in May 1942 he demanded that 250,000 French workers be sent to Germany by the end of July that year. Laval, initially unhappy with this decision, responded with a scheme called la relève by which one French prisoner of war would be returned to France for every three workers who volunteered to work in Germany. This scheme, perhaps inevitably, failed to recruit the required number and by February 1943 the Vichy administration was required to introduce a form of conscription, le Service du travail obligatoire (STO). The response in France to the introduction of a compulsory labour service was an increase in the numbers of réfractaires, young men fleeing, some joining the resistance, and of those finding work in occupations exempted from STO like mining. There is an account of one déporté du travail STO at Témoignage: les parias du STO (R. Noblet). France's contribution to the German war effort was considerable. At the end of the war, it is estimated that approximately 650,000 Frenchmen and 44,000 Frenchwomen had been sent to labour in Germany, making France the second largest contributor of unskilled labour - only Poland contributed higher numbers - and the largest contributor of skilled labour to the German economy (Atkin: 1998 p.174). Of the wealth Nazi Germany acquired from its occupied territories, some 40% came from France. As early as 1940, Vichy had authorized the transfer of the Beligian gold reserves held in France and the shares to the Bohr copper mine in Yugoslavia. The looting of art works and antiques from Jewish owners which were then sent back to Germany. -------------------------------------------------- Everyday Collaboration There was a degree of daily, low-level collaboration with the occupier. This frequently took the form of letters of denunciation. Letters to the Vichy or German military authorities identifing black marketeers, réfractaires, resistance members and sympathizers, and, of course, Jews were commonplace and even encouraged by the collaborationist press. Collaborationist magasines like Au pilori and Je suis partout with peak wartime readerships of about 100,000 and 300,000 respectively, encouraged such activity and included the relevant adresses to which information should be sent (Pryce-Jones: 1989 p.28). Such letters, a sample of which are collected in Henri Amouroux's La grande histoire des Français sous l'occupation, were frequently motivated by personal grudges and anomosity rather than ideology. -------------------------------------------------- Military Collaboration Although Vichy maintained a position of neutrality, there was nonetheless a degree of military collaboration with Nazi Germany. This was entirely consistent with other forms of collaboration that Vichy had sought with Germany. However, military collaboration and Vichy's abandonment of its neutrality became more and more difficult in the context of the `total war' Germany had to fight and of the invasion of French colonies in North Africa by the Allied forces. At certain key moments, Vichy offered various forms of support to the German war effort. Some military collaboration, like the logistical support Darlan offered the German military in Tunisia and Syria (27-28 May 1941), was accepted. Other proposals, like the offer in November 1942 to create a Légion tricolore in which French troops, in French uniform, would fight alongside the Wehrmacht in Tunisia, were rejected. Such rejections of Vichy proposals expressed German reluctance to consider France as a proper ally and not as a conquered territory. Vichy's priority was very much one of defence. It was determined to avoid fighting a war on French territory and was therefore willing to resist Allied invasion of its colonies. This inevitably meant that Vichy was, in spite of its desire to maintain neutrality, engaged in combat with Allied forces. By 1943, however, Germany was fighting a war on many fronts - a `total war' to use Hitler's own phrase - and required as much assistance as possible. On 22 July 1943, Frenchmen were allowed to join the Waffen-SS and, in 1943 Laval was finally granted permission to create the Milice. The Milice played an important role alongside the German military in combating the resistance - the defeat of a resistance cell at les Glières is an infamous example. Various collaborationalist parties in the Occupied zone assisted in establishing the Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme (LVF). This volunteer unitarmy - there were 10,000 volunteers initially - fought against the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front in Nazi uniform. The LVF became a Wehrmacht infantry regiment and continued to fight in Germany after France's liberation as part of the SS Charlemagne division. The Allies, for their part, were interested in persauding France to join in the struggle against Germany. -------------------------------------------------- Collaborationism Although most forms of collaboration were not motivated by any ideological affinity to fascism, there were a number of political parties in the Occupied zone with a firm commitment to Nazi ideology. Falling under the influence of what French historian Philippe Burrin calls `le champ magnétique des fascismes' (Burrin: 1984), the magnetic field of fascisms, these parties modelled themselves on the Nazis. Some went so far as to adopt paramilitary uniforms and Nazi-style salutes, Their view of the degeneration of French society owed more to Nazism than to the National Revolution. France was enjuivée (riddled with Jews) or négrifié (riddled with blacks). Its only path back to greatness was through the creation of a régime along the lines of Nazi Germany and a closer relationship with them than even Vichy had envisaged. The Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP) founded in February 1941 by Marcel Déat, or the Parti Populaire Français (PPF) established by Jacques Doriot in were two collaborationist parties that advocated such a strategy. -------------------------------------------------- Conclusion One justification for collaboration put forward by Vichy ministers during and after the war was that it reduced the damage the occupiers might potentially inflict on France. After the war, Pétain used this argument at his trial. His defence claimed that Pétain and Vichy had formed un bouclier, a shield that had protected France against the worst excesses of Nazi domination. Historians call this defense the `shield' philosophy. Although plausible as a theory, it doesn't stand up against the evidence. Firstly, protecting France against the full barbarity of Nazi rule implies an awareness on the part of Vichy of Nazi policy. It is possible to argue that Vichy's understanding of Nazi policy was limited. The actions of Vichy, predicated on the victory of Germany in an essentially European war, expresses a blinkered view of the dynamics of Nazism. The Germany of 1940, thought many in Vichy, was little different to the Germay with whom they had agreed an armistice in 1918. Moreover, the argument that Vichy collaboration prevented France from becoming another Poland is similarly unfounded. The `polonization' of certain sections of the French community took place, and took place, more importantly, with the complicity of the French authorities. The deportation of 75,000-80,000 Jews, the forced dispatch of 750,000 Frenchmen and Frenchwomen to work in Germany, the trials of 135,000 French people, the internment of 70,000 `enemies of the state', the complicity of the French police and the Milice in suppressing resistance are all examples of this. There was no shielding or moderating influence here. Comparisons with other occupied countries in Europe underline the specificity of the French experience. In the Netherlands, for example, civil servants were only expected to ensure the proper functionning of essential services and not to provide any other assistance to the occupying forces. Vichy not only facilitated and assisted in Nazi atrocities, but it also exploited France's military defeat to construct its own internal political revolution. This makes Vichy France, with the possible exception of Croatia and Slovakia, newly created states, a specific case in occupied Europe. I shall leave the last word to Gerhard Hirschfeld; Collaboration had not prevented the worst from happening but rather had made it possible and in any case paved the road to Auschwitz (Hirschfeld: 1989 p.13). -------------------------------------------------- Further Reading N. Atkin, Pétain (London & New York: Longman, 1998) Philippe Burrin, `La France dans le champ magnétique des fascismes' in Le Débat, 32 (1984) 52-72 F. Burrin, `Le collaborationnisme' in J-P. Azéma & F. Bédarida (eds), La France des années noires (Paris: Seuil, 1993) Tome 1 363-383 J. Defrasne, Histoire de la collaboration (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1989) 2nd ed. B.M. Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the Second World War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) G. Hirschfeld, `Collaboration in Nazi-occupied France: Some Introductory Remarks' in G. Hirschfeld & P. Marsh (eds), Collaboration in France: Politics and Culture during the Nazi Occupation 1940-1944 (Oxford: Berg, 1989) 1-14 H.R. Kedward, Occupied France: Collaboration and Resistance 1940- 1944 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) 32-45 L. Malle, Lacombe Lucien (film available in Language Centre) P. Ory, Les Collaborateurs (Paris: Seuil, 1976) P. Ory, La France allemande (1933-1945): paroles françaises (Paris: Gallimard, 1995) R.O. Paxton, `La collaboration d'état' in J-P. Azéma & F. Bédarida (eds), La France des années noires (Paris: Seuil, 1993) Tome 1 334-361 D. Pryce-Jones, `Paris during the German Occupation' in G. Hirschfeld & P. Marsh (eds), Collaboration in France: Politics and Culture during the Nazi Occupation 1940- 1944 (Oxford: Berg, 1989) 15-31 D. Veillon, La Collaboration (Paris: Livre de poche, 1984) ------------------------------------------------ Concept & Text: Tony McNeill tony.mcneill@sunderland.ac.uk The University of Sunderland Last Update 3-Nov-98

History has already spoken on Vichy France. There is no need to perfume a skunk. When other nations had governments in exile France did not. The whole concept of keeping the Germans out of Vichy was based on pleasing Hitler. He wound up occuping the place anyway. So at the price of their soul to keep the devil away, that devil came anyway, but that soul was still lost. That is the legacy and lesson of Vichy. It is proof that peace at any price is too high a price to pay. [ February 04, 2003, 02:07 AM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

Inflamatory remarks deleted. Let's just say that IMHO Vichy France has nothing good I would say about it. [ February 03, 2003, 07:27 PM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

If you seen the movie "The Battle of San Pietro" (A documentary made during WW II, by John Huston) it shows the Italian Army attacking Mt. Loungo (sp) in support of the US assualt on the city of San Pietro. This is a fascinating movie in that not only does it show the Italian regular army fighting along side the US (very brief scene), it also shows failure to undersatnd the concept of Key Terrain. The critical part of the battle was the assualt on Mt. Lungo (The Italians got waxed and didn't seize it). The failure of the Italians resulted in the US also getting waxed, but the US commander failed to understand Lungo was the key to the battle and ordered assualt after fruitless assualt to take the town. A really great picture to show how combat operations can be mucked up! It even shows a pure tank assualt into a city. That was very scary with predictable results when the narrator says out of 17 tanks only 4 returned. [ February 03, 2003, 07:30 PM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

Thank you for the history. There are a number of areas in WW II that could be called forgotten or appear forgotten. If you would like more about Yugoslavia the Time-Life history of World War II book series covers it at length. In the West history of the Partisan/resistance efforts tends to be a focused discussion about Norway and France. The Yugoslavia experience is a history that is out there, but lack of interest tends to make it forgotten. For partisans the War in Russia becomes one of a lot of missing history. Many Partisan leaders were shot or sent to Gulag's after the war. A small number of partisan groups (in the Ukrain) kept fighting the Russian Army after it showed up and replaced the occuping German Army. Stalin was such a great guy that it seemed some people didn't see a big difference between fighting him or Hitler. A lot of the Russian partisan history has been deliberately forgotten by the old USSR. One of the other areas that falls into the realm of forgotten is Italy. On September 8, 1943, Italy unconditionally surrended to the Allies. Well, duh, that's not forgotten. On October 13, 1943 Italy declared WAR on Germany! That is forgotten. Its forgotten that the Italians provided troops and equipment to fight the Germans. Its forgotten how Italy was treated after declaring war. Italy was in a weird status of "co-belligernt", she wasn't part of the Allies. Going quickly to the Pacific, the Guerreillas (sp) in the Phillpines are also a forgotten element of WW II, which is sad as they have a direct US connection and were one of the very few pro-west guerreilla effort in the region. I shall stop before I digress into pure babbling.

Thank you for the kind reply. I am confused to your comments at the end about no invasion in regards to the US and Canada. Invasion how? Thanks!

Shaka of Carthage Thank you for the comments. I still maintain that strategic warfare should be done in a pool method, hopefully this diatribe will not bore too many folks. Why strategic pools? I feel the “Battle of the North Atlantic” is given exceedingly short shrift in this game. On the other hand the game is designed to do that. This is a fun beer and pretzels game that concentrates on the land action in Europe in World War II. It offers wonderful alternatives during game play. It does that in a fun fascinating fashion for both multi-player and the single player (like me) against the AI. I can’t stop the compliments on how well the AI functions in this game compared to other games. The game is fun, a lot of fun , to play. This is very much a significant accomplishment and is not discounted in any fashion. However, it does not work well as a naval wargame. What it does do is poor and unrepresentative. I’d drop the whole find a submarine counter play from the game. In this game it is counter productive to Germany’s war effort to fruitless support (i.e. buy submarine units) a North Atlantic Offensive, when in reality the Germans came close to forcing a UK submission via that campaign. In the case of Lend-Lease convoy’s to the USSR, German interdiction of the northern Lend-Lease routes was so effective that it prompted the Allies to invade Iraq to establish the southern Lend-Lease route. The bulk of Lend-Lease was delivered to the USSR via the southern route. I would not ask for this fun game to have a greater detailed naval simulation. You start talking supply convoy’s needing to be simulated and a much larger map would be needed. It’s a real tar-baby that turns into a black hole. The focus of the game is on the land and not the sea. That’s why I’d just abstract the whole naval campaign. In abstraction it would be easier for the game to reflect the actual campaign and still not impact the fast fun flow that the game has. What I have said for the strategic naval campaign I would reiterate for the strategic air campaign. The strategic air campaign against Germany was a major disruption of the transportation net, a cause of shortages in strategic materials and caused a delay in the V-2 program. Yet, in game play it’s the same boat as a naval offensive, not worth the investment to conduct. I shan't wax and wane about the Blitz or UK Bomber Command. Iy all addes up to why I’d just abstract the whole campaign. It would be easier for the game to reflect the actual campaign and still not impact the fast fun flow that the game has. Partisans I won’t discuss a second time. So, how would the strategic pools work? There are three pools and three counter pools- Air (includes rockets), Counter Air Naval, Counter Naval Partisan, Counter Partisan The pool’s investment causes a random reduction of the opposing player’s MPP’s based on investment and tech level, plus a small reduction of the opposing players “counter pool’s” for that type. The counter pool reduces the effect of MPP reduction and reduces the strategic pool of the opposing player for that type item. This of course is based on amount of investment and tech level. Some pool concepts: 1. You don’t have to buy a full “unit” to be in the pool and to have strategic effect, you just invest whatever amount MPP you want. 2. You can extract units from the pool as needed. If you want to extract surface/submarine/land units/ fighter/bomber/rocket units, go ahead, but they aren’t available to do strategic operations until they are returned to the pool: Example your Anti-Strategic Air pool is at 650 MPP’s and you are desperately short fighters for close air support. You could “buy” a fighter unit at its current going price of 400 MPP’s and it appears as a normal freshly bought unit. Of course in this case it would reduce your Anti-Strategic Air pool to 250 MPP’s. The opposite would be true in that you could put a unit into the pool at its current price (I’d not maintain unit type identity in the pool, it would just be a pool of points. Invested units would be transformed into points.) 3. You have random attrition of troop convoys that go through sub-infested waters, with that attrition affected by the size of the naval and counter naval MPP pools. 4. There would still be troop convoys and naval bombardment units (when created) to push around the map. Opposing Naval Bombardment units would fight each other the same as now if they meet on the map. 5. Almost as an aside comment, it would be possible in the Strategic Air Pool to allow for a tech development far beyond existing tech levels and when that level tech is hit the strategic impact of MPP reduction would be massive, i.e. welcome to the nuclear age. But, like I said, I know pools aren’t going to happen. This is just a concept discussion. As to the suggestion for a bigger ocean map, with the game as it stands right now, I would not want the map of the Atlantic bigger. However, I’d like Canada and the US to be land connected on the map.

Please bear in mind my comments are based on playing against the AI and not a human player. Partisans in the game are “OK” as is, but it could be done better. I would prefer the following elements be treated the same: Strategic Interdiction 3 pools: Submarines, Partisans, Strategic Bombers The Allied/Axis player would put MPP’s into a Strategic Interdiction Pool (One of the three areas listed) and then the opposing player would have counter-acting-pools to place MPP’s in. Failure to counter-act results in a variable per turn reduction in MPP’s for the player being interdicted. The interdicting player on every turn would determine how many MPP’s to put into the interdiction pool. Each player would be putting MPP’s into one of the three pools blind and there would just be a results given at the end of the turn. You could still invest in technology. The increasing technology would enhance the effectiveness of the MPP investment. I would only have Partisan counters appear on the map in result to a trigger event such as the USSR getting X number of spaces from Warsaw. At the same time I’d also have Volkstrum counters appear when the Allied player gets within X number of spaces to Berlin. Then again, this may create other issues. As to the “big” airborne debate; I’d go for one unit per side with a 2-4 hex drop range. I would add this unit not because it’s a critical feature for the game or something needed at this scale, rather it’s a fun aspect that gives a World War II feel to the action. My perspective is that then game right now could very easily pass as World War I. Along those lines it could actually be a WW I game if the icons were changed, air units degraded, zones of control added, Cavalry units that upgrade to tanks (tanks ignor the ZOC), and the map changed to 1914. This gets back to why I’d like to see airborne as it gives it that WW II feel. I will now duck in response to all those rocks coming at me! [ January 29, 2003, 06:18 PM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

"Game has a requirement for the Axis to invade the US to win. Don't think so." Then explain why the game would not end when I had over run all of Europe and Canada?

There are many good points made in this thread. I think part of the answer of why some of them haven't been done lays in the fact that its a game not a simulator. The game has a requirement to invade the US for the Axis to win. That just doesn't work well from a simulator aspect. If its going to be a simulation then there is a massive delay for the Axis to come up with the needed amphibous navy to conduct such an operation. The rules now allow for a rapid and smooth game to do an item that would have been difficult to take place in 1947 assuming the Nazis had beat the USSR in 1942. Even in that scenario there's years delay as the Nazi war machine has to gear up for a cross Atlantic operation. Yea, this re-tooling could be simulated but somehow sitting and waiting turn after turn as the Axis player says "I am re-tooling my industry and re-configuring my strategic force" doesn't make for too much fun. The current amphibious rules allow for a FAST game abliet at the expense of reality. So then, how does the game get to the valid points brought up in this thread and still allow for a fun fast game? Maybe part of the answer is in the victory conditions. If the Axis doesn't need to invade the US to win then restraints on the Axis or advantages to the Allies for amphibious operations can be applied without a big impact on how the game ends for the succesful Axis player.

JerseyJohn: Thank you for the response. I couldn't find anything on the web either. If I find anything, I'll start a new thread about it. Thanks again.

At the end of a thread that has many non-sensical posts one more is an issue? The ruddy comment was a pun to begin with. Geese, I deleted it. [ January 16, 2003, 07:26 PM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

That's a very interesting statement. Could you please direct me to where I could read the full account? THANKS!

The 1st Army capture of the bridge at Remagen was the result of an advance in technology. The Tank/Infantry team that captured the bridge was equipped with M-26 Pershing Tanks. The far side of the bridge had a 88mm Flak unit on the ridge. Shermans would have retired in the face of such a foe, the Pershings did not, and rapidly dispatched the 88's with their own 90mm cannon. They then provided needed fire support for the infantry to capture the bridge. So, owing to the improved technology the infantry was able to sieze the bridge. The side note is that in March '45 there was less than 200 M-26's in the entire ETO. Talk about being at the right place at the right time! The M-26 was the late war US Heavy tank that political wrangling and poor "offical" assessments of German Armor resulted in it not going into mass production until October '44. The book "Pershing" gives a great account (Duh, the book is about the tank). (Ya know, this comment did seem in sequence when I started writting it!) [ January 16, 2003, 12:56 PM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

Deleted [ January 16, 2003, 07:23 PM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

Horus: Yes, I am and thank you for your very kind words. Imagine, there are Germans doing American bashing in an open forum? If it was 60 years ago there wouldn't be an open form in Germany. My concern about American bashing in Germany is summed up by; in the days after 9/11 NATO sent AWAC's to help patrol the eastern seaboard of the US, there were German Airmen among those crews. When I was stationed in Bosnia in 2000 there were German Soldiers working civil affairs down the road from me. Today, when peacekeeping in Afghanistan is discussed Germany and its support is mentioned as well. I am not concerned about a few Germans bashing the US, Germany's a free country, they got a right to do so. Rather I am grateful for all the support that Germany has given to the US and the manner in which it has stood by us in our time of need.

I have to agree about the three groups of people. I shall now go on to a hopeless diatribe that might get somewhere. Usually, they don't but there is always hope. No, seriously, it strikes me odd how WW II is slowly evolving into this saintly self-sacrificing event for the US. I would agree that there are certain absolutes in that war, Nazis and Imperial Japanese are evil. Its astounding how rotten those fellows were! But, because we opposed those that needed opposition there has been some very wild self-serving rationalization taking place in the US for like the last 10 years. Perhaps this is the result of the very ugly fact that our WW II veterans are dying by the bushel (old age) and those in control of the media today are the children of those who are dying. What greater tribute than to acknowldge the supreme sacrifice of one's parents? This is lauditory in my opinion and yet, a classic example of the road to hell being paved with good intentions. This may explain what is happening today with such comments as the "Greatest Generation", in several ways tweaking WW II history started even while the history was being written. There is an EXCELLENT film series called "Why We Fight" made by Frank Capra during WW II and shown to US troops prior to deployment and in theaters across the US during the war. These entertaining "documenteries" are available on DVD today. They are also big time propaganda films. They state such nonesense as "our freedom loving allies the USSR and China". Oh, the USSR and Nationalist China were dictatorships? Nope, you got that wrong they were freedom loving democracies "JUST LIKE" the US! Ha, is to laugh. These films are so in favor of the USSR and China that in the 1950's the Defense Department added a note to the films saying they don't represent the opinion of the US government (A funny irony- after that note the emblem of the US Army appears). These films were part of the World War II war effort, they need to be viewed as such, but alas no such effort goes into explaining them today in the video store. I guess my point is that we should not look to the media for our knowledge of history. They don't get it "right" for any number of reasons. We need to really do some old fashion reading if we want to be rounded in our knowledge of past events. Ok, I'll bring it all together. This get's to why people's view of WW II is skewed. Its the fact they rely on the media instead of taking personal responsibility and either paying attention in school or doing their own research. That certainly isn't a unique US problem. However, in a democracy, like our's, the penality is an electorate that isn't informed. This means in the US we should demand that our people do know better. When the people at large don't have an accurate view of past events then how can we prevent history from repeating itself or fully understand the base values on which our country is founded?

In 1979 I was on the Canadain Armed Forces Base in Petawawa (sp). The good ol' Canadian Militia was on the base at the same time. I got into a discussion with a number of their members. During this discussion they pointed out how Canada had about 50 tanks in Germany in support of NATO, and they (these Canadians) felt rather beleagured with this small force. I pointed out that the base I came from (Ft. Hood, Texas) had 500 tanks alone and that Canada was not the only North American country that was a part of NATO. Their retort? "Why don't you send some of those tanks to Europe. We could use the help!" The sorry part of that discussion was that they weren't joking and thought the US had zero forces deployed to Europe. A myoptic view of the world isn't unique to the US. I hate it when you can't quote the book. However, I had a Soviet History of World War II, translated into English. Don't recall the name, durn. In that history it barely acknowledges the US was in World War II and doesn't speak at all about the 2nd Front or Lend Lease. It was a general history of the war. Of course the USSR had an agenda, in this case it illustrates that some times a government will encourage a myoptic view. (Let me add that today you can find many Russian websites that talk about Lend-Lease. There is even one with a picture of a soldier that was awarded the "Hero of the Soviet Union" medal and he is standing in front of his M4a2 Sherman Tank, on which he earned the medal.) Now, as to that silly point about Iraq. Geese, they were merely making a prediction, in a couple of months its going to be blown off the map; nobody will be able to find it. Of course in the case of marines could be they got confused before the question was asked by all the pretty colors on the map. I must go now, it appears some marines have taken umbrage at my last comment (To the marine types that means y'all got pissed off). [ January 15, 2003, 01:25 PM: Message edited by: CalifVol ]

An interesting idea, however, if in play an automatic appearance of "Lend-Lease FDR" should appear, he comes in a motorized wheelchair with titanium blades of death (ala a chairot race), and spews nerve gas from his gawdawful cigarette holder.

I was at Ft. Irwin 81-83 and 84-87. I lead the very first OPFOR meeting engagment against bluefor. In that engagment I took one of my MRC's (no tanks) against a Mechanized Infantry Battalion Taskforce. The result? I lost 6 BMP's versus destroying 17 M-60's, 24 M-113's, and 10 ITV's, plus chasing that entire Taskforce from east of the Whale to completely out of the Valley of Death. On top of that by the time we chased them out of the Valley we were out of ammo, they were just too terrifed to stop and take a shot at us. The controllers finally stopped us when it began to look like they were running them all the way back to the cantonement area. One might say that the element of surprise and Elan of the OPFOR can be decisive in the mock combat of the NTC.

I hate to point out the obvious. A World War II tank that falls off a bridge is a +90% chance for total incapicitation for the length of the game. This of course assumes falling off a bridge means a sudden loss in heigth. World War II tanks did not have modern day suspensions. If you want to see a obsolecent suspension that would mimick World War II technology then look at a T-62, M-60, or Chieftan tank. Looking at T-72's, M-1's, or Challengers current reaction to impact would be missleading. However, do note the damage examples listed here that did happen on new techonolody systems, they are very relevant to the discussion. I have worked on the older systems and have had many conversations with Sherman tank crewman and a couple with some Panzer crewman. These are vehicles where a large diameter one foot hole in the ground suddenly appearing in front of a tank doing 20 MPH could cause serious damage to the tank or crew if they are not avoided. WW II medium tanks, except for some great publicity shots, do not jump like today's tanks. Driving away after falling off a bridge that is tall enough to drive under is just not in the realm of likely possibilities. Some observations, knocking a tank off a bridge with it moving sideways means one track will go first, then the belly hits the bridge. To continue to push the tank sideways off the bridge is most likely going to roll it. Rolled tanks do not normally just drive away (though on rare occassion conceptually it can.) If you roll the tank with the added impact of a drop, the tank is just done for within the time span of the game. Assuming the tank landed right side up, there can be sight alignment damage, rarely but conceptually you can pop the turret off the hull, the suspension can be destroyed in the process, the track can be thrown off, the engine or transmission can be dismounted, massive fuel leaks can result, the rolled vehicle can catch fire (esp. Germans as they use Gasoline), if the gun is rolled into the ground it will create issues besides dirt in the tube as it very likely will damage/destroy the recoil system or exascerbate turret damage, WW II tank ammunition is percussion detonated the ammunition on board the tank can actually just explode in this process and all this before you get to the crew that didn't have safety belts and was thrown about the inside of the tank as it rolled and dropped. If you want to see what its like to be inside a metal object that is dropping put molded jello in a lunch box and drop it three feet, then open the box up and take a look inside. If the tank drives off the bridge (i.e. goes head first or tail first) then the issue becomes height. If the height is sufficent to where the tank will decend at a 70% angle (3 meters for sure will do that) then its guranteed that the tank will come to a very dramatic and sudden stop. If the angle its going down is less than 70% then maybe its going to drive (i.e. roll on its tracks) upon impact. In that case the issue of damage becomes a more and more open discussion assuming a minor drop. If the height is such that the tank has hit bottom while the back half of the tank is still on the bridge there will be far less damage than if the tank had gone into a free fall. However, the game discussion here is of tanks off bridges greater in heigth than the tank. Geeze, how many tanks in the game were operational after that? I doubt a human in the tank could have survived the drop (Why would they have remained in the tank if they were being pushed by friendlies?) Ok, so we take a WW II tank and drive it nose first off a 4 meter height. Great, lands nose first and knocks all the cannon sights wacky. Its going to drive that lead suspension wheel on the front of the tank back toward the first road wheel and bust the mount (Assuming a tank with the idler infront of the forward edge of the glacis, i.e. a T-34), you can scrape the crew off the armor plate they had to cushion their fall, in addition to the guranteed results above you can have all the same damage as present in a roll over. You cetrainly aren't going to have three operational T-34's, there's an obvious error in the game program. Two quick war stories- I was on an MTLB (Russian PC) driving at night. We hit a 3 meter deep anti-tank ditch. We were moving at about 10 MPH under total black out with no night vision devices. We went into the ditch at 10 MPH. We medivaced three men off the vehicle owing to the resulting injuries. The MTLB had minor running gear damage. However, we were knocked out of action for four hours. I have seen an M-60 tank hit a two foot high berm while doing about 15 MPH. It seared the right compensating idler wheel off the tank and the right track went to the ground with it. Plus the crew was in shock for a good 30 minutes. So, yea, I'd agree there appears to be a glich if tanks fall off bridges and remain operational in the game.