Jump to content

Nidan1

Members
  • Posts

    5,561
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Posts posted by Nidan1

  1. I think Vladimir (but I am not going to put words or thoughts into your head) that we may have a language issue here. Your command of written English is very good Vladimir, but you are posting a word that really does not exist in English. "cowarding" is not a word, the English word coward means;  "a person who lacks the courage to do or endure dangerous or unpleasant things." The word used in the game is "cowering" which means; "to crouch down in fear." Now cowering does not necessarily mean that the soldier in the game has no courage, it means he is hiding from or trying to avoid incoming fire. He may start shooting back after a few seconds of cowering, or he may stay in that state for longer periods. Correct me if I am wrong Vladimir, but I think you are equating the act of cowering by the pixel troops as an act of cowardice, which IMO may not be the case. Or you may just have typo-ed the word.

    I don't think that any simulation even one as well coded as Combat Mission can truly duplicate the mental and physical responses of a human being under combat conditions. This was well articulated by Steve, and all the points he makes reinforces this notion.

  2. I guess you could also add Operation Redwings as a Specops screw up with all the bad pieces you mention above Steve. This was the operation of "Lone Survivor fame. I have always thought that sending four men in to recon the village where supposed Taliban leaders were was asking for trouble. If a quick reaction force was established to come to the rescue if the team got in trouble, why not just send more men on the initial patrol. They also knew ahead of time that comms might be a problem in the mountains, that proved to be sadly true. Seals are no doubt badass, but how much real infantry and fire and manuever practice/training do they get? They are stealthy and highly motivated, but are they the right type of unit to send in where the likelyhood of contact with equally motivated and equipped infantry of the type that were encountered during the firefight on the mountain.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Red_Wings

     

     

  3. I'm not sure how much awareness is programmed into our CM troops. Do they react more to impacting bullets and shells or do they first react to the sound of firing. They will quite obviously drop and cover when they are ambushed by small arms, and in some cases they will turn and run, thus exposing themselves to more fire. How many of you have experienced this in a game, where an entire team or even a squad is annihilated by MG or rifle fire because they just didn't immediately take whatever cover was available at the time? 

     

    A sburke said human beings will exhibit many different forms of behavior when under conditions such as combat. Training, unit cohesion and the desire to perform well in front of your buddies, are all factors which will influence human behavior under fire. Fear is also a factor, but in my experience the fear of death or maiming becomes secondary to getting away from a bad situation or doing something that will mitigate it. Do our pixel men have a fear of digital death? They sure look like they do, and the "Cowering" mode is one way that they deal with it. In a squad under fire, initially some men are cowering and some may be spotting, I think that is about as realistic as this game can get. If they remain under fire, or worse, grenades or heavier stuff comes in, some will stay cowered and probably be killed or wounded, and some will seek to escape the torment. A frontal assault against a defended position is the best way to observe this behavior. This is the one factor that makes splitting squads so essential. Bigger units are unwieldy, they dont get into position as quickly as smaller ones, and they don't traverse terrain as effectively. They also present a smaller target to enemy units.

     

    As to sound recognition. If a person is exposed to the sound of gunfire often enough the human brain, with practice, will be able to distinguish the general location of a shooter or shooters. There are always two sounds, the intial report of the weapon and the supersonic crack of a bullet in flight. With multiple weapons firing it becomes harder, but certain weapons have different distinct sounds when fired so a person could know that the fire was hostile by the sound. The legend of the 7.62 AK-47 having a distinct popping sound when fired at you is mostly true. Of course weather, and environment can change these situations, but the laws of sound moving through the air are pretty unshakable. An experienced unit could probably gauge the direction from which firing is coming from pretty quickly. They may not actually see the shooter or shooters, but they get the general direction. That is of course if they are all still alive and have survived the initial ambush.

     

    In the early 20th century individual infantry weapons were designed for accurate, long distance, timed firing. MGs and artillery were meant to do the most damage which historically has been the case. The advent of the early submachine guns like the Thompson, MP40 and the Sten were attempts to get more firepower into the hands of individual soldiers. Then came the assault rifles, which gave a bit more range but allowed for increased rates of fire. Is was in Vietnam with the Marines at at time when we still had M-14s. The Army had been using M-16s since the beginning of their involvement. We had selector switches on our 14s, but hardly ever used auto mode, because it was nearly impossible to hold the rifle down, and the 20 round magazine was empty in 3 seconds. In the late 60s the US military decided that putting more rounds downrange at shorter distances was more important than accurate fire.  A good idea in the confines of jungles, but what about the open terrain of Afghanistan and Iraq. So now, sniper and sharpshooter teams accompany infantry troops in close combat, to provide standoff accuracy.

     

    Funny how things evolve.

  4. Earlier I stated that Russia is also operating large amounts of support units in Ukraine, in particular signals, EW, and other such things. Here is one of many examples of how hard it is for Russia to hide its activities thanks to the Internet. Though for some reason logic + evidence ≠ fact for some people:

    https://informnapalm.org/12200-kompleks-radyorazvedky-torn-dap

    The power of open source information is really showing itself in Ukraine. No wonder that as of today new laws in Russia give the government more control over the Internet. It won't prevent the outside world from discovering the truth, but it can make it even more difficult for Russians to learn what is really going on.

    This particular example is especially interesting because it combines video footage taken from a "crowd sourced" UAV from a volunteer unit (Dnipro 1), with pictures taken by separatists on the ground, finding it on Google Earth, and known pictures of the signals system in question. It's an impressive amount of data that is sitting right out in the open.

    Steve

    I can't read Russian or Ukranian Steve, what does the white square on the vehicles signify? Why are they highlighted. Also those trucks are pictured several times, what is their significance. I am assuming the pictures are of Russian regular forces, and the "signals" units you mention. 

  5.  

     

    Nidan1, who never talks to me, is slowly giving up ground as my battered Brits overrun his positions and whittle him down. It was inevitable.

     

     

    There is a reason for that......have you ever looked at your beloved pet dog in the face as you talked to him. His head tilts from side to side as he recognizes your words, his eyes shine with a crystal-like twinkle, and you just know he understands everything you are saying. Well when talking with Boo you get none of those satisfying hints of recognition, sort of like reading a love poen to a head of lettuce.

  6. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a954940.pdf

     

    This report may prove interesting, although very technical. This test was done on the side armor (no specific location for the sample section that I can find). Also it does not say what model Panther was used.

     

    I would assume though, that the glacis plate used similar materials. Since the report is dated after war one could assume that the steel came from a G model, although As and Ds were still on the field in 1945.

  7. Also not all minefields are carefully established. Only a permanent/semi permanent position would have minefields with deliberately established covering fire and precise location of mines. The CMx1 games also had "hasty minefields" IIRC, these types are more in keeping with the fluid nature of the encounters in CMBS. Something of that type should have been labeled as such on the icon. I assume that all minefields in CMBS are of the "hasty" variety and can potentially cause trouble for both sides. Although they are not really defined as such in the manual. 

  8. Let me save you the trouble and tell you right away. As you are from the "East" (as myself) any personal experience on any matter is irrelevant on these forums. Only western anecdotal evidence is accepted.

    Really? I think the opportunity for us "Westerners" to get interesting anecdotal stories of real military experiences from our former "enemies" is really important. I grew up during the cold war, the missle race, the space race and all the other competitions real or imagined that took place primarily between the US and the former Soviet Union. I myself am tired of the conflict. Russian and American people have more in common than we like to admit, and to continue the Cold War on these forums is a waste of time. We can learn from each other here, many more things than just the common interest we have in military matters.  As my friend sublime has said, sarcasm and other verbal nuances do not work well in message boards and forums, especially when not all of us have a common native tongue. I only brought up the T-64 autoloader story because it was something we heard back in the 60's when the Soviets were putting them into front line service. If its totally without merit then you have convinced me, and I will stand corrected on the issue.

     

    Let's not waste the opportunity, to move past our old suspicions and predjudices and really have some credible give and take.

    We can still enjoy playing this game, and debating related interests without starting World War Three on these boards.

  9. without fueling a NATO tank or Russia tank stronk war, If you are a crewman who has been informed that if you put your arm into the breach area when the tank is loading that it will load your arm in most likely. I mean it is impossible for it to load your arm in if you are sitting properly in. I've searched countless of times for a legitimate arm loading incident it hasnt happened. Stop with this myth.

    I have no interest or intention of wanting to start a flame war sir, but there are loads of anecdotal stories about the auto loader on the T-62 and even the early T-72, as well as other shortcomings. No weapons system is perfect on day one, believe me I have seen what bureaucracy and political BS can mean to the men who actually use them.

     

    http://tankerslife.homestead.com/Foreign03.html

  10. It was an urban legend kind of story, but we always thought it could be a possibility. However claymores were not set in that far from our foxholes at night, usually about 20-25 meters out for safety. 

     

    There was so much un-exploded ordnance lying around that the VC had plenty of high explosives to make mines and booby traps.

    NVA had factory manufactured stuff.

  11. In my experience we rarely, if ever,  set up a claymore for trip wire detonation. We used them on ambushes, and for defensive protection of our nighttime positions. They were always in the command detonation mode.

     

    On night ambushes, as a combat engineer it was my job to set up some sort of improvised tripwire device(s) that would trigger an ambush when someone walked through the area. We did not do this indiscriminately. We truly hoped that civilians would not be walking through the area at night, especially an area of active engagement. I now would like to tell an interesting story. In May of 1967 I was involved in Operations , supporting the 3rd Marine Regiment south of Da Nang in South Vietnam. One night I went out on an ambush patrol and I set up a daisy chained string of c ration cans stuffed with C-4 and machine gun links. I set this up around sunset and placed two separate trip wires, as well as a wire running back to our positions attached to a mechanical detonating device we called a "clacker" To make a long story short, the night was uneventful, and at dawn I went out to retrieve my handiwork and found that all the cans and devices that I had emplaced were gone. Obviously someone watched me set everything up, and quietly and efficiently removed each can and wire without either making a sound or triggering the devices. The implications sent chills up my spine, and from that day on, I either avoided using ambush triggers entirely or set them up in darkness.

×
×
  • Create New...