Marc

Well, first became aware of the darn things around 66 or 67, think I saw a copy of the old AH Battle of the Bulge in a store. Got serious the year I entered college, 68. First games were the classic AH ones, Bulge, D-Day, Waterloo, Afrika Korps and a few others. Now it is a sickness I am afraid. My collection is now over 1,000 (yes that is a 1 followed by 3 zeroes) wargames! Marc

I kept track and indeed there are only 13 turns for a player in a year. I also thought it was more, just goes to show you! Still, plenty of fun, especially for the money! Marc

I combined Holzems excellent interface and maps with Jmbunnelle new counters. Must say, VERY IMPRESSIVE! Maybe Jmbunnelle can "borrow" Holzem's HQ to continue to picture theme on the counters? WELL DONE to both of you! Marc

You raise some very valid points, ones that are still debated today. A few points however. While the majority of the manpower employed, of the two million, would not be prime candidates for combat units, they could well have been used for other logistic purposes, such as rail repair. Further, since the Germans refused to use women in any great degree in the production area (no Helga the Rivetter here!), they turned to the very uneconomical and counterproductive use of impressed and slave labor. These self same young boys and older men would have been available to bolster production. By freeing up some of the rear area types the German army would have gained further manpower resources for combat units (though I am NOT arguing 2 million men worth!). The problem with increased use of fighter, fighter-bomber and tac bombers was that, until such a time as the allies secured a fair amount of area on the continent, most targets the luftwaffe felt they needed to defend were beyond the range of all but the heavy bomber. An interesting side note, the allies did toy with the idea of using the P-38 as a bomber. It had the range and was a half way decent bomber, though at range payload tended to drop off. However, it couldnt defend itself when loaded with bombs, would have to jettison the bombs at first sign of fighters (rather counter-productive) and would still have to be escorted. Another point to remember is that the North African Campaign was seen as a side show. For morale purposes on the home front the western alliance had to be seen striking back at the German's directly. Dont underestimate the psychological impact on the home front of the bomber offensive. It was also a mean to demonstrate our committment to the Russians, lacking a true "second front". Though, to Stalin, anything short of a full scale invasion of France would never be credited. Further, the bomber offensive drained two-thirds of the fighter assets from the Eastern Front as well as diverting much needed resources. The gradual switch to air superiority by the Soviets was greatly enhanced by this. Imagine, if you will, three times the amount of first line fighters on the Eastern Front in 43 and 44. The allies also gained valuable experience for running a Strategic campaign including seasoned aircrews and leaders. There is NO arguement that much too much effort was expended on political targets with little effect. The one thing that bothers me when we "count the cost" is a sheer running of a balance sheet of so many aircraft and allied aircrew lost for such and such an effect on industry. What is usually left out of the equation is the fact that several thousand German aircrew also lost their lives, that valuable fighters, using scarce resources, were destroyed in the thousands and that we saw a marked shift in the Luftwaffe from an offensive to a defensive force. Did the Strategic Bomber offensive accomplish what its prewar proponents stated it would? Obviously not. However I must agree with Overy, among others, that Strategic Bombing was one of the major contributing factors to the allies victory in Europe. Now, what this has to do with our beloved game............. Marc

While Oil turned out to be the "achilles heel" for the German war effort, it wasnt the only target that mattered. Nor were allied efforts prior to concentrating on oil targets wasted. Other key targets were the logistic/tranportation infrastructure in anticipation of the Invasion, and a target not pursued, but outlined by Speer in his book, the Electrical grid system. Many ineffective targets, such as submarine pens, were struck for a combination of Politcal and Morale reasons which really dispersed the effort. Overy, in his book "Why the Allies Won" makes the following case for reasons other then just damage to economic infrastructure for the effectiveness of Allied bombing: "The bombing offensive caused German military leaders to drain much need air strength away from main fighting fronts to protect the Reich...By the end of 1943 there were 55,000 anti-aircraft guns to combat the air offensive--including 75 percent of the famous 88-millimetre gun...By 1944 one-third of all German artillery production consisted of anti-aircraft guns; the anti-aircraft effort absorbed 20 percent of all ammuntion produced, one-third of the output of the optical industry, and between half and two-thirds of the production of radar and signals equipment. As a result of this diversion, the German army and navy were desperately short of essential radar and communications equipment for other tasks. The bombing also ate into Germany's scarce manpower: by 1944 an estimated two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defense, in repairing shattered factories and in generally cleaning up the destruction...The combined effects of direct destruction and the diversion of resources denied the German forces approximately half their battle-front weapons and equipment in 1944." In addition, the Bombing offensive resulted in air superiority over Germany by the allies. Over two-thirds of the fighter forces on the Eastern front were transferred to the West resulting in the gradual gain of air superiority in the East by the Soviets (Von Hardesty in "Red Phoenix" has some interesting insights into the rise of Soviet Air Power during the war). Were there problems? Of course. Ineffective targetting and the horendous loss of Allied aircrew were but two. However, it was the only effective way the Western Allies had to take the war to the Germans until an Invasion of France could be mounted. Marc

So far I have played the 39 and 40 Scenarios as the allies. In the 40 Scenario America entered right on time. In the 39 Scenario America didnt enter until midway through 42. So, would seem America doesnt always enter early. Marc

I'll give it a go! Marc

Quick question. Once Russia surrenders are partisans still an issue? I kept the area thoroughly garrisoned (cities, forests and swamps) just in case. Marc

Have same problem. Says Direct X 7.0 not found. Doesnt seem to be effecting game play. Running 98 SE. Marc

Actually it is out in computer form as well, called Computer War in Europe which makes it very playable, though there is NO AI with it. We even have a group to discuss it. Marc

Bill; Happened to me once in the older Beta version as well. The AI seemed to spend a fair amount on Research with the Italians getting jet level 1 before the Beta ended! Marc

David; I do think you are right. Though must say need the full game rather then where the Gold Beta cuts off to see what effect the expenditure in UBoats will have vis-a-vis the Eastern Front. Cheers Marc

Ask the Israelis

Folks, If you cant recognize this by now, shame on you. Already shame on me. None of us has made the statement that US, or Western Allies relied solely on finesse, nor that brute strength wasnt used, and used effectively at times. Husky will simply discount any examples you use, carry your examples to ludicrous ends and generally discount any and all sources which dont support his arguement. I would be more then willing to compare professional credentials. Husky has read many books, and that is admirable. I am not trying to be glib, I do admire the fact you bother to research instead of relying on one book or one source. However, some of us have been cited in books, have National planning experience and have actually come under fire. The one thing I wont accept, no matter how impassioned your arguement is this casting of the Western Alliance as ignorant brutes while showing the German soldier as some sort of shining Knight on a noble cause and the epitome of tactical finesse. Almost seems some think the wrong side won the war? V/R Marc

David; Indeed well said! I agree on Overy's book being an excellent source as well. One other worth a read, and relates to our game: "Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority" Kenneth Macksey, Greenhill Books, London & Stackpole Books Pennsylvania, 1996. And with that, should we return to arguing about best strategy and tactics in the game in quesiton? Marc