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Vanir Ausf B

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  1. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to FancyCat in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/fear-and-loathing-in-munich/
    A reminder for all America's uselessness, Europe remains a close competitor.
  2. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Maciej Zwolinski in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Three FSB agents got medals for their diligent work at dislodging it.
  3. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Kraft in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    On the topic of rotation and casulties, situation in Zenit and Avdiivka overall. 

  4. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Rokko in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I'd like to a bunch of back-of-the-envelope calculations and present them here for "public scrutiny". Lately I have been fascinated by this data set on confirmed RU KIA. Sadly, I can't embed the individual interactive plots, so I'll just use a screenshot or two, but I'd encourage everyone to take a look for themselves. Especially the breakdowns by branch of service and by time are really interesting.
    So these people have been collectively gathering data on at least 43,460 killed RU soldiers from all branches (including PMCs and convicts), sampling from a variety of sources, ranging from social-media obituaries to on-site graveyard visits. I am not sure, if this data set includes L/DNR KIA figures or not, but it seems likely to me, since I found a couple of individual records of KIA high ranking officers that fought in (former) L/DNR formations. Now the total figure is obviously too low and one must also keep in mind that the degree of inaccuracy in the weekly KIA figures may also vary, but I think it is not totally unreasonable to assume a factor of roughly 7.2 for total casualties, overall (x3 for WIA/MIA, x2.4 for unreported losses). Note, the site makes a convincing argument, putting the probable WIA:KIA ratio in a range between 1.4:1 and 4:1. Using a 3:1 ratio would put the total figure at around 315,000, which matches with the CIA estimated as stated on this site (I didn't double check this figure or how recent it is). The UKR MOD currently claims just short of 400k for total personnel losses, btw.
    Below the figure I am referencing here it says that only for 34,388 out of the total of 43,460 KIA (~79%) the exact date of death is known. I take that to mean the remainder is not included in this figure and, assuming an even distribution of these cases, will include a factor of ~1.26 in all subsequent calculations, i.e., x3.033 for probable KIA and x9.099 for probable total casualties, based on the number of (date) confirmed KIA.

     
    If we now look, for example, at the weekly breakdown of all recorded KIA for the duration of the summer/fall 2023 offensive (roughly 01/06 through 4/10, or 18 weeks) we come up with a total of 5,591 confirmed KIA, with the intensity of the fighting seemingly steadily declining after June. So a probable total KIA count for this timeframe would be around 17,000 and 50,900 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this is 310 confirmed KIA, 940 probable KIA and 2,820 probable total casualties. These weekly averages are much lower, by a factor of ~2, than those during the two bloodiest months of the war (01/23 and 02/23) and lower by a factor of ~1.2 than weekly RU losses in 10/23 (right after cessation of the offensive, when the assault on Avdiivka began). Between 29/12/22 and 01/03/23 (9 weeks), which is somewhat arbitrary but roughly coincides with the deadliest fighting for Bakhmut and Vuhledar, the Russians suffered a total of 5,878 KIA, 17,800 probable KIA and 53,500 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this amounts to 653 confirmed KIA, 2000 probable KIA and 5,900 probable total casualties.
    I am not totally sure what to make of these figures, maybe others can gather meaningful insight from them, though. I really hope I didn't miscalculate anything. If I did, please correct me. To me, they seem to underline that, considering a RU replacement rate of about 20k per month or 5,000 per week (although we don't know since when and for how long this rate has held or will hold), a strategy focused on personnel attrition is probably not a viable option. Not that anyone would have made that claim. Even in their worst time, this replacement rate would have been almost sufficient to absorb their casualties (at 5,900 weekly casualties only 84.5% over a period of 9 weeks). There are some further caveats to that, I think: Before the fall 2022 mobilization and through early 2023, the RU replacement rate seems to have been much more inadequate before they managed to reach the current high levels, that allow them to absorb even absurdly high casualty rates. So there would have been a serious backlog of unreplaced losses, that would only slowly have been filled by that time. This might serve to explain the RU unwilligness to demobilize (or even just rotate) the fall 2022 mobiks and to just keep them for the duration. These figures also seem to indicate that the 2023 summer/fall offensive was probably never adequate at inflicting debilitating losses to the Russians, at least from a global perspective. How serious these losses affected RU troops locally can not really be concluded from this, although my gut feeling tells me that it probably never got all that serious for them, given that they managed to absorb roughly the same number of casualties in half the time during the winter (while on the offensive).
  5. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Beleg85 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Good summary from Tatariagmi.
    Judging by various accounts aggregated here and there, it seems to be one of first Russian successes in coordinating airstrikes with infantry assaults. FABs were flying naturally before, in Severdonietsk, Soledar etc. but this time they indeed report of great concentration of hits by this type of weapon, supported by near-constant presence of Russian drones over city. Relatively crude tactics, but effective over time- muscovites definitelly were able to concentrate a lot of resources here.
  6. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Rokko in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    In the case of Europe I'd say UKR is cut off not due to political will (or lack thereof), but lack of means. The last aid package from Germany mentioned 2500 artillery shells. That's one day of firing and this was a couple of weeks back. And last time I checked, UKR seems to be losing around 3 artillery guns, self-propelled and otherwise, every other week. Europe can't replace those. Shell production will eventually reach useful levels (although we don't know how many of those will actually end up in UKR hands), but I am afraid they will have run out of guns at that point.
     
    From what we know, Russia is recruiting 20k (GUR estimate) to 35k (Medvedev bragging) men per month. Their losses are obviously high, but I'd guess given these numbers they are ultimately sustainable, not so for UKR it seems. And how many brigades were they able to smash against Avdiivka, one after the other? If they can keep this up, they'll whittle UKR down eventually this way, if they don't get a grip on their own issues.
  7. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Rokko in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
    The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.
  8. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to billbindc in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    The reminder very emphatically did not come from the White House. It came from GOP Rep Mike Turner and Jake Sherman actually did a press briefing to express bewilderment that a Republican on the Gang of Eight would publicize the secret subject of a meeting scheduled for the following day.
  9. Upvote
  10. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Quick update regarding Avdiivka.

    RU reached Industrialnyy avenue cutting it off RU reached City park RU did not reach Brevno There are conflicting reports as to who controls Avtobaza Overall situation seems to fluid at the moment.   
  11. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to cesmonkey in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
  12. Like
    Vanir Ausf B got a reaction from Chibot Mk IX in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Machine translation of a summary:
     
     
  13. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B got a reaction from Carolus in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Machine translation of a summary:
     
     
  14. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Sorry to interrupt the lively discussion about US politics, but I'd want to add my two cents regarding the Avdiivka situation.
    Most likely, it will attempt to halt or slow down the current RU attack on the O0542 route. It is the most dangerous RU attack, with the potential to collapse the entire Avdiivka pocket rapidly. If 3rd manages to stop or slow this RU attack down, we could argue that 3rd indeed saved Avdiivka from quick collaps.
     
    Most likely, Avdiivka is going to fall because the Russian gliding bombs (UMPK) have not been neutralized yet. Essentially, RU are simply leveling with UMPK UKR strong points that their meat groups encounter. The system works as follows: an RU meat group meets a UKR strong position, dies while the RU command watches it through drones and then RU command orders a bombing of the strong point into oblivion. A fresh RU meat group is then dispatched forward. So, given enough time and bodies, RU will capture the place that once was called Avdiivka. 
     
    The situation is advantageous to UKR in Avdiivka. Avdiivka is the most fortified area in UKR. Even with UMPKs, the Koksohim plant and south urban areas are incredibly tough to breach, and RU losses are horrific.
    The problem is there is a certain critical vulnerability that RU have found and are trying to exploit now. If they succeed, Avdiivka will fall swiftly. Much faster than it would be otherwise.
    Let's discuss the overall situation and then look at my quick map.
    RU failed to encircle Avdiivka via Stepove > Orlivka (north axis) and Vodyane > Tonenke (south axis). The assault via Tsarska Ohota (48.11372615890259, 37.77596770282691) toward the major urban area (that pipe infiltration) was originally successful but is now slow and painful. Finally, since the Azov Steel battle, RU want to avoid any major assaults on large plants such as Koksohim.
    So, using their standard tactic of persistent pressure by meat groups along the front lines, they discovered the weak spot.

    The O0542 road is the primary communication route for the Avdiivka defense sector. Assaulting via Avtobaza and Brevno is the shortest way to reach it. There are not many urban-style buildings in this village-style area. As a result, it provides sufficient concealment for assaulting RU meat groups while providing substantially less cover for UKR defenders against UMPKs.
    If UKR manage to neutralize this assault they could hold Avdiivka a lot longer. So, I believe this is the reason UKR commit 3rd assault "to save Avdiivka".
  15. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to billbindc in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I would strongly recommend Paxton's "Anatomy of Fascism" or John Ganz's online writings about anti-Dreyfusard and/or Boulangiste France. The model of fascism represented by Mussolini or Hitler is not quite what's happening to the GOP, subject as it is to the cultural and political mores specific to the United States. On the one hand, that's a good thing because the essentially immigrant/moderate/revolutionary/democratic foundation of the state makes blood and soil dictatorship a much harder prospect. But on the other, the United States also contains within it strains of racism and violent action that, should they ignite fully, can be positively Balkan. 
    Luckily, there's one simple and decisive thing Americans can do. Vote. Vote for the current administration even if it isn't your cup of tea. Because if nothing else, it will remain within the normal bounds of politics. And (to remain on topic)...because it is far more likely to see the war in Ukraine to a positive conclusion. 
  16. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Haiduk in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Acoording to updated information UKR Su-25, lost on 7th of Feb was shot down on 17th minutes of flight by R-37 long-range AA missle, likely from Su-35. This missile has 200 km of range and speed 6M . Other carriers of this missile are Su-27 and MiG-31BM  
    For the lost pilot Vladislav Rykov ("Magic"), this was 385th combat flight.

  17. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to The_MonkeyKing in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/02/10/syrskyi-in-zaluzhnyi-out-what-to-expect-from-ukraines-army-reshuffle/
     
     
  18. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to omae2 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Nah it will not. If Trump get elected he can delay decision makings and troop deployment enough to get Europe tangled in a war alone. I don't understand how an idiot like Trump can compete in the race to white house but i'm not American.
    The whole russian strategy is to isolate the USA, and i cant understand how are they that successful with it. It almost feel like you guys wanna lose the next major conflict of the human history.
    NATO is a sheet of paper only held together by trust. If you guys betray that trust than you global hegemony will be lost. As soon as peoples around the world get a whiff of cowardliness from the USA they gonna look for other partners. Everything that makes you live on the level of standards that you accustomed is based on your country's hegemony. Once things go down they go down quick.
     
    I don't know what you guys doing on the other side of the sea but everything seems messier by the week.
  19. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to sburke in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    it wasn't even the dumbest thing he said.
    The best comment of all though was from Nikki's husband
     
  20. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Maciej Zwolinski in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    As I wrote, the sample is from WW2 Italy and North-West Europe. The only  failed attempt by the Allies to take a city that I can find off the top of my head in that period is Arnhem. Although even that battle can be described in reverse way as a successful German attempt to storm it from UK/Polish defenders rather than failed Allied attack. So certainly the majority of actions from Allied side would be successful attacks, and those which failed, are probably temporary repulses (e.g. 1st and 2nd Monte Cassino). If German battles are included (will try to check that) you may have Bastogne from the Battle of the Bulge
    You are right that an failed attack on a city would probably have significantly different outcome in terms of casualty ratios, because for the attacker, the desired return on his investment in the form of POW harvest at the end does not happen. 
    Also, I agree that these big success rates/low casualty rates in urban attack must be to a large degree the result of commanders knowing it is a difficult fight, preparing for it particularly well and going slowly. in addition to those second-order effects, the other factors are abundance of cover for the attacker and the posture of the defender, who is often determined to defend a city even from encirclement, so at the end of succesful attack, there is a large crop of POWs and all unevacuated wounded men and damaged equipment become permanent losses.
  21. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Haiduk in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    We critically need F-16. Problem of KABs have been becoming more and more dangerous month by month
    This serviceman writes from Novomykhailivka, where Russian intensivley attack and drop many gliding bombs:
    For the hour 17 KABs impacted, and I more and more looking for F-16 on the horizon 
    Autumn photo of Novomykhailivka with two gliding bomb craters
    The same serviceman: "Then [in Autumn] about 30 KAB were arriving for a day. More than 200+ bombs were dropped. No one di...k can't sit there. Two years Russians have been grinding it, the cities have fall, but Novomykhailivla still stood"

    This is article of UKR OSINT group "Information resistance" (alas in UKR only) about number of KAB usage by Russians: https://sprotyv.info/analitica/taktichna-aviacziya-rf-rekordno-zbilshila-vikoristannya-kabiv/
    According their information November of 2023 became a record month of KAB strikes - 1200 and one day - Nov 25th had daily record - 120 KABs. 
    For the 10 day of February 2024 Russians aviation already dropped 460 gliding bombs. And this month can beat the previous record. Despite Russian gliding bombs don't have the same precisiosn like JDAM, but their quantity already turning to quality and our troops feel this on their own. 
    Russian industry produce up to 50 gliding kits per day for FAB equipping. France is going to give us 50 AASM per month. Feel a difference...
    The quantity of US JDAMs likely was also in dozens of bombs. And all they already dropped.  
     
  22. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Haiduk in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    We had usual FPVs, then "Mamont" - the "fat FPV" has appeared, now we have "Darts" - the "long FPVs". This is winged type-FPV, but not the same as Lancet - completely other architecture and control. 
    M2 SBU unit already operates with them. Each "Darts" complex has 10 drones and control/transmitting equipment. There are no information except these drones can carry about 3 kg of load. Their range is more than usual FPV, but some less than Lancet. But this drone complex is more cheaper.

    In other "serious" class of kamikadze-drones, some recently unknown UKR long-range jet drone was found in Russia

    More evidences, that UKR has some new EW system, which can supress Shaheds and force them to land. One more almost undamaged UAV was found in Dnipropetrovsk oblast  
     
    This statistic shows since Russians (or Iranians) two months ago made some improves in Shahed design - new black composite shell, integrated SIM card of UKR cellphone operators, which probably gives opportunity of inflight change of route wapoints, resultativity of UKR AD on Shaheds reduced on 1/3. Though, this can other reason - Air Forces Command didn't count supressed by EW and landed Shaheds as shot down. They are "drones, which didn't reach aims"

  23. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to wolfgang500 in Open or Closed Hatch, That Is The Question   
    I used to work with tanks through the seventies and eighties. We were trained to basically unbotton from M47 all the way through M60A3, for situational awareness. We only had residual light amplifiers in the latter, though. It changed with Leo 2 of course. Especially in the american tanks visibility from the buttoned-up cupola was very bad. So far the real live expierence.
  24. Thanks
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to photon in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
    I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
    The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
    The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
    We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
    So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.
  25. Upvote
    Vanir Ausf B reacted to Astrophel in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    @OBJ
    I am convinced that Putin has no intention of stopping.  At the most he would take a ceasefire to regroup and rebuild, but right now he probably thinks he is winning and will not look for a ceasefire.  Any attempt by Ukraine to look for a ceasefire will be rejected - Putin is looking for a surrender, not a ceasefire.  Why would Putin stop now when everybody is dancing to his music including the United Nations and the United States Congress?
    Putin himself reminds me of Macbeth:
    "I am in blood / Stepped in so far that should I wade no more, / Returning were as tedious as go o'er"
    He has no way back.
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