Amedeo

Chieftain V T-62 | Operation Nasr, Iran – Iraq War, 1981
H

I saw this and immediately thought of this thread again:
 
It seems we can actually cite historical precendence for tankers mounting grunts (that came out wrong) on their tanks for spotting!

I doubt it.
 
 
Considering that in the assumed timeframe the 3BM21 should be available for all T-62s in the game, I think that the Chieftain will be vulnerable in its frontal arc to 115mm tank guns. Not to speak of the 125mm guns.

I doubt it.
 
 
Considering that in the assumed timeframe the 3BM21 should be available for all T-62s in the game, I think that the Chieftain will be vulnerable in its frontal arc to 115mm tank guns. Not to speak of the 125mm guns.

I doubt it.
 
 
Considering that in the assumed timeframe the 3BM21 should be available for all T-62s in the game, I think that the Chieftain will be vulnerable in its frontal arc to 115mm tank guns. Not to speak of the 125mm guns.

As is ever the case, the real-life utility of these is often because they are there.
To take the Soviets, and Soviet-derived forces (so, Syrians and Russians in CMSF and CMBS), the 120mm mortars are a battalion asset, so each battalion would have a battery of mortars embedded within them, and these will always be available to the paper structure of this formation.
122mm and 152mm artillery are brigade-level assets, so will be assigned to the main effort. That's often, but not always, what we're representing in CM scenarios. Call-in times will typically be longer, but not necessarily long enough to matter. 122mm and 152mm howitzers have a significantly longer range than mortars, so there will be tasks they will do which mortars are unsuitable for.
A CM battle is an extremely limited perspective on a wider task. In that specific case, the roles of 152mm howitzers and 120mm mortars are very similar. They are providing the same four basic tasks that artillery carries out, destruction, suppression, obscuration and denial. The HE in a 120mm shell tends to be larger than the 155mm/152mm artillery, so bigger boom for less accuracy. This means that laying smoke for obscuration is the task which mortars are generally strictly better at, but most tasks can be done more or less equally well with either system. There will be some differences in things like the angle of incoming fire. Whether that matters will be terrain dependent.
Accuracy is for the most part unimportant for suppression and denial, and only really matters when you're trying to actively destroy targets, which is a task that 152mm and 155mm artillery will be superior to 120mm mortars at... but still not ideal, since that's a task better suited for rocket artillery and more specialist munitions (sensor-fused munitions, for example), which are often not really a close support artillery role (and hence not necessarily something you'd see a lot of in CM terms).
So, sure, if you want to phrase the question as "Why should I pick this system in a Quick Battle?", the answer may come down to points values, rarity and available ammunition. Mortars tend to be a little cheaper, but that will vary.
If you want to phrase this question as "Why would you put this in a scenario?", the answer is (or should be) that this is something that is available to this unit, in this context.
If you want to phrase the question as "How do I best use this unit?", then there's very little difference in how these are employed, they both do similar tasks to approximately the same degree of effectiveness, with minor differences.
 

I don’t think anyone of serious power in the West wants a full Russian collapse.  The overall Western grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has been “stable status quo”.  We have spent the last 33 years pretty much working on all fronts to sustain “the system”.  We toss scarfs and hats on it but at its core is a central unchanging stability.  Why?  Because stability is good business.  The West, with the US at the centre built the scheme that “won” the Cold War and want that party to keep going because we get very rich off it.  The rest of the world makes our stuff for cheap, while also buying our other stuff.  
But pretty much from Day 1 “the others” pushed back.  First was the intra-war years, interventions and then terrorism.  Now this has upscaled to “revisionist states” and “power competition”.  Russia invaded Ukraine for several reasons but one of them definitely was to demonstrate that they are not going to be bound by western rules (Hell, Putin said exactly this in that speech back in Sep ‘22).  This puts the West in a dilemma, they can either do too little and Russia threatens the system, or they crush Russia…and it threatens the system.  So they appear to have chosen the middle path, which of course is getting hijacked by the internal movements who want to…wait for it…change the system.  MAGA, alt-right, nationalists, whatever, all disagree with “the system” even though it has made everyone richer.  The reality is that it did not make everyone equally rich so discontent is natural.  Worse, power spheres exploit this so they can get more powerful (and richer).  So Rust-Belt yokels eat this stuff up and start to dismantle “the system”, which includes democracy apparently.  The reality is Trump is a symptom, not a cause and I am not sure even they realize how dangerous this game they are playing is.
So Ukraine happens and becomes a symbol of a “war for, and against, the system.”  It isn’t about the fact that killing innocent Ukrainians is wrong - hell if morales like human life mattered we wouldn’t have Gaza.  No, Ukraine is all about “the system” and both sides appear to be waging it viewed through that lens.  Russia needs to show that they are going to play by their own rules, but not completely break themselves.  One could ask “why is Russia fighting this war by half measures?”  Do they enjoy a quagmire?  No, Putin understands what he has gotten himself into and is adopting a slow burn strategy, hoping we will get distracted and caught up in our own nonsense…and he might be right.
The rest of the West is trying to step up, but frankly we have grown awfully fat, dumb and happy on the back of the US - who now is having a bipolar fit.  In the end, we can live with a fallen Ukraine.  We can shore up the borders and lock Russia out.  We can live with a partial victory in Ukraine, do we really care about Crimea, LNR and DNR?  No, we did not in ‘14 and we don’t now.  We can’t live with a completely imploded Russia.  Those are where the real risks lie.  Too many unknowns that could really break the system.  So we wind up with a half hearted war designed to punish Russia for challenging the system but not destroy them.  Ukraine is, and I am being brutally honest here, is almost secondary to the entire conversation.  It was simply a very unfortunate country where both sides could try and prove a point.  We love Ukraine all of a sudden because they are an opportunity to show that 1) Russia was wrong to challenge the system, and 2) the system still works.  
I strongly suspect this is why this war is also so muddled in military circles.  We are watching a war to defend the system..that is demonstrating the weaknesses of our own military system at the same time.  So we put blinders on and try to pretend it isn’t happening.  Our military power has to still be relevant…otherwise how can we defend the system?
So to answer your question, “yes, the US and the West know exactly how important Ukraine really is and are fighting this war based on that calculus.”  The answer however is “somewhat important”.  We care and feel bad, but care much more about our own issues.  Putin read the short game about as wrong as one can.  He may have read the long game extremely well.  The way to beat the West is not outright confrontation, it is apathy.  2 years is forever for a culture addicted to clicks and flashing lights.  Putin’s off ramp is being able to draw a victory line somewhere of his choosing and he is shooting for that.  And we might just let him get there.
Now I would not start freaking out and worry about a second attack on Kyiv.  Something that dramatic might actually get our attention again.  No, this needs to become a boring war - I am starting to think Putin’s Tucker Carlson interview was smarter than we thought.  What better way to get Western audiences to yawn and start to change the channel than a history lesson?

Steve/theCapt originally said they were aiming for a 2023 release, so hopefully that means atleast a first half of 2024 release
I'm personally hoping that Steves bones part 2 post will be the initial screenshots for BAOR and a confirmation of what the Soviets will be getting (not expecting a release date at this stage though, just want some eye candy)

I tend to feel that balance has always been seriously overrated in game design. I'm perfectly capable of having fun while taking a beating from a stronger opponent (desperation and despair can be a lot of fun in a simulated environment), or ruthlessly crushing a weaker one (indulging in a power fantasy is also fun). And thinking of CM as an educational tool, it's certainly valuable to learn how to fight a set piece battle against an equal opponent. But learning how to exploit against a weaker opponent or withdraw in the face of a stronger opponent is just as important.
Withdrawal and exploitation are two skills that us wargamers get precious little practice with. There is probably a bit of sport/tournament thinking going on. People think that once victory/defeat is determined, the battle doesn't matter anymore. All that matters in a sport is who wins and who loses. There are no higher or lower gradients of victory or defeat. But in reality it mattes a great deal whether you can turn a victory into a decisive victory, or prevent a defeat from turning into a decisive defeat.

I'd say it depends on. Soviet doctrine absolutely was "fight buttoned up"... but that doesn't mean the Joes doing the fighting weren't capable of determining what actually worked out in practice and what worked better in manuals. I read wartime recollections of an Su-76 commander a few years ago, and he discussed this specific topic. What he'd been taught in training was that the commander should always use the periscope, but he soon understood that the old hands in his crew advising him that he really ought to just stand up above the armour plating and use his binoculars if he wanted his SPG to actually hit anything were right.
The notion that Red Army TCs religiously buttoned up instead of getting outside and using their binoculars even when fighting tanks at range isn't reasonable just based on the fact that it would've been obvious that doing so would not be conductive to surviving against an enemy TC actually unbuttoning while you yourself stayed inside a cramped fighting compartment and peering through narrow, dirty, un-magnified vision slits.
I make an exception when it comes to Cold War tanks and only peer out occasionally when closer than 1km simply because the crew becomes very handicapped if the TC is hit, as well as the role play aspect (official doctrine is less likely to be flaunted only a few days into a conflict than it is several years in).

So, after I learned more about how Soviet tactics are actually supposed to work from watching @domfluff's collaboration with Free Whisky, and giving FM 100-2-1 a full reread*, I found that Soviet doctrine actually works really well. I was even able to use it to good effect in CMBS, even against American forces.
One of the most important things to remember is that it's not about just lining up and charging forward (in fact I rather got the impression that the founding principle of Cold War Soviet doctrine was "let's not do things the way we did them in WW2" (more emphasis on maneuver and avoiding frontal attacks, and more emphasis on artillery)). The most important part of the Soviet army isn't the tanks, it's the artillery. The tanks come in 2nd place in importance after the artillery, and the infantry come in 3rd place (though the infantry are still important, they understood completely that tanks need infantry support**). It's true that the Soviet army is less flexible than NATO armies at lower levels. It's true that lower ranked leaders (platoon and company commanders) were not supposed to exercise the kind of initiative that lower level NATO leaders were expected to exercise. So from the battalion level down it was a very battle-drill focused army. But from the regimental commanders up there is considerably more flexibility to come up with detailed plans, which should account for multiple contingencies. The lack of emphasis on lower level initiative (in fact outright discouragement of lower level initiative) isn't about stifling flexibility, it's about ensuring the will of the commander is carried out. So how well a given Soviet force performs will depend very heavily on the quality of their regimental and division commanders.
Again, the battalions and companies fight according to battle drills. But the regimental commander had a lot of flexibility in how and where to employ his battalions. Assuming the regimental commander is competent (granted, a big assumption, based on what we've seen from Russian commanders), he would try not to just use his battalions as blunt instruments. He would come up with a detailed plan, using deception, maneuver, and overwhelming firepower. In Combat Mission terms, since you rarely have full regiments, you'll be wanting to do this detailed planning with whatever sized force you have available, even if it's only a battalion or company.
When it comes time for the main attack you should go all in with everything you've got. But you shouldn't send the main attack in until you're ready. You'll want to spend a large chunk of the scenario just preparing things for your main attack. Think hard about the avenue of approach you want to use for your main attack. The Soviets would try to attack from an unexpected direction (for example: they absolutely will attack through forests if they think their vehicles can get through and it might allow them to emerge on the flank or rear of enemy defenses). So if you think you see an approach that the scenario designer wouldn't have thought to defend, and which you can get your forces through, then that approach is in line with Soviet thinking. A key element of the main attack, when it is finally time to send it in, is overwhelming firepower. The artillery fire plan is one of the most important elements of the overall plan. The Soviets were an artillery army first and foremost. Every attack would be supported by mass concentrations of artillery. You'll want to time your main attack to coincide with a full barrage consisting of all of your guns (the main attack is not the time to save ammunition), hitting both known and suspected enemy positions that might interfere with your advance. And don't just leave it up to the artillery either. Don't wait for your tanks to spot targets, but give them a large number of target briefly commands to hit every potential enemy position you can think of, even if you don't know for certain that it's really an enemy position (my rule of thumb as the Soviets/Russians is that my infantry never storm a town until every floor of every building has been hit by at least two HE rounds, regardless of whether enemy troops have actually been spotted in that building). Again, the main attack is not the time to try to save ammunition. I'll generally chain up multiple target briefly commands for each tank to execute each turn by targeting them from waypoints, sometimes with a 15 second pause order at each waypoint for better control (though firing on the move is probably more in line with how the Soviets wanted to fight). Whether I intend to bypass a position or storm it with infantry, I want to make sure no point in the position remains unhit with HE. And I always endeavor to have my infantry, coming up in their vehicles just behind the tanks, enter the enemy positions mere seconds after the last HE round has hit them (the timing on this can be tricky, but it is possible). Mass is an important component of Soviet doctrine. But it's really about massing firepower, not massing platforms. Massing platforms is merely a means to massing firepower.
In a meeting engagement (or any attack that does not start with Soviet forces already in contact with the enemy), they would have an advance guard ahead of the main body, itself broken up into three parts. The first part is the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP), consisting of one platoon. Their job is to find the enemy. Ideally by spotting them, but if necessary by dying to them. The second part is the Forward Security Element (FSE), consisting of a company minus the platoon that was split off to form the CRP. Their job is to brush aside a weak enemy, or fix a strong enemy in place for the third part. The third part is the advance guard main body, consisting of the regiment's lead battalion, minus the company that was split off to form the FSE. Depending on the conditions set by the CRP and FSE they may try to flank the force that was fixed in place by the FSE, or pursue some other objective that the fixed force can't stop them from taking. In this sort of battalion-sized advance to contact the battalion commander has more of the flexibility and initiative normally reserved for the regimental commander. Technically the Advance Guard main body is still setting conditions for the regiment's main body to do whatever it intends to do (larger flank attack, breakthrough, exploitation). But in Combat Mission terms I think it's good enough to just think in terms of your CRP, FSE, and your main body (the regimental main body behind the advance guard main body is probably out of scope for a single Combat Mission scenario anyway). You may want to have an FO with your CRP or FSE to start calling in the barrage that will support your main attack. Or you will want to preplan your artillery (you can certainly have a more complex fire plan if it's preplanned), with your main attack timed to go in at the 15-minute mark, and the CRP and FSE expected to have done their jobs before the 15-minute mark.
When an attack starts in contact with the enemy (they aren't moving to contact, and they already know what's in front of them), the Soviets wouldn't have an advance guard. The attack would go in more according to the 'deliberate attack' training scenarios. Whether you choose to employ a CRP and/or FSE in advance of your main attack, the important thing is that you have a good idea of what you are facing so that you can decide how, where, and when you want your main body to spring the main attack. Again, you are trying to avoid a frontal attack (hit their positions from the flank or rear if such an approach is available), and go in firepower-heavy with everything you've got, when (not before) you are ready to spring the main attack. Do everything you can to prepare the way for the main attack before springing it (recon, fix any forces that need to be fixed, start calling in fire-missions timed to support the main attack).
*I had read parts of FM 100-2-1 before. But I had skipped to the parts about platoon, company, and battalion formations and battle drills. But those are just the building blocks of Soviet doctrine, not the actual substance of Soviet doctrine.
**In fact they apparently decided that they were a bit too tank-heavy at some point in the 80s. One of their late 80s organizational reforms (which I don't think they ever actually completed before the Cold War ended (the 1991 edition of FM 100-2-3 suggested they were still early in the process of implementing this reform)) was to replace one of the tank regiments in each division with another motor rifle regiment. So tank divisions were to go from three tank regiments and a motor rifle regiment to two tank regiments and two motor rifle regiments. And motor rifle divisions were to go from three motor rifle regiments and a tank regiment to four motor rifle regiments, with the only tank support being the tank battalions organic to each motor rifle regiment. One can imagine how this would have resulted in a much more sensible ratio of tanks to infantry.

I usually fight in alignment with the doctrine of the forces. US I keep TCs out as much as possible. Sov I'll turn out the TCs if the tanks are doing recon, but if they button up due to threats I'll leave them alone. Same with APCs/IFVs. 
About thermals, as far as I know nothing in CW has independent thermals for the TC. So I'd expect the spotting advantage from thermals to stay entirely with the gunner and have a very limited FOV. 
H

This is not correct.
Orders here: http://www.tankarchives.ca/2015/12/aa-mg.html
Example from 62nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment in Danzig, 1945:

The remaining PzG Infantry put up a fierce resistance but it is fruitless.
 
 
 
and after another 15min of fight, German AI surrender
This mission has a bug on VP , hey I am not tactical defeat here 😀
 

Fully working on the 5th and last campaign "Our Father". Some impressions from the City of Mogilev:

Mogilev Town Hall before the war 
 

And Mogilev Town Hall in the campaign on the morning of 29th June 1944
 

Mogilev, St.Nicolas convent today
 

St.Nicolas convent after the heavy fighting in July 1941, when Germans captured the city
 

And the ruins of St.Nicolas during the campaign on the morning of 30th June 1944
 

And  the German Airfield near Mogilev 
 

Mogilev during WWII
 

Mogilev during the campaign on 28th June 1944
 

Well, British SLRs are only capable of single shots. So yes, it's completely representative of how British infantry fought. But it's not because they place a tactical emphasis on single shots. It's because their weapons are physically limited to single shots. The full auto capability of the original FAL has been completely removed on the British version of the FAL, the L1A1. So even if these soldiers wanted to fire in full auto, they couldn't. But, since it's firing a full power cartridge, not an intermediate cartridge, I'm not sure how controllable full auto from a FAL would be anyway. I imagine it would be bucking around pretty wildly, so much that you would be depending on more luck than skill to actually hit anything. Which is probably why a lot of armies that used a full powered cartridge in their rifles disabled any full-auto capability.
The question of how the SLR will perform compared to the M16 is one I've been very interested in. I've been going back and forth, but my thinking right now is that British and Canadian infantry should mostly be fine against the assault rifle armed Soviets (probably). They'll be at a theoretical disadvantage at short range, but I think the situation and positioning should be more important than the weapon most of the time. Obviously a British infantry squad with SLRs and a GPMG will have a massive amount of firepower by WW2 standards. But having a massive amount of firepower by WW2 standards doesn't necessarily mean that they'll be able to compete with the fully assault rifle armed US and Soviet infantry in the late Cold War. Whether or not British infantry will be able to hold their own in this era is part of what I'm really curious about, and a big part of why I can hardly wait for the BAOR module to be released. Again, my current thinking is that they should do fine, but I'll lay out in a moment why that's in question.
Unlike the British, both the US and Soviets are armed with assault rifles. The core principle of an assault rifle like the American M16 or Soviet AK74 is that it is a sort of universal small arm. With an assault rifle, there is no need to choose between a semi-automatic rifle or a submachinegun. An assault rifle fully combines the features of both a semi-automatic rifle and a submachinegun. You no longer have a tradeoff between long range firepower and short range firepower like you did in WW2, in which every submachinegun on the squad meant one less rifle and every rifle meant one less submachinegun. An assault rifle can smoothly transition from functioning like a WW2-era semi-automatic rifle at long range, to functioning like a WW2 submachinegun at short range. 
It does this by firing an intermediate cartridge. It is "intermediate" between a pistol cartridge, and what would have been considered a normal rifle cartridge in WW2. What was found in WW1, WW2, and Korea was that almost all fighting took place at ranges far shorter than what was envisioned when the rifles that were in service in WW2 were first designed. The intermediate cartridge of an assault rifle retains the ballistic properties of a full power cartridge out to the edge of normal combat ranges (about 500 meters), but not beyond. Instead of wasting power on achieving a maximum range that will never be utilized in real combat, you can have a smaller and lighter bullet (so you can carry more of them) with a much softer recoil. The soft recoil of the smaller cartridge makes an assault rifle about as controllable in full auto as a submachinegun (we are talking about aimed automatic fire, not random spraying). But because it is still as accurate as a full power cartridge out to the maximum range that you are likely to encounter in real combat you can, with the flick of a selector switch, have a weapon that is optimized for long range fighting or a weapon that is optimized for short range fighting all in a single package.
The theoretical advantage that a full power cartridge, such as the cartridge fired by the SLR, has in range and accuracy only starts to matter at ranges far exceeding normal combat ranges. You would need superhuman eyesight (or optics (which have become more or less universal in the modern day, which is part of why we are looking at going back to something like the SLR (look up the XM7 rifle for more details on that))) in order to take advantage of the theoretically superior ballistics of an SLR. 
At long range M16s and SLRs should perform pretty similarly. The M16 may have a slight edge, since the softer recoil makes follow up shots a bit faster (your sight picture isn't thrown off as much by the previous shot). But at those ranges they are both functioning as if they were WW2-era semi-automatic rifles (with higher magazine capacities). But as the fighting moves from those longer ranges into close quarters the M16 can, with the flick of a selector switch, give you firepower equal to a submachinegun, while the SLR is still only giving you the firepower of a semi-automatic rifle. Unlike assault rifles, SLRs aren't universal small arms. They are just really good semi-automatic rifles.
If you don't think that having a squad made up entirely of submachine gunners gives you a tremendous advantage in close quarters fighting, them I'm guessing that you haven't played CMRT (there's a reason that everyone has switched to assault rifles). Again though, I've been going back and forth myself on how much of a difference this will actually make. One day I'll find myself thinking that the British infantry are screwed, and the next day I find myself thinking that they should prove more or less equal to US and Soviet infantry. So I'm really curious to see how they actually perform when the BAOR module is released.

I can't remember if I posted this once before when CW first came out, but I have still a small pocket handbook that was issued to all FIST Chiefs in the 1/320FA back then. At the time I got this book I was a FIST Chief in A Btry, 1/320FA (Abn), later a Fire Direction Officer at battery and battalion level (in 2/321FA (Abn), and later still a Fire Support Officer (at both Bn and Bde level in 1st Bde). 
It's 5 separate pdfs. The first one has a lot of info on how a Soviet MRR would operate in the attack, which may help with tactics opposing them. It describes the recon element, the advanced battalion, with tactics and TOE. There is a nice table on how each element is organized and fights, along with (importantly!!) vulnerabilities. There is a lot of fire support information which will be more useful for background information, but does include a lot of specs of both US and Soviet equipment - rates of fire, shell weights, even airlift requirements to move a battery and supply it by air. In those tables DRF and DRB refer to the Division Ready Force, and Division Ready Battalion, referring to the artillery units associated with the infantry brigade that is on "Mission" cycle - the ones who are always ready to fly away at a moment's notice. One battery is direct support for an infantry Bn, one artillery Bn in direct support of an infantry brigade. Back then those direct support roles remained rigid, so that the same units batteries always supported the same infantry. For example as a FIST Chief, I supported C Co, 1-325 Inf (Abn). We trained with them in the field all the time, so we built a good working relationship. 
The TOE for US is specific to the 82d Airborne so you can't really apply it to a US mechanized unit. More men per squad, limited vehicles, etc. The 82d is kind of unique, and keep in mind that it's walking infantry, and the tactics for defense are described as the 82d being put in a position to oppose a mechanized Soviet advance, but in general terms, they still apply pretty well. 
Hope you find it useful. Feel free to download and save copies for yourself. This was freely given out, never classified in any manner, and we carried them around. 
They may help with tactics opposing Soviet advances, which in the AI scripting are pretty well based on how it's described here. Any fans of Flashpoint Campaigns (either Red Storm or Southern Storm) may also find them useful there - easier to see the larger scale Soviet organization unfold.
Enjoy.
Dave
Fire Support Handbook -5.pdfFire Support Handbook -4.pdfFire Support Handbook -3.pdfFire Support Handbook -2.pdfFire Support Handbook -1.pdf

Combat veterans from all ranks and all branches describe their experiences in/with combat, but they also explain what they believed worked, and what could be improved.
Amount of info is stunning, and some of the tips and advice could still be useful on the modern day battlefield.
 
Urban fighting, logistics, AT-warfare, combined arms, engineering, camouflage, maintenance, supplies, medical stuff, transport and much more.
It is a 388 page report, and you can (safely) download it from this WW2 US Bombers channel. Play in Youtube, than see description below this video how to obtain this report.
 
Whether you want this very interesting download or not, but you have even a slight bit of interest in WW2 bombers, check this channel out. You will be amazed, no doubt about it.

Or you can create yourself a dedicated shooting range map. 
Just use the blank map that is given to you once you fire up the scenario editor and adapt it to your need. 
Some people I know even place some range markings on it or different sectors to test different things. 
 
I use that mainly to test what weapon can hit/penetrate a certain target at a certain distance. 
 
The editor is fairly simple to understand I would say, so setting something up should not be a big issue. 

A new episode of Anti-Tank Chats just dropped which probably belongs on this thread
 

Steady as she goes gentlemen.

Well, the module timeframe is from 1976-1982, and the Canadians only started replacing their Centurions with Leopards in 1978 or 79. So I think it's a safe bet that Centurions are going to make it into the game for those early (1976-1977) Canadian forces.
But yeah, expect Leopards for most Canadian scenarios

And probably breaks down at 7 minutes (insider British Army of that era joke ...)

As far as I know, the only Soviet divisions equipped with T-80U/UDs were the Moscow garrison ones. So I guess the answer is no.