Harry Yeide
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Posts posted by Harry Yeide
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Okay. Shmavis: I actually said that it was Combat Mission that was the greatest wargame ever and got me going on the book. I recommend strongly that you buy another copy, or maybe two just to be safe.
Mr. Hedges in essence gets at the heart of the doctrinal problem as it is usually cast: It was *tank doctrine* that was deeply flawed, because that said tanks should not fight tanks. The debate on that question, only bits and pieces of which you see cited in books (and I, too, left out some great stuff because of space) is fascinating. From the beginning, there was a school that argued nonsense! Tanks have to fight tanks, that's the way the real world works.
I find that discussion here tends to get too wrapped around the axel of gun penetrating power, which is only part of the story. The M10 served effectively to the end of the war, as did the M18. Tank fighting is as much about tactics and tactical circumstance as it is about gun power. You find that in Italy, TD crews were immensely confident about their ability to kill Tigers, Panthers, Ferdinands, etc., because the few times they were encountered in large numbers, the TDs could always find a way to get a flank shot using their doctrine. There was some nervousness after rough encounters in Normandy, but TD crews soon regained their confidence. In the book, I cite one commander who said casually, we have their number, because we can almost always maneuver for the kill. This, by the way, was one of the messages I tried to deliver in "Steel Victory," because the supposedly grossly inferior Sherman crews did darn well, thank you very much, except when they were completely green or caught in a toe-to-toe, head-on match where maneuver and tactics went out the window.
Excerpt from the radio logs (G=George, code for A/743d Tank Battalion) for 17 November 1944:
0917 G14 G The doughs would like us to fire in haystacks just beyond Phase Line 3. There are vehicle tracks there.
0918 G11 G10 There are friendly doughs in there up ahead. Let me pull up with you to help them.
0919 G10 G11 Don’t go sticking your head out for trouble. Be careful!
0920 G11 G10 I can see that machine gun that is firing at us, and if our doughs will get down, I can dispose of it.
G G11 Be careful of our doughs!
G14 G The doughs are 300 yards beyond Phase Line Green.
G G14 Give us coordinates, and we will give ‘em help.
G11 G We put AP and HE in there. Soon as we move, I will let you know. I think we did some good because there is no more firing coming out of there.
0922 G14 G One of our boys is laying some in there now.
0924 G11 G The doughs want us to lay a few big ones in there because they believe it to be a pillbox.
0935 G G14 I know Company C wants help to take the objective, but I will not take any more chances on roads not swept. We are with Company B now.
0937 G11 G10 Better put out panels, hadn’t we? Plenty of air support up there.
Cheers,
Harry
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Jon: My view is that TD doctrine was resonably sound when battlefield conditions matched those anticipated when the doctrine was formed--namely at the height of the German Blitzkrieg--but that it was incomplete, particularly in the absence of a plan to use TDs on the offense and in combined-arms teams. I also argue that the doctrine did not matter all that much in the real world. The army in the field figured out how to use the TDs effectively, and adjusted the de facto doctrine as new conditions demanded.
The towed 3-inch guns were tank destroyers, no ifs, ands, or buts. The towed TD was close to a conceptual failure, however, and the guns generally filled the roll of infantry antitank guns. The only tank-assault infantry teams mentioned are TD men, who were commando-trained to assault tanks as infantry when their vehicles were knocked out.
Cheers,
Harry
[ October 19, 2004, 02:19 AM: Message edited by: Harry Yeide ]
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Comrades! I have just set up a website, in part to hawk my books, but I have posted a bunch of photos of tank destroyers in action in North Africa, Italy, and the ETO, few of which I bet you have seen. I plan to expand the selection of photos as time permits.
Go here: World War II History by Harry Yeide
Cheers!
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You don't have many options on the tank destroyer front. Squadron/Signal publishes "U.S. Tank Destroyers in Action," which includes a fair amount of technical info and many pictures. Lonnie Gill published (in cooperation with the TD Association) "Tank Destroyer Forces: WWII," which is impressive but hard to find and a tad costly. I have a history of the TD Force coming out from Casemate in circa October, but it does not focus on the hardware so much as the men, units, and combat.
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Using jeeps for such recon is not gamey because it was so done by the Recon companies of TD battalions, which often conducted reconnaissance for other outfits. Here is just one incident from my forthcoming book, "The Tank Killers":
"Company B [701st TD Bn] arrived at El Guettar about 1700 hours [on 22 November 1942]. The trees of the oasis were visible to the right, and the Americans reasoned that the enemy had probably placed guns there. Company CO Capt Gilbert Ellmann sent two TD platoons to cover the trees. The men of the reconnaissance platoon continued down the road, manning the .30-caliber machine guns mounted on pedestals in their jeeps, and Edson and 2d Platoon followed. Generally, reconnaissance men depended on their wits to avoid ever having to use their machine guns because practically everything else on the battlefield was better protected than they were.
Recon found ten Italian M13/40 tanks rather suddenly after cresting a small hill. The lead jeep was lost as fire struck the American column, but the crew dashed to safety. Several Italian tanks advanced on the American column. The first M3 in Edson’s platoon smashed the lead tank as it clanked over a rise, but then its gun jammed. The second TD pulled by just in time to destroy the next enemy tank. "
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The M10 lacked power traverse, which is the reason for the slow rotation. In theory, the driver was supposed to help by turning the vehicle if a major rotation was required and conditions allowed.
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You are correct that the M36 was not used in Italy, and that one battalion so equipped shipped immediately to the ETO. The M18 (T70) received its first combat testing at Anzio. The 805th TD Bn used M18s in Italy beginning June 1944. The two TD battalions associated with Sicily did not fight there--they supplied a few troops for guarding prisoners and other non-combat functions. Cheers.Originally posted by JasonC:Yes ETO. In the Med the fighting started earlier so it was mostly M10s. And it was a low priority for the improved types, so it appears to have stayed that way.
I have Torch and Tunisia (early) - M3 halftracks with 75mm - 3 battalions. Tunisia (later, 1943) 4 M10 battalions (in addition). Sicily - M10s 2 battalions. Italy - M10s 6 battalions, towed 76mm 2 battalions.
Several units that fought in the Med early on with M10s upgraded to M36s or M18s when they transfered to the ETO, but don't seem to have had the better equipment while in Italy.
[ October 25, 2003, 10:48 AM: Message edited by: Harry Yeide ]
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My guess is that's a hulk that they dragged in front of a hill as a test target. Could have been maybe 105mm HEAT or 90mm from pretty close in....
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John,
That story comes from a thin book that Wilkes published himself:
Wilkes, Homer D. 747th Tank Battalion. Scottsdale, Ariz.: n.p., 1977?
The separate tank battalion records are full of blue-on-blue incidents, almost always involving airstrikes.
Cheers,
Harry
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Here's another Cota story from Normandy, courtesy of tanker Lt. Holmer Wilkes, 747th Tank Battalion (Cota later suffered real damage to his reputation during the fiasco at Kommerscheidt when he commanded the 28th ID because he was far to the rear and had no grasp of what was happening on the ground):
The column . . . formed up at Vierville in terrain curiously free of hedgerows. We started out in column on the road with Company C leading. I know not what others thought, but I thought we were marching to the front. This impression was corrected minutes later by the appearance of an infantry skirmish line. Although it was my first taste of battle, I knew what that meant. . . .
[One] strongpoint was Osmanville. And there on a clear day this village was attacked by a dozen British fighter-bombers.
The Company C platoon leader of the advance guard was killed trying to display his identification panel. Other officers threw out smoke grenades.
But the strike was pressed home until the pilots had dropped all their bombs and expended all ammunition. As a result, 32 infantrymen were slain, plus our officer, and Company C lost an entire platoon of tanks. . . .
This seemed to paralyze the infantry command group, as well it might. Omaha was their first combat too. After sitting on the road a while we were notified to attend officers call in a field.
There we found Major General [Norman] Cota (the assistant [29th Infantry Division] commander), officers of the 175th [infantry] Regiment and 747th Tank Battalion officers.
The general asked for a situation report upon which the regimental commander told him he could not get through the enemy line by any means, frontal or flank. He would have to wait for artillery support, which probably wasn’t ashore.
The general replied, "All I can tell you, Colonel, is the commanding general told me this attack has to get moving."
He then addressed the 747th’s commander. "Colonel Fries, can you get us through this strongpoint?"
To which the Colonel replied, "Yes, Sir."
"Who will be your leading officer?"
The colonel indicated the 3d Platoon, Company A [Wilkes’ platoon] would be in the van, whereupon the general was introduced to the officer [Wilkes], who promptly received a pep talk.
"Is there a place for me in your tank?" asked Cota.
The reply was a crewmember would have to be dismounted. And if the general rode, it would be as assistant driver, which entailed handing ammunition up to the turret.
"I can do that. Which is your tank?" he replied. . . .
Cota’s request (actually an order) made me nervous. The general had to serve as a crewmember. Hence I as commander gave him several orders during the night, all of which he obeyed with alacrity. . . .
Before describing the attack, two things must be understood. First, we were then in the bocage. The macadam road was lined with hedgerows over which a tank could climb only at the expense of shaking all ammunition and other moveables loose. Second, by the time the attack started dusk had fallen.
Now, the plan as [i outlined it to my] tank commanders was to drive along the road until targets were encountered (meaning buildings. We had found out the enemy would be in buildings.) Then the first tank would ease left while the second tank, commanded by Lieutenant George P. Gale, then an enlisted man, would pull alongside. The commanders would engage targets on their respective sides of the road.
General Cota and Captain Stewart listened to the order but said nothing. After all, there wasn’t much else one could do. The infantry was stymied. No one had told us about these hedgerows, and to sit still was to invite disaster.
The general took up the assistant driver’s slot in the officer’s tank and was furnished with crash helmet, headset, and microphone.
An infantry captain accompanied by a Browning Automatic Rifleman came up to report that his company was attached to the platoon. The BAR-man was an alert, clear-eyed soldier, an encouraging sign under any circumstance. The captain said they would be right behind the lead tank any time needed them.
At 100 yards, the first buildings were successfully attacked. The advance continued.
No flank guards were visible, therefore after dark commenced throwing hand grenades over the hedgerows. After a while, the infantry captain requested this be stopped so he could put out flank guards. . . .
Coming upon a mined place, the point stopped. The division had not placed engineers forward with the advance guard. No one present knew how to remove the mines.
The infantry captain suggested firing the coaxial machine gun at them. This was done, but no mines exploded. Therefore it was thought the mines were inactive.
The march continued and the platoon sergeant’s tank was blown up by the mines. . . .
[Lieutenant Colonel Fries] came forward on foot to be captured by American infantrymen who promptly stole his pistol (One reason this happened is that the 29th Division landed wearing olive drab uniforms. The 747th landed wearing gas impregnated fatigues that were nearly identical to German Army uniforms. Several tankers were almost shot before we could get a change of clothing).
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For general OB and eqipment tables, try George Forty's US Army Handbook 1939-1945.
For details on the separate tank battalions, watch for Steel Victory.
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Someone find Dandelion an opponent, quick. He's setting up footrace scenarios and timing them!
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If you DO get interested in tactics and technical matters beyond vehicle specs, watch for "Steel Victory," due out on 2 December from Presidio Press (see e.g., Amazon.com). It is the history of the US Army's separate tank battalions in the ETO. Cheers.
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JasonC's point re: MG-only pillboxes also comes through in the American AARs and combat interviews regarding the West Wall in the Aachen area. The 3d AD noted that all 75mm AT guns were located in well-camouflaged positions outside the pillboxes. The bunkers themselves clearly came in every quality range from Mercedes to Yugo. There are AARs indicating that 75mm guns took care of some, but that's rare. Re: small-arms fire against slits, the 30th Infantry Division reported that it's Tennessee sharpshooters were pretty good at this--during the Würm River crossing in October 1944, a large number of German MG gunners were found inside pillboxes with holes between their eyes.
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I second the Jagdpanther nomination. She's sleek, with a slight wedge slope. The TR7 of panzers. She's got muscle, too.
But my heart goes to the plain Jane M4A1. She lands at Omaha and trundles all the way to Magdeburg. She looks like Hell, she's got a slight limp, but she's there when the boys need her.
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It seems a tad improbable as I cannot imagine an American tank crew that could FIND that many panzers in 80 days, much less kill them. Do you have a unit number?
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Dandelion,
I'm e-mailing you a note off-line. It may well be that we have the Wehrkreis II materials here. The collection of German records is a bit odd, which makes me wonder exactly what US forces captured. Typically, records appear to be fairly complete at all levels through 1943 and in many cases mid-1944. After that, things are spotty. This corps yes, that corps no. Everything from OKW quartermaster records, but no late Kriegstagebücher. Etc. The same seems to be true for the Waffen SS, though I have spent less time looking at that material.
Cheers,
Harry
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Dandelion,
More interesting material. Thank you. My use of the term "Sturmgeschütze" is consistent with the original German-language documents cited. The only German records I have dug through with great attention are those covering the battle from Aachen to the Roer River crossing, September 1944-February 1945. I find that, particularly in LXXXI Armee Korps records, the term "Sturmgeschütz" is frequently applied to any unit with assault-gun style vehicles. This happens most often with Hetzer-equipped units, but with others as well. The usage in all of these documents suggests that the term had taken on a broad meaning in common usage beyond the technical application to StuGs.
As you have clearly looked at some of the records from the Budesarchiv, perhaps you could help me with an even more off-theme question. What was the difference between a grenadier and an infantry division? Oberst Gerhard Engel's 12th Division is conventionally referred to as an infantry division. But there are many documents indicating that the unit had reconstituted as a grenadier division in August 1944, including references to it as such in Army Group B records as late as 5 October 1944. (It converted to a volksgrenadier division on 17 October). It had about 2,500 more men than the authorized strength of a 1944 infantry division. Frequent references in various records to it as an infantry division do not necessarily mean much, as volksgrenadier divisions also were often referred to as ID's (JD).
Thanks and cheers.
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Dandelion: I'm not trying to pick on you or take over the thread (I kind of lost the Firefly theme!), but our exchange convinced me to troop out to the National Archives and root around a bit. Sadly, we have only partial records for the 12th SS Pz. Div. after late summer 1944, and no I SS Pz. Korps records for the Ardennes. But we do have the reports written by German officers after the war for the U.S. Army historical division. I found some interesting things. Note that for some reason, the historical division changed SS ranks to Heer ranks and added "der Waffen SS).Originally posted by Dandelion:Actually, the 12th SS never had any Tiger battalion. The persistent Rocherath-Tiger rumor stems from bogus US reports, primarily those of 38th Inf Rgt from December 17. Numerous other such rumors circulate, such as the 12th SS having Jagdpanthers (they did not) and more than 100 panzers (they had 79, plus 22 TDs, at the start of the offensive).
The units actually deployed to Raum Rocherath-Krinkelt were the following (per date)
December 16:
Gren.Rgt. 989 (from VGD 277), reinforced by elements of I./25 SS PzGren. With G.R. 991 as reserve (not engaged, instead diverted South).
December 17:
I./25 and II./25 (both are SS PzGren bats) plus Pz.Jg.12 (a TD bat with 22 JgdPz IV)
December 18:
I./12SS Pz Bn (the brigaded remnants of the panzer regiment of the division, with 37 PzKpfw IV (coys 5. and 6.) and 41 PzKpfw V (staff, coys 1. and 3.), plus the entire 25 SS PzGren Rgt, plus elements of G.R.990.
741st were deployed to Rocherath December 18. I have no ID on the US armoured unit present on Decmber 17, it might have been 741 for all I know. Either way, they faced no Tigers on these dates in Rocherath.
Regards
Dandelion
Generalleutnant der Waffen SS Hermann Priess, Kommandierender General des I. SS Pz. Korps, 6. Pz. Armee ("Ardennen, Einsatz des I. SS-Panzer-Korps Während der Ardennen-Offensive, Dezember-Januar, 1944-1945," MS A-877, National Archives), indicates in his order of battle that both the 1st and 12th SS Panzer divisions had a Schwere Panzer Abteilung attached. He almost certainly was referring in the latter case to the 560th Schwere Pz.Jg. Abt., but it does get one to thinking...
In any event, that leads to the point regarding whether the 12th SS Pz. Div. had any Jagdpanthers. Generalmajor der Waffen SS Hugo Kraas ("Die 12. SS-Panzerdivision ‘Hitler-Jugend’ in der Ardennenoffensive." MS B-522, National Archives) writes in his order of battle:
"SS-Panzer-Regiment 12, mit I./SS-Pz.Rgt. 12 und Heeres-Pz.Jg. Abt. 560"
He follows with:
"Das Pz.Rgt. hatte nur eine eigene Panzerabteilung mit allerdings guten und fronterfahrenen Soldaten, Unteroffizieren und Offizieren. Eine zweite Panzerabteilung wurde erst Mitte Dezember zugeführt und zwar die Heeres-Pz.Jg.Abt. 560. Diese verschiedenartige Zusammenstellung verhinderte natürlich gerade diese stärkste Waffe der Division erheblich. Obwohl taktisch als auch technisch musste sich der Einsatz des Pz.Rgt. mehr schwierig gestalten, bestand doch des Pz.Rgt. neben diesen völlig verschiedenen zwei Pz.Abteilungen aus vier verschiedenen Pz.Typen (Pz.Jg. IV und V und Pz. IV und V)."
Oberst der Waffen SS Rudolf Lehmann ("Ardennen, Einsatz des I. SS Pz. Korps während der Ardennenoffesive, II. Teil, Offensive 16.Dez.44-31.Dez.44," MS B-779, National Archives), in his order of battle, also identifies six of the Sturmgeschütze in the 12th SS Pz. Div. as Jagdpanthers.
The 12th SS Pz. Div. evidently did have Jagdpanthers!
Cheers, and open minds to all!
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Aargh. Another addendum. Almost all of the 801st TD Bn guns were lost at and around Hongen. The 741st, by the by, reported the loss of only eight medium tanks at Rocherath. All of the foregoing per battalion AARs.
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Dandelion: Thanks for the extra info. I don't have the 12th SS PzD history handy, but the captured records are only about 15 minutes from my house! Regarding your question re: starting numbers, the 741st TB was probably very close to authorized strength (54 mediums, six assault guns, 17 lights), as it had been in reserve during November. Almost all of the TDs were in Krinkelt. The 644th TD Bn, less one company, took control over a Company C/612th TD Bn plus three towed guns from 801st TD Bn. Again, you were probably in the neighborhood of the 36 guns authorized to a TD battalion.
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Well, 500 yards was a "typical combat range." I wasn't there, but contemporary judgments rendered by the men who were indicated that they thought HVAP generally gave them what they needed. Lt. Col. Stuart Fries, for example, who commanded the 747th TB (which landed on 6/7 June and had plenty of experience), commented in his January 1945 lessons-learned report, "The 76mm gun firing HVAP ammunition is a good step toward battlefield parity with the heaviest German armor." Lt. Howard Davis reported an engagement his M10s had with a Mark VI on 8 November: "No. 1 gun fired one round of HVAP using 3,000 yard range and scored a direct hit on the right front sprocket and stopped it cold. They then fired one more round of HVAP and scored another direct hit on the tank. They then fired HE destroying the crew.... IN MY OPINION HVAP IS WONDERFUL AMMUNITION." (capital letters in original--see Gill, 78) And back on the theme of tactical situation and experience making the difference, the commander of an M18 battalion told Army Ground Forces that his men had the panzer's number and that "the enemy tank can easily be out-maneuvered and is extremely susceptible to two-way attack." (AGF Report #700)Originally posted by rexford:"-- HVAP ammo did allow the 76mm gun to kill Panthers, at least, from the front at typical combat ranges. HVAP became available shortly after COBRA. The problem was not in the thinking--it was getting the ammo to the crews."
No it didn't. 76mm HVAP was effective against the Panther glacis at 100 to 200 yards tops, although it would penetrate the mantlet and nose armor at much further ranges.
But 76mm HVAP was highly accurate, which meant it usually landed close to the aim point, and the usual aim point was the Panther glacis armor.
76mm HVAP would routinely penetrate the Panther A nose armor (65mm at 55 degrees from vertical) at less than 500m. Panther G's with 50mm armor at 55 degrees from vertical would be vulnerable at a greater distance.
When 76mm APCBC failed, the Americans thought 76mm HVAP would solve things. It didn't.
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Dandelion: The American armored unit during the entire fracas in Rocherath was the 741st TB. The identification of Tigers comes from the 741st AAR, combat interviews conducted by the U.S. Army historical division available at the National Archives, and accounts of American tankers involved in the action (see "We'll Never Go Over-Seas," available for a modest price from Al Heintzelman at the 741st veterans' association, heintzle@juno.com). Usually, there are conflicting stories in cases like this. In this case, the stories are consistent. The U.S. Army history concludes that the armored force that attacked the twin villages (Krinkelt-Rocherath) was about evenly divided between Panthers and Tigers (a battalion of each) (Cole, 115). The men in Krinkelt identified the panzers there as Panthers. All these people may be wrong, but this is no "rumor." I am unsure of your source as you did not mention it. One of these days, I'm going to have to read the captured German records for this period and see what gives from their perspective.Originally posted by Dandelion:Actually, the 12th SS never had any Tiger battalion. The persistent Rocherath-Tiger rumor stems from bogus US reports, primarily those of 38th Inf Rgt from December 17. Numerous other such rumors circulate, such as the 12th SS having Jagdpanthers (they did not) and more than 100 panzers (they had 79, plus 22 TDs, at the start of the offensive).
The units actually deployed to Raum Rocherath-Krinkelt were the following (per date)
December 16:
Gren.Rgt. 989 (from VGD 277), reinforced by elements of I./25 SS PzGren. With G.R. 991 as reserve (not engaged, instead diverted South).
December 17:
I./25 and II./25 (both are SS PzGren bats) plus Pz.Jg.12 (a TD bat with 22 JgdPz IV)
December 18:
I./12SS Pz Bn (the brigaded remnants of the panzer regiment of the division, with 37 PzKpfw IV (coys 5. and 6.) and 41 PzKpfw V (staff, coys 1. and 3.), plus the entire 25 SS PzGren Rgt, plus elements of G.R.990.
741st were deployed to Rocherath December 18. I have no ID on the US armoured unit present on Decmber 17, it might have been 741 for all I know. Either way, they faced no Tigers on these dates in Rocherath.
Even if all the panzers in Rocherath were Panthers, the point remains: the right mix of tactical circumstance--especially having the luxury of playing defense--and crew experience routinely allowed men with "worse" AFVs to beat the other guy, particularly when their tanks were integrated into the powerful American warfighting package. The big examples are mainly limited by the Germans' inability to mount frequent substantial armored attacks to prove the point. When they did, it almost always went badly for them. The early attempts to crush the Anzio beachhead cost so may panzers that the Germans quit trying. Mortain was a failure. The 4th Armored Division knocked the stuffing out of Panther-equipped panzer brigades--plus the 11th Panzer Division--when they counterattacked in Lorraine. AARs from several separate tank battalions during the Bulge describe cases in which their Shermans firing from advantageous positions KO'd large numbers of attacking panzers. The 2d AD destroyed the 2d PzD at Celles, though in fairness the panzers were mostly out of gas by that time.
The main counter-examples aren't really. Kasserine was a display of inexperience in a typically theatrical American style. (See instead the 10th PzD's boxing at El Guettar by M3 TDs that were even worse than Shermans!) The 9th PzD and 506th Schwere Panzer Abteilung wiped the floor with two battalions of 2d AD tanks near Puffendorf on 17 November. But in that case the Germans caught the Shermans stretched out in lines ready to launch their morning attack. BAD circumstances.
On the question of TD doctrine, watch for my book "The Tank Killers" from Casemate in September of next year. Doctrinal questions influenced the development of equipment early on, but the main argument was within the new armored force over whether the tank was primarily an infantry-support weapon or a cavalry-like tool. The first M3 TDs had the same 75mm gun as the Shermans that went into combat beside them--or worse yet, the same 37mm gun on the M6 as was in the Stuart. By the time of CMBO, the warfighters were using TDs either in roles indistiguishable from that of separate tank battalions and as part of increasingly integrated tank-TD formations. Neither fit doctrine, and nobody cared. There were many reasons why the Army kept even 75mm Shermans in action until the end of the war, but TD doctrine was not one of them!
Cheers.
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Oh, and Cooper neglects the fact that crews in Korea prefrred the Easy 8 Sherman to the supposedly better Pershing. It could go more places, had better power, etc. The Shermans did fine against the T-34, as they had against the Panther.
Tank Destroyer Photos Posted
in Combat Mission: Afrika Korps
Posted
Forgot the commando-trained thing. The training left the TD Force thinking it was an elite formation, which it was. The photo on my site is of TD men in training with sticky bombs and molotov cocktails. The TD guys figured out almost immediately, however, that "nekkid" tank hunting was dumb and didn't do it. The recon guys, however, did some commando-like stuff.
Cheers,
Harry