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Harry Yeide

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  1. 105th Antitank Battalion redesignated 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion on 15 December 1941. Arrived in England 18 August 1942. Landed at Algiers 17 January 1943 equipped with the M3 TD. Actions included Kasserine Pass and Gafsa. Converted to towed 3-inch gun battalion in October 1943. Debarked in Italy 28 October 1943 at Bagnoli. Shipped to Anzio beachhead 12 March 1944. Served largely as artillery even after re-equipped with M18s in June–August. TDs were part of advance guard at capture of Bologna and Brenner Pass. Attached to: 34th, 85th, 91st Infantry divisions.

    Cheers,

    Harry

  2. My writing storm is more of a steady rain, with the current flood caused by scheduling flukes on the publishing side. "Steel Victory" was in process for nearly two years because Ballantine's purchase of Presidio slowed just about everything down. Casemate produced a beautiful volume with "The Tank Killers," but it hit the streets four months after the target date. Zenith was exactly on schedule with "The Longest Battle." I try to write about one book per year, which is a reasonable speed with holding down a real job at the same time. There is one more in the hopper at Zenith, and another in draft.... Cheers.

  3. Thanks for the question, HVAP; I'll stay away from the kiddie pool in the General Forum from now on.

    The thing that surprised me the most was how much TD outfits did in battle that had absolutely nothing to do with fighting tanks. The recon troops were one such great surprise. They started out in North Africa acting a bit like the "Rat Patrol" out in front of the rest of the entire Allied army. They show up later clearing mines, directing artillery fire up to corps level, and mounting patrols behind German lines.

    The TD story in North Africa in general came as a pleasant surprise. I knew little about it, because general histories on the theater pay almost no attention to the TDs. It really is a wild story of sweeping action over huge distances and meeting engagements against panzer forces the likes of which took place nowhere else, really. I had the great fortune to track down veterans from the first battalions to see action and get their personal stories.

    One other discovery that came as a surprise after spending many years interested mainly in the Armored Force was the confidence the TDers retained in their ability to handle German armor with their 3-inch/76mm guns pretty much through the end of the war. When you read about the Sherman, you find all this hand-wringing about how inadequate even the 76mm gun was against the heavier panzers. The TD guys learned they couldn't necessarily penetrate the front armor on this class of panzer, but this troubled them only briefly, and they responded with tactical fixes that left them the masters of the armored battlefield, as far as they were concerned.

    One more nibblet is that it would be nice if in CM one could mount machine guns on tank destroyers, because that is what a lot of battalions in the ETO did. The TDers in SP battalions wound up having to fill in as infantry-support tanks with great regularity as early as Normandy, and they eventually figured out that they would have to mount their own MGs because the Army wasn't going to do it for them.

    Finally, for now, I found the story of the towed TD battalions a sad case of military stupidity that cost men their lives. The brass transformed half the TD Force to towed battalions after the fighting in North Africa because towed German guns had proved so effective under prevailing conditions there. The generals failed to foresee that, in Italy and Western Europe, the Americans would usually be advancing rather than defending, and that terrain conditions were going to be more than a little different.

    Cheers,

    Harry

  4. Any gamer interested in the US Tank Destroyer Force in North Africa, Italy, and the ETO might want to check out my just released book, "The Tank Killers." You can get more info--plus photos of American tanks and tank destroyers in action--at my website, World War II History by Harry Yeide. This is the second book to grow out of a certain Combat Mission addiction. I'd be happy to answer any questions regarding the history or any related topic right here. Cheers.

  5. Michael: The film gives no other indication of the target.

    Runyan99: The first important step is to find a really good story to tell. My personal philosophy is this: The world does not need yet another book on D-Day or the Battle of the Bulge. I look for stories that have generally been ignored before. You'd be surprised how many such stories there are in a field as well-tilled as World War II.

    The second thing I have learned is that the story you write must have the human dimension woven in through mechanisms such as the personal recollections of men who were at critical places in your narrative or who offer a tale that represents the experiences of many other men. The occasional humorous anecdote never does any harm, either. One editor told me that the same people who buy military history also buy men's action stories. We do not write in the same era as B.H. Liddell Hart, I guess.

    Third, research using as many primary sources as possible. I have the good fortune to live 10 minutes from the National Archives. You would be surprised how often you will find things heretofore either passed over or cast in a partial or distorted light. Sometimes you will face the problem of having to figure out a most plausible version of events from conflicting contemporary accounts. I try to give some idea in the foreword of how I have tackled that situation. In "Steel Victory," I state clearly that I am using the tankers' version of what happened, which seemed appropriate to the subject. In "The Longest Battle," a history of the campaign along the Roer River (September 1944-February 1945) due out next year, I give as equal weight as possible to all sides and therefore spent considerable time cross-checking battle reports from various American and German sources (the British section is compact enough that this was not a big issue there). I should add the veterans can be a great source of information, but that resource is quickly becoming lost to historians.

    Fourth, write solid standard English (or whatever language you use). A good story badly written is doomed.

    Fifth, I got my entré to the book industry from a generous Combat Mission forum member who knew the right guy. My bet is that there is always someone out there in our community who would be willing to help you out.

    I hope that's helpful!

    Cheers,

    Harry

  6. Originally posted by John D Salt:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Mr. Picky adds that the towed TD is the 3-inch, a different gun from the 76mm (same calibre, same ammunition, same ballistic performance, but a different gun).

    Reynolds shows each of 3 TD coys having 1 SP and 2 towed platoons, each of 4 guns.

    All the best,

    John. </font>

    The towed TD battalions only used the 3-inch gun, not the 57mm gun. (I have one towed TD picture on my website--Military History by Harry Yeide--that is incorrectly labeled 76mm, but I have learned the dot-Mac software will send me back to square one if I try to fix it, which just isn't worth the trouble.)

    Several TD battalions in the Bulge were equipped with towed guns. They included those attached to the infantry divisions that manned the line at the outset: the 801st (99th ID), 820th (106th ID), 630th (28th ID), and 802d (4th ID). I am aware of one battalion that had a mix of M36s and M10s because of an unfinished conversion: the 814th, which was at St. Vith with the 7th Armored Division. The 823d TD Battalion (30th Infantry Division), fought around Stoumont-Stavelot with a mix of M10s and towed guns, again because of an unfinished conversion. Company B was still entirely towed, and Company A had a mix.

    Cheers,

    Harry

  7. Dave: I cover the Bastogne fighting (theaters addressed are North Africa, Italy, and the ETO), but from the TD perspective. If I recall, the 10th AD records do not give much detail, though the memo cited above was very helpful. In general, you get more detailed accounts of events in the official records from the separate battalions because the armored divisions kept battle records at the CC level. On the other hand, some divisions produced histories at the end of the war with some very enlightening annecdotes.

    I like the idea of a trained-to-kill-tanks variable in CM. But the gentlemen cited did not say his tankers were not trained to kill tanks, just that they were not as well trained to do so. The TDers took great pride in their gunnery, and there is little question that the TD training system more consistently cranked out qualified replacement personnel than the Armored Force did. The separate tank battalions often received replacements who knew nothing about tanks, and I would guess the armored divisions had the same problem.

    I'm not certain to which tank-killer theory you refer, Mr. Tittles, but one might note that Europe is mostly close terrain, the weather is generally lousy, etc. That's the real world.

    Cheers, guys. Thanks for the interest.

    Harry

  8. Buy the book, Mr. Tittles. But here's something to whet your interest. Colonel W.L. Roberts, CCB/10th Armored Division, wrote shortly after the battle at Bastogne:

    [EXT]

    The TDs taught me and my tanks a lesson that is being straightened out right now in this command. Properly employed in the defense, some tanks must be up with the infantry (I do not say what proportion) and some in reserve in the "socker" role. Those with the infantry must act in the TD role 98% of the time. The TDs know how to do it. Tankers are not as well trained, and they suffered. My eight TDs lost only three while getting twenty-two sure kills. My tanks did not approach that proportion.

    [END EXT]

    Dave: I'm in Hyattsville near the court house.

    Cheers,

    Harry

  9. Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

    In Seek, Strike and Destroy: U.S. Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, its very clear that the the US 'proved' its TD theory in silly wargames that had nothing to do with battlefield realities even at that time they were proved.

    German 'blitzing' in the desert was not a fleet of massed AFV sprinting about. They used slow methodical combined arms attacks that was covered by long range antitank fire themselves. They exploited situations by applying fire superiority.

    That is true and not true. The prewar exercises were without a doubt flawed in that they did not reflect Germany's combined-arms approach in some ways. But there is a phase in the TD's employment in North Africa that most folks overlook, including to some extent Dr. Gabel in his otherwise excellent Leavenworth paper. M3s from the 701st TD Bn engaged French tanks shortly after the landings at Oran in something approximating the conditions anticipated in exercises and doctrine. M3s from the same battalion exploited their fast and light advantage to deploy rapidly to support the Tunisian Task Force shortly thereafter and experienced doctrine- and exercise-like meeting engagements with Axis armor. At El Guettar in early 1943, the 601st TD Bn (M3), eventually backed by two companies from the 899th (M10), played the key role in defeating a 10th Panzer Division attack that almost perfectly fit the conditions of the exercises and doctrine. Kasserine Pass did, too, for that matter, but American commanders failed to deploy the available TD battalions according to doctrine in almost every case, and they did not prove overly effective.

    German attacks against the Salerno and Anzio beachheads fairly closely resembled the conditions foreseen by TD doctrine, as did the results. So, too, did the German counterattacks against the 4th Armored Division in Lorraine, and even to some extent the fighting in the Ardennes. Exactly? No, but close enough for the TDs to do their thing as the men had been trained. And when has reality exactly matched prewar exercises?

    But again, a key point is that de facto doctrine was fast emerging on the battlefield as early as North Africa. TDs took the point of armored columns, acted as assault guns, and began firing as artillery (well before Dr. Gabel says they did, by the way). None of these roles were foreseen by official doctrine. The de facto evolution continued through the war's end.

    Cheers,

    Harry

  10. Re: communication. This limited selection of radio logs covers only a few days, but its the only such document I found in any tank battalion records. By this time, most tanks would have had the field telephones installed, but the 743d was just beginning to install SCR-300 radios in company and platoon command tanks. Some infantry desires are clearly being relayed (they want us to shoot the haystacks), but the single specific reference to means is a radio command to a tank crew to look out for a GI who is going to come point out a target, which suggests face-to-face communication.

    Cheers,

    Harry

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