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Harry Yeide

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Posts posted by Harry Yeide

  1. Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

    Harry Yeide

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, after conferring with Lieutenant Colonel Skaggs, conceived a plan for the use of tanks in the next attack that would very nearly approximate the manner of using tanks in open country suited for tank combat. This plan, which came to be called a sortie, involved the maximum number of tanks, equipped with the Rhino device, that could be brought into position, allowing for the variation of the terrain

    Do you have links?

    You will note that the terrain was especially chosen for a particular type of attack. I think that also there is a tendency to believe rather like all tanks were Tigers all hedges were true bocage. If you sincerely believe a Stuart could drive through a 10ft thick mound of earth tied together with hundreds of years of roots I suggest you are wrong.

    Reading the account makes me think that these hedges were fairly traditional European unmounded hedges of perhaps 4-5ft thick maximum, possibly even thinner at 3ft. Designed to be impenetrable to livestock they were plenty adequate to disrupt severely human movement. To a tank not a huge problem provided they had momentum.

    Harry have you looked any any pictures of true bocage? </font>

  2. Medium tanks v bocage, courtesy of the 741st Tank Battalion's AAR:

    "With the new [Rhino] device, it was felt that the unit would be enabled to operate with more freedom, as the hedges were much less an obstacle than they had been before. . . .

    The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, after conferring with Lieutenant Colonel Skaggs, conceived a plan for the use of tanks in the next attack that would very nearly approximate the manner of using tanks in open country suited for tank combat. This plan, which came to be called a sortie, involved the maximum number of tanks, equipped with the Rhino device, that could be brought into position, allowing for the variation of the terrain. In most cases the full number of tanks could be used. The tanks would be placed in position at the line of departure and the infantry elements withdrawn several hundred yards in rear, for safety purposes. At H-hour a barrage of timed fire would be laid down over an area from 300 to 500 yards in depth past the LD. The tanks would advance rapidly under the airbursts, smashing hedges and uprooting enemy emplacements in the zone of action, at the same time placing a maximum amount of direct cannon and machine gun fire on the enemy. After breaking the enemy defenses the tanks would return to the line of departure, establish contact with supporting infantry, and resume the attack with the infantry-tank team.

    On 26 July, 1944, at 0600, this battalion attacked in support of the 38th and 23d Infantry regiments, with the line of departure south of the St. Lô-Berigny road. . . .

    With Companies A and B, both reinforced, attached to the 38th Infantry, and Company C attached to the 23d Infantry, the attack started on schedule and the tanks smashed through the hedges on the tank sortie. With their cannons blasting and machine guns stuttering, the tanks were an awe-inspiring spectacle as they churned their way through the enemy positions after a crashing barrage of timed fire. The enemy was obviously stunned by the ferocity of the attack, as not a single tank was lost on the initial sortie. Hundreds of German infantrymen were killed as they lay in their foxholes, and then ground under the tracks of the onrushing tanks. Machine gun emplacements were ripped out of the hedges by the impact of the Rhino devices, and the enemy lines, to a distance of 300 to 500 yards, were a shambles.

    At H+20 [minutes] the tanks returned from the sortie, joined the infantry half of the team and resumed the onslaught at H+30."

    As it happened, Company F, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with Rhino M5A1s participated in this sortie adjacent to the 741st Tank Bn, with similar results.

    I'm not aware of a Rhino-equipped unit being unable to move through hedgerows with facility.

  3. Case study continued: The 3d Infantry Division engages in mobile warfare and deploys three regiments with attached armor over great distance to mount a combined-arms assault on the objective:

    After trucking 75 miles unimpeded by German fire, the 3d Infantry Division’s 7th Infantry Regiment reached the area of Besancon about 0100 hours on 5 September, where the 2d Battalion dismounted to attack the city at 0500. The rest of VI Corps was following, the 36th Infantry Division slanting to protect the left flank around Dole, and the 45th Infantry Division angling toward Beaume-les-Dames farther up the road to Belfort.

    Inside Besancon, where the 11th Panzer Division had arrived a day earlier, von Wietersheim had been shocked to receive the first reports that the Americans were approaching Beaume-les-Dames from the south. Soon, the amount of artillery falling on his positions told him that this was no reconnaissance probe. By noon, the lead elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, joined the 7th Infantry’s assault, and the rifle companies of both regiments were soon embroiled in stiff fighting along an arc south of the city. Besancon was the first city in which modern American arms pitted themselves against fortifications built by Vauban, and it would go better than most. The Citadel dominated the high ground above the city, while four smaller forts were tied together in a mutually supporting defensive system.

    The arrival of the 3d Infantry Division near Besancon unhinged German plans to defend the Doubs River line. Nineteenth Army over the next two days threw the 338th and 198th Infantry divisions and the just-arrived 159th Infantry Division into the breach to relieve the 11th Panzer Division.

    German hopes of throwing back the 3d Infantry Division were stillborn. O’Daniel brought all of his regiments into the line on 6 September to attack Besancon from three sides, a task made somewhat easier by the German abandonment of positions south of town during the night. O’Daniel invested the city and captured the smaller forts one by one until, on 7 September, the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, stormed the Citadel.

  4. Originally posted by JonS:

    Right, but the tpt provided by the tanks and TD isn't organic to the regt. Using a whole battalion of tracked vehs to, 'in a pinch', help one of the regts fwd isn't really all that different to allocating a GS tpt coy for the same task. (Although it's probably easier to arrange givn that the track bn is already allocated to the div)

    As a practical matter, the tank and TD battalions were organic to the division cited in the example. And as a practical matter, non-organic trucks were almost always available in sufficient numbers to motorize US infantry divisions when needed. Why pick nits?
  5. From the 3d Infantry Division's history, regarding operations in southern France: “Improvisation paid dividends. It was found that an entire infantry battalion could be completely loaded on transportation within a regiment, including tanks, [tank destroyers], jeeps, and other assorted vehicles without having recourse to non-organic vehicles. It was a common sight to see a whole rifle battalion moving down a road—doughboys draped over the 3-inch guns of tank destroyers, clinging to the slippery-sided tanks of the 756th, or loaded sixes-and-sevens to trailer-hauling jeeps."

  6. The 701st (M3s) fought around El Guattar with the Tunisian Task Force in November 1942, but it was the 601st that fit the battle of El Guettar in March 1943 with the 1st Infantry Division. The 701st was at Kasserine, still using M3s.

    From "The Tamk Killers" (if you buy the book, there's a map of this action):

    The Perfect Test: Action at El Guettar

    On 23 March, the Germans threw one last major armored punch at the Americans. Von Arnim counterattacked II Corps’ 1st Infantry Division with the 10th Panzer Division just east of El Guettar. At about 0500 hours, the Germans advanced slowly in a hollow-square formation of tanks and self-propelled guns interspersed with infantry carriers. Additional infantry followed in trucks.

    Sergeant Bill Harper, an M3 commander in Company C of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, watched the advancing force with concern from the crest of the ridge above the pass to El Guettar. Harper counted seventy-five German tanks, and one platoon leader thought he spotted at least one hundred. These guesses were not bad, as the 10th Panzer Division had fifty-seven tanks and about the same number of armored cars and halftracks. The outnumbered TD battalion—on that day fielding thirty-one M3s and five M6s—was filling a two-and-a-half mile gap in the American lines.

    The tank killers had expected trouble. Recon, which had established a picket line across the valley early that morning, spotted the advancing steel storm. After a brief exchange of fire, the recon jeeps, accompanied by a few TDs, raced back ahead of the foe. The lieutenant in charge of one group kept repeating over his radio, “Let the first three [vehicles] through, and then give ‘em hell!”

    The battalion’s TDs were arrayed on the reverse slopes of the ridgeline and nearby hills. Companies B and C held positions in front of the 1st Infantry Division artillery, while Company A guarded the pass to El Guettar. The German formation split into three prongs and overran some American positions. Lieutenant Fred Miner in Company A reminded his men that the Americans had fled from the panzers in Ousseltia Valley and at Sbeitla; he told them that this time they would stand and shoot it out no matter what the odds.

    In the weak light of early morning, the TD crews engaged the Germans as they came into range. Sergeant Raymond, of Company B, spotted a giant Tiger moving past and maneuvered to put six shots (probably from the flank) into the panzer, four of which ricocheted but two of which did the job. Raymond next set a Mark IV alight. German rounds found Raymond’s M3, and three hits set the halftrack on fire.

    Guided by forward observers, most of the TDs raced over the crests of the ridges and hills, fired, and backed out of sight, only to pop up and do the same again at another location. The German gunners never knew where a TD would appear next. Except, it seemed, for one crew, which found itself the object of heavy fire every time their M3 crested the rise. They finally realized that their radio antenna was standing proudly tall and revealed their approach every time. They lowered the aerial.

    After Company A’s TDs had knocked out eight tanks, the German assault force withdrew and circled to reinforce the attack on the rest of the battalion’s line. The panzers penetrated to within one hundred yards of the Companies B and C TDs. Some of the M3s were no longer moving, and a few were burning. The Germans were so close that Sgt Bill Harper at one point thought the outfit was surrounded. Even as ammunition ran low, the battalion doggedly held its ground. At the height of the assault, some TDs were forced to abandon the duck-and-strike tactics; they stood and fired as fast as the guns could be loaded. The crews also had to beat back German infantry using small arms, machine guns, and 75mm HE shells.

    The German tide receded about noon, leaving a litter of burning tanks on the slopes and approaches. The tanks withdrew into defilade positions among wadis and small hills on the northeast side of the valley.

    The untested 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion was in mobile reserve near Gafsa when, at 0845, it received orders to move to El Guettar. German tanks had overrun a field artillery battalion, and the 601st had already lost most of its 75mm guns. Company B entered the valley to engage the Germans while Company C provided overwatch from the ridgeline to the west.

    Second Lieutenant Gerald Coady’s platoon led the Company B charge through the gap into the valley. As the M10s rolled by to their first test against an enemy, LtCol Herschel Baker stood among his remaining Purple Heart boxes and shouted an unprintable but heartfelt welcome.

    The Germans had skillfully selected their firing positions and—combined with an American minefield—they left Coady little room for maneuver. Coady tried to rush his force into covered positions to the north three times, and three times he fell back with losses. After two of his own TDs had been disabled, Coady saw that the platoon leader in the next platoon had been killed. He dismounted under heavy tank, antitank, artillery, and small-arms fire and organized the remnants of the two platoons to continue the battle.

    Corporal Thomas Wilson commanded one of the Company B M10s. His destroyer received two direct hits and had two fires aboard. Wilson helped extinguish the fires while his gunner, T/5 Stephen Kurowski—who was wounded in both legs—continuing to fire his 3-inch gun at the Germans. Kurowski knocked out two emplacements, an artillery piece, and several machine guns before the M10 absorbed a third hit in the fuel tank, which started another fire. Wilson decided that he could not allow the Germans to capture their first M10 and directed his driver to a place where American forces would be able to recover the crippled vehicle.

    At 1645 hours, the Germans struck again, supported by Stuka and fighter attacks. Infantry advanced first, overwatched by tanks and antitank guns. On the ridgeline, as the crews of C/899th watched the advance as if from an opera balcony seat, the gunners itched for something to come into range. The TDs of the 601st and 899th blazed away, and American artillery pounded the German troops. Thirty-eight panzers pressed the attack until almost 1900 hours but gave up after suffering further heavy losses.

    The TDs and the artillery together had wreaked havoc during the day. Twenty-seven of the 601st’s thirty-six guns were knocked out and fourteen men had died, but its sharp-eyed gunners had destroyed thirty-seven German tanks and damaged an unknown number of others. The crews of the M10s claimed fifteen Mark IVs for a loss of five TDs and a halftrack.

    The battle at El Guettar had played out General Bruce’s dream scenario and doctrine to a tee. And, despite substantial American losses—concentrated among the antiquated M3s—the concept had worked. It would be nearly a year before the Tank Destroyer Force would have another opportunity to meet a large armored attack with a full TD battalion.

  7. Comrades! For the benefit of researchers and the curious, I have posted in the "public folder" of my website World War II History by Harry Yeide pdf versions of the key memos in the US Army's debate over whether tanks or antitank guns should fight enemy tanks, written by major generals McNair and Lynch. It is worth reading McNair's reasoning in its entirety rather than the usual soundbite summary, and Lynch takes a position one would not necessarily expect from the Chief of Infantry. Cheers.

  8. Originally posted by JasonC:

    Thanks to all for the useful corrections.

    To Harry in particular - do you have any numbers for 76mm Shermans for 3rd armored during the Normandy fighting, when they got them, etc?

    Sorry, I don't have that info handy. There are photos, though, of 33d Armored Regiment 76mm Shermans with the 3d AD in August.
  9. The 3d Armored Division fielded M4A1(76mm) tanks in Normandy. I am uncertain about the 2d AD. Like many equipment upgrades, the appearance of 76mm Shermans in the independent tank battalions varied tremendously. At one extreme, the 774th Tank Battalion entered combat in August fully equipped with 76mm-armed Shermans, and the 70th drew 76mm Shermans on 10 August (all of which went to Able Company). The 737th on 19 October 1944 received a single tank with a 76mm gun, which it decided to use as an assault gun attached to Headquarters Company and shuttled among the line units as needed. And the other D-Day veterans? The 741st drew its first 76mm Shermans on 1 January 1945, and the 743rd received its first five M4s with 76mm guns on 2 January.

    The French 2d Armored Division landed in Normandy. It was the French 1st Armored Division that landed in southern France.

    The 1st-3d Armored divisions did, indeed, use combat commands, but the fundamental structure was different. The heavy divisions retained the regimental structure, whereas the other armored divisions had three each of tank and armored infantry battalions. Moreover, the heavy divisions normally had only two combat commands, although the 1st Armored Division used four for a while in North Africa and the 3d Armored Division formed a CCR sometime around November 1944. The 1st AD converted to the light structure on 20 July 1944.

  10. Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Harry Yeide:

    Sorry for being a no-show...

    Harry, a word of appreciation. I recently acquired and read Steel Victory and Tank Killers. The latter I especially enjoyed. Seemed like by the time you got around to writing that, you had settled in to the job and had a clearer idea of how to go about it.

    What I am wondering is whether you are planning any other books on WW II subjects? I do hope so. Tank battalions in the Pacific might be nice, if I may drop a hint. Not so much material there I suppose though...

    Michael </font>

  11. Sorry for being a no-show, but I've been traveling. I think that one reason the Med theater received no M36s is that nobody asked for them, as the M10s had proved effective in every substantial engagement with German armor. Guys in the ETO, by contrast, were hopping up and down after learning the 3-inch/76mm gun could not take out a Panther from the front.

    The 704th TD Bn landed with the first M18s in Normandy on 13 July and first saw action during Operation Cobra. The first M36 deliveries took place in September. The First and Ninth armies channeled them into battalions supporting armored divisions, so in those cases the M10s were supplanted. Third Army, however, used the M36 to convert towed battalions to SP ones.

    Most of the TDs in the Ardennes sector on 16 December fielded towed guns. The 803d TD Bn, attached to the 4th Infantry Division, was equipped with the M10. The 814th TD Bn brought the first M36s into the battle zone on 17 December, though the outfit was still partially equipped with the M10. I've never sat down and figured out the proportion of TD types in action at the peak of the engagement.

    Cheers.

  12. I'm wrapping up a book on the 6th Army Group and can add this. As of 15 August, German forces defending nearly 350 miles of southern French coast included, from west to east:

    -- General der Flieger Erich Petersen’s IV Luftwaffe Field Corps, controlling the 716th Infantry, 198th Infantry, and 189th Reserve divisions.

    -- Generalleutnant Baptist Kniess’ LXXXV Corps in the Rhône valley—incorporating the 338th, 244th, and 242d Infantry divisions—and the 148th Reserve Division, which was subordinated to General der Infanterie Ferdinand Neuling’s LXII Reserve Corps.

    -- To the rear, the 11th Panzer Division near Bordeaux and 157th Reserve Division in the Grenoble area.

    Some of these divisions were far from peak condition. The 11th Panzer Division had arrived near Bordeaux in June to reconstitute after its near destruction on the Eastern front and had sent one of its two tank battalions to Normandy, also the destination for four infantry battalions from the 338th Infantry Division. The 157th Reserve Division was scattered around the mountains fighting the Maquis, while the 716th Infantry Division had lost so many men in Normandy that it was incapable of offensive operations. The third regiment of the 148th Reserve Division was just organizing and had a cadre strength of only about two hundred men. Excluding the 338th Infantry Division (50 percent strength), the divisions had on average about 80 percent of their authorized manpower. They lacked assault gun battalions, which were often attached elsewhere, and 37mm antiaircraft and mobile mortar companies typically fielded on other fronts. Many troops were ethnic Germans from occupied areas who were considered on average less reliable, and many of commanders were older men no longer fit for duty on the Eastern front. Grenadier regiments often had a fourth battalion attached consisting of Osttruppen.

    All that said, German commanders did not later point to poor equipment as a meaningful factor in their inability to stop the DRAGOON forces. Their troops were so strung out that given the nearly complete lack of reserves, they had no chance at all of stopping the landings at the shore.

    Cheers,

    Harry

  13. Thanks for the compliment, Mr. Hellfish. I have a book coming out (sometime) called "Weapons of the Tankers" that covers the tank battalions a bit in North Africa, Italy, and the Pacific, including the amphibian tank and amphibious tractor battalions. I've heard that another author has a history of the Pacific tank battalions in the mill. Cheers.

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