Jump to content

Harry Yeide

Members
  • Posts

    193
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Posts posted by Harry Yeide

  1. Sounding off late on this, you could do a great scenario built around the 2d Infantry Division's attack on Hill 192 on the 29th Division's left (the July one). If you look in the public folder on my web site (http://homepage.mac.com/yeide/Homepage.htm), you will find the actual terrain study done by the division and passed out to all elements. The action was well-documented and a model of combined-arms warfare. The Germans had excellent troops and some armor. The 35th Division's attack, by contrast, was a miserable example of combined-arms fighting. The 29th Division's attack is less well documented than the 2d Divvision's, though it, too, was a pretty good show.

  2. Originally posted by JasonC:

    Harry,

    you can, maybe. I get nothing but endless search screens that are slow as molasses, and find nothing.

    Have a proper link to the item itself and nothing else handy?

    Nope, that didn't work. I stashed a copy of the file, 1944ArmInfBnFM 17-42.pdf, in the public folder at my website, World War II History by Harry Yeide. It's pretty big--6.5 megs. You should really try another browser on the MHI website, as it is stocked with tons of great stuff.

    Cheers,

    Harry

  3. Originally posted by dalem:

    So anyway, does anyone have any recommendations for books or papers I could get to further my knowledge? Any good anecdotes? Knowledge? Experience? Is Harry Yeide working on this one yet? ;)

    Thanks!

    -dale

    No, but it's a great idea. First to the Rhine on the 6th Army Group hits bookstores in September, and Steeds of Steel on the mechanized cavalry (including the Pacific, baby) comes out early next year. I'm looking at separate armored battalions in the Pacific, North Africa, and the Med just now. Hmmm. Armored infantry....
  4. Originally posted by tar:

    I received the following link to a US Army Leavenworth papers study on tank destroyer doctrine in WWII:

    Leavenworth Papers No. 12

    Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II

    by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel

    Combat Studies Institute

    U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

    Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

    September 1985

    http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gabel2.pdf

    I like Gabel's study more than JasonC does, but what struck me immediately when I started looking at the TD story was that doctrine is the wrong focus--conditions anticipated by doctrine occured on a largish scale only a handful of times during the war. In those cases (e.g., El Guettar, Anzio [sorta], Lorraine), SP TDs did what they were supposed to do. But most times and most places, armor, infantry, and TD officers tossed the doctrine out the window and did what seemed to make sense at the time.

    I have no insight into the "what if they had built more of these thingies than those thingies" question. As Rummy said, you go to war with the army you have. The infantry wanted tanks to support them with 75mm guns, and I have never once seen an infantry account that said, "If only the tanks had had a 76mm gun...." The infantry also liked tank destroyers. If a division could get a battalion of each, which was typically the case from Salerno on, everybody was happy. The armored divisions happily mixed TDs in with tanks where needed; it wasn't doctrine, but it worked. On balance, the army had just the right equipment to win the war.

    I will say that SP battalions were much more effective on average than towed battalions. They could go where the enemy was instead of waiting for him to come to them. SP TDs could withdraw when the enemy overan the infantry line, and towed guns frequently could not. Towed guns are swell antitank guns, but lousy TDs.

    Must take out the trash now.

    Cheers.

  5. Originally posted by C'Rogers:

    To go back to the original concept of the Priest and changing it on map to indirect fire, while certainly realistic, seems to be out of game scope as a company level game. It seems like it could be more used in a gamey concept then realistic. While it has been shown in this thread the rate at which Priests could change between fire modes were they sent into battle with that intention?

    What little I know of the issue in comparison to others here a Priests wouldn't be dispatched to the frontline under the instruction that to use either direct fire or indirect fire given the circumstance. It seems that there role would be designated ahead of time and only in an emergency would a switch be done.

    Not necessarily gamey, but unusual. M7s used as assault guns (units beside the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron that did so included the 1st Armored Division and 751st Tank Battalion in Italy) would fire as circumstances required.
  6. Michael: No, sure haven't the photo of the turret penetrations. The film claims the Tiger IIs depicted were on the Roer front, but ultimately it's--literally--Nazi propaganda, so who knows? Likewise, my contact in Germany, a historian in the Aachen area, says the Bundesarchiv supplied the photo of the identical looking Tiger that I forwarded in response to a request for photos from his area, and that the Archiv identified the shot as vicinity Puffendorf. Denkert's account of the attack on 15 October does not break out whether his own or 506. vehicles were knocked out, nor did any of the corps or army records I consulted. (We do not have the actual 3d PzGr Div records at NARA.) Anyway, I'm one book and two manuscripts beyond that question now, so I confess I haven't pursued the matter!

  7. There is one example that comes to mind that one could add to JasonC's excellent roster that shows, perhaps, that artillery fire could break up a combined-arms attack quite effectively (which is the real point) even if it did not destroy numerous tanks.

    On 15 October near Aachen, the 3d Panzergrenadier Division, reinforced by the 506th Schwere Panzer Abteilung’s Royal Tigers, attacked out of the Würselener Wald and through the lines of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division toward Aachen. Generalfeldmarschall Model had ordered that the operation begin later in the day than usual because the tempo of fighting usually declined at that time, and he hoped to achieve tactical surprise. The 8th and 29th Grenadier regiments attacked abreast after an artillery preparation, with the Tigers on the right. By 1300 hours, the Germans had overrun two companies from the 16th Infantry Regiment, which reported that the situation was critical.

    Massed artillery fire—capped by a dramatic appearance by American fighter-bombers—smashed the attack over the next hour. The 29th Grenadier Regiment reported, “The enemy artillery fire became stronger than we had ever experienced before, and shells fell almost uninterrupted for hours. Casualties climbed; weapons and equipment were destroyed. Artillery observation planes—as many as four circled constantly over the division—competently directed this massed fire.”

    Panzers were burning across the battlefield, and division commanding general Denkert watched as the intense fire drove his infantry to cover, which left the remaining tanks without support. Denkert pulled back his tanks to good cover. His formation had suffered a pounding; one American company counted 250 two hundred fifty dead within and in front of its positions

    I would add that, as JasonC noted, CM doesn't really capture the volume of artillery that often was directed at a single German tank. There are many accounts of barrages being called to take out a single panzer or handful of tanks sitting in a defensive position or stopped during an attack. If that didn't kill the target, ai generally convinced the crew to go somewhere else. Again, mission accomplished one way or the other.

  8. Originally posted by zmoney:

    Maybe I don't get it but how is this going to keep anyone from looking at the records? It does say they will be open from 9-5 doesn't it?

    Like I said I don't understand what the problem is so please explain it to me. I don't understand how them changing the office hours can be considered as some kind of way for them to keep our history silent.

    Why isn't this stuff on the Internet?

    The changes do not prevent people from looking at records, but they make it substantially more difficult. Total access time is cut by some 25 percent, and people who cannot go during the 9-to-5 period lose more like 80 percent of their access. Within the remaining access times during regular 9-to-5 hours, the "pull" times when you can request records are cut by a third, and the first one is pushed until 10 AM. What this means is that you can get substantially less material on a given day, and that by the time documents actually reach the reading room (which is likely to take longer because volume will be greater for each pull), a researcher will have a little better than 5 hours to work with the documents. Picture what losing 30 to 80 percent of access to the records is going to do to research, which means books on great WW II things like (salivate) tank destroyers, and tank battalions (ooh, ooh), and mechanized cavalry, and....

    As to why it is not on the net, the NARA page simply announces the changes. Nobody is paying attention to the issue yet.

×
×
  • Create New...