Andreas

Not really comparable, since the Americans were defending, and (except the two regiments of 106th) not encircled or completely overwhelmed. Spook, I was only a draftee for 15 months, so I don't think my military background counts for a lot. But I also seriously doubt most of my former officers could contribute anything meaningful to this discussion.

Joachim, I guess my opinion with this is quite simply summed up in saying 'So what?'. Is it unrealistic that a unit that gets shot in the rear while bailing from a position is more likely to rout than a unit attacking? In my (admittedly naive) opinion, that is consistent with the little that I have read (and can remember) about such occasions. It appears to me that true 'grit' (groans from the audience) is easier to generate in soldiers when you are moving forward trying to get to grips with the enemy than when you leave the field to him. I would be interested in other opinions on this though, in particular based on Real Life experiences/tales.

Keke, in that case that seems a low density to me for a 1944 operation. Are you sure they really attacked on a 4km front with the five BNs? Sometimes they would designate an actual main sector within the wider breakthrough sector. It also sounds as if a lot of forces were kept in the back. This could mean that they were less than clear about what faced them, and hoped to be able to reinforce success quickly. That the two Finnish battalions were shattered in just an hour is hardly surprising. Standing in the way of the Soviet juggernaut must have been devastating. Poor sods.

So you are not of the opinion that suppressive fire has a role to play in achieving a decent break from the enemy?

Well yes - and Stalin of course trusted his Allies completely. As he did trust his officer corps in 1937. Hindsight is of course a wonderful thing in these matters.

(need to get my post number up - but really, I put this in a different post so that nobody assumes that it is a direct referral to von Nev's opinions). So, the following section is not in response to von Nev, and I do not attribute any of the views outlined below to him. On a more general point here, because these discussions keep coming up (not just here): many Wehrmacht 'apologists' everywhere like to focus on the supposedly bad training (most of the time understanding very little to nothing about the training in the Red Army, and how it prepared for its attacks) and bad tactics (again, most of the time without ever having looked at a Soviet Field Manual). What they like to overlook is that the late-war Wehrmacht was hardly a shining example of well trained and well led troops. If these people started bothering themselves with research into the state of the Wehrmacht infantry, instead of continuously drooling over its (few) shiny tanks and elite tank formations, that would become clear to them very quickly. Officer training declined to a degree during the war that von Plato, a general staff officer in the tank forces, is quoted in Glantz saying that late war Soviet junior officers were better trained than German junior officers. Infantry replacements became very low quality from 1943 onwards (there had been complaints from 1940 onwards about the quality of replacements), and I have mentioned elsewhere a case of 12.PD GOC mentioning in the KTB that officers had to use force of arms to get their soldiers to attack, or even hold, in 1943. But of course, you won't find much or anything of that sort of information in the gushing histories of strapping Panzerformations doing their bit to rescue Germany, always winning, but eventually drowned in a faceless sea of Soviet automatons. [sarcasm mode on]It never ceases to amaze me how the Germans just won every fight, right up to the 8th of May, and all the way back from Moscow.[/sarcasm mode off]

That is one interpretation - how about: why? Because they wanted to ensure that they win the battle, and they needed to win it big. This was after all not a rerun of Rorke's Drift, or Iraq 2003, where one side could overwhelm the other by technology. It was perfectly in keeping with the old maxim that strategy is the art of avoiding a fair fight.

Oy - where is that Justin scenario only you have now. Welcome back Eridani. </font>

von Nev - I really don't care very much about your military resume, it was you who brought this up. I actually think that it is completely irrelevant since it is apples and oranges. You having a military background does not by itself mean you have a better understanding of these matters than I do. You may have it, but that is not connected to you wearing a uniform and me not. If your intention is to 'pull rank' here, forget it, as far as I am concerned. Even your attempt at doing this leaves me distinctly unimpressed regarding the value of what you have to say. Of course you would not be employed in today's Marine Corps if you thought those were acceptable casualties and mentioned as much in the interview. But if you wrote a letter to the Commandant after Iwo Jima 1944 arguing that the commanding officers should be sacked because of incurring high losses, and their job should be given to you because you would never accept such high losses, what do you think the response would be? So please keep things in the historical perspective, otherwise we will not need to continue this discussion. While you do consider that, please take time to respond to the losses I posted for 4th Mountain in the Uman encirclement battle, and how you would rate them in comparison to the Soviet losses in the Berlin Operation. Or the losses of the US infantry divisions in operations in NWE in 44/5. Just as a pointer - the Berlin operation ran for 17 days, from 16th April to 2nd May. 17.5% total casualties are just above a 1% loss rate per day. In a WW2 context (not Chechnya, not Iraq in the 1990s), considering this was in part one of the most intense MOUT occurences in history those are not bad numbers. Relatively speaking. What people seem to forget here is that the Germans also lost a number of guys. One estimate I have seen is 134,000 POW on the day of surrender in Berlin alone. Add to that the butcher's bill of those who died defending or breaking out of the city, defending at Seelow, and the POWs taken in the Kessel at Halbe (over half of 9th Army), where also another 50-70,000 may have been killed (Volksbund figure - I may be able to get more accurate figures tonight).

Not stop them - that time had passed in August 1944 - but delay them for long enough to allow the Americans to collect their wits and march on Berlin.

Well, as long as you show an alternative solution that gets the Red Army to the Reichstag before the Americans do get there, I think that will do. If you thought that this time pressure was not a valid argument at the time, then I would be forced to assume that you believe that the final military operations in 1945 happened in some political vacuum. Which is not something I believe. Just to put the 17.5% into perspective - from 3rd August 1941 to 8th August 1941, during the encirclement battle at Uman, German 4th Mountain Division lost 1,563 all ranks. The division was a two regiment formation, so assume somewhere about 13,000 men at full strength, probably less by this time, since they had already been through the Stalin line (I could not dig out the actual figure they went into battle with on the 21st July). Thus, in August 1941 at absolute height of German military prowess, a German elite formation managed to lose anywhere between 12-20% of its total strength in six days of very intense combat (4th Mountain had the highest losses of all formations in the Mountain Corps, because it was in the way of repeated break-out attempts). In the previous 13 days, by comparison, 4th Mountain had lost 215 all ranks. That was low intensity combat though for this division, a pursuit during which the division was resting most of the time. I guess few people would disagree that the Berlin operation qualifies as high-intensity combat. By comparison, 1st Mountain lost 223 during the pursuit and 536 during the encirclement battle; 125th infantry (they had three regiments) 1,178 during the pursuit and 562 during the encirclement battle. It is well to say that you don't want 17.5% losses on your resume - but I guess that means you would not qualify for even an interview to lead a formation in World War 2.

Oy - where is that Justin scenario only you have now. Welcome back Eridani.

Keke, out of interest, what could have been done differently at the Seelower Höhen to reduce casualties? I understand little about the battle, but from what I know the Soviet bridgehead was in a pretty ****ty position, and the Germans were well dug-in opposite it. Were there other approaches that they could have taken? How realistic would gaining another bridgehead with good links into Berlin have been? No question about Mars, but that happened almost 30 months earlier, and involved a much better Wehrmacht, and a much worse Red Army. I guess the comment about the generals and history may refer to the 'competition' between Zhukov and Konev. But would it have been any different if just one of them had attacked? The real aim was to get Berlin before the western allies, and that is hardly something you can blame the Soviet generals for. Also, until then the German regime had somehow failed to show an understanding that the game was up, so it was actually necessary to go to the Führerbunker in person to deliver the message by hand. Which involved all that messy fighting.

Another case where you clearly look at desperation, not doctrine. The Red Army in front of Stalingrad was not exactly in the best shape after being beaten all over the Steppe. I am always marveling at how people equate this sort of action to some sort of doctrine on the part of the Red Army. To compare, it was not doctrine for the Wehrmacht to draft 13 or 60 year olds, but it happened anyway in 1945. It was also not doctrine to randomly hang soldiers behind the frontline, but it happened a lot too in 1945. Well, you heard it now. Some of the units fighting in the Harz went into battle with some Panzerfausts, sometimes Italian SMGs with 20 rounds of ammo, not enough personal weapons, etc.

The only time I know this happened was in late 1941, or early 1942. Do you have any info it happened after that? You may also be interested to hear that the vaunted Wehrmacht did not give rifles to every infantry soldier - in 1945. This would indicate to me that it has more to do with external restraints, than internal doctrine.

Well, you are forgetting the context. This was the last battle, they just needed to win it, and casualties were almost irrelevant, since there just wasn't another German army they needed to deal with. By the way, there are some US infantry divisions that had 250-300% casualties over the time June 1944 to May 1945 (90th comes out 'top' with 292%, IIRC). That translates into 23% losses per month at the lower end, so for a two-week period (like the battle for Berlin), that is 11.5% on average (90th would have >13%). Across the whole division, not just the rifle platoons. So in a single battle phase running over two weeks (e.g. Normandy, or the Siegfried Line), 17.5% may not have been extraordinary for them as well, but may actually have been at the lower end of things. This is of course not directly comparable, because it is not at the same level, but should give some indication of the scale of slaughter in modern mechanised warfare. Considering the circumstances of Berlin, the figure does not appear high after all, now that I have thought about it. In absolute terms, no doubt. In relative terms, for the Red Army, I don't think I would agree.

IIIN is short-barreled 75L24.

I am asking to get some info regarding play recommendations and design for future scenarios. Note that this is really only relevant for attack/defense scenarios, not meeting engagements. When playing myself, I find that if I play PBEM, I am perfectly happy to take 10-15 turns (or even longer) before any contact occurs. When I play TCP, I am much less tolerant of these 'delays', and like to see early contact. Knowing there is a chap at the other end of the line twiddling his thumbs has that effect on me. What that comes down to is that some scenarios that maybe very good for multiplayer because of the action and the balance, are much less good for TCP than they are for PBEM, because the action occurs late in the game. What are players' thoughts on the matter - do you notice a difference in playing PBEM or TCP yourself?

Another way the Red Army dealt with dug-in positions was by developing a deep loving for direct fire artillery assets. No self-respecting assault group would go into the attack without at least a few 45mm AT guns and 76.2mm regimental guns. When protection and speed of movement of these became an issue, Soviet engineers would put really big guns or howitzers into really well armoured vehicles - always a winner on the battlefield. So if you were a Landser unfortunate enough to man a fire-point in a breakthrough sector in summer 1944, and somehow were spared in the aerial or artillery bombardment, chances were that within 15 minutes or so a 122mm round would knock on your door from a short distance - followed by a couple of sturdy fellows with submachine guns.

By what amount? If the 17.5% includes all losses, I would also not consider it excessive (let alone horrific) in the context of the Berlin operation. If it was some rinky-dinky operation in the Baltic States in 1945 I would think differently, but for this one, nothing unexpected.

Grisha, are those irrecoverable losses, or total? Regarding the loss total - 17.5% is quite high, but in order to compare it, one needs to first understand that Soviet divisions were much 'shallower' than e.g. US or German divisions. A far higher proportion of the chaps would be up front trying to kill Germans. Kip continues telling me about this Newton book on Kursk. There, apparently, a 7% loss across the whole army translates into 70% or thereabouts for the rifle platoons. As a ballpark figure, I think the effect would be roughly about the same here for 17.5%, if not less (Soviet divisions were only 50% of the strength of a full German division in 1943, and you have to allow for the Soviet love of DF fire support assets, which increases the number of guys being shot at). High losses - certainly. Horrific - well, I would quibble with the word, on a relative basis. In the context (taking a city from defenders who don't know when they should stop, technical means of the time, assaulting over unfavourable ground at Seelow), I would expect this level of losses. What I find horrific are the civilian casualties in the operation, but they are hardly the fault of the Soviets. I would be more interested in a comparison of losses between Zhukov's 1st Belorussian and Konev's 1st Ukrainian Fronts, since the latter had a much easier ride into Berlin. If Model's army had fought it out in the Ruhr pocket, the US Army would have seen similar losses, without a doubt.

I think the main point here is that without suppression of the enemy, your units should suffer a lot if they withdraw, more so then when they attack, since they do not even have their own fire to suppress the enemy (I am assuming that shooting from the hip while walking backwards is pure Hollywood). Your test does not test for that, it tests for what is the equivalent of 'let's get out of here' with no support. In that case, I find it acceptable that my men would be happier to attack forward than to retire while being shot at. The more fundamental point though maybe that borg spotting makes it unrealistically difficult to just melt away from the enemy, by dropping out of sight of just one unit, and thereby reducing the volume of incoming fire. That is an underlying problem, and I seriously doubt that a 'controlled withdrawal' command (whatever that is supposed to look like or do) could negate this effect. That soldiers are less happy to be shot in the back then they are about attacking is IMO just as it should be, and gels with what I have read about combat. Disorganisation is the price to pay for trying to get out of a tight spot in a hurry. Finally - unrealistic casualty levels have many reasons, but I doubt that withdrawal problems feature highly. If I see that the game is up during an attack, I ask my opponent for a cease-fire. If he accepts, the game ends with quite low casualty ratios. If I wanted to withdraw to fight elsewhere on the map, then I think it would be up to me to execute a competent withdrawal, using bounding overwatch, suppressive fire etc. I would not expect the game to do it for me anymore than I expect the game to organise my assault.

Andrew, can you dig out those URLs, and do you have any idea about the scale of the map you have there? How many metres to a square? 500?

If it was the central breakthrough sector, then I would have thought it likely that 30th GRC was rebuilt to anywhere above 75% of strength levels. This means you have 18 battalions (assuming they all have their three regiments present) milling about in the area. Plus the 40 or so tanks (probably much less) from the two attached AFV regiments. Is there some more info about this offensive available online?