Andreas

This is the official museum of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, dealing with the service of the regiment in Bella Italia. Amongst other things, it fought at Ortona. Of course, Michael will tell us that the Calgary Highlanders would have done much better there, but then again, Edmonton has the bigger mall... The site has extracts from the war diary, pictures and a letter written to a widow by a company commander. A model website, by the looks of it. Loyal Edmonton Regiment at Ortona

OK, so we both had a typo! It's "TomeViewer"... </font>

No, but I really wish I had played the first one 2 player. Fun against the AI none-the-less. I'm starting the second 2 player, and as soon as I line up players I will start the others as well. I was very impressed with the first one </font>

That is hardly fair, since you did not have to deal with German 10th Army (well, maybe German 10th Holidaymaker Army (mot)...) on your way Not sure now who was responsible for Anzio in the end. It sounds to sensible a plan to be of Churchillian origin. The problem was the execution after all, on paper it looked alright. To reiterate, Clark's remark to Lucas 'Don't stick your neck out...' is often blamed for the cautiousness on the part of Lucas. So what are your thoughts about Clark's interference in the break-out battles?

Ah, thanks a lot. I need to get them little by little. For those not in the know - this is what he is talking about: Germany and the 2nd World War The books are a lot cheaper in German - I believe OUP has priced them for university libraries. This is the official history published over the last 15 or so years by the Office of Military History of the Bundeswehr. It does not get much more official than that, I guess.

Possible, but the first I hear of that. I think that may have depended on the unit in question. Reinald, thanks for the correction. Everyday's a schoolday Is that all from Vol.5 of the MGFA book?

Michael, German divisions often (but not all of them) had a Feldersatzbatallion (FEB), which was the place where raw recruits coming from the depot units back in the Reich would be trained up to be suitable for frontline use. From the start of Barbarossa on, beginning with the two-regiment divisions, these FEB were used as stop-gap KGs, to make up for weakening main infantry forces. But not all divisions had them to start with, and their (ab)use as line infantry did not help matters. Obviously this would get worse when losses increased over time in Russia. Following the campaign in Poland, and again following the campaign in France, there are complaints about the quality of replacements received (e.g. divisional histories of 21st ID and 13th ID (mot)). The long breaks between the following campaigns did however allow the divisions to digest the lessons learned in them, work on weaknesses exposed, and train the replacements up. I have references to life-fire training by 21.ID in the Eifel in winter 39/40 (including a section killed in an artillery short), and to extensive training of 12.ID (mot) when it converted to become 12.PD in 1941, in particular in the type of operations that were expected in Russia. Training was pretty much a constant feature of the Wehrmacht, and when a unit was taken out of the line, many junior leaders and specialists would go on courses. I also have references to NCO schools that were set up by divisional GOCs in at least two divisions, 12.PD and 1st Para division (their NCO course was stupidly annihilated defending against the landing of 78th 'Battleaxe' division at termoli in 1943). This is why I am of the opinion that the Wehrmacht in June 1941 was at the height of its capabilities. After three victorious campaigns, and a lot of downtime for training, even soldiers that would probably have been considered hardly suitable in e.g. the US, due to their age, had been shaped into very well-trained and capable specialists. From then on, it went downhill. But yes, these 3-month Reserve II chaps would have seen a lot of training, and a lot of it based on real lessons learned in campaigns, before they went to war. BTW, I own a training handbook for Wehrmacht officers on how to fight a reinforced infantry battalion, written by two Wehrmacht Colonels. I think it saw a number of revisions between 1939 and 1941 (I own the autumn 1941 edition). Very interesting book.

Well, since all the MAc geeks are hanging around here, I have a question. On my G4/400, when I am in OS9.2.2, it does not recognise the internal ZIP drive, or one of these cute USB memory sticks, at all. If I put in a Yip disk it asks me to reformat it. After reformatting, it asks me to reformat it. When I boot into OSX 10.2, it recognises everything and anything. Does anyone know which extension I must have screwed up in OS9.2.2 to achieve this peculiar setup?

I would agree on both counts, and add that once the Soviets managed to get on a par with that operational capability from 1944 onwards, it was game over for the Germans, with no chance to come back. Here is (courtesy of Lexikon der Wehrmacht) the makeup of an infantry division of the 3rd Wave, established in 1939/40! In these divisions therefore, 88% of the soldiers were at least 26 years old when war started, and 46% must have been very badly trained. 4th Wave divisions were slightly better: Here the age and training situation was considerably better, also because these 14 divisions already 'existed', because they were based on existing replacement formations that had already practiced together. Motorisation levels were comparable to those in 1st Wave divisions. Now compare the above to the 1st Wave division personnel below: As I said, all the data from the goldmine that is Lexikon der Wehrmacht. It needs to be added though that the high level of active personnel in the 1st Wave formations was quickly diluted, when formations were split off to become part of other, newly established formations. This is all just a paper exercise, but goes to show how far back the Wehrmacht had to reach to come up with personnel even before the war started. As an aside. My grandfather was drafted into the Wehrmacht at the age of 23, and was a 25-year old private when war started. [ August 03, 2003, 05:46 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

No I did not, actually. Never heard it used that way, and dictionary.com did not throw it up as first choice. I only knew 'stipulate' in the form of 'I stipulate that condition', or sumfink. Thanks for enlightening me

I was talking of the chaps that did the work, not of the equipment here. Captured kit, maybe a bit in these areas. Cannibalised kit, very little, since most of the disbanded units tended to be disbanded behind Soviet lines, making access to their equipment a tad difficult. BTW -I would not rate AG North's performance as a success. They just got lucky, and then that luck was wasted because Dönitz wanted to have a training area for his submarines... Gotta love the inter-arms rivalry of the Reich

How many varieties of guns/HMGs? How many varieties of vehicles? How many of these in total? Relying on captured or self-manufactured ammunition stock? On how many fronts? Over what distance did the logistical system have to support it? It does not reflect directly on the fighting capabilities of these formations whether they are equipped with the German lFH18 or the Soviet 122mm howitzer (indeed, the 122mm is probably the better gun), but it creates a logistical nightmare, one exacerbated by many factors that did not apply to the Finnish army at all. Another thing I feel has not quite been looked at enough is the shortage of specialists (e.g. radio operators, pioneers, etc.) that also is exacerbated by the creation of additional units. I am still unconvinced about the firepower benefit outweighing the drawbacks of creating the additional overhead within the system. These specialists were in short supply, as far as I know, and their training and their equipment were constantly lacking. Every new division needed a signals battalion to be able to function, plus signals equipment in the sub-formations. The same (although not as critical) for pioneer and transport assets.

I'm willing to stipulate to that. </font>

No it shouldn't. So is what you are asking for a simulation of the John Wayne 'walking backward and shooting from the hip' movement, or the 'dash - drop - turn - covering fire - get up -turn - repeat' drill that I as an untrained nitwitwould assume is performed by a section retreating under fire? Basically a command that assumes that the section carries out a drill like the 'advance' and 'assault' commands now, thereby producing a section-internal overwatch that you currently can not order, except by breaking the section into teams?

Ah, my apologies, the 'more glorious' bit was actually in reference to the quote from 'D-Day Dodgers' saying the frontline was held 'dangerously thin', not the divisional history. Or sumfink. Other than that it is nice to see we agree. Although I am not quite sure whether 1st SSF actually tied down much of HG - referring to your second post now. I can check that when I am back with my sources. The Germans did not like to operate with significant forces at the sea-edge of the perimeter, because they were afraid of the naval artillery coming into play there, and I am not sure whether they posted much along the Mussolini Canal.

On that question - has anyone here read Maximilian Fretter-Pico's 'Verratene Infanterie', a book dealing with the infantry divisions in the ast 1941-45? Maybe that could give us some info from the horse's mouth on this question? fretter-Pico started Barbarossa as commander of either 97th or 101st Jäger Division, then became GOC XXX.AK, and ended it in charge of the Harz defense.

Jon, I forgot about this one. I am not sure (but you certainly know more about it than I do) this was so silly given that the initial planning was not "and we will get ourselves hemmed in and stay here for four months, not going anywhere.", but rather expected a quicker link-up. IIRC most of the landings of multi-divisional size (with the exception of TORCH and DRAGOON), were combined landings. HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SHINGLE, OVERLORD certainly were. In all of these cases, a quick progression away from the beaches presumably brought bigger benefits of having two forces available, outweighing the problems created initially in the logistics department. The failure to get out of the beachhead at Anzio however did not bring that benefit. Now, since we are rubbishing Clark, how about his interference in the break-out battles. Was that the cause for the escape of the Germans, or do inepet staffers of the British forces, and German Überingenuity have something more to do with it? ISTR Ellis is very generous in rubbishing everyone involved, except (surprise!) Juin and the CEF. I also seem to remember that there was a third way out through the mountains apart from Highways 6 & 7. BTW - regarding Ellis, his lofty statements about the inability of Allied airpower to threaten German LOCs (in particular his calculation about the required tonnage of supplies and the capacity of the rail network) do not seem to be confirmed by German sources, who e.g. felt that at Anzio they really did not have enough artillery ammunition to deal with the Allies.

BTW - while googling for the Leavenworth Paper on Petsamo-Kirkenes, I found this one on the Rangers at Cisterna. Quite interesting and topical. While on a different site, this appears to be Chapter 4 of a Leavenworth Staff College paper on Ranger missions in WW2. Rangers at Cisterna Does anyone know if Leavenworth papers are still accessible from outside the US post 9/11? If so, can someone email me the link please?

That was not Army Group North. I have no idea what they called them, but AG North was (1941-45) fighting in the Baltic states and the Kurland. After it was renamed to AG Kurland, parts of the old AG Centre became AG North, fighting in East/Pommerania and around Danzig.

I would not give a lot on what Churchill said about operations in the Mediterranean from Italy onwards. It appears to me he checked in his brain at the door whenever he went to a meeting about it. In autumn 1943 he was perfectly happy to waste quite a large force (at least a brigade+ of infantry, the LRDG, a couple of destroyers and a squadron or so of Spitfires) in the ill-advised Dodecanese venture. They might have come in handy at Anzio, or anywhere else for that matter. Michael, I have to agree with Jon - while HG was a skilled opponent, where SSF was sitting not a lot did happen. The Mussolini channel combined with the Pontine Marches was a very good protection - also, for much of that line most of the ship's artillery could work quite well, even on the smaller units. This is IMO confirmed by the fact that the main fighting went on in the other areas, notably Aprilia 'The factory') and in the general direction from there to Cisterna, east of Padiglione wood. Seems to me that maybe the unit history is out to make things a bit more glorious than they were. As for dissing Clark - well yes, he gave Lucas that stupid advice, didn't he? In best Teflon-management manner, Lucas than had to go.

I don't remember anymore from where i have the knowledge, because i heard/learned about that from several sources. I can't understand, why you are that stubborn and can't accept such a simple (and quite logical) fact. If you are interested in, simply take a look at the history of anti-tank weapons. There are enough books and surely websites about that topic. Due to the well known Panzerschock from WWI, Panzerabwehrabteilungen were included into infantry-divisions. Their name was program: simply to be able to withsand tank-attacks, or at least to give the soldiers the psychological feeling, that they are not completely helpless. If you don't believe me, inform yourself. After war against Poland, tanks (i.e. Panzerjäger I) were attached to the Panzerabwehrabteilungen and in consequence soon they were renamed to Panzerjägerabteilungen. Anti-tank weapons, their use and the organizations were in the same way developed as every other weapon. And as reaction to the Panzerschock the PzAbwAbt. were included. And as logical evolution when enough experience was collected, they were supported by flexible AT-weapons. @Scarhead: Have you ever heard from the old german saying: Mehr Sein als Scheinen? (being more than seeming to be). Don't make the mistake to believe, all times were that shallowly and full with advertisements everywhere like actual times. Panzerabwehrabteilungen were renamed not because of fooling the own soldiers, but because of the included tank-hunting units. </font>

KINGFISH: How far? Quick. ANDREAS THE ARGUER: What? KINGFISH: I say he has to take account of the reserves. ANDREAS THE ARGUER: Oh. Uhhh, Highway 7? KINGFISH: Right. ANDREAS THE ARGUER: What? KINGFISH: There you are. ANDREAS THE ARGUER: Wait a minute. KINGFISH: What? ANDREAS THE ARGUER: Well, we're-- we're supposed to argue. KINGFISH: No, no. I agree-- ANDREAS THE ARGUER: What do you mean, 'no, no, no'? KINGFISH: I haven't time. I agree-- ANDREAS THE ARGUER: Well, say something else, then. KINGFISH: No, no, no. I just agree with you. ANDREAS THE ARGUER: Jon! JON: Yeah? ANDREAS THE ARGUER: This bloke won't argue. JON: Won't argue?! KINGFISH: All right. Do we have to? ANDREAS THE ARGUER: Now, look. I say they should have gone for Highway 7. KINGFISH: I-- I just agreed with that. etc. (With apologies to Monty Python)

Yep Kingfish, and all that Intel was, well, bollocks. There was no heavy resistance on the beaches, there was no division assigned to defending the area. Now, if the first five minutes of your landing show you that one part of the intel is seriously flawed, would it not be a good idea to test whether the rest of it is correct? Which could have been done by immediate aggressive reconnaissance. Instead what seems to have happened is that the forward detachments were pushed out just as far as was planned under the flawed intel and no further, even when they did not meet any resistance. All this when this intel had been shown to be false already. It was the most conservative option possible - well, short of re-embarking. The point is that a less conservative action would in this situation have been justified by the new intel gathered after the landing - there is next to no-one here. The approach march of 26th Panzer would have taken days (and actually did), which you need to add to the D*2-3 estimate for actually releasing it from the front. The same goes for a lot of other forces. Also note that the CMH report does not seem to even mention the controversy about Lucas ignoring Alexander's intent, if not orders, and seems designed to just gloss over it. It does say this though, which I note you forgot to quote, although it follows one of your quotes: If the Fifth Army attack in the south were sufficiently powerful and sustained, it should pin down all enemy reserves in that area. G-2 did not believe that the Germans could bring down reinforcements quickly from northern Italy, especially in the face of overwhelming Allied air superiority. Probable build-up from north of Florence was estimated to be not more than two divisions by D plus 16. The final summary by G-2, Fifth Army, on 16 January pointed out the increasing attrition of enemy troops: (bolded by me).

Is the right answer

Jon, have a look here and here. These are the official maps from the US history available online at CMH. The first map is dated 22/23 Jan. and shows the weakness of German forces. The second is from 29 Jan, and still shows only weakish forces (note all the battalions are "(-)"). I think it should be clear that occupying the road centres 'Junction NE of Ardea', Campoleone/Osteraccia and Cisterna was not a 'silly' or fanciful proposition, and would at the very least have created serious problems for a defensive perimeter to contain the bridgehead later. Highway 7 was certainly within the reach of the landed forces. Cisterna appears to be about 23km from Nettuno, all on decent roads. [ August 01, 2003, 12:44 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]