Andreas

Which is what so far BFC have said they are not going to do. Have you read something contradicting the first statement that CMAK will be cheaper than CMBO and CMBB? If so, please direct me to the statement. I may have overlooked it. Can you please direct me to the CMAK demo? I must have missed it. Nope, his opinion is based on a wrong impression about charges for the new product. Thus it is not valid, regardless of how you feel about it. Your feeling does not change the facts. Oh Boy. Do you actually check on something you write before you do so? I am one of the people who happily gives up his private time for no reward to help BFC. BFC always asked for my agreement before providing my scenarios as part of their new ways of distributing their product. Do you have any proof that they did not do the same with the modders and other scenario designers? If so, please put up, or shut up, on this issue. Foolishly - more like it. If you want to be taken seriously, it really does help to get your facts right.

Just a quick anecdotal piece of data for Soviet officer training. 10th Guards Rifle Division on the Arctic front was commanded by a chap called Chudalov during the second half of the war. The last time before the war that he had any sort of formal training was in 1933, at Cavalry School. At the break-out of the war, he commanded the reconnaissance battalion of the division. He then rose to take over a regiment. Then he became the divisional commander. Finally, in December 1943 he was assigned to a staff course in Moscow, which was to last from January to April. So here we have someone in command of a large formation who had zero formal training for the job, at the end of 1943. The training was cut short in early March, when he was sent back to his division, BTW. Contrast that with the German approach to training, explained quite well in 'Soldat' by Siegfried Knappe, where every officer with general staff training was trained to lead a division. So on this level, it may well have been that the Germans had the edge until quite late in the war. If Comrade Chudalov's example is not an outlier, of course.

They labour under a similar misconception WRT the game of cricket. As can be seen as I write this...

Ah yes. Nothing like a cuppa to soothe the nerves. 'There'll be Stukas over - the vale of tebourba - tomorrow when I have my tea.' I think those were the lyrics? The word 'tea' must be one of those that divide US and British English. I only learned about a year ago that for quite a few people in the UK, to 'have my tea' means to have your evening meal. I think. That after spending five years in this country - I am a slow learner, I admit.

No - I know that Kip is too. Must have been something in those beers at The George you had when you were in London. Weirdos. What is wrong with battalion size 2x2km maps and a 15 turn fixed battle length? Seriously though, I agree that many battles we see are simply too short. We have discussed this elsewhere, and I still think that even for a Byte Battle™ you need 25-30 turns variable as a minimum (the lower end if you are on a 400x400 map at most). For anything where you actually need to move forces, you need to give >=35 variable turns, IMO. What I will probably do in the future is to suggest in the briefing to those who are interested in longer play against the AI to just open the scenario and give themselves 20 extra turns. I am also considering experimenting with non-game victory conditions, but am not quite sure yet how to do that, or indeed to make it work in multi-player.

You had me flusterered there by calling for the inclusion of a vehicle that is already in the game . Just open the scenario editor, and at the default you can buy the 250/11. Jaws - what Michael said. Private Bluebottle - what is 'the market place'? Looking at sales figures, I think it is fair to say that 'the market place' asks for real-time first person shooters with Lara Croft's rear-end in them. So why is that not swinging in front of me when I roll my ISU152 into the German defenses. She would look cute with a tanker's cap too! Seriously though - 3, or 4, or 5 people asking for it are not 'the market place'. So far BFC have done quite well out of designing what they think is a good game. IMO they change that approach at their peril. The problem with asking people what they want is that they actually do not have a frigging clue what they want. That is the problem with focus groups and market research. If you want to break the mould with your product, 'the market place' is going to give you bugger all help in figuring out how to do it. [ August 25, 2003, 06:01 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

I don't have a lot of time today. It is not the size of the ship, it is the motion of the ocean that counts. As a female friend once told me. But they were not aiming that high - these offensives of late 1943 did not have as their goal anymore to destroy whole army groups. In 1944 that was their goal. Well, I am not saying something is inherently wrong with the tactic. But tactics do not exist in a vacuum. What I am saying it that it was wrong to stick to it regardless of the improvements in Red Army handling of their forces. Rather different. The tactics are sound - if you have an opponent who does not learn. Using your chess analogy - if you play against a much better player who uses just one strategy year-in year-out, you will eventually figure out how to beat him. If that player then refuses to change his play, he will continue to lose. Also, is the decision to deploy a certain defensive tactic again and again operational or tactical? I think we need to clear that up now, otherwise we are talking past each other. In my opinion it is operational - and therefore falls into the realm of stupid decisions you outline below. Yes, but that does not mean there was no risk that they would bring superior operational play to bear on the soviets now and then. I.e. the Red Army was facing a risk in that respect. They had the doctrine alright, but they still were not as good at implementing it. Nobody does, see above. So in your opinion they equalised in 1943? In which case it is not a 'hackneyed claim', but a matter of difference about the timing when this happened. Ah - well now we are getting somewhere with the loss figures. So, from June 1944 to November 1944, the Germans lost 20% more than the Red Army in the whole year. Does not seem so bad to me, if I was at STAVKA. Looking at Glantz, and using some other figures, the loss ratio for Iassy is roughly 1:4 in favour of the Soviets (this is not directly comparable, since it excludes Romanians, but it gives a rough idea of the scale of what went on). For Bagration it looks at <2:1 in favour of the Germans. Again not too bad one could argue, and certainly a significant improvement on earlier offensives. Edit to add: Even this makes the germans look good, because say >1/3rd of the Soviet losses would come back after recuperation, while the German losses are irrecoverable. If you look at the figures in Glantz again, you'll see it was not just a case of attrition, but really one of mobilisation on the Soviet side. If you exclude Kursk and the preparation for it, the force ratio is reasonably stable, but it suddenly crashes (or goes through the ceiling, depending on how you look at it) from July 1944. Just picking the earliest figures for each year: 1941 - 1.00:1.4 1942 - 1.52:1 1943 - 2.03:1 1944 - 2.20:1 1945 - 2.96:1 These are of course masking quite significant goings-on within them and can therefore only be rough indicators. Well, it was during Bagration and Iassy. So what had changed then? The strongpoints were still well manned, by equally capable divisions, if I am to believe what I read here. See the first reply about size of ships and motion of the ocean. That is not operational, it is strategic. The margin in capability shrunk. I think that is where we disagree. You seem to believe that right after the desasters of Gallop and Star, somehow the Red Army saw the Light™. I contend it took them longer to figure it out, and they only got really good at it in 1945 (Vistula-Oder). Please refrain from putting words into my mouth. Where do I say that tactics as such employed in Bagration or Iassy are 'simple'. I do not think so. I actually do believe that putting together the operations, and then executing them, required a wealth of skill on all levels. Division level and below was irrelevant in 1944 - this is the point I have been making all along. Therefore relying on division level positions to save your rear was a huge mistake. If your opponent plays on Corps/Army level to defeat you, you will have to play that level as well. If you continue relying on your divisional strongpoint, you are IDS. That figure is far too low. 4th Army alone had 246 Stugs, 40 tanks and 116 heavy SP ATGs on 20th June. Total 402 AFVs. You need to add 9th Army and 3rd Panzer Army plus Army Group reserves to that. 300 may have been the operational figure (without recourse to the KTBs that is impossible to know), but it seriously understates the number of AFVs available. 20th Panzer Division was moved to the Army Group on 16th June, I believe. A number of Panzer divisions were moved after the start of the offensive (at least 12th and 5th), but by then it was too late. Can you please give the source for your 300 AFV claim? Mine is Niepold. 2nd Army was not attacked until 18th July, I believe. Not in the Baltics. Without the German navy, Kurland could never have been held. I do agree that it was not of relevance to the Crimea though. [ August 25, 2003, 08:08 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

The problem is that currently TRPs are not just for artillery, but also give boresighting for guns etc. Which is probably less appropriate for the attacker than the defender. I am not sure whether it is not more realistic to simulate this through the use of a fireplan. I know it would not be today, but especially with the Wehrmacht and the Red Army and their comparative reliance on wire instead of radio, this may give too much flexibility to the attacker. The problem with fireplans is of course that in a QB you do not have the information to plan it as you should. So really it maybe an information problem (lack of it reduces the value of the fireplan in the game for QBs and scenarios with no intel).

What would the /5 and /6 do? Would they not just be carriers for engineers, carrying the stores? What would be the great difference between the 250/11 and the 251/11? Replenishing ammo under fire was done, but probably was not the chosen method to do so. There is an instance in the book on Stug Brigade 276 mentioning it. But it can well be mentioned because it was so unusual? It exposes crew to enemy fire, so it is quite risky. The RSO was unarmoured BTW, so risking it on the battlefield would be a very stupid move. I would tend to agree with sgt.goody on the reason for the use of tracked/half-tracked vehicles for supply being that they could go places. The armour may just have been an added bonus (or not, since it reduces payload). Would be interested if someone has more info on this though. I never looked at this closely.

Ahem, it was a genuine 'interesting' regarding the mod, and not a hidden 'I think you have it wrong'. I know next to nothing about vehicle markings, I can not even remember the number schedule for German tanks despite reading about it a gazillion times. I had always believed there was only the B/W Balkenkreuz (not Balkankreuz, BTW Michael ) at Barbarossa, that's why I commented. Little did I know the service Gautrek provides. Made me feel guilty. I shall never comment on markings again, until the next time I do.

The Germans had specialised assets that could enable the equivalent of UNCLE and VICTOR target equivalents. These were ArKos and Höhere Arkos, Corps level and Army level artillery HQs, respectively. These needed to be combined with specialised Feuerleitbatterien (my guess is these are just a large number of signallers), and then they could do it. They did that at Anzio - which may tell us something about the flexibility of the system, compared to the Commonwealth. ISTR there was another such instance either at Zhitomir or on the Mius 1943, can't recall which, and my suspicion would be that this would have been used at Kursk as well, but I have no evidence for that. So they had the idea, they just did not have the means to implement it whereever they went. [ August 23, 2003, 06:43 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

My position on the 6 battalion division has indeed shifted - as you could have noted. I am no longer as convinced as I was when the discussion started that it was a failure, but unless I can get some more information about scarcity of the 'overhead' elements, I will not be convinced that And that is wrong? Were they on holiday in France? And that is wrong? Yep, compared to a full division it is. Well, do you have figures showing that there were enough around? Don't know where you got this from. And that is incorrect? And that is wrong? And I still would, unless I see the actual production figures. I have not gone that far in my research yet. And that is wrong how? Are you saying specialists were not lacking? Are you saying that creating more units does not add to logistical strain? Are you saying that logistics in the east were not a serious problem? In response to an insulting post, which you conveniently forget to mention. What has that got to do with anything? People say all sorts of things, and I can not help if they have a warped perception of my opinions. Dogs bark, the caravan moves on - to use one of the favourite phrases of Helmut Kohl. Oh I do. But at least I am not accusing other people of 'debator's pose' while shamelessly pandering to the gallery like some 3rd rate US TV lawyer. I think I said that quite early on, and I am actually reconsidering that. No need to respond to that. You have forgotten Rob, who made some great contributions here. Well, actually they managed to withdraw in the nick of time, to a secondary theatre, with one flank anchored on the sea. I would consider that lucky. As I posted above, there is also the possibility that they used a different tactic than the relatively inflexible strongpoint defense. Where did I say that? Not geniuses, just someone comparatively more skilled than most of their Red Army counterparts in that period. Of course that idea must be anathema to you, since you seem to believe that the Red Army did not need to improve after 1943. I don't get it, are you saying something different from the last para? Does not appear so. How about - their comparative advantage in operational direction started to diminish, and therefore their tactical superiority did no longer matter as much. The Red Army only re-introduced Corps by mid 1943, and did only set up the first mech corps and tank corps a year earlier. Handling massed armoured forces, and the understanding of logistical constraints seems to not have been as well developed in the first half of 1943 as it was in mid-1944. Even in autumn 1943 Konev got a real fright out of the Zhitomir operations, with the Kharkov nightmare coming back. If you want to claim that Russian operational play was superior in 1943, you will have to explain Star and Gallop to me, together with the failure to keep Army Group A from escaping, if you please. I did not quote a figure for the calendar year, but for the period June - November. Since most of the casualties would have been from late in June, we are talking 5 months. The problem for the Germans was that they could not kill their way out of their situation. They could do that in 1942, when casualty ratios were far more favourable, and in 1943 they traded a lot of space for survival. Quite apart from the fact that you are comparing Apples and Oranges with your 5 million figure. The German 1.5million are only irrecoverable losses, while Glantz (based on Krivosheyev I assume) gives just short of 2 million Soviets for the whole of 1944 KIA/MIA and another 5.5 million wounded and sick. The figures are absolutely not comparable, in time, and scope. But if you have figures that are, I would be interested in seeing them. No I don't. The question was whether this was an outlier. You contend it was, I am not so sure. 'Tactical' - 'operational'. What is the difference Jason? Do we know that in your examples strongpoint defense was actually used? But if you want to get really into unrelated territory - Fester Platz Tarnopol, March/April 1944. I did not quote it because it is not relevant to the discussion, IMO, but I can easily drag it out. I am sure you are well aware of what happened there, with all your deep understanding of the east. Maybe you can patiently explain to me poor sod how it relates. I suggest you go back to my post. I said 'more open', and compared to the Bocage country of Normandy. The comparison you claim I made would indeed be a screamer, which is why I did not make it. You were talking about the stand at the 'borders' that was so successful. I was just pointing out that the stand did not really happen much on the borders, since the Oder was not a border then. Indeed my whole point was that it happened behind a natural obstacle, and not at some border. Such are the perils of taking things out of context Jason, as you here do. Indeed, except for some heavy fighting in East Prussia, and a few significant operations at the AG Centre/AG North intersection. Also, the clearing of the Carpathians on the southern flank of the AG Vistula frontline. Again, the Soviets did clear flanks before they got to the major business at hand. The experience from Kharkov showing again? I am saying it was not monotonic destruction of strongpoints with 1,500 men in them. I would agree that it was fairly monotonic losing, but with the loss of a much smaller number of men per day in typical operations. Again, you would benefit from reading more closely what I write. I am not 'sniffing' at his learning. Questioning the validity of a source was par for the course at the universities I visited. I am surprised it is called 'sniffing' at your learned institution. I am uncertain about the quality of Haupt for a source - I have his AG North book here, and while the list of sources is impressive, I do not think it is that well written or instructive. I have not seen the other Army Group ones, but I own other books of his, about Leningrad, Demjansk and Kiev. These are not so great. I can not judge his AG Centre book, because I have never read it. As for 'sniffing' about obscurity. Well, you could not twist it more if you wanted, this was an admission by me that I don't know a lot about it, and therefore would need to look it up. Neither of which addresses the scale problem of your example by the way, and the fact that an operational history can hardly count as an AAR. We are still having the minor problem that we are talking different scales here. Your examples (including the ones from Haupt) are operational in nature, while Leontina was a tactical situation with an operational consequence. Do you know what sort of defensive tactics were used at Vitebsk? I don't, and my guess is Haupt does not make it clear either. Yes - and your point is? Throughout it has been my contention that you don't need a lot of Leontinas to wreak havoc on the Germans. In AG SU, one may have been enough. What I mean by 'rare' is that there was not a lot of combat like this. What you seem to mean by 'rare' is that there were not a lot of outcomes like this. Rather different. Now, I still stand by my earlier statements which you have not quoted, presumably because you don't have an answer to them, that your statistical approach is not able to elucidate tactical happenings, or indeed judge whether a tactical approach is valid. This sort of information is lost when looking at the overall picture. You have still not addressed that criticism of your method, which you drag out in this discussion to prove something that is so obvious, it is not even in contention. I leave it up to you to figure out what that might be. It will be more rewarding for everyone to see the answer than having to read through your biased, selective and out of context quoting in your previous post. [ August 23, 2003, 05:31 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

I am not quite sure who you are talking to, or indeed what you are saying (there seems to be a bit missing in the sentence, or I am very tired). If it is me, since I brought this up, I think, I did not mean it as criticism at all. I am quite pleased with the development.

Well, I have now scanned a map and the AAR by Oberst Friebe, written after his failure to break through. I have only scanned the first part of the AAR, not the bit where he shifts the blame (rightly!) on Balck and Raus. Here is the accompanying map. The Soviet resistance lines can clearly be seen in the centre (black arrows are the German advance, 4-digit numbers are the time, the zick-zack lines are the Soviet positions) Friebe's command was of course not a full Panzerdivision, and most importantly lacked heavy artillery. He could also have broken through the last position, but then he would not have been able to return, in his assessment. Ironically, the fear of the establishment of a strong Pakfront was one of the reasons for the hasty cobbling together of the relief attempt of Tarnopol on March 25th, and the failure to wait for the assembly of a stronger force. Pakfronts also feature highly in the failure of 9th SS and Friebe to break through to Tarnopol on April 14th, when it all ended. In a different theatre, half a year away, rapid deployment of AT Brigades was also used by 1st Baltic Front under Bagramyan to deal with the German attacks to reopen connections to AG North near Schaulen (Siauliai). The first order was to integrate divisional artillery into the first line of resistance of the infantry battalions. The next thing was to bring in four AT Brigades (three from STAVKA reserve, probably the 8th Gun Artillery Division). This deployment was noted by the Germans, who commented on the high number of ATGs destroyed. 1st Tank Corps was used in the battles and taken out of Front Reserve, but the 19th was put into Front Reserve. Here is an interesting quote by Bagramjan: "Special consideration was to be taken by him to build up a strong AT defense, in order to destroy the massed tank attacks together with the 3rd Air Army." from his recollection of his order to Gen. Skornjakov, who took over 5th GTA (then with 17 tanks) when Solomatin was wounded. Bagramjan ends his account of operation 'Doppelkopf' lavishing praise on his AT gunners.

Oh yes? Where do I do that? Please do give a quote, or at least an interpretation of something I said that is credible, before making up stories. Well, we can settle this argument here and now. I don't think they were idiot pushovers. Where do I say that, or say something that could be interpreted that way? Finally no slander. Instead a completely pointless statement. How weak am I portraying the Germans? Oh yes, I think they are idiots. I forgot. Thanks for telling me what I think Jason. You are ever so helpful. [ August 22, 2003, 04:37 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Nobody did claim 'monotonic successes'. You claimed Leontina was an outlier (i.e. you claimed exactly what you now say nobody ever did claim) and this is what the discussion has been about. After I have reduced my standards of evidence to the most basic level, just in order to get you to go out and put up some evidence, you have now found some examples, well thanks for looking. Obviously these examples are not on the same scale, so I will try and see if I can find something more about it. I'll get back to you if I am able to - not having a university library to back me up, it will take a bit longer. But to be honest, I find your attitude wearing to the extreme. You are still trying to twist my words into something I did not say, and you are obviously miffed that I do not take your word as gospel, like so many others here do. The anger when asked for sources to back up your claims is astounding. What kind of an academic environment do you work in where this sort of attitude of yours is encouraged? The University of Jasonia? The one being snippy around here is you. It is funny that you accused me of adopting a 'debator's stance' - have you ever actually noticed that it is you who is theatrically booming to the audience ('So Andreas did not...'), while I am trying to talk to you? Does it actually enter your head that asking questions, and challenging another person's opinions could be an attempt to exchange information and progress the debate? It does not appear so from here. BTW - if Haupt is the best you have at your university, I'd put in a request for new books. Standard indeed - let's not say what kind of standard. But good enough for people who are monoglot, I assume. Beggars can't be choosers after all.

Just had a closer look at Nafziger. He says that the leichte Infanterie- (later Jägerdivisionen) were formed specifically for fighting in lower-lying wooded areas, where the specific mountaineer training and equipment was not required. This would probably explain the narrow organisation with only two regiments. Unfortunately he does not say how/if this affected training. It is interesting to note though that all these divisions were formed in Bavaria, Czechia, or Austria, i.e. in parts of the Reich/occupation areas featuring a lot of broken and wooded terrain.

Part of the belt-fed field gun myth could be that the Pommies had 8-gun batteries, no? ISTR that Blackburn says the 25-pdr has a very high ROF. But looking at Nigel Evan's RA site, he says that the highest ROF ('intense') was five rounds per minute. By comparison, von Senger und Etterlin gives 6-8 rounds for all models of the 10,5cm lFH, and 8-10 for all models of the 7,5cm Feldkanone.

Well this should tell you what you can think of that 'Budapest - Stalingrad of the Waffen-SS' title...

I would also be interested in an answer to the question of how you play - I think that may go some way to explaining why you feel the scenarios are not as good as they were in CMBO. CMBB is much more relentless, and unforgiving.

Say nothing, start reading?

I always thought the white cross was no longer used by the time of Barbarossa. Interesting. ISTR that I read somewhere that even by the time of the campaign in France, crews had cottoned on to the idea that painting a big, white cross to enable the opposition to aim well was not what could be described as a smart idea. They therefore took steps on a non-authorised basis to make it a bit less visible.

Well, I think one of these threads is fine, and fully sufficient. Livens the place up. Which is why I shake my head in wonder at the Goodale thread. I guess it is for the losers who can't handle the Peng thread.

I don't think it would be a bad idea. The CMBO forum has a decent level of activity going on, and some useful discussions. This for a game that is much more inferior to its successor than CMBB will be to CMAK. There are people who are interested in the east, and will stay with it. Drowning them out in 'w00t! OMG the Lee r00lz' threads would not do them a favour. Also, if it means the Goodale thread moves to the CMAK forum, so much the better.

Indeed, it was for info purposes only anyway. Michael, regarding infantry guns - you are quite correct, the Brits never had anything like that, AFAICT. Neither did the US Army. The French early in the war, according to Hogg, had a 37mm infantry gun, which was, again according to him, a bit pointless. Depending on whether this was a howitzer or a gun, I would not fully agree with that however, because I saw a quote from a German report saying that while the PAK36 had outlived its usefulness as an ATG by 1941, it was still useful as an infantry gun. My guess is that the small profile, low weight, and good precision because of high MV would make up a bit for the low HE load. If you want to post a greeting through the firing slit of a bunker, the PAK may well come in more useful than an IG18. Moving to mortars probably makes a lot of sense though. While you lose the ability to fire over open sights on a horizontal line, ease of transport, ease of production, and rate of fire probably make up for this. The Soviets, as is well known, were absolutely in love with direct fire. Given the chance (i.e. no danger to the guns from the Germans) they would roll up everything and the kitchen sink to blast aways over open sights. During the fight for Tarnopol they brought up heavy batteries and Katyushas to bear on the town from the surrounding heights, once they knew the German force had run out of heavy arms ammunition. Late-war assault groups had ridiculous numbers of guns to support relatively small groups of infantry. The concept of fire superiority allowing maneuver was fully understood by the competent Soviet commanders at the end of the war. This is also one reason why the 45mm gun was kept in service for so long past its sell-by date as an ATG. And this was of course the reason why they adopted the German assault gun idea, and implemented it with a vengeance. There is nothing like a 152mm gun in a tracked armoured enclosure to convince a German bunker that the game is up.