Andreas

The mission of the picket line is to make the attacker to believe that the frontline is fully manned before the barrage begins. Once the barrage begins, it usually lasts as long as was planned in the first place. </font>

The way I first read this was that they preferred having the trench full of their own soldiers before bombarding the hell out of... </font>

I think this happened to some degree during Bagration. I also seem to recall that during L'vov Sandomierz part of the barrage was cancelled. I check that later. I can imagine it happened a lot in 1942/3. I think this pulling the defenders back was quite normal (and to a degree sensible) practice, in order to not expose the forward troops to the losses reported in the AARs I posted above. When the Soviets cottoned on to it, they set up these initial attacks referred to above, in order to: a) seize the trench before the Germans got back into it avoid wasting the barrage on an empty trench What has me surprised is that some in 15.ID's divisional HQ seemed to believe the initial attack was it.

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The Germans had special forces from the Brandenburger Division operating in the med. This does sound like the stuff they would have been trained for. Quick googling found nothing on it though. It could also just be confusion, sounds from the report above that there was enough confusion to go round for mistaking a forward detachment suddenly appearing for paras.

Okay Ruthless, so I am cherrypicking. The four operations I mentioned caused the Germans at least 1-1.5 million irrecoverable losses (i.e. wounded are extra) so >10% of their military losses in the war, but hey, guess they can't have been that important. They happened concurrently with the Falaise pocket, where the W.A. managed to ensnare a wooping 40,000 Germans, while letting the bulk escape over the Seine to fight another day. So, since my argument is not good enough for you, how about we use yours? Let's see. US Army performance. Well, I think the Louisiana maneuvers were a bit of a shambles, right? And the Rapido crossings - phew, better not mention those. Kasserine - oh dear, that was an embarassment, eh? Oh well, clearly that indicates that in 1945 they would struggle to beat the Albanian army. So, let's move on to the Pommies. Did rather get their rear end kicked in Belgium 1940, n'est-ce pas? And the early desert war against the Germans is at best a draw, being extremely generous. Then we have Cassino (actually, there is enough idiocy to go round at Cassino to have a big share reserved for the US Army too). Oh dear oh dear. Clearly based on this, in 1945 the British would not be able to hold a candle to the South Uppsala anti-Nazi league when it comes to beating the Wehrmacht. Well, there are always the French. Woops, 1940 again. Best leave it at that. Ah, but air-power will handle the Red Army. Err no it won't. I mean, just look at the losses the RAF took in the Nuremberg raid, or the USAAF in attacking Schweinfurt? Everybody knows anyway that in 1940 the bombers had trouble hitting a target the size of Berlin. Clearly air power will not rescue the W.A. So, but at least strategically it is clear that the US will get lots of kit across the ocean. Well, no. Operation DRUMBEAT showed the US to be incapable of protecting their shipping outside Miami, let alone anywhere else. Shipping losses in 1942 were so bad, it just defies believe that the US got their invasion force across by mid-1944. Cor blimey guv, doesn't look good for the W.A. at all, now does it? I mean, looking at all this, it rather surprising they managed to get to the Reich, now isn't it? If that all strikes you as ridiculous, that's because it is. Just as your continued insistence to evaluate the Red Army of 1945 by analysing their performance in 1941/2. You say you have studied the Red Army performance in the war. It appears to me that you stopped doing so when 1943 came around. You asked a clear question about advance rates, and you got a clear answer, but it is equally clear to me that you don't like it, otherwise you would not come back to this ridiculous comparison with 1941, and the repeat comment that I am cherrypicking. As for me exaggerating the Red Army performance - I am not making this stuff up. There are history books in which you can read up on it if you feel inclined to do so. I quoted two of them, but here are a few more for German speakers: Kissel, Hans 'Die Katastrophe in Rumänien 1944' Magenheimer, Heinz 'Die Abwehrschlacht an der Weichsel 1945' Some interesting single actions: Kissel, Hans 'Vom Dnjepr zum Dnjestr - Rückzugskämpfe des Grenadierregiments 683 9.3. - 12.4. 1944' Fricke, Gerd 'Fester Platz Tarnopol 1944' Hoffmann, Dieter 'Die Magedburger Division' about the 13.PD which was destroyed in Romania 1944. Then of course there are the works by Glantz, of which I recommend to the sceptics the Art of War symposium transcripts which involved a lot of former German officers. As for Korea, yeah that performance of the US trained Korean forces and the US forces stationed there really inspired confidence when the North Koreans jumped across the border. Holding on to the Pusan perimeter was a masterful success of a military operation. Also the foresight of the US Army, to stick to the old Bazooka model really tells you how seriously the US Army took to learning lessons from the war.

Me too - it is almost as if they are taunting them.

Ruthless, I know you as a bit more clued up than that. Which Red Army would the W.A. be fighting in 1945, that of 1945, or that of 1941? Answers on a postcard, but please stop being ridiculous.

Can you explain please? As an add-on to my previous post. Bagration, Iassy-Kishinyev and the Vistula Oder operation did emphatically not happen against a 'badly battered German army'. The same German army that was given a vicious kicking by the Red Army in the east was giving the W.A. a very hard time in Italy and France in June (and indeed defeated them at Monte Cassino two times earlier in the year, while hemming them into the Anzio bridgehead for four months), beat Market-Garden in September, and launched the Ardennes offensive in December. So by that token, all the W.A. successes in 1944 were also achieved against a badly battered and by that time small German army.

100 miles were done in ~3 days on a regular basis during advance operations in late war. 2 weeks in the Vistula Oder operation in January to advance 500km. Roughly the same rate during Iassy-Kishinyev in August 1944. About 3 weeks to move 5-600km during Bagration. I can think of one time the W.A. achieved these advance rates against an unbeaten foe, and that was for a few days in late August/early September 1944 in France. So, the answer to 'how many months did it take the Red Army to advance 100 miles?' is 0.1. 2 weeks to take Berlin - an advance of 70 km, including an encirclement of half of 9th Army (~100k men give or take inside the cauldron I would guess) followed by a wide encirclement and then reduction of a city of 3-4 million inhabitants that was fiercely defended. There simply is no comparison for this for the W.A. because they never had to deal with this sort of military challenge. I very strongly recommend Christopher Duffy's 'Red Storm on the Reich' and Paul Adair's 'Hitler's greatest defeat' as reading matter. The former deals with the various operations in January to March 1945 in what was then east Germany and Poland, the latter deals with Bagration.

Last piece, the view from the divisional CP. Finally, the view from the gunners of 15.ID:

Referring to the fact that the Abbey itself was not fought over. The Poles occupied it with no resistance after the Fallschirmjaeger moved out. What was fought over was the hill that the Abbey stood on. I.e. there was no fighting in the ruins of the Abbey. As I indicated, it is nitpicking.

In a book I am currently reading, he appendices contain some description of the initial stages of the Iassy-Kishinjev operation. The book is 'Die Katastrophe in Rumänien' bei Hans Kissel. Kissel was a regimental commander during the retreat battles from the Dnepr into Romania, and then became head of the Volkssturm. He has written a few books, usually available only as OOPs in German. The following is the experience of 15. ID, part of XXX.AK of (reconstituted) 6.Armee. It was facing the Soviet bridgehead at Tiraspol from which 3rd Ukrainian Front would break out. To its right was the 306.ID, the fate of which is described in another thread I started a while 'How to attack like a Soviet rifle corps'. To its left it connected to 257.ID, the old division of Kissel, who at this time had been posted away. 15.ID was pretty much up to strength, with an 'Ist' of 336 officers, 12,697 NCOs/ORs, 6,355 horses and 419 motor vehicles. It was reinforced by heavy artillery battery 414 and the I.Abteilung of AR 51, which may have been a 15cm sFH battalion. (Text in brackets by me) A comment on the last paragraph. While it sounds as if the division had managed to hold its own, what had really happened was that it was on the northern flank of the Soviet breakthrough, attacked by 68th Rifle Corps. 257.ID to the north of it was not attacked. Below the report by a battalion commander in the southern position of 15.ID. The Ursoaia position was too far north to interfere with the Soviet breakthrough by 66th Rifle Corps and 6th Guards Rifle Corps sectors that I have described in that other thread. At the evening of the 20th August, south of 15.ID a giant hole had opened. Within it stood the remnants of 306.ID, and 13.PD, unable to plug it. 15.ID was encircled with the rest of 6th Army. Small elements of it may have managed to break out, and it was reformed in Hungary in October. [ October 18, 2003, 01:07 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

That is TO&E or real average?

I doubt it is worth that much. Is it something the Brits put into their tea that makes them such fearsome fighters, compared to the US soldiers? All this nationalistic analysis is just so much rubbish. The numerically superior, fearsome and fanatical Zulus at Rorke's Drift were not victorious despite all three of these attributes. Yet there are still people around who think that if e.g. the Waffen-SS had fought in Africa in 1941, their fanatical fighting ability would have defeated the Commonwealth there and then. Bollocks.

How much they add to my knowledge. You should try using that as a yardstick. Since I already knew the reasons, I did not need the programme to tell me about them.

Yawn. I did say it is superb oral history. That is not the same as a superb documentary. If your English is not up to understanding the difference, there are three options: a) improve it stick to German message forums c) stop commenting on things you don't understand Others have pointed out the main reasons why so few survived.

Don't get Berli started The soldiers who did the job were Fallschirmjaeger, not Waffen-SS.

Marlow, the tank/SP number does not make sens I think. In May 45 there were about ~10,000 tanks with the frontline troops of the Red Army, but another 25,000 or so in the depots. As for divisional numbers, I think it is around 450, which are usually half the size of those of the W.A. (remember that by this time especially Brit/Canadian units may well be much understrength though). Also, you don't address the teeth vs. tail issue. US/UK divisions were very tail heavy, and did not really bring that much more infantry to the party than a Soviet division of half the size. They had a lot more artillery to be sure, but that is just a question of where this was located (the W.A. did not have artillery divisions). The logistical tail of W.A. divisions was a lot bigger than that of either the Germans or the Red Army. The figures for the share of the tail I have read in a study on Cassino claim the relation was 10% for the Germans late in the war (although that seems very low), 20% for the Soviets and 35% for the W.A. @Ruthless late in the war the Soviets tended to just push the Germans around. You can not judge the Red Army of 1945 based on its performance in 1943 anymore than you can judge the US Army in Europe in 1945 based on its performance at Kasserine Pass.

It is extremely good. Probably the only chance many of us have to see and hear veterans of the 1942 summer campaign from both sides. That female Russian medic with all her medals was who impressed me most, together with the German private who got out on one of the last flights because a wounded officer gave up his space for him. Superb oral history. If only they had gotten some Romanians in there as well.

As for comparing the German and the Soviet supply situation. The Red Army had a much much better grasp on their supply lines than the Germans ever had. They very speedily relayed the (completely destroyed) railway lines, and after the Vistula-Oder operation started creating pipeline battalions capable of laying 30km of fuel pipes per day, IIRC. The crappy roads are a complete non-issue. All important transport went via rail. The allied airpower had struggled knocking out the few rail lines in Italy in 1944, so I am a bit hesitant to ascribe to them the absolute power to do just that in central Europe in 1945/6. And just to hammer it in - air power does not win wars. Did not then, does not now. If all one can come up with is that air power would have saved the day for the W.A., I suggest further study of the impact of airpower in WW2.

Sorry dalem, I must have missed out on the history books that tell how the war ended on the 20th of June 1944. Can you give me the links on Amazon to buy them? Cheers! </font>

Shouldn't that be Herr Picklehaube, you Salt wannabe? </font>

Sorry dalem, I must have missed out on the history books that tell how the war ended on the 20th of June 1944. Can you give me the links on Amazon to buy them? Cheers!

I would not say 'never'. They did have to, but most of the time it would be against relatively disorganised defense, because they would attempt to seize it from the march to establish bridgeheads while they go. Certainly the major rivers I can think of immediately (Oder - Berlin operation, Vistula - Vistula/Oder operation, Dnestr - Iassy-Kishinov operation, Dnepr - err...) were crossed that way. I think they realised quite early on that being held up on one side of the river while the enemy is across it is not a very good situation if you want to continue attacking.