Rattler

The tourney 2003 scenario page 2003 Scenarios is ready again for those who like to do some training or sandboxing, you can either go to the details pages from there or download the files for either Mac or PC (tourney will be played from saved game files). I have the 3rd scenario for the elimination round uploaded, a SOF TF NIght Raid into Honduras, this promises to be a real killer...:-> We had a lot of fun during preparation of this one, great sandboxing events and you might want to check it out for out-of-tourney 2p-netgames or PBM two-leg games. I plan to turn this one into a CPX once the Elimination Round has finished (of cause with giving RED some more air to breathe...:->) Check out the description at SOF Night Raid page , you can dl all necessary files from there as well (incl an INTEL overlay for US with all RED positions and movement directions). Attn Wazza/Henk: A lot has changed, so best read the rules again...:-> Also, the corrected 2nd scenario is availiable again, check it out at Scenario 2 page , makes for some nice netgames or PBMs as well. Enjoy, Rattler

As I havent heard a lot from this forum (but a lot from others) with regard to the ROLL CALL psot from a few days ago I will put one up with a more clear subject line (sic), The last TacOps tourneys have (I think) been a success as far as interest and participation is concerned, now I have started to develop the background for the upcoming TacOps Tourney (TT) 2003. Here is what I am planning to do, and how: - As we are now in v4 with netplay as one of the features, and as I have always seen the PBM tourneys as a source for learning for all the community and as a means to broaden the base of potential players by encouraging newbies to participate I intend this time not to run a dedicated PBM tourney but one that tests the overall capabilities of players and could be truly called a TacOps Tourney (w/o the PBM bit, making full use of what v4 offers. - This said, I want to run a v4 tourney in two stages: Stage 1, an elimination round with a number of short and heavily unbalanced scenarios (20-30 game minutes) with a two-legs approach (each player plays each side once) and a point system to evaluate performance ( a bit like in 1999, for details how we ran it that year see Matts 1999 Game Plan , a certain precentage of players with the highest point rating then go to the next stage. This stage 1 will be played in two-players netgame mode. The advantage of this approach is a) that tourney time is reduced and that we can have live observers that could take part in the learning and fun, finally c) that this might help to draw a bigger crowd of up-to-now-lurkers to have a go at netgaming... - The qualified players that enter stage 2 will then hash through some (balanced) PBM scenarios (60 min+) to evaluate two finalists (spectators will have to resort to game replay) who will then play the final game in a multiplayer environment with a referee as host and (hopefully) with spectators. - Scenarios for the elimination round (stage 1) will test basic player capabilities such as coordination between differnet force types (inf, vehicles, helos, arty), timely execution of plans, defense on the move, extraction of friendly units in hostile environment, engineering exercises, etc.) - First Scenarios are coming in, check out the Tourney 2003 Scenario Page - Scenarios for Stage 2 will evaluate complex player capabilities such as the combination of all stage 1 scenario challenges <g> Now, to allow me to plan with some background I need to have a rough idea how many participants I have to plan for, so here a (yet non-commiting) ROLL CALL (so far from other forums 26 potential players have shown interest, first 2p-netgame playtesting with 2 scenarios has been completed this weekend): EVERYBODY BASICALLY INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN THIS TOURNEY PLEASE SPEAK UP! Please send a mail to tourney2003@eventfoto.com to let me iknow your level of interest. TIA Rattler

hmm... as I have not had any responses to my ROLL CALL post which invites for the tourney I assume I should put up a msg with TacOps Tourney in the subject line... Fact is, its taking shape, ppl interested should follow the developments checking out TacOps Tourney 2003 Main page from time to time. Tourney start is expected in 1 to 2 weeks roughly (rather a little later dpenidng on my RL work situation)

I ***hate*** forums, much prefer lists: After one hour of carefully phrasing my responses to this very interesting and informative questionaire I tried to add a smiley and got rewarded with the message "Thanks for logging in, sit tight...etc". and was brought to an empty reply window again. No trace of my posting anywhere... I wont spend another hour on this, sorry.

Hi, Folks! The last TacOps tourneys have (I think) been a success as far as interest and participation is concerned, now I have started to develop the background for the upcoming TacOps Tourney (TT) 2003. Here is what I am planning to do, and why, comments appreciated (this is all still very open for discussion and changes, let me know what you think, either over the list or privately to <tourney2003@eventfoto.com>): - As we are now in v4 with netplay as one of the features, and as I have always seen the PBM tourneys as a source for learning for all the community and as a means to broaden the base of potential players by encouraging newbies to participate I intend this time not to run a dedicated PBM tourney but one that tests the overall capabilities of players and could be truly called a TacOps Tourney (w/o the PBM bit, making full use of what v4 offers. - This said, I want to run a v4 tourney in two stages: Stage 1, an elimination round with a number of short and heavily unbalanced scenarios (20-30 game minutes) with a two-legs approach (each player plays each side once) and a point system to evaluate performance ( a bit like in 1999, for details how we ran it that year see http://battlefront.com/resources/tacops/HQ/text/tournament/mattsgp.html, a certain precentage of players with the highest point rating then go to the next stage. This stage 1 will be played in either two-players netgame or by multiplayers netgame (2 players + host) mode. The advantage of this approach is a) that tourney time is reduced and that we can have live observers that could take part in the learning and fun, finally c) that this might help to draw a bigger crowd of up-to-now-lurkers to have a go at netgaming... - The qualified players that enter stage 2 will then hash through some (balanced) PBM scenarios (60 min+) to evaluate two finalists (spectators will have to resort to game replay) who will then play the final game in a multiplayer environment with a referee as host and (hopefully) with spectators. - Scenarios for the elimination round (stage 1) will test basic player capabilities such as coordination between differnet force types (inf, vehicles, helos, arty), timely execution of plans, defense on the move, extraction of friendly units in hostile environment, engineering exercises, etc.) - Scenarios for Stage 2 will evaluate complex player capabilities such as the combination of all stage 1 scenario challenges <g> Now, to allow me to plan with some background I need to have a rough idea how many participants I have to plan for, so here a (yet non-commiting) ROLL CALL: EVERYBODY BASICALLY INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN THIS TOURNEY PLEASE SPEAK UP! TIA Rattler

A good page to visit is the TacOps Scenario headquarters page maintained by Rikki Tikki, it is at: TacOps HQ Page

Hub closed the website as he obviously was insulted by someone with regard to this work. Anyone having an archive of some of the files, please notify me, I am trying to get as much together as possible from this site and post it.

Oops, ment to add: With regards to the often discussed vulerability of helos in TO: Seems TO models the use of helos quite nicely, sending out 33 apaches ahead of my attack force overflying suspected enemy positions and engaging in small arms range would have me lose quite a few in the game as well, well done Major!

henk, sorry to contradict, thats a mis-conception (I had fallen into this trap before myself): Running 1 trun games still allows the same type of cheating, but just to *one* player, and to this one player in every turn. My way to deal with 2nd turn cheaters (I have been suspecting this twice in my careere as well) was to make use of my "knowledge" w/o alerting then enemy to run fake moves, lay low, etc and use the other turn for my truee moves. This way my opponent actually had more probs than gains from his gamey tactics "optimizing" the 2nd turn.

From another Forum: Chop the Chopper The Army's Apache attack-helicopter had a bad war. By Fred Kaplan Posted Wednesday, April 23, 2003, at 3:42 PM PT Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is gearing up for his next war—not with the Syrians or the North Koreans but with the hidebound generals of the U.S. Army. These are the generals who criticized Rumsfeld's battle plan while Gulf War II was still raging and who beat back his efforts, over the past few years, to "transform" the Army into a lighter, lither fighting force. With Rumsfeld's star rising and the generals' tarnished, he can be expected to mount a new offensive on their bureaucratic turf at the first opportunity. He might want to start by junking the Army's attack helicopter. The current version, the <A HREF="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ah-64d.htm">AH-64D Apache Longbow</A> , is in many ways a vast improvement over earlier models, but it is still too dangerous to the pilots who fly it and not dangerous enough to the enemy it's designed to attack. The U.S. Army's only disastrous operation in Gulf War II (at least the only one we know about) took place on <A HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A29946-2003Apr4&notFound=true">March 24</A>, when 33 Apache helicopters were ordered to move out ahead of the 3rd Infantry Division and to attack an Iraqi Republican Guard regiment in the suburbs of Karbala. Meeting heavy fire from small arms and shoulder-mounted rocket-propelled grenades, the Apaches flew back to base, 30 of them shot up, several disablingly so. One helicopter was shot down in the encounter, and its two crewmen were taken prisoner. After that incident, Apaches were used more cautiously—on reconnaissance missions or for firing at small groups of armored vehicles. Rarely if ever did they penetrate far beyond the front line of battle, out in front of U.S. ground troops or without the escort of fixed-wing aircraft flying far overhead. Shortly afterward, when a speech by Saddam Hussein was broadcast over Iraqi television, some armchair commentators observed that the speech was probably live, or at least very recent, because he referred to the downing of an Apache. In fact, that proved nothing. If one thing could have been predicted before the war started, it was that an Apache would be shot down. Last year, during the Afghanistan war, seven Apaches were flown in to attack Taliban fighters as part of Operation Anaconda. They all got shot up, again by RPGs and machine-gun fire. None crashed, but five were so damaged they were declared "non-mission-capable"—in other words, unable to go back into combat without extensive repair—after the first day. In the 1999 air war over Kosovo, 24 Apache helicopters were transported to the allied base in Albania. Their arrival was anticipated by many officers and analysts as a turning point in the war. Yet, within days, two choppers crashed during training exercises. Commanders decided not to send any of them into battle; the risk of losing them to Serbian surface-to-air missiles was considered too great. Attack helicopters have always been troublesome. The U.S. Army lost over 5,000 helicopters in the Vietnam War. (Nor is this a uniquely American problem: The Soviets lost hundreds of Hind helicopters to mujahideen firing shoulder-launched Stinger missiles during their Afghan venture.) This sorry chronicle raises the question: Why did the Army build helicopters in the first place? It all goes back to the end of World War II, when the Air Force became an independent service of the armed forces. (Before and during the war, air forces were a branch of the Army.) In its first few years of independence, the Air Force became involved in tumultuous budget battles with the other services. Finally, in April 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal called a meeting with the service chiefs in Key West, Fla., where they divvied up "roles and missions." The emerging document was called the <A HREF="http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/armyxxiav.htm">Key West Agreement</A> . An informal understanding that grew out of the accord was that the Air Force (and, to an extent, the Navy) would have a monopoly on fixed-wing combat planes. The Key West Agreement specified that one mission of the Air Force would be close air support for Army troops on the battlefield. However, it soon became clear that the Air Force generals—enamored of the A-bomb and then the H-bomb— had no interest in this task. To their minds, the next war would be a nuclear war. Armies would play no serious role, so why divert airplanes to giving them cover? The Army realized it would have to provide its own air support. Blocked from building its own fixed-wing planes, it built rotary-wing planes (or, in civilian parlance, helicopters). And it built thousands of them. During the Vietnam War, the Air Force's reluctance—at times refusal—to provide close air support became a grave problem. Congressional hearings were held on the lack of any airplane dedicated to that mission. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara briefly brought a wing of the Navy's late-'40s A-1 fighter bombers out of mothballs to take up some of the slack. Finally, the Army got bold and began research and development on a hybrid aircraft, a bizarre-looking fixed-wing helicopter called the Cheyenne. McNamara killed the Cheyenne before it got off the ground, but meanwhile, an Air Force general named Richard Yudkin was furious about the Army's maneuver. He saw it as an infringement of the Key West Agreement and a raid on the Air Force's share of the budget. In response, he initiated the Air Force's very first dedicated close-air-support attack plane called the A-X, which grew into the A-10. Yudkin was a bit of a rebel within the Air Force. The establishment generals (who, by the early '70s, were still dominated by the nuclear-bomber crowd) hated the idea of the A-X for the same reason they hated the close-air-support mission: It had nothing to do with the Air Force's bigger, more glamorous roles. Yudkin couldn't even get the Air Force R &D directorate to work on the project, so he set up his own staff to do it. The A-10 rolled onto the tarmac in 1976. The brass still hated the thing. It survived only because of pork-barrel politics—it was built by Fairchild Industries in Bethpage, Long Island, home district of Rep. Joseph Addabbo, who was chairman of the House appropriations' defense subcommittee. The plan was to build 850 of the planes. By 1986, when Addabbo died, Fairchild had built just 627, and the program came to a crashing halt. No more A-10s were ordered, and 197 of those in existence were transferred to the Air National Guard and allowed to rot. When the first Gulf War was being planned in 1990, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the chief of U.S. Central Command, had to fight the Air Force to send over a mere 174 A-10s for his use. Yet in the course of the war, those A-10s knocked out roughly half of the 1,700 Iraqi tanks that were destroyed from the air, as well as several hundred armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery guns. They also conducted search and rescue operations, blew up roads and bridges, and hunted for Scuds. Even the Air Force brass had to admit the planes had done a good job, and they kept them in the fleet. (They had planned on replacing all of them with modified F-16s.) Though the statistics aren't yet in, the A-10s seemed to do well in Gulf War II, especially now that the Army, Air Force, and Marines are more inclined to <A HREF="http://slate.msn.com/id/2081388/">coordinate</A> their battle plans. The <A HREF="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/a-10.htm">A-10</A> is an unsightly, lumbering beast of a plane. (It's commonly called the Warthog.) It flies low and slow, but its cockpit is made of titanium; it can be shot up very badly, all over, and still not crash. It was the only plane that the Desert Storm air commanders dared fly at under 15,000 feet. Its GAU-8 gun can fire 3,900 rounds of 30 mm armor-piercing ammo per minute. It can also fire Maverick air-to-ground missiles. So here's a suggestion for Donald Rumsfeld: Deep-six the Apache, and restart the A-10.

Thanks! For those interested in CPXing with TacOps: A quite interesting CPX AAR collection can be found at CPX_AARs. NOTE that the earlier one of those still refer to v2 and v3 TacOps CPXes which where played without netgame capabilities using plotting print maps and text msg exchanges (the actual TacOps game was only run on the umpires machine) and imagine the thickness of f-o-w.

Hi, Folks! We still could accomodate 2-3 more players for the multiplayer net Easter Sunday CPX to be held on IRC, 1600 GMT. The CPX features a small BLUE Cav Task Force (2 coys- M2 + 2 coys M1s, attached engineers) with a functioning IVIS installed, supported by Cobras, plenty of Arty and Rocket Arty, UAVs, Satellite Imagery, CBR and under Air Superiority attacking over map 780 to take the town and airport in the SW. Those objectives are defended by an oppenent much superior in numbers (2MR BNs+ 1 Tank BN, plenty of arty) but technologically inferior (few thermals, sluggish comms) in an obstacle rich environment. So far following players have signed up (in no special order): BLUE: - Kenneth Chan <khwchan888@hotmail.com> - Matt Fortino <vze24sz4@verizon.net> - Tom Schaub <tom_and_sue_schaub@mac.com> RED: - jim holman <siguiriya@attbi.com> - Cornel Bruecher <cornel.bruecher@t-online.de> - Bernard Cousin <bcousin@irisa.fr> - Alex Ingles <a.ingles@abertay.ac.uk> - as a reserve (but hopefully playing): Brian Rock <brian.rock@pacific.net.au> So, if you are looking for some fun, please speak up and email me directly at rattler@eventfoto.com Rattler

I am running a CPX this Easter sunday revolving around comms differences between technologically far apart oppnents and the impacts. More details, or want to play, email me at <rattler@eventfoto.com>

sorry grab, just now saw your message, we surely could have needed another player... (see AAR section). Maybe next time also check on the tacOps list as this is the traditional place to recruit for CPXes (checking and feeding the Battlefront.com forum means double work for most of us) Rattler

I am a big time of time limits as well, my problem is to find out what thed appropriate setting are for a given situation: Take this CPX: I had the arty, those are units that (require( attention every turn, aslo are so vital they are the first itmen on the list. Next came the helos, in the role used as a relive package they, too, require attention every turn. Then come the combat units, they are third on the list and you can give them orders ahead and only have to attend every now and then 8or you give them one order: Move East! by drag selecting all over a certain part of the map). Last there are the arty observers and the logistics units, those you will only have to check out every five turns or so as the have fairly long term orders. Still, in the one minutes orders time it was hard already to make it to the helos, only now and then I made it to the combat units. Like this then any ccordination is lost quickly and the game falling apart. As an umpire I try to sense such moments and give players a break ( a little more time every now and then to allow everybody to take a breath, regroup mentally and the smokers to light). I think there is a balance required between forcing the players to prioritize and think ahead and giving so little time that you end up in a simple shootout w/o much tactics left. My 2c Rattler

no prob, Jingo! So fra only 4 players have showed up, but we need at least 8 to make this fun. So there is a high chance I might postpone it if we dont get the players together. Rattler

What makes a CPX a good CPX? IMO the fun of CPXes comes from 5 areas, The Planning, Team Ops, The Battle , the Scenario and the Lessons Learned. In four of those five aspects yesterdays CPX - umpired by Slagg with tech help from Redwolf - excelled, making it one of the best CPXes I ever had the chance to participate in: I was the BLUEFOR XO during the planning stage of our operations, and as our CO John Osborne had to drop out on short notice due to RL quests, I then assumed command and acted as CO during the battle. 1. Planning We got a good headstart with the planing phase to the actual CPX, as about two weeks before that stage recruiting had finished and we got our briefing of the umpire. The scenario would be played out on map 541 would see Blue with a mixed US/German formation vs Red as an international terrorist organisation with unknown OOB. The briefing was kind of sparse, it had some background on the terrorist organisation named "F4T", an OOB, two spotreps from SOF teams and a few satellite photos: >Initial unit setup will be limited to the following area: >No further East than Easting 03 >No further South than Northing 07 > >High probablility of Air support >Artillery will have access to HE, ICM, and Smoke rounds > >Mission Objective: To capture the OPFOR HQ (location: vicinity >of Grid 1103) with minimal loss of life/equipment. Prevent destruction of >civilian infrastructure. Ensure safety of all native civilians. Clear >towns Einstadt, Zweistadt, and Sechstadt of all OPFOR units. > >Please find attached the OOB for your force. Barring any flashes of genius, >this is it. I've also attached the OOB for 'My' Civilians. Don't hurt em, >they won't like it. My giving you the Green OOB equates to intel on the >region, satellite images, etc. > >OOB >2 x Armored Panzer Bns (4 x coys) a total of 116 panzers. >Recon of 12 M3 Bradleys w/12 scout teams >4 x UH60s >1 x 155 SP Battery >12 x Mortar carriers >a German PzGr Company. The satellite photos were an interesting twist to bear in mind for future scenarios, umpire had worked on them in Photoshop to make them "low quality", and they always showed only a little area which we had to puzzle together to find out what they shwoed where. Take a look at them at: cpxpix If you cklick on them it will show what they looked like originally, the thumbnails are bigger...:-> This is the sat shot of the objective in 1103, the F4T Headquarters, nice twist the blinding of the lens by the lights...:->: cpxpix The SpotReps (NOTE: coordinates are OFF MAP): SPOTREP (Source: Seal Team Bravo OP) 1700 hrs Grid 027043 4 Leopard tanks 2A6s 1 122mm SP Howitzer, Orientation North Heading South towards Einstadt, lights out Continuing to observe Out SPOTREP (Source: Ranger Team Kilo OP) 0230 hrs Grid 029021 2 BMP1 2 Trucks, .5mt 4 Trucks, 6mt 4 Trucks, Tanks Transports, trailers unloaded Heading West, lights out Continuing to observe Out So, we were set, we did not know much but stated evaluating rapidly. First, we found out that the map in use, 541, has some very strange uncharted terrain features, rough in seemingly clear terrain and clear woods, parts that were shown as roads were in fact no roads but rough 2. So, first thing we set out to produce an overlay with the correct terrain and BattlePositions numbered all over the map which during preparation and battle proved extremely useful, making comms a piece of cake. For a look at it: cpxpix, the parts with the strange terrain are marked with arrows and encircled (Alex?) In conference with the CO we established the problems we were facing with the intel and the OOB (enemy was known to have Leos 2A6 and BMP1s). - W/o an idea about enemy ADA we cannot set up a rapid strike package to capture the HQ (it says "capture", not "destroy") w/o running the risk of a "Blackhawk down" situation. - Enemy Tanks cannot be attacked from front or side by the major part of our force, so knowing where they are is vital. - Our Force seems fairly big and sluggish for such an Operation, we have a lot of armor but almost no manpower (12 inf teams). - We are lacking infantry and troops with telescopic aided sights (snipers or recon) to take out enemy OPs and do proper recon So, a list of requests was made to the umpire (see: incl the answers) > >> Slaggg, > >> Request more info in Sat image data revealing ADA capabilities. Also sat image on F4T HQ at grid 1103. > > the one .bmp file I sent, "Sat Image 3", is a shot of the HQ. Info on ADA on the way > >> > >> Request all info from intel sources on police and civilian data to find > >out > >> where possibly enemy positions are located. > > On the way. > >> > >> Request grid location of the OP Teams and if we can control them. > > Negative. OP teams will extract prior to start of operation > >> > >> As we are confined in a small area at between grids 03 Easting and 07 > >> Northing. Are we to assumed that the town of Zweistadt is clear of enemy > >> forces or are we entering at that grid location and have to clear that > >town? > > It is 'assumed' that it Zweistadt is clear. Confirmation required. Then, a new OOb was submitted, now with a mixed mech (M2s) and armor force, and the VCs specified (we had asked what "Capture" meant vs. "Destroy": > I've also attached the OOB for 'My' Civilians. Don't hurt em, >they won't >like it. My giving you the Green OOB equates to intel on the >region, >satellite images, etc. > >The win conditions for Blue are: >>The capture of the enemy HQ vic 1103 within 120 minutes. >That is, if you've eliminated all enemy units from within 2km of the HQ, and >your force surrounding the HQ seems sufficient to repel any enemy efforts to >regain the HQ. >The destruction of the enemy HQ won't result in a win. If that happens the >win condition will change to whoever beats the snot out of the other side >wins. On this basis we did the planning. Right from the start we had figured, that sporting Leos 2A6 for the terrorists would be an expensive experience, while very strong and impenentrable by our tanks from side or front the system is around 20 Millions $ each, so, even with funds like Al Chaida (300 Millions) this would only mean max BN strength against us, probably with a lot of inf ATGMs. Of the BMP1s we were not so afraid, as we outreached them with our M2s and their saggers could not take our M1s from the front, our few leos not even fro the side. Still, a formidable opponent when you dont know anything about deployment or intentions (enemy could be everywhere; we figured there must be some reason for all the background info on the recent bombings in Germany and expected either bombs in the cities or even ABC type of weapons from the terrorists, the latter was later excluded by umpire) After a week a plan had formed: You can see the detailed OPORD, under cpxpix , a graphic showing the plan as a sum of our overlays under cpxpix Basically, we decided to put the focuzs on recon to find out about enemy deployment and strenght and only strike at the HQ at the very last moment when enemy could not react anymore. For this purpose we had redistributed our forces so that they formed three Task Forces, one for the NOrth (TF1), one for the South (TF2) and one, around the Germans for the center (TF GE). Thos ef orces were screened and lead in terain by two recon forces (Recon 1 and 2), small strike forces all bythemselves. The idea was to advance TF1 and TF2 stealthily to a point where they could start a charge against the HQ at 1103 until 0830, using the TF GE to "dance around the battlefield and distract and confuse enemy as to our intentions and their strength. About 48 hours before battle another mission of "untmost importance" was added, thge extraction of some government people that wanted to defect from vic 0501 (Objective B in the plan graphic). At the same time we were told that we could get a bigger set up box (AA 2 on the plan graphic) and were ensured enemy had no LOS into it at game start. The latter allowed us to assume areas clear of enemy that we had not before, which allowed us to speed up deployment a lot and to shift the entire center operation farther to the EAST, which is how we proceeded in the game. Here is the associated FRAGO that changed the plan according to the new situation: cpxpix 2. Team Play There is nothing more rewarding during the plannig stage and during battle in a CPX than to be part of a great team meet that comments vividly on everything and is devoted and high spirited during the whole process. Well, Blue this time definitely had such a team: CO was John Osborne from US, TF 1 commander was Wazza from Australia, TF 2 commander was Berny from France, TF GE commander was Wolfi from Germany, Recon1 commander was GoatChomper from US, Recon2 commander was Jeff intitially, when he had to leave due to RL reasons, Jingo from the US took over, I had the Support. Everybody in this team went to or even beyond his limits, in planning as well as in sandboxing and then later in battle where everybody performed flawless. As an example I want to mention Jingo here, who, a newbie to TacOps, IRC and CPXing joined the team late, but with a lot of effort got to speed really quick through a truely steep learning curve and did an extraordinary job commanding his unit in the battle. 3. The Battle After the intial 4 hours of tech problems redwolf jumped in to host and the game finally got underway (big applause to redwolf here, a very smoothe operator with such a monster of 14 players!!!). By this time we had lost one player, Recon1 commander, so I took the unit together with the arty. Here I have to say that it is probably much better for a CO to have none or little units only, as he should be IMO have time to keep in the big picture and take the time to explain it to the players to adjust the overall friendly situation. In our case, because the team knew what to do and everybody needed little guidance fro some minor adjustments, also because communications went smoothe, concise and effective, I just about managed (40 units alltogether), but was pushed to the limit of my attention envelope which later in the game led to not having the supply packs close enough to my mortar units in time. (TF GE had no certain course and had to react to the things we encountered which required a lot of decisions, so Wolf and I got on the telephone between turns to clarify new intentions, etc. This worked well, Wolfgang did an outstanding job). Once the batlle got off, it was real super fun, very interesting, a nice buildup and a full timeworthy experience. The decision to push the center action farther EAST right from start was worth gold, within minutes TF GE reached Objective B and started extracting them, with only marginal losses, first mission complete. Recon 1 and TF 2 cooperated perfectly, recon 1 had all critical OPs cleared precisely at the time when this TF had to cross a hill on around Easting 05 (BP93/94) and in the center and north Recon 2 was ploughing a way to allow TF 1 to advance far EAST w/o being spotted. Problems started when more and more enemy units appeared in the woods vic 0907 (BP8) and we had to start clearing them off bit by bit in a slow apporach by pushing the sniper team of TF1 to where it could gide arty and then hammering away on them. The problem had been anticipated, and while it forced TF 1 to go to defialed an not move, we had planned ample time to clear this critical BP by giving us max 80 minutes to get the job done. Gradually we kept chewing away any red units that appeared there and at around minute 50 had achieved it almost clear. TF2, otoh, was not so lucky. Berny had been frequently disconnected (I think he was more time disconnected than playing) and had little control over what was happening in detail. So, it occured that his units started firing repeatedly on some inf that was in smokie and not seeing them and so gave away his basic position (we had planned to have the ranges of both TF1 abd 2 to be 500 so this should not happen, but obviously something had gone wrong). Under stress then Berny advanced much too fast with his TF EASTwards, he would have had time enough for a slow sstealthy approach (45 minutes left to make 2.5 km) by stopping his units and extending them into a long column while having the snipers go on foot to where they could find observers (the plan had the TF advance stealthily llike the northern one, pressing that stealth preceded speed) As a result his whole TF got compromised around 08E and came unter a heavy ICM barrage (they go supressed and were in rough terrain, = 1/4 speed, so they could never escape the focus of this attention again). In the second vollea the snipers that had dismounted this moment wer ekilled by ICM and the TFs eyes gone. Also at this moment umpire changed the orders time from 2/1 to 1/2, meaning that Berny did not manage to get control of his huge force and they piled up even more (the first got supressedn and slowed in rough, the later ones advanced unsuppreseed over clear right into the mess). This destroyed TF 2, he had 50% losses within 5 minutes or so. Also, it had compromised the whole plan, as the attack on the HQ was planned to come from two or three axis at the same time in coordination, and now the southern axis got hammered. In this situation, and after confering with my teammates,I decided to charge on the other axis as well to make use of the arty being focussed in the south and try to get TF1 into a good postion before it would have the same fate as the southern With only one minute to order (we had lost another player and everyone had to command between 50 and 70 units) there was no way we could re-group in a coordinated way and follow the plan any further. Because the charge came much earlier as anticipated, arty was not really prepared to support it and went in with low acc and 4 out of 7 batteries out of ammo (no time to get the logpacks to the units at that moment, with 50 units to order and 1 minute orders time). Tis went well for about 4 minutes, but then red arty reacted and focussed on the northern TF as well, precisely in the right moment when it was buched up in the woods. By this time, and with a feeling we could not reach the HQ anymore with minimal losses as ordered, we decided to call it a day. We had been 14 hours in fromt of the computers, and the fun was beginning to get replaced by aches in many parts of my body...:->. In the briefing tunred out that we had not fared too bad in the attack and with our momentum (TF south had regrouped and GE was advanicng strongly in the center) we would have probably made to where we were told the HQ was (only problem: it was not here...) OTOH, Red hade made perfect use3 of its forces and deefended flawless, so it could possibly have been an outcome even worse for us. We had been on the road to victory for quite some time during the game (and feeling it) and had it not been for the bad luck of TF2 and the aprupt change of working conditions upon a team in the attack (= double effort than defense) and overwhelmed already with tasks I am sure we would have won. Even losing, seeing the whole team perform so well and the single elements of the overall force work together so perfectly and with almost no friction (best I have ever seen in a CPX) was an experience in itself, well worth the time. 4. The Scenario To be frank, I think the scenario was, um... disappointing, at least from my POV. I know Slagg put in quite some effort and I am the first to encourage him to go ahead and provide us with more scenarios (In my first two scenarios I goofed bigtime, so I know the feeling), but I cannot help but feel it was flawed and had no inner red thread or theme: - In the debrief we found out we had been up against an MRR. No Leos 2A6, and no BMP1s, btu plenty of BMP2s , T80Us and Leo 2A5s. Now, while I am the first to admit that I had completely forgotten during game to come to a decision what exactly we were facing (we were still in the recon phase when we suddenly had to charge), this simply does not go together with the terrorist organisation we were looking to battle, nor with the spot reports or sat shots we were provided as intel. Slagg argued, well, INTEL must not always be correct, and that surely is true and might make a nice scenario by itself, but then the environment or the VCs should have been diffeent IMO, as we were in a no-win situation against such a force right from start (1.5:1 as attackers vs defenders with 218 inf observers all nicely split up and distributed over the eastern half of the map, we lost more vehicles to inf than to the ICM barrages). What I mean, when setting up a task that a commander cannot win, then either you should give him the means to change that (I had requested snipers for recon, this + arty could have made up, even with less tanks and stuff, might have been very interesting), or you should change the VCs so that e.g. to understand that you cannot win and therefore better withdraw or contain enemy would be the decision to be rewarded. - in the debrief we found out the HQ was nowhere near we had been told or shown on the satellite photo. This means even if we wouldhave reached our objective, we would have been back to square one w/o even knowing where the objective might have been. I dont see the sense in giving such false intel and then keep the VCs at the same level as with correct intel. If such a situation was wanted by the umpire, which would be ok all by itself, then he should e,g, have provided us with means to react to the situation, i.e. by heliborne recon forces in a helo frindly environment (we had helos, but against 9 SAM 16 in the rear where your arty does not reach its suicide to use them) - the intel was presented to us as a sort of puzzle, in bits and pieces, the pictures changed so that you could not get real information (I worked 3 hours in photoshop to make partial force type and strenght identification), the background story about the bombings, etc, this lets you assume as team that you should get the pieces together and form assujmptions based on them (another great idea for a scenario). Of cause we jumped on that and tried it only to find that in the debriefing Slagg said it was just an ficitional story, and not important at all. We, OTOH had been grossly mislead by the way the intel was provided and had e.g. assumed that a force over a BN could not be financed by terrorists... Hmmm. Why provide a not important story, if it is not important? In a CPX (and any other game, I gues) you always assume that the things you are presented with are of importance, and finding out that you devoted time and energy on something not important is a bit of an anti-climax. - When the mission change was announced (which in itself again is ok, did that as well in scenarios) I as acting CO was confronted with contradicting requests by Higher and voiced my concerns: >OTOH, we have no concrete intel about enemy deployment, nor about whether >we can employ our helos w/o have them shot down (for the AAR: Still think >that doesnt fit well with the story with the terrorists being in Germany, >our terrain, as a RL commander I would refuse the job on that basis and >make sure my concerns are noted, especially whith so many conflicting >requests that Higher has: Either you want a job done, or you want to >preserve forces or you want to restrict use of force. All three together, >w/o INTEL, is calling for disaster a la Vietnam, and bound to fail in RL at >least in one aspect, if nt in all three). Slagg answered: >Now you're understanding what I'm attempting to model here. Fine, I like the basic concept, every good novel piles problem after problem on the protagonist and thats what makes them interesting to read. But, if you want to model such a conflicting situation, you should adjust the VCs to it as in a TDG (making the right decisions gets rewarded) or at least try to get a coherent story environment which allows us desktop warriors to get into the situation and react according to the info that you give us, roleplay...( Not sure, if I can make myself understood here, reaching the limits ofmy English here) For example, having to evac the govs was not welcome but something you might expect in RL as in a CPX. Also, the idea that the civilians would turn hostile if they got taken over by red was a neat idea. BUT: We had originally planned to let them go with red (as we had to belive you were in the osuzthern town, much clser to them than we and I did not want to commit piecemeal) and snatch them back on the way out, one of the (I believe) correct decisions I made in the conflicting situation. Point is, it would not have been rewarded had we not been lucky (Also, I think for game balance it would have been intereting to have the civvies go hostile against red after we sntched them) Still, we had fun, and this is probably what counts most...:-> 5. Lessons Learned - First, and always the biggie, dont assume!!! It has happened to me again despite having written that so often :-O... Assuming you face a BN sized force only to find out in debriefing it was a regiment, is... bad. - Recon, Recon, Recon! We did overall well in this aspect this time, but still were too fast in the south. - Overlays with BPs are great tools if they are done right and used well. Ours was, i think, and it did serve us extremely well during preparation, planning and the battle - Comms are a multiplier if they work well: One of the things that worked best were comms during the game, everybody was callling in his spotreps, his arty requests, and so on, in a concise and unagitated way. Also, everybody paid attention to IRC every turn. Smoothest CPX ever in this regard, great help (even if I could type to one channel only as I had switched playing to the laptop and needed the mouse of the other mac to get any speed ingiving orders) - Touch pads are crap if you try to play in a high speed environment (see above) - CPXes tire... I slept full 12 hours after that one...:-> Anyway, thanks to all for a great two weeks and a great battle! Rattler, Blue CO (acting)

I have a little scenario ready for a CPX Nov 16, game start 1500 GMT It can accomodate up to 9-10 players, forces are of BN size, it will be played on map 568, a variation of Darius Kasinskas map 567 which I altered slightly for this scenario. Only basic planning required. Any takers? Rattler

Rattler reporting in for duty. I would prefer BLUE, if the CO job is already covered, I would prefer recce or arty. Of cause anything else fine as well. Drauf! Dran! Drüber!

Replying to TONY TALBERTs post: I cannot really comment on your question as I dont recall the Geneva rules on this situation. In an exercise in the early seventies such team was discovered by civilians (in this case a school class on a leisure walk in the woods stumbled into them when they just HALOed into a clearing), they chose to ignore them. The major running the exercise was close by as an observer and after the exercise made it a standing order to execute such civilians immidiately in the future. Three of the four team members left the army for this reason, claiming a "conscious objector" status despite seeing the reasoning behind the order. Rattler

Replying to STOFFELs comment: In the German Army, with the lessons taught us by the US (some High Brass like Gen. Keitel and Adm. Doenitz got hanged for following orders, sentenced to death for "participating in the preparation of an agressive war") nowadays it is not only your right but your obligation to resist orders that infringe with International Law (obligationn in the sense that you can be tried for following such orders). While this might not really be practical in the situation (you will probably get shot on the spot by your superior ), it at least makes a strong point for relieving the burden on the shoulders of the regular soldier by giving him guidelines...

the link STOFFEL posted (to the multiplayer calendar) is not correct. The correct link is: http://schlepper.hanse.de/redwolf/tacopscal.cgi You might also want to check out the TacOps Scenario HQ page by RikkiTikki on the Battlefront website, which offers links to everything you will want to have as a TacOps player: http://battlefront.com/resources/tacops/index.html

True. Major, maybe a copy-and-paste feature for priorities (did I ask that before?) Rattler

>>? How much ground should a basic level unit or weapon be allowed to try to suppress?<< Depends on the weapon, I guess, as well as on the effect taking unit we are talking. While agreeing that direct hit probabilities for kills against vehicles are tending towards miracle (i.e. suppressive effect on the tank neibouring the target tends against zero = small area = 75 ? mtrs), supressive effect generated against inf should be much wider spread. You *will* find yourself reacting a little more cautious when shells whizz by 50 mtrs, no? (i.e. suppressive effect on the neighbouring inf tends to be higher = larger supressed area = 250 ? mtrs?) Just guessing... Rattler

Ah..., cheating! Apart from finding it opposing my idea of personal honourable behaviour (but knowing this is viewed a cultural defect in ohter cultures possibly...<g>)....: I have been playing TacOps for quite awhile, mostly PBEM, and I ran into one cheater one day (or so I presume, hitting invisble units, etc..., see above). I find, at least in TacOps, you'll still win almost every game against a cheater, because cheating makes him predictable (adds a cycle to the game). In case of TacOps you will find that the "lucky" things always happen in the turn you cannot control and, once you understand that, you use this knowledge to place all relevant movements into the other turn. Usually works, (probably, flying all these planes about makes your opponent loose perspective...<g>). Cheating is just a tactic that can be countered tactically. My 2c Rattler