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Apocal

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  1. Like
    Apocal got a reaction from JulianJ in Was lend-lease essential in securing a Soviet victory?   
    Братская могила на шестерых more like... six brothers' grave.
  2. Like
    Apocal got a reaction from Bulletpoint in Hammer's Flank Crossing the River   
    JasonC doesn't like scenarios where the player is railroaded (especially when he is railroaded in dumb ways), where the scale goes beyond a reinforced company, where the actual relevant tactics and techniques are distorted to make a scenario more action-esqe.
    Given the delay involved (~20 minutes) and lack of TRPs for the attacker, it was pretty clear the intent was to use the rocket battery as the player's personal prep fire, particularly since the ammo provided is somewhere south of half it's normal load. IIRC, the briefing said as much. But given that, it is lackluster at the task; even putting the rocket barrage directly on target doesn't appreciably degrade the totality of the defenses. Even if you inflict casualties, it isn't as if the scenario designer actually degraded the German personnel numbers in each team so what is fielded still has manpower depth enough to endure and stay intact. The suppression doesn't last longer than a minute or two, so it is basically irrelevant. Odds of a player arriving just after the fifteen minute mark (longest delay possible for a fire mission) in this scenario are very low.
    It's been years since I played it, but I think the mortars have limited ammo as well, even though you can't use them for prep fire since they are MIA at scenario start, only coming in at (I think) the five minute mark for whatever reason. At any rate, they are incredibly difficult to employ effectively, due to the lack of map-fire ability in CMx2 and basically no good overwatch positions, which means you're exposing a unit leader (or the singular green or conscript FO) to whatever nastiness you require mortars to deal with. 
    The first mission a monster in size terms. Some people enjoy them, some don't. I thought that was a bit annoying in the stock campaign just because I prefer real time and it is well beyond anyone's ability to manage played that way. If you're into splitting squads to maximize infantry performance, it goes straight into near-unplayable territory even for WeGo; each turn for me took something like a half-hour of tweaking, especially once I realized it was a shooting gallery for one side if I didn't carefully echo-locate each of the backfield ATGs and try to hit them with mortars before they took out my supporting armor. The careful approach doesn't work very well; you cross right in sight of the deep German backfield defenses and a few close-in machine guns in some serious chokepoints, all of which have TRPs set on them. The end result is that the Germans get a free harvest of kills wherever you cross and if you choose a single crossing point, they get a series of them with their artillery, which out-matches the player's by a fair margin.
    So yeah, I didn't really like the scenario that much either. Whenever I replay the campaign I just hit cease fire during the setup phase and save myself the aggravation.
  3. Like
    Apocal got a reaction from Denis1973 in Lend-Lease stuff coming soon?   
    As far as I know, the LL vehicles were slotted into the existing TOE in exactly in place of their Soviet equivalents. Certainly, the Soviet Shermans weren't running around in platoons of five and companies of eighteen like in the US Army.
    In a game with Jagdtigers?
  4. Like
    Apocal got a reaction from agusto in Tactical Lifehack   
    I'm trying to imagine reasons someone (anyone) would look at that and NOT expect there to be mines in the middle. Like, seriously. Dude literally left a big polygon of wire in the middle of the road, I wonder what's inside...?
    Mines are useful to me in limited doses, for very specific purposes. One of the best uses is planting them on the AS next to doorways, especially the only doorway into/out of a building with good line of sight. Another good use is placing them along map edges when facing another player. Occasionally, I'll leave an entire objective undefended but covered in mines, with a TRP emplaced; the mines act as a sort of sensor and artillery/mortars follows up on whatever is there.
    But the use is situational, so it is rare for me to invest too much into them. Personally, I think they could use a bit of a price reduction, especially obstacles like wire. Even better if defenders could get a preset minimum, depending on stance (hasty or deliberate defense) to which players could add more if they chose.
  5. Downvote
    Apocal got a reaction from beersmurff in Rethinking the assault command   
    I'm able to effectively micro five or six teams at once, I would be able to do a lot more if pause command + order-stacking worked in real-time multiplayer. It doesn't so you have to deal with stuff as it comes.
  6. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to JasonC in References to "Armored Spearheads"   
    A march formation in a manual isn't a combat doctrine.
     
    US armored task forces in fact led with a medium tank company, as a rule.  With a Jumbo on point if they had one.  Not with attached cavalry in jeeps or recon anything.
     
    Recon forces mostly got screening and security missions, defense of long flanks to enable other forces to concentrate, and the like.  Sometimes they even attacked, but when they did they dismounted and fought like infantry, supported by organic mortars and their assault guns and light tanks - hopefully against a relatively weak, infantry only enemy.  And that wasn't a matter of doctrine or fulfilling a planned role, it was just a field expedient when the only unit around was a cavalry battalion or company, and the operations situation required another probe.
     
    The typical tactical formation in a US AD force was a task force, a battalion sized unit created by cross attaching armored infantry companies with tank companies to create an armor heavy or an infantry heavy mix in 2 to 1 ratios.  The typical tactical formation in a US ID force was an infantry battalion with attachments, working as part of a regimental combat team that attached tank and TD support, and a portion of the divisional artillery, down to regiment.
     
    Then when a US ID force actually had to attack, it is a battalion assigned the mission, but they don't attack with the whole battalion.  They designated one company as assault, another as support, and the remainder as reserve (3rd line plus HQ, weapons, etc).  The support has a front line position with observation and in range to support by fire, and gets to hold the frontage if the assault battalion gets shot to pieces, so there isn't a hole in the line as the result of a defeat.  It quickly has the same frontage assigned to it as the assault company, just staying at the start line.  It also is supposed to move up and relieve the assault company when and if the attack succeeds, to allow that company to reorganize and the like.  Either it, or the reserve, then takes the assault role, with the other getting the new support role, while the original assault company rotates into reserve as soon as the local combat conditions permit it.
     
    Thus, a US infantry battalion is expected to attack with just a single company, and at most some mortar and MG fire support at medium range from the rest of the formation. 
     
    How the heck is that supposed to work?  Answer, they aren't relying on infantry numbers to begin with.  It doesn't take a regiment to follow up a barrage.  Sending more men wouldn't increase the shells sent, or the number of supporting tanks, or make the ground any better, or surprise the enemy more.  All the determinants of the success of these little probes, not pushed too hard individually, were outside of the question of how many men were sent and frankly most of them were beyond the control of the attacking infantry battalion.
     
    Didn't matter, because these nibbles were going on all over the line, and some would succeed, and the accompanying artillery fire would bleed the enemy, and between him bleeding and little wedges being driven into his position and the whole thing being continued day after day, the line would gradually crawl over the enemy and hurt him the while.  That's how US infantry divisions fought.  The whole system was designed to have another probe ready to go the next day, no matter what.  They didn't try to win the war *today*.  Meanwhile, every nibbling company could get tank support and an artillery barrage and have the whole "kit bag" in a combined arms sense, and the local commander was expected to use the right tool for each enemy encountered, and carefully pick through them.
     
    The US AD way of fighting, on the other hand, was above all the find a local flank and turn it with a vehicle move.  Find fix flank was the standing method of any task force.  Terrain and enemy dictated who had which role in that.  An armor heavy task force (2 medium tank companies, 1 armored infantry company, smaller attachments of TDs, engineers, cavalry, whatever) would generally do the finding with a tank company, and the fixing with one of the others.  The armored infantry could be the flankers if it involved going through woods or a town or over a river, or the fixers if it was just a matter of containing an enemy infantry force and pinning them down.  The flanking move could be designed to assault the enemy from a new direction, or to just get behind and "bag" them, expecting to take them prisoner after subjecting them to a prolonged shelling, or it could be a true bypass movement, finding a route that the rest of the task force would follow, leaving only a small screen around the enemy and hauling tail for the next objective.
     
    Both forces tended to think of their problem as one of movement and reaching tactical objectives.  The AD way in particular wanted to find a way around and keep going, and fought to get that only if it had to.  The ID way assigned near and reachable objectives, expected to clear them and hold them, and then ratchet the whole thing forward, more systematically.  They also fought to enable movement more than the other way around, but expected to have to fight more because more things could readily block them.
     
    The emphasis on ground control and rating any mission as successful if a terrain objective was reached, was arguably a pretty dumb way of thinking about combat, but it was the American way in such things.  Big bags of prisoners and avoiding complete destruction of one's own formation were about the only other items that ranked.  And even the former of those was not much more than gravy, the big thing was to reach the spot on the map the muckety mucks had assigned one to reach, by the hour they called for it to be reached.  Stringing those together into a victory was the responsibility of someone with stars on their shoulder, not bars, oak leaves, or birds.
     
    Failure was always an option.  Meaning, if the mission looked too hard or losses promised to be too high, they could and did just say "screw this, somebody blew it" and chuck the mission, go to ground, defend what they could.  Somebody else can do the job today.  Pressing hard and getting a lot of guys killed was considered a disaster and stupidity, not bravery or devotion to duty.  With the net result that advantage situations were pushed and disadvantage situations were backed off, though also with a side effect of some lethargy or half heartedness - at least by some other armies' standards in such things.
     
    Just an example of the variety of actual combat practice, in different armies and branches, in the second half of WW II...
  7. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Stagler in Real Time Only?   
    Aye you spend 80% of the time at full zoom monitoring your forces, only going in when contact is made or  you need to test and adjust your approach.
  8. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Stagler in What is your best lesson learned from CMBS experience?   
    MP is not always available, and I cant just boot up the game, go to a lobby, and get a game going one night after work for an hour
  9. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to --WOKI-- in WOT & War Thunder Panther Skins   
    Hi guys,
    This's my first attempt to convert some WOT and War Thunder historical skins but still not perfect as im just learn about photoshop in 20 minutes from a friend..lol ( i never know how to use photoshop before )
    for now just panther (sorry for the wheels still using original CMBN, im too lazy to do it )
    the colors looks match with CMBN engine especially when using Reshade Sweetfx
    so what do you guys think?









     
     
     
    My wish for the next patch is they (Developer) can make separate skins for each model not combine them especially with vehicles
    in example i would like to see panther_early_hull.bmp with panther_early_turret, panther_early_hull 2 with panther_early_turret 2, panther_early_hull 3 with panther_early_turret 3 and so on but not mixed them because they will not match the body texture with turret and some other parts between their numbers bmp file (it's like probability if they're match than that's good but most they're not match between each file in one model
    i think it's only work with infantry skin but not with vehicles skin

    it would be nice to have a lot additional skins to the game in every vehicles model

    Sorry for my english
     
  10. Upvote
    Apocal got a reaction from Bulletpoint in Light Infantry on the modern battlefield   
    The 101st Airborne had trouble doing this even against light opposition in Iraq. They were supposed to be securing the highway and towns that made up the 3ID's supply lines but needed (and received) tanks for the actual fighting. Even then, they didn't have enough firepower on hand (three or four companies of Abrams) and found themselves snarled up in some nasty fights in built-up areas that the 3rd Infantry Division had smashed their way through without even slowing down. The other major light infantry centric operation was a sideshow; the 173rd Airborne Brigade dropped onto an airfield already held (and marked by) friendly-forces then stayed mostly static while calling down gobs of airpower to beat up Iraqis that were going out of their way to not inconvenience them. The major Iraqi formations in the north had already largely disintegrated and the brigade's presence didn't draw any defenders away from Baghdad. It was a sop to the original war plan that envisioned the 4ID coming from Turkey.
     
    Overall it wasn't exactly a grand showing and one big reason the original plan of having light infantry take Baghdad was scrapped in favor of just sending heavy forces in.
     
    edit: I guess taking Umm Qasr kinda counts, but there were tanks involved there as well, so I'm not sure how much credit is due.
     
     
    Even facing only lightly armed militias in Fallujah, tanks (and other forms of protected firepower) were the big winners:
    "By far the best two supporting arms used were tanks and CAAT.  Tanks and CAAT were the infantryman’s best friend.  The battle would have been incredibly bloodier if it hadn’t been for tanks and CAAT.  The tanks were able to provide a 120 mm direct fire weapon on the spot of any contact within a matter of minutes.  The thermal sites were able to pinpoint exact position of snipers and then effectively neutralize them within seconds.  CAAT was able to use its M2 .50 caliber machine guns and Mk19 grenade launchers to breach as well as destroy buildings were fire was received from.  CAAT also helped the squads by clearing the buildings that lined the street in their lane.  The infantry should never attack in MOUT without tanks or CAAT."
     
    CAAT = Combined Anti-armor Team, basically the infantry battalion's heavy weapons -- TOWs, MK19s, 50cals -- mounted on Humvees and operated as mixed sections. In the remainder of the AAR, they are very clear about the necessity to employ combined arms in built-up terrain, relying on firepower arms as primary killing tool, rather than sending infantry to clear buildings the hard way. This is consistent with every other AAR to come out of urban fighting in the last four or five decades.
     
     
     
    Massive amounts of airpower and moving at a snail's pace while praying you don't get caught out anywhere.
  11. Upvote
    Apocal got a reaction from agusto in Light Infantry on the modern battlefield   
    The 101st Airborne had trouble doing this even against light opposition in Iraq. They were supposed to be securing the highway and towns that made up the 3ID's supply lines but needed (and received) tanks for the actual fighting. Even then, they didn't have enough firepower on hand (three or four companies of Abrams) and found themselves snarled up in some nasty fights in built-up areas that the 3rd Infantry Division had smashed their way through without even slowing down. The other major light infantry centric operation was a sideshow; the 173rd Airborne Brigade dropped onto an airfield already held (and marked by) friendly-forces then stayed mostly static while calling down gobs of airpower to beat up Iraqis that were going out of their way to not inconvenience them. The major Iraqi formations in the north had already largely disintegrated and the brigade's presence didn't draw any defenders away from Baghdad. It was a sop to the original war plan that envisioned the 4ID coming from Turkey.
     
    Overall it wasn't exactly a grand showing and one big reason the original plan of having light infantry take Baghdad was scrapped in favor of just sending heavy forces in.
     
    edit: I guess taking Umm Qasr kinda counts, but there were tanks involved there as well, so I'm not sure how much credit is due.
     
     
    Even facing only lightly armed militias in Fallujah, tanks (and other forms of protected firepower) were the big winners:
    "By far the best two supporting arms used were tanks and CAAT.  Tanks and CAAT were the infantryman’s best friend.  The battle would have been incredibly bloodier if it hadn’t been for tanks and CAAT.  The tanks were able to provide a 120 mm direct fire weapon on the spot of any contact within a matter of minutes.  The thermal sites were able to pinpoint exact position of snipers and then effectively neutralize them within seconds.  CAAT was able to use its M2 .50 caliber machine guns and Mk19 grenade launchers to breach as well as destroy buildings were fire was received from.  CAAT also helped the squads by clearing the buildings that lined the street in their lane.  The infantry should never attack in MOUT without tanks or CAAT."
     
    CAAT = Combined Anti-armor Team, basically the infantry battalion's heavy weapons -- TOWs, MK19s, 50cals -- mounted on Humvees and operated as mixed sections. In the remainder of the AAR, they are very clear about the necessity to employ combined arms in built-up terrain, relying on firepower arms as primary killing tool, rather than sending infantry to clear buildings the hard way. This is consistent with every other AAR to come out of urban fighting in the last four or five decades.
     
     
     
    Massive amounts of airpower and moving at a snail's pace while praying you don't get caught out anywhere.
  12. Upvote
    Apocal got a reaction from MOS:96B2P in Light Infantry on the modern battlefield   
    The 101st Airborne had trouble doing this even against light opposition in Iraq. They were supposed to be securing the highway and towns that made up the 3ID's supply lines but needed (and received) tanks for the actual fighting. Even then, they didn't have enough firepower on hand (three or four companies of Abrams) and found themselves snarled up in some nasty fights in built-up areas that the 3rd Infantry Division had smashed their way through without even slowing down. The other major light infantry centric operation was a sideshow; the 173rd Airborne Brigade dropped onto an airfield already held (and marked by) friendly-forces then stayed mostly static while calling down gobs of airpower to beat up Iraqis that were going out of their way to not inconvenience them. The major Iraqi formations in the north had already largely disintegrated and the brigade's presence didn't draw any defenders away from Baghdad. It was a sop to the original war plan that envisioned the 4ID coming from Turkey.
     
    Overall it wasn't exactly a grand showing and one big reason the original plan of having light infantry take Baghdad was scrapped in favor of just sending heavy forces in.
     
    edit: I guess taking Umm Qasr kinda counts, but there were tanks involved there as well, so I'm not sure how much credit is due.
     
     
    Even facing only lightly armed militias in Fallujah, tanks (and other forms of protected firepower) were the big winners:
    "By far the best two supporting arms used were tanks and CAAT.  Tanks and CAAT were the infantryman’s best friend.  The battle would have been incredibly bloodier if it hadn’t been for tanks and CAAT.  The tanks were able to provide a 120 mm direct fire weapon on the spot of any contact within a matter of minutes.  The thermal sites were able to pinpoint exact position of snipers and then effectively neutralize them within seconds.  CAAT was able to use its M2 .50 caliber machine guns and Mk19 grenade launchers to breach as well as destroy buildings were fire was received from.  CAAT also helped the squads by clearing the buildings that lined the street in their lane.  The infantry should never attack in MOUT without tanks or CAAT."
     
    CAAT = Combined Anti-armor Team, basically the infantry battalion's heavy weapons -- TOWs, MK19s, 50cals -- mounted on Humvees and operated as mixed sections. In the remainder of the AAR, they are very clear about the necessity to employ combined arms in built-up terrain, relying on firepower arms as primary killing tool, rather than sending infantry to clear buildings the hard way. This is consistent with every other AAR to come out of urban fighting in the last four or five decades.
     
     
     
    Massive amounts of airpower and moving at a snail's pace while praying you don't get caught out anywhere.
  13. Upvote
    Apocal got a reaction from Nerdwing in US Campaign, first mission observations (spoilers)   
    10 AFVs lost
    33 men killed/wounded
    "US Army Tactical Victory"
     
    mfw:

  14. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to womble in Hey BFC!! Time for a general CM2 forum?   
    Personally, I'd be happy to have the Cmx2 forums merged, and have no specialist forums. Add an easy way of tagging your post for if it's specifically about one game (and not blatantly freakin' obvious that's the case). So much of what we whitter about is transferable between the game families.
  15. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Vanir Ausf B in Suppression AFVs...again   
    I don't think non-penetrating hits cause suppression to AFV crew anymore and I'm pretty sure it's deliberate. And if that's a bad thing you can probably blame me for it to some extent.
     
    A while back (like a year ago or so) I noticed that in the WW2 games British AP that bounced off tanks did not cause any suppression while US, German and Soviet AP did. It became apparent that it was the HE burster charge that was the source of the suppression (the UK used AP shot instead of AP shell). This was rather silly since the burster charge was far too small to be of any concern to the crew when detonating outside the crew compartment. In fact, another tester brought up the fact that the production of suppression was tied more precisely to the distance from the tank at which the burster charge detonated (a shell that bounced far away before blowing up would produce no suppression at all). I brought up this discrepancy to BFC and the suppression effect was removed. Good? Bad? Ugly? Debatable I'm sure, but it's not a bug.
  16. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Los in Inferior to CMBB   
    I always wanted to play this game in first person commander mode (anyone play Scourge of War Gettysburg using Headquarters in the Saddle mode?). The game could make a great Company commander simulator. Of course the single greatest thing you could do for multiplayer realism is make the game coop (Like SOW does) and then play it in realtime, so you have say a  two or three guys each running a platoon or what not in realtime, locked to their player character. Not everyone's cup of tea, but if CM did this I'd marry it!
     
    Los
  17. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Pat O in New player and Forum member.   
    Just wanted to say hello. I just purchased the game and am very excited to have a game that is so complex. Reading through the forums I can see that this is a very serious community with great information. 
     
    i am myself a combat Infantry veteran and purple heart recipient. I was a member of the Army's very first stryker battalion 1-23 INF during the experimental phase and deployed with them twice to Iraq. I had ICV 0004 so I am pleased to see a game that allows me to use that old tactical noodle again. Looking forward to learning from you guys and being a part of this community.
  18. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to panzersaurkrautwerfer in Photo of destroyed Iraqui M1A1M   
    I swear to god simply burning every dollar, ounce of construction material, all military equipment given to the Iraqis in a giant pit would be a less wasteful use than what the Iraqis have done with it. 
  19. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Reiter in Movie White Tiger   
  20. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to JasonC in Soviet Doctrine in WW2 - 1944   
    So if I were going to make a CMRT scenario showing the mech force type in a hasty attack off the column of march, I'd use something like the following forces and arrivals.
     
    At start, set up area to include a road entry point - 2 BA-64s, 5 jeeps, recon platoon HQ and 4 half squads, 1 sharpshooter.
     (HQ+SS jeep really a 3/4 ton "pick up" truck, the "jeeps" are really motorcycles).
    Arriving turn 3 on the same entry road - 3 T-34/76, SMG platoon HQ and 2 SMG half squads.
    Arriving turn 5 on the same entry road - 4 trucks carrying motor rifle platoon (HQ, 3 squads) plus an ATR.
    Arriving turn 7 on the same road, 1 M5 halftrack carrying a company HQ plus a 120mm mortar radio FO (start of support section)
    Arriving turn 8 on the same road, 4 trucks carrying platoon HQ, 3 Maxim MMGs (1 with HQ, 2 in second truck), 2 82mm mortars
    Arriving turn 10 on the same road, 2 jeeps towing 2 76mm ZIS-3 divisional guns (these would really be 3/4 ton pick up trucks, but closer to jeeps than full trucks).
     
    Optional larger scenario - add a second T-34 force just like that given on turn 5, bumping the arrival order of the rest back.
    Also add a second motor rifle platoon, so those arrive turns 7 and 9, with the support arriving turns 11-14.
    Finally, add a third motor rifle platoon at the tail of the column, arriving turn 15.
    That gives 6 tanks and a full motor rifle company, but takes a bit longer to arrive etc.
     
    Then have that sort of column fight against - (1) a pure infantry defense (1 75mm PAK as heavy AT), or pure infantry with just one Marder as AT support - about 2 platoons of infantry and a heavy weapons section with 2xHMG, 1x81mm would be typical for this scale, (2) A German "recon" screen force, with SPW 250/1s carrying a single recon infantry platoon, with a pair of SPW 251/9s for fire support, and like 2 PzKw IVs arriving turn 10 or so to support them, with one platoon of Pz Gdrs, or (3) A full German "panzer" force vs the larger column version, with 4 PzKw IVs and 2 platoons of PzGdrs (motorized) present from the start, plus a few HMGs.  A tougher version of (1) (e.g. vs the larger column) might have 2 PAK and 105mm artillery support, but still 2 infantry platoons and 1 heavy weapons section.
     
    This variety would be enough to show how the force was meant to function, and how it defeats the most typical forces the Germans would actually need to rely on to stop it.  The recon screen version would be the least common in practice, the infantry version (with no German vehicles) the most common.  But the others are important, to show how the force could exploit through rapid blocking forces once through the front.
  21. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Sublime in Any ETA on Lend-Lease, German special formations,etc?   
    well imo, humble as it is, every other ww2 title has at least one module, some a few. RT has none. thatd be my reason why it should get some love first..
  22. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to JasonC in Soviet Doctrine in WW2 - 1944   
    A sample force for a GMT "Panzer" scenario to show how a Russian mechanized corps force fights (as distinct from a tank corps force) - since it was asked.  Feel free to translate into Combat Mission terms.
     
    Recon element - 2 BA-64 armored cars, 2 infantry half squads motorcycle mounted.
     
    Main body, tanks - 3 T-34/76, 1943 model, with 3 SMG half squad riders.
    Main body, motor rifle - 4 trucks carrying 4 full Rifle squads, 2 designated as also having ATR secondary weapons
     
    Support, HQ element - 1 M3 Scout Car carrying infantry half squad with FO ability.  Medium artillery support (120mm mortar) with a max of 4 fire for effect missions.
    Support, mortar element - 2 trucks carrying infantry half squads manning 82mm mortars
    Support, ATG - 1 jeep towing 76mm divisional gun (ZIS-3)
     
    You could up the recon element to a full platoon of motorcycle recon, 3 T-70s and 3 MA-64s, double or triple the tanks, and increase the motor rifle to 1-2 companies, and the weapons and supporting guns to double the figures above, for a larger scenario.  But at least in Panzer, smaller command spans make for a more playable game, hence the force design above.
     
    Understand, this sort of column is what you'd expect as a single one of the elements I describe in the echelon attack "drill" discussed above - the first hit or the flankers or the exploiters, each would be a column like that.
     
    Notice, half the heavy HE firepower comes from dismounted weapons rather than tanks (82mm mortars or towed 76mm guns).  There are small amounts of light armor, but most of the armor is just T-34s and they provide the armor hitting power of the whole formation.  The trucked motor rifle is about half the infantry, the rest split between SMG riders, recon, and infantry heavy weapons parts of the formation.  There is enough infantry to lead with it when the enemy and terrain calls for that, but its normal battle role is to follow hard behind the tanks, dismount just out of sight of the enemy, and mop up whatever the tanks have blasted through.  if they need to deliver a "set piece" attack rather than fighting off the column of march, then the dismounted HE tubes (guns and mortars and FO) plus the tanks form the base of fire, and the infantry steps out first under their overwatch.  The tank riders wait while that is happening, and mount to move forward with the tanks as enemy positions to neutralize are IDed.  
     
    When fighting off the column of march, instead, the recon leads and just scouts for open roads; the BA-64s can suppress infantry outposts to free the recon infantry if it is fired upon.  The tanks follow and go where no enemy is encountered until they run out of undefended road, then hastily attack the easiest looking target.  The motor rifle follows behind them and drops men if needed to dig out enemies that go deep to escape the attentions of the tanks, letting the SMG riders stay with the tanks.  If a strong enemy is encountered, the recon and tanks try to bypass it, a bit of motor rifle screens it, and if needed the support element can come up and plaster it.  Normally, though, the support element only deploys when a strong enemy position that needs to be carried is encountered.  When that happens, the column piles forward and deploys to either side of its approach road, the support element and tanks form a base of fire, and the deliberate attack method described above is apply as quickly as possible.
     
    FWIW...
  23. Downvote
    Apocal reacted to John Kettler in US Anti Aircraft defences   
    This thread, methinks, very much needs to be put back on the track. Am not going to attempt to respond by individuals, so am going to address this by specific issues.

    Yom Kippur War IADs effectiveness
     
    IAF CAS losses were so severe vs Egypt for days that Israel terminated them altogether. They didn't resume until IDF tanks, which had crossed the Suez Canal, drove into the SAM zones and systematically shot up the SA-2/3/6 SAMs and dense AAA, of which the most notable AAA was the "airplane eater" ZSU-23/4. DEAD Israeli style. Against Syria, the story was much the same, but in both cases, Israeli CAS was effectively out of the war until the SAM problem was addressed, of which the pacing element (and eye waterer to defense types in the US and) was the lethality of the highly agile, mobile SA-6, a weapon against which the IAF had no ECM capability whatsoever. None. The SAMs were sufficiently deadly to force IAF planes to fly low, placing them in the deadly embrace of radar directed AAA, not to mention a plethora of SA-7s. The US provided Israel with as many as 40 F-4s and definitely 46 A-4s as replacements for terrible air losses. What's not generally known is that the US provided Israel with numerous complete tail end assemblies for A-4s. Why? The planes were eating SA-7s, but barely getting back home. Spare part planners never envisioned such a situation, so the IAF suffered major virtual attrition as a result. The IAF started the war with 440 combat planes and lost, depending on which numbers are used, 107-387, but I don't know offhand whether the US supplied additional planes over attrition during the resupply effort.
     
    Given the above, I'm having real problems signing up for the "lessons of the Yom Kippur War." Likewise, I'm having similar problems with GW I. There were other factors at work other than those enumerated including: precision destruction of a key Iraqi air surveillance radar, the removal of which allowed the entry of the Stealth fighters and more visible friends. Inter alia, this resulted in the pinpoint destruction of the key Syrian AD HQ, spectacularly shown time and again on strike vid broadcast worldwide. Even in unbroken state, the IADS had very little capability vs Tomahawks which are, many don't realize, pretty stealthy in their own right, let alone when whizzing down the boulevard so low details on the weapons were clearly visible. This isn't the famous footage, but it gets the idea across.


     
    The US went into GW I with not merely with superlative intel on Iraq's IADS, it went into battle with a direct conduit right into the IADS situation center, thanks to a physical hack into the fiber optic trunk line from the front, a hack put into place by a brilliant US SpecOps mission. Reportedly, the US was able to show, or not show, IADS HQ whatever it desired, but the hack is believed to have been used as a generator of enormous numbers of false targets. I firmly believe it's dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions without a fundamental understanding of what was going on to begin with. I recall the mighty MOD himself came out from Russia with his experts to figure exactly this out. One such insight was a demand for a weapon capable of downing a HARM attacking a defending SAM site. Pantsir, anyone? Tunguska itself has substantial capabilities vs things like GBU-15, LGBs, JDAM, JSOW and Tomahawks.
     
    Now, let's look at the Vietnam War, shall we? It's fashionable to deride NVN's IADS as ineffective. This is based on another faulty premise. That premise is that the aggregate performance figures reflect how the national IADS performed historically throughout. Not the case. What you're seeing are the effects of a lot of really bad outcomes late in an otherwise impressive career.  When the US first ran into the SA-2, the SA-2 was killing 0.5 planes per engagement. 0.5! Indeed, there were several cases of two planes downed in one shot. What broke the back of the NVN IADS was a masterful CIA op called HA/BRINK or HABRINK. What was that? The CIA slipped people into Indonesia's SA-2 warehouses and obtained the relevant guidance link frequencies, allowing the US to pretty effectively jam the SA-2. Why Indonesia? The Indonesian SA-2s were identical to the NVN's SA-2s! Sure, evasive maneuvering, Wild Weasel, Iron Hand played their part, but HA/BRINK was what undid the IADs as far as SAM coverage. By late in the war, Linebacker II, jamming, better tactics, SEAD and other means had so degraded and cowed the SAMs that they were blind launching (no radar at all, optical direction only)  dozens of SAMs at once, and that's why the overall numbers look so bleak. That wasn't the case through much of the air war over NVN and the DMZ. We lost a family friend and his WSO to an SA-2 over the DMZ. It came out of the clouds below, so they had no chance to see the launch and evade. Boom!  Two wall entries on the Vietnam Memorial.
     
    For a more informed view of Russian SAM operational effectiveness than what I've seen in this thread, please see Carlo Kopp's analysis here. Kopp has some scathing things to say about how the Arabs not only fundamentally disregarded a throughly thought out Russian doctrine, but did some things which would've been comedic had they not been so hurtful to the using force! Suggest interested parties also look at what specific threats the newer generation SAMs were designed to defeat, what their tactical-technical characteristics are and how that applies to the ability to detect, localize, engage and kill them. Makes rather sobering reading. A Serbian captain with his ancient SA-6 unit not only survived a major SEAD/DEAD campaign, but also cost the US the stunning loss of an F-117, damage to a second one and an F-16.
     
    As a longtime student of military history and a former defense professional, I deem it folly to expect the USAF to be able to so thoroughly control the skies that Russian CAS and similar can't operate. US AAA threat is risible, so there's no real dense AAG penalty for operating in the weeds to make it really hard vs both fighters and Patriot to engage it, and SU-25s have survived hits by things much worse than MANPADS. Russia's not going to sit idly by and let the US/NATO gin up its air power before striking, so the force ratios, for a time, at least, are not going to be pretty. Contrary to popular opinion, the AWACS supply is quite limited, and people need to remember that these vital birds can stay aloft only so long before they have to be replaced to keep a given area in coverage. The harder they're flown, the less reliable they become, and the worse the even more critical highly trained control crews perform. Tired radar operators miss things. That. of course, presumes the plane ever gets airborne to begin with, A single Russian sniper armed with, say, an OSV 12.7 mm rifle, could ruin NATO's day at places like Geilenkirchen, which when last seen, had a whole 5 E-3As. It's even worse with JSTARS, where there are but a handful of planes in total.
     
    And this discussion is without taking into account Russian missile hard kill systems or jamming. Put it this way, for every long range sensor we deployed, the Russians deployed countermeasures. Jammers vs the E-3A, the TR-1's SAR, JSTARs. I used to have some SECRET diagrams of the E-3A radar display under jamming. Thanks to steerable antenna nulls, the system performed very well in the face of one or two jammers, but after that things progressively fell apart. It was entirely possible to jam the E-3A so effectively that entire (pizza slice wide) sectors were blind. Additionally, the more jamming energy received, the shorter detection range becomes, totally compromising the vast volumetric region a Sentry ordinarily controls. This allows even crude Stealth weapons a veritable free ride through the defenses.
     
    If memory serves, the wartime scenario over West Germany envisioned only two E-3As up, covering the entire region. What happens if one doesn't show up, is shot down or is jammed so effectively it can't do its job? How many would likely be available to support ops in Ukraine, and how much coverage, even best case, would be lost just to keep things like S-300PMU and S-400 from simply devouring them? The Russians also have the Il-76 MAINSTAY, their Gen 2 AWACS. Nor, as a look at page 3, #46 in that thread will show, is that by any means the limits of what's going to be faced. The Russians are building a combined function aircraft able to handle everything but undersea warfare from an AWACS perspective. I'd argue that Russian force effectiveness will be greatly enhanced by even the vanilla MAINSTAY of the Cold War period, never mind what it's evolved into since. Patriot will assuredly be a key Spetsnaz target, and if it goes down, there's no way the Air Force can handle the flood which would ensue. SAMs are 24/7 systems, but planes, even with in-flight refueling, have to go home sooner or later. There is no in-flight replenishment of munitions, LRUs or crews. And who's to say that the planes keeping the Russians away in one place won't suddenly be retasked elsewhere, leaving the poor ground force commander in the denuded zone in a Heinz factory sized pickle?!
     
    What are the MCRs (Mission Capable Rates) for the F-22A under high sortie conditions?  We already know the F-35 is compromised practically across the board when it comes to just about every combat metric, so why should MCR  or sortie generation rate be any better? It'll probably break a lot, not least because it'll be anything but a mature system. We know how those tend to be. As a mature system, the F-14 Tomcat was running ~65% MCR. This meant a two-carrier CVBG could use only one CVN on a given day for strike--because the other could do nothing but conduct FAD to keep both alive! Doubtless the numbers these days are better, bit I think they nicely illustrate the main issue. Complex things, and the F-35 is super complex and broken to start, are iffy at best to depend upon. The more you stress a complicated system, the faster it breaks, not necessarily in ways anticipated, either. Given this incredibly important issue, does it really make sense to make campaign success dependent on breaking the Russian Air Force via aerial combat, as seems to be the general expectation?
     
    I don't have the latest numbers and all the tech specs for what I fervently hope are upgrades from what I knew of US capabilities, but I do know the overall situation should give serious pause to US/NATO planners, operations and combat personnel. There is a strong case to be made for a real integrated US tactical air defense a la Russe or similar. I close with a cautionary tale from my Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix days.
     
    The FAD (Fleet Air Defense) Section Head vs His Boss, the Operations Analysis Department Manager.
     
    My section head, Bill Knight, ran OPFOR--Tu-22M BACKFIRE & SOJs (Stand Off Jammers); his boss, Dave Spencer, had the FAD for a BLUFOR CVBG (carrier battle group). Site of battle? Navy tactical simulator in Monterey, California. Each side had its own war room, and there was a separate Control room where all was known. The stakes? A good bottle of wine and gloating rights on Monday. Event was part of a threat conference the weekend immediately before Monday.
     
    OPFOR objective:
     
    Penetrate FAD screen and launch long range Mach 3+ AS-4 KITCHEN ASCMs to hit and destroy CVNs (in the days before AEGIS was deployed)
     
    BLUFOR objective
     
    Use CAP and DLI (Deck Launched Interceptors) to destroy OPFOR before it can reach the missile release line.
     
    Execution: BLUFOR
     
    BLUFOR radar detects jam strobes on expected threat axis and gleefully commits both CAP and available DLI to attack OPFOR. Once in range, and operating in HOJ (Home ON Jam) mode, salvos of Tomcat launched Phoenix missiles kill the jammers, clearing the radar scopes. Dave Spencer exults, thinking he has destroyed the attackers and won a crushing victory.
     
    Execution: OPFOR
     
    Bill Knight fully anticipates BLUFOR commander's battle plan and uses it to destroy him. OPFOR demonstrates with SOJs, getting exactly the response he anticipated, but sends the actual striking force, without SOJs, around to the back door, conducting completely unhindered AS-4 missile attacks. The SOJs and crews blown to bits? Regrettable losses necessary to fulfill OPFOR commander, Bill Knight's, operational intent.
     
    Battle Resolution 
     
    About the time Dave Spencer was celebrating his great victory, Control informed him  his triumphant Tomcats would begin ditching shortly. Seems both of his carriers had been sunk by Bill Knight, and no fixed airfield, or even another carrier, was anywhere to be had. This was the end. I have no idea what the wine was, how expensive and delectable, but the wine of victory was thoroughly savored by my section head, for he had wiped the floor with Dave, who possessed an awe inspiring Ph.D. in Military Operations Research, from Harvard, no less. Come Monday, though, his customary arrogance and aura of superiority were gone. He walked about head down, visibly depressed and like a man in a daze. He couldn't believe what had happened to him; so catastrophically at the (perceived) moment of victory.
     
    Summing up, I believe the expectation that the US would almost immediately own the skies over Ukraine to be on the scale somewhere from delusional clear up to clinically insane. Such expectations seem to be predicated on a largely incompetent opponent who hasn't a prayer of prevailing vs western military might and training. Additionally, this seems to be predicated on the notion that Russian pilots are no better than Arab pilots and would be flying planes just about as capable relative to US combat aircraft. Does the US have some nice toys? Absolutely. But how many will actually be usable--and stay usable--over the course of the envisioned campaign? Is it reasonable to assume that other US foes are going to lie doggo so the US/NATO can fight Russia absent other military crises? I think not. And has anyone here bothered to look at the Russian approach to BVR aerial warfare in a very heavy jamming and rapidly maneuvering target environment? Once you have, consider this notional engagement, but with as many as 4 x AAMs targeted on each Raptor. This engagement presumes, too, that AWACS isn't attacked and downed or badly crippled. Nor does it recognize the existence of a technology called forward pass, in which missile shooters simply salvo missiles on command of aircraft whose far superior sensors allows guidance of those weapons even though the shooters can't see the target. All of a sudden those numerous not Stealth planes become a real threat, making the already enormous missile loads of Russian Stealth fighters many times larger than can be carried. 


     
    Regards,
     
    John Kettler
  24. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to JasonC in Soviet Doctrine in WW2 - 1944   
    The basic German defense doctrine was the one they developed during WW I to avoid being defeated by local concentration and artillery suppression, and it remains the basic system the Germans used in the east.  That tactical system has been called the denuded front, in comparison with practice near the start of WW I of lining continuous front line trenches with solid lines of riflemen.  Instead it was based around a few fortified machinegun positions, concealed, and cross fired to cover each other rather than their own front, in an interlocking fashion.  The idea being to make it hard to take out just a piece of the scheme.  Most forces were kept out of the front line to let enemy artillery "hit air".  Wide areas were covered by barrage fire and obstacles (in WW I generally just wire, in WW II plenty of mines as well).  Barrages and obstacles have the feature that they multiple in their effectiveness the more then enemy sends; his local odds does not help him, it hinders him or raises his losses instead.  The MG and outpost network is meant to defeat penetration by smaller enemy numbers, while barrages crucify their masses if they overload those.
     
    Then the main body of the defending infantry defends from considerably farther back, and executes local counterattacks into portions of the defensive system reached by the attackers.  The idea is to spend as much prep barrage time as possible deep in underground shelters, and only come up and forward to mix it up with enemy infantry after they are mixed in with your own positions and hard for the enemy to distinguish and coordinate fires on them etc.  This also was meant to exploit the confusion that even successful attackers were generally in, after crossing the outpost and barrage zone described above.
     
    That is an effective enough system, but it isn't foolproof.  The thinner front and separated strongpoint positions it uses are vulnerable to stealthy penetration, night infiltration e.g., rather than frontal attack on a large scale.  The local counterattack part of the doctrine can be taken to extremes and get rather expensive for the defenders, resulting in mere brawling inside the defender's works, and just exchange off with the more numerous attackers.  What it really relies on is the enemy being defeated by the artillery fire scheme and ranged MG fire over most of the frontage, so that the counterattack and brawl stuff only happens in a few exceptional spots, where the defenders have a safer route to the front, better information about where the enemy is, what routes are left clear of obstacles, and the like.
     
    The main line of resistance, once hit, generally tried to solve the fire discipline dilemma by firing quite late, when the attackers were close enough to really destroy them, not just drive them to ground.  Harassing mortar fire and a few "wait a minute" MGs were all that fired at longer ranges, to delay the enemy and prevent them being able to maneuver easily, mass in front of the defenders safely, and the like.
     
    At a higher level, the division's artillery regiment commander, divisional commander, or regional "Arkos" tried to manage the larger battle by choosing where to intervene in the outcoming attack with the weight of divisional fires.  They didn't distributed those evenly, or according to need.  Instead they would have a plan of their own, to stop the Russians cold in sector B, and just make do in sectors A and C.  They divide the attack that way.  Then shift fires to one of the break ins, and counterattack the other one with the divisional reserve.  The basic idea is just to break up the larger scale coordination of the offensive by imposing failure where the defenders choose, by massing of fires.  They can't do this everywhere, but it can be combined with choices of what to give up, who pulls back, what the next good position is, and the like, as a coordinated scheme.  The function is "permission" - you only get forward where I let you get forward, not where you want it.  If the enemy tries to get forward in the place the defenders "veto" in this way, they just mass their infantry under the heaviest artillery and multiple their own losses.
     
    I should add, though, that those doctrinal perfect approaches sometimes could not be used in the conditions prevalent in parts of Russia.  In the north, large blocks of forest and marsh are so favorable for infiltration tactics that separate strongpoints with only obstacles in between just invite penetration every night and loss of the position.  The Germans often had to abandon their doctrine in those areas, in favor of a continuous linear trench line.  And then, they often didn't have sufficient forces to give that line any real depth, but instead had to defend on line, manning that whole front as best they could.  In the more fluid fighting in the south, on the other hand, the Germans could and did use strongpoint schemes.  The Russians got significantly better at night infiltration as a means to get into or through those, as the war went on.
     
    Against Russian armor the German infantry formations also had a harder time of it.  In exceptional cases they could prepare gun lines with enough heavy ATGs well enough protected and sited to give an armor attack a bloody nose, but normally they were not rich or prepared enough for that.  Keep in mind that the Russians were quite good at tank infantry cooperation in their mech arm - by midwar that is, early they hadn't been - but lagged in the development of tank artillery cooperation.  Which is what tanks need to deal with gun based defenses efficiently.  The German infantry formations themselves tried to just strip tanks of their infantry escorts and let the tanks continue.  The Russians would sometimes make that mistake, and send the tanks deeper on their own.  That put them in the middle of a deep German defense that would know more about where they were and what they were doing than vice versa.  But that is really an "own goal" thing - if the Russian tanks just stayed with their riders and shot the crap out of the German infantry defenses, the Russian doctrine worked fine.
     
    On a deeper level, the Germans relied on their own armor to stop Russian armor.  Brawling frontally with reserves, often enough, sometimes aided by superior AFVs.  Sometimes by counterattacks that sought to cut off the leading Russian spearheads, and prevent their resupply (with fuel above all).  That worked less and less well as the war went on, however, because the Russians got better at keeping multiple threats growing on the map, gauging defender strength correctly and waiting for all arms to consolidate gains, and the like.  There was also just less of the fire brigade German armor later in the war, and it had less of an edge in tactical know-how.
     
    There are also some weaknesses of the Russian doctrine that the Germans tried to exploit.  It can be quite predictable.  You can let them succeed at things to draw them in, in a pretty predictable way.  The Russian mech way of attacking was at its best against infantry defenses, or vs armor against heavily outnumbered defenders.  If they pushed too hard at a strong block of armor, they could get a brigade killed in a matter of hours.  If you have such an asset, you can try to string the two together - let them hit a weak spot precisely where you want them to come on hard into your planned kill sack.  They aren't doing a lot of battlefield recon to spot such things, they are mostly relying on speed to create surprise.  If you let them think they just made a brilliant and formula perfect break in, they are apt to drive hard trying to push it home, and not to suspect that its is a trap.  But a lot of things get easier if you have a Tiger or Panther battalion lying around, don't they?
  25. Upvote
    Apocal reacted to Denis1973 in Operational level campaign completed.   
    2All, thanks for responses and advices  .
    Regarding Few Good Men – already done. Pavel have sent a message there. And received some posts.
     
    2kipanderson
    In short, The Rules are consist of several blocks:
    1. The transitional tables from/to CM/TOAW to depict experience, ammo loads, readiness, etc. of the troops and quantity of entrenchments in both games.
    2. Set of rules to restrict possibilities provided by TOAW because of:
    - it is sometime hard to  GM to work with
    - we need to restrict quantity of forces on CM battle map
    3. Some administrative rules for:
    - whole campaign
    - playing the battles in CM
     
    Most of the events are tracked by TOAW engine so it no needs to be mentioned in Rules. Both sides makes moves in-turn, like in TOAW or PzC.
    Peoples involved are GameMasters (one or two), Head of Staff with XO (for each side) and Field Commanders.
    GMs are responsible for making a CM scenarios, operational map, reports and so on. GM is the final judge if any issues evolved. Maps making doing by all people involved.
    HoS&XO issued orders on operational level and basic plans for CM battles. They decided what battle should be played in CM, what – in TOAW.
    FC are played battles in CM. One of important moment – they are not assigned for exact forces on whole campaign. All my experience shows that strict assignment isn't lead to "careful behavior" while some of players became bored with "nothing happened here" or "tenth attack on the same village (with same results)". My system provide player with different forces, tasks and terrain during campaign. This keeps player involved. Care on forces – work of Head of Staff, he must be in close contact with his fellow commanders.   
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