Sgt Joch
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Posts posted by Sgt Joch
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Syria has WMD's? :eek:Originally posted by Battlefront.com:That being said, a UN sponsored NATO lead military action is certainly possible if there was a serious, very straight forward and immediate reason for it. Although the US and British would be on the hook for a great deal of the logistics necessary for an action like that, the amount of troops necessary to defeat Syria is not so large that a coalition of forces couldn't get in there and settle the matter decisively. Occupation, on the other hand, is an entirely different story. For that other forces would be necessary because the US and Brits aren't in a position to do it.
Hmmm you know what? That sounds a lot like something else... wonder what?
Steve
Does anyone have a link. I would like to find out more about these skirmishes.Originally posted by lucero1148:"Already there have been skirmishes between US and Syrian troops on the Iraqi /Syria border with Syriuan troops KIA."
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I found this in the U.S. army's internal evaluation report on RPG performance against Stykers deployed in Iraq:
If I read this correctly, the Anti-Tank RPG can penetrate a Stryker.Topic A: Slat Armor Performance(ART 5.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems Indicators)
Observation: The majority of attacks faced from RPG systems can be defeated. Slat armor performance, however, is less then expected against certain types of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG).
Discussion: Soldiers were briefed that slat armor would protect them against eight out of eleven strikes against Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attacks. In the field, Soldiers say the slat armor is effective against half of the RPG attacks. There are three types of RPG attacks that have been encountered, Anti-Personnel (AP), High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT), and Anti-Tank (AT). The AP RPG attacks were not reduced by slat armor because the rocket explodes with shrapnel and is dangerous to the Stryker Vehicle Commander (VC) and air guards that are exposed outside the vehicle regardless of where it hits the vehicle or the slat armor. HEAT RPG attacks can be successfully defeated if the rocket hits between the slats because the slat armor affects the shaped charge and prevents it from working properly. AT RPG attacks are not be defeated, in most cases, because the penetrator is not affected by the slat armor. In one case a Stryker VC was struck by the penetrator after it went through the slat armor, Stryker vehicle armor, kevlar lining, and the Soldier’s body armor lodged into the Soldier’s chest. In one mission, a Stryker vehicle, with slat armor, was attacked and hit with nine RPGs. The locations of the hits on the vehicle were sporadic. The crew escaped with minor injuries and the vehicle moved under its own power to the nearest operating base for assessment and repair. The RPG attacks were thought to be AP RPG. The crew escaped injuries because of their personal body armor and reduced exposure to the outside of the vehicle.
http://www.pogo.org/m/dp/dp-StrykerBrigade-12212004.pdf (at page 48 of the report)
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I wonder if the showgirls will be modeled or are they considered to be civilians.Originally posted by Michael Emrys:I take "with augmentation" to mean "with tanks, artillery, air support, showgirls in skimpy thongs..."
Michael
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I have a question about the web page I posted earlier:
The is the first scenario, which is what the Stryker Brigade was designed for.However, it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small-scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and midrange threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities.
This is the second scenario, war with Syria. Does anyone know what...with augmentation...mean. Is it bureaucratese for.. we are going to give you some tanks so you don't get your behind shot up? .. and does anyone have any idea what the possible other roles would be?The IBCT participates in war (with augmentation) as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or a corps and in a variety of possible roles. -
Here is some additional information I had found on Stryker Brigades:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htmThe interim force will not be an early-entry force. Instead, the IBCT's will fill the gap between early-entry forces and heavier follow-on forces; the brigades will be lethal, agile, and mobile enough to dominate combat during that interval...The Army's IBCT is a full-spectrum, wheeled combat force. It is employed in all operational environments against all projected future threats. However, it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small-scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and midrange threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The IBCT deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. The IBCT participates in war (with augmentation) as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or a corps and in a variety of possible roles. The IBCT also participates (with appropriate augmentation) in stability and support operations as an initial-entry force or as a guarantor to provide security for stability forces by means of its extensive capabilities...
The IBCT is a divisional brigade. It is designed to optimize its organizational effectiveness and to balance the traditional domains of lethality, mobility, and survivability with the domains required for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater footprint. Its two core qualities are its high mobility (strategic, operational, and tactical) and its ability to achieve decisive action through a dismounted infantry assault. The major fighting components are its motorized infantry battalions. The IBCT has a unique reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron to enhance situational understanding...
To achieve a rapid deployment threshold, the brigade's design capitalizes on the widespread use of common vehicular platforms-particularly a highly mobile, medium-weight, combat/CS platform coupled with the minimization of the personnel and logistical footprint on theater. Encompassing a personnel strength of about 3,500 and preconfigured in ready-to-fight combined-arms packages, the entire IBCT can deploy within 96 hours of "first aircraft wheels up" and begin operations immediately upon arrival.
The comments on the off-road capability are from the U.S. army's dec.2004 evaluation report, although it's true it will probably have limited application to CM style battles.
As I said, I am looking forward to the tactical challenge of commanding a Stryker combat team in CMSF...but I would feel more comfortable if I had a M1A1 platoon backing me up
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Actually, I was commenting on the article posted by RMC in the first post.
But yes, I am not convinced by the Stryker Brigade concept. My understanding is that it is a first reaction team which can be airlifted and deployed quickly on the ground, (in theory, 96 hours), until heavier forces can arrive. It will utilise the latest technology to monitor enemy forces, which it can then bypass with it's superior mobility while it calls in air/artillery assets to neutralize the threat.
However, firstly, the stryker has limited off-road capabilities, and would be mostly confined to the road net. That would make it easier for the Syrian forces to predict where they will advance and set up an ambush. Secondly, even with the greatest intelligence capability, there will still be situations where enemy forces are not detected. I can just see so many situations where a Stryker Brigade can run into trouble during a Syrian invasion.
In CMSF, I'm sure it will be tactically challenging to command one, but in real life, I would see the Stryker Brigade as being more of a rapid reaction force to be airlifted to, for example, Sudan, to quell a crisis or participating in peacekeeping or counter-insurgency operations. However, I don't think it is suited to spearheading an Invasion of Syria.
[ October 19, 2005, 10:37 AM: Message edited by: JC_Hare ]
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Great article. Thanks for posting that, looks like the authors are not jumping on the Stryker Brigade bandwagon.
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:eek: :eek:Originally posted by Battlefront.com:We can do plenty of stuff to mess with the US Player's "perfect" Situational Awareness potential. I don't want to get into details yet, but not being able to utilize support assets, units not being registered with Blue Force Tracker, poor quality enemy intel being passed along the network, etc. All sorts of things can be done to realistically make things less than perfect for the US player.
Steve
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Here is a summary AAR I found in an official friendly fire investigation report (it's amazing what you can find on the internet). It shows a typical confused small unit action, unfortunately with tragic consequences, which raises several CMSF questions.
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Unclassified Executive Summary
On 23 March 03, 1st Battalion 2nd Marine Regiment was assigned the mission of securing two bridges over the Euphrates River (the southern bridge) and Saddam Canal (the northern bridge) in An Nasirayah. These bridges led to a critical intersection, which was also to be seized.
The Battalion consisted of Team TANK, which lead the way, followed by Team MECH (Bravo Company-task organized as two tank platoons and a mechanized rifle platoon), the Forward Command Post, Alpha Company and Charlie Company.
As this offensive began, Team TANK engaged in protracted combat operations. As a result, they had to break off to refuel in the rear.
After Team TANK withdrew, Team MECH was designated as the lead. Bravo Company's offensive led them across the southern bridge. Bravo Company then maneuvered off the main road, to avoid the threat associated with "Ambush Alley," and into the eastern section of the city where muddy conditions halted their advance (note: two AAVs, two tanks and a Humvee sank in the mud). The Forward Command Post element, in trace of Bravo Company, also got stuck. During this maneuvering, Alpha Company secured the southern bridge and maintained a defensive posture at that location.
As these forces entered the city, their situational awareness became clouded due to deviations from the planned scheme of maneuver, the urban environment, and problematic communication links.
Because of communications problems throughout the Battalion, Charlie Company thought Bravo Company had pushed straight up Ambush Alley, through the city, and seized the northern bridge.
Accordingly, Charlie Company crossed the southern bridge and started to maneuver through Ambush Alley to the northern bridge. In the course of this maneuver, Charlie Company began to take heavy fire. Additionally, unbeknownst to either Charlie Company or Bravo Company, this maneuver put Charlie Company in the lead.
Charlie Company proceeded just north of the northern bridge and seized it. Then, realizing they were in the lead, the Charlie Company Commander called the battalion commander, located with the Forward Command Post, to notify him of their position and that they had taken the objective.
After a brief lull in enemy fire, Charlie Company again began taking heavy enemy fire from artillery, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), mortar and small arms.
At approximately the same time, the Air Officer, located with the Forward Command Post, called Bravo Company Forward Air Controller (FAC), requesting close air support (CAS) to combat the enemy forces attacking their location.
A two-ship formation of A-10 aircraft responded to the call. Based on the information he possessed concerning the scheme of maneuver, the Bravo Company Commander, collocated with the FAC, identified their company as the lead element. Therefore, believing that only enemy forces were ahead, the Bravo company commander cleared the FAC to engage the enemy targets north of the canal.
The A-10s targeted what turned out to be Charlie company ground assets, making multiple passes against them. Eventually, the A-10s were informed to cease fire, which they did.
Eighteen Marines were killed during this engagement. The evidence, primarily witness statements and/or forensic reports, indicates that eight marines were killed due solely to enemy fire. The intensity of the enemy fire, combined with friendly fire, makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and sources of fires that killed the other 10 marines.
During this same period, 17 marines were wounded in action; 13 solely by enemy fire and one by distinct rounds of enemy and friendly fire. Three marines, one of which had a prior distinct injury from enemy fire, were simultaneously hit be enemy and friendly fire, the intensity of which makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and source of these injuries.
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issues:
1. How will friendly fire incidents be handled in CMSF?. Friendly fire incidents in CM1 were limited, but in Syria 2007, the massive firepower of U.S. forces could lead to some very nasty friendly fire incidents. (The summary is non-commital, but if you read the Charlie Company individual interviews, it's pretty clear the A-10s killed and wounded alot of marines).
2. terrain & bogging: from the above"...into the eastern section of the city where muddy conditions halted their advance (note: two AAVs, two tanks and a Humvee sank in the mud)....". The U.S. invaded Iraq, in what was supposed to be the best season for the attackers and here you have two tanks, tracked vehicles, sinking in the mud, going through a city! What's going to happen to the overweight, wheeled Stryker when it tries to go off-road in rural Syria?
3. command & control. It's pretty clear the battalion and company commanders lost track of friendly forces in the heat of the action, something which happened regularly in WWII and which will no doubt happen often in Syria 2007. (the summary is a bit dry, but in the full report, you find out that the leading company ran into 9 Iraqi T-55s, an event which would tend to rattle most commanders). Other than minimising Borg spotting, adding target memory, playing with command delays and command radius, will CMSF be very different from CMAK? I see Steve alluded to alot of new stuff in this respect in another post.
For those who are interested (or have a lot of time to kill), here is the link to the full report.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/a-10-friendly-fire_centcom29mar2004.htm
[ October 18, 2005, 02:17 AM: Message edited by: JC_Hare ]
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That's good to know. I have my doubts about the Stryker brigade concept, but I am looking forward to commanding one in CMSF ... as well as lighting up a few with Syrian ATGMs.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:...The December 2004 report is, however, something to look at. When you check it out (and you should) you'll need to know that many of the things brought up have been addressed already, either in the field or with upcoming upgrades. All new systems have teething problems...
Styrkers in CM:SF will be simulated, problems and all.
Steve
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That is an interesting question about the AT-3s. According to this site,
Most of them were manufactured in the 60s and 70s. There is apparently a newer model, the AT-3d which came out in the 90s. However, I had read in a different article that Syria has had problems acquiring equipment since the collapse of the Soviet Union and that the only missiles acquired by Syria in the nineties were the AT-10/14 and MILANs.
This article has a lot of information about the current state of the Syrian army:
The Military Balance in the Middle East
on page 38, the author states:
"For example, Syria's only modern third-generation anti-tank guided missile launchers consist of 200 Milans, 40 AT-5s, and an unknown number of AT-10s and AT-14s out of total holdings of some 3,390 anti-tank guided missile launchers."
[ October 16, 2005, 03:57 AM: Message edited by: JC_Hare ]
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This site lists an estimate of the equipment Syria has.
Syria is rumored to have about 800 AT-10/14 and 200 MILANs. These should be in CMSF and will be the weapons that give the U.S. player the most trouble. In all likelyhood, they will be fielded be Syrian commando/special forces units, which are the best trained and motivated Syrian troops. The AT-14 has an effective range of 3,500 meters, can penetrate up to 1.2 meters (i.e. 4 feet) of armour and has an optical/thermal sight. This troop/ATGM combo should be the greatest threat/challenge to U.S. armour in CMSF.
Syria has 3,000 AT-3s, but they will probably be fielded by second line infantry/reserve units who are not well trained and motivated and therefore should be a much smaller threat.
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According to soviet reports, the AT-3 SAGGER knocked 800 Israeli tanks (M-48s & M-60s) out of action for at least 24 hours in the Yom Kippur war, so they are a real threat, since Syria is supposed to have 3,000.
Having said that, they require a lot of training on the part of the operator, something the Syrian army is'nt strong on. The best troops will be equipped with the newer stuff, AT-14s and MILANs.
Also all the Syrian SAGGERs are at least 30 years old, we have no idea what conditions they are in or even how many can still fire.
I would be surprised if it's an effective weapon in CMSF.
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I, for one, am alot more psyched for this setting than normandy 1944 redux.
In 2007, Tank v. Tank warfare will be alot less important than in WWII. In 1991 and 2003, most Iraqi tanks, including the vaunted T-72s, were knocked out from the air or by U.S. tanks before they fired one shot. The situation should be the same in 2007. Tank v. Tank battles will be very one-sided and will get boring very quickly.
If you look at the article I posted above, these will be the Syrian units that will give the U.S. invading force the most trouble:
"• Give priority to elite commando and special forces units that can be used to defend key approaches to Syria and spearhead infiltrations and attacks. Many of these forces are equipped with modern anti-tank guided weapons and other modern crew and manportable weapons that allow them to disperse without relying on armored weapons and other systems Israel can target more easily. They are supported by attack helicopters..."
The most feared weapon in the Syrian arsenal will not be tanks but Anti-Tank missiles such as the AT-14 Kornet. In the 2003 invasion, the most feared anti-tank weapon in the Iraqi arsenal was the AT-14.
In march 2003, Iraqi commandos armed with AT-14 missiles were reported to have knocked out several Abrams tanks and Bradley AFVs, which surprised and worried U.S. commanders, although later U.S. studies attributed these kills to either friendly fire or RPGs.
The AT-14 is a wire guided weapon. The operator aims a laser beam at the target, fires, and keeps the beam on the target until impact. The missile rides the beam with input from the wire which has a maximum length of 3,500 meters. It has an optical and a thermal sight, which means it can be used day or night. The launcher weighs 19 kg (about 40 lbs) and the missile 27 kg (about 60 lbs) so it's comparable in size, weight and mobility to a WWII infantry mortar.
The AT-14 packs quite a punch. It has an effective range of 3,500 meters and contains a shaped charge that can penetrate up to 1.2 meters (i.e. 4 feet) of armour and foil reactive armored systems. To put it in CM1 terms, if a AT-14 team has a clean LOS to a King Tiger, it's dead.
The Kornet can also carry thermobaric explosives. These incendiary munitions release a fine spray of fuel before detonation, creating a fireball. Thermobaric explosives are designed to target infantry as well as light- or non-armored vehicles, such as trucks or Strykers.
Syria is believed to have up to 1,000 of these.
Having said all that, I hope the M1, T-55, T-62 and T-72s will all be included and fully modeled.
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I own CMBO, CMBB & CMAK. I enjoyed them a lot and I am really looking forward to CMSF. Based on past experience, I have no doubt that Battlefront will do another great job. So when is the demo coming out?
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I found a very interesting article dealing with the current state of the Syrian Armed Forces. Here are the interesting bits:
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Syrian Military Forces
current posture
"... Syria still treats Israel as an enemy power, but has had to abandon its search for conventional parity. As a result, it has had to minimize the risk of a future military clash with Israel, and make shifts in its strategy and procurement effort which include a new focus on “asymmetric warfare:” These shifts:
• Emphasize the procurement of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as a relativelylow cost offset to Israel’s conventional superiority while giving Syria a limited counterweight to Israel’s nuclear strike capability.
• Give priority to elite commando and special forces units that can be used to defend key approaches to Syria and spearhead infiltrations and attacks. Many of these forces are equipped with modern anti-tank guided weapons and other modern crew and manportable weapons that allow them to disperse without relying on armored weapons and other systems Israel can target more easily. They are supported by attack helicopters.
• Maintain a large tank force both as a deterrent to any Israeli attempt to penetrate Syria and to maintain a constant threat to the Golan, even if Syria has no hope of achieving overall parity.
• Use the Hezbollah and Amal as proxies to attack Israel and the SLA in Southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and the Shebaa Farms area..."
current procurement
"...These shifts cannot compensate for the recapitalization crisis ... and a lack of modern arms and military technology. Syria has attempted to remedy some of its growing modernization problems by procuring upgrades and technology from Russia and the West, but Syria has not done well in obtaining such help. Its only major conventional force improvements during the mid and late-1990s were some Ukrainian modifications for part of the T-55 tank fleet and AT-14 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles. Some reports indicate that the Syrian Armed Forces did acquire an additional 1500 Kornets as well as upgrade packages for up to a brigade of T-72 tanks. The upgrade will boost the T-72’s armor while adding an attachment that would enable the tank to fire ATGMs.65 Yet it is important to note that Syria has tried four previous times to upgrade the T-72s with little success and past attempts to incorporate elements of the current upgrade package met with great difficulty...
...Syria and Russia held new highly level talks on military cooperation in September 1999. These talks seem to have again involved a $2-2.5 billion deal over five years, and the possible purchase of the S-300 surface-to-air missile defense system, the Sukhoi Su-27 multirole fighter, MiG-29SMT fighters, T-80 tanks, and more anti-tank weapons. Once again, however, the contractual status of such agreements, the weapons involved, and delivery schedules remained unclear..."
officer corps
"...Syria’s limitations will be further compounded by its problems in absorbing new equipment. These include the endemic corruption. They also include its politicized and compartmented command structure, inadequate military pay, poor manpower management, poor technical training, and poor overall training - particularly in realistic combat exercises and aggressor training. Syrian forces have inadequate combat and service support, equipment for night and poor weather warfare, long-range sensors and targeting systems, and mobile rapidly maneuverable logistics, recording, and combat repair capability. While individual Syrian officers have shown a keen understanding of many of these problems, Syria has never taken effective action to deal with them.
Syrian Land Forces
Syria organizes its ground forces into two corps that report to the Land Forces General Staff and Commander of the Land Force. The chain of command then passes up to the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister, Minister of Defense (Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Syrian 1st Corps is headquartered near Damascus, and commands forces in southeastern Syria, opposing Israel. The 2nd Corps is headquartered near Zabadani, near the Lebanese border, and covers units in Lebanon. The command relationships involving Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq are unclear. The 1st Corps has two armored and three mechanized divisions. The 2nd Corps has three armored and two mechanized divisions.
The Syrian army has a total of 215,000 active men and is organized into five to seven armored divisions, including the 1st, 3rd, 9th, 11th, and 569th. Syrian armored divisions vary in size. They have 2-3 armored brigades, 1-2 mechanized brigades, and one artillery regiment. A typical division has around 8,000 men. A typical armored brigade has 93 main battle tanks, and 30 other armored fighting vehicles like the BMP. The Syrian army has 3 mechanized divisions. They normally have about 11,000 men, but vary in structure. They have 1-2 armored brigades, 2-3 mechanized brigades, and 1 artillery regiment. A typical mechanized brigade has 40 main battle tanks, and 90 other armored fighting vehicles like the BMP.
Syria also has 1 Republican Guard division, with 3 armored brigades, 1 mechanized brigade, and 1 artillery regiment that reports directly to the Commander of the Land Forces, plus a special forces division with 3 special forces regiments and eight independent special forces regiments.
Syria’s other independent formations include three independent infantry battalions, two independent artillery brigades, and two independent anti-tank brigades. Its active smaller formations include 1 border guard brigade, 3 infantry brigades, 1 anti-tank brigade, 1 independent tank regiment, 8 special forces regiments, three surface-to surface missile brigades with an additional coastal defense brigade, and 2 artillery brigades. According to some reports, it has one reserve armored division, and 30 reserve regiments, including infantry and artillery formations.
On paper, Syria has one low-grade reserve armored unit with about half the effective strength of its active divisions, plus 30 infantry and one artillery reserve regiment. Most of these Syrian reserve units are poorly equipped and trained. Those Syrian reserves that do train, usually do not receive meaningful training above the company to battalion level, and many train using obsolete equipment that is different from the equipment in the active units to which they are assigned. The Syrian call-up system is relatively effective, but the Syrian army is not organized to make use of it. Virtually all of the Syrian reserves called up in the 1982 war had to be sent home because the Syrian army lacked the capability to absorb and support them.
armour force
Although Syria now has a total of some 4,650 tanks, at least 1,200 of these tanks are in static positions or in storage. Roughly half are relatively low-grade T-54s and T-55s, and only 1,500 are relatively modern T-72s. Even the T-72s lack the advanced thermal sights, fire control systems, and armor to engage the Israeli Merkavas and M-60s on anything like a 1:1 basis. The T-72 also performed surprisingly poorly in Iraqi hands during the Gulf War. Its armor did not prove to be as effective against modern Western anti-tank rounds as was previously expected, and its sensors and fire control systems proved inadequate for night and poor visibility combat and could not keep up with Western thermal sights in range and target acquisition capability.
Syria has some 4,600 armored vehicles, of which approximately 2,400 are BMPs. These armored fighting vehicles can supplement and support Syria’s tanks in combined arms combat, and increase its potential ability to overwhelm
unmobilized Israeli forces with sheer mass. Only about 100 of these BMPs are the more modern BMP-2s, plus a limited number of BMP-3s. Nearly half of Syria’s other armor consists of low-grade BRDM-2 and BTR-40, 50, 60, and 152 reconnaissance vehicles and APCs. Even the BMP-2 has relatively light armor, and retains many of the ergonomic problems in fighting from the vehicle and using its guns and anti-tank guided missile launchers as with the BMP-1. The BMP has only moderate ability to escort tanks in a combat environment where the opponent has modern sensors and anti-tank guided weapons. US experts believe Syria has made relatively limited progress in improving its combined arms and armored warfighting capabilities since 1982, although it does have more advanced anti-tank guided weapons like the Milan, AT-10, and AT-14. They believe that Syrian exercise and command post training is weak above the battalion or regimental level, that Syrian tactics are rigid, and that Syrian reaction times are slow.
artillery park
Syria can mass large numbers of towed artillery weapons and multiple rocket launchers. Syria maintains an inventory of 150 122mm M-1938, 600 122mm D-30, 100 122mm M-1931 (mostly in storage), 600 130mm M-46, 20 152mm D-20, 50 152mm M-1937, and 10 180mm S23 towed weapons. Additionally, Syria employs 200 107mm Type-63 and 280 122mm BM-21 rocket launchers. This could have a major impact in an area like the Golan where ranges are relatively short and where Syria normally deploys much of its artillery. At the same time, massed artillery fire has only limited lethality against well dug in defenses and armor, and Syria lacks the sensors and battle management systems to concentrate its artillery fire with great precision and to rapidly switch fires. Syria will also have problems in maneuvering its artillery. Only about 28% of Syria's artillery consists of modern self-propelled weapons. These weapons include 380 122mm 2S1 and 50 152mm 2S3s.
anti-tank assets
Syria does have good physical defenses of its own positions on the Golan. Syria has spent decades in improving its terrain barriers and creating anti-tank barriers and ditches, and many of its units in the area between Damascus and the Golan have considerable readiness and effectiveness. However, Syria has not come close to Israel in developing the kind of capabilities for combined operations that the IDF takes virtually for granted. For example, Syria’s only modern third-generation anti-tank guided missile launchers consist of 200 Milans, 40 AT-5s, and an unknown number of AT-10s and AT-14s out of total holdings of some 3,390 anti-tank guided missile launchers. Most of its systems are still relatively low-grade anti-tank guided missiles systems can hardly be ignored, but they greatly reduce the effectiveness of Syrian anti-tank forces both in the defensive mode and in providing mechanized infantry support for armored operations..."(p.35-38)
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the full article can be found here:
http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_mb_ai.pdf
[ October 20, 2005, 12:52 PM: Message edited by: JC_Hare ]
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While searching for information about the Stryker, I came across some interesting documents, dealing with the weaknesses of the vehicle.
Stryker Brigades versus the reality of war
This is a document written for a U.S. congressman, who was trying to have the program killed, so you have to take it with a grain of salt.
However, this second document:
Initial impressions report - operations in Mosul, Iraq
is an internal U.S. army report from dec. 2004 assessing how the Strykers are doing on the ground in Iraq. It confirms alot of the same problems:
-the additional slat armour that was added to the Strykers only stops about half of the RPG attacks (p.48);
-The weight of the additional slat armour (about 5,000 lbs.) significantly impacts handling off road during the rainy season (p.49);
-The vehicle encounters soil bearing difficulties when operated off of an improved road and frequently becomes mired (p.50);
-The rear hatches are over exposed to enemy ground fire (p.53);
-The Stryker features a Head-Up display used by the vehicle commander. However, commanders do not use use it in potential combat situations since it has a blind spot which interferes with situational awareness and it's too large and difficult to use inside the vehicle (p.54);
-The FBCB2 computer (which displays current orders and the location of friendly and known enemy units) is too slow and frequently locks up (p.56);
-The digital systems overheat in the desert. Air conditioners are required (p. 56);
-The Machine Gun is not stabilised and cannot be fired accurately while the vehicle is on the move (p. 58);
Now some of these problems are obviously teething issues with a new weapon system, however some appear to be basic design flaws(i.e. inadaquate armour protection, poor off-road capability).
I presume Battlefront will model the Stryker accurately, warts and all. It looks like the best tactic for the Syrian player will be to pick them off with RPG's once they're stuck in the sand.
[ October 13, 2005, 04:16 AM: Message edited by: JC_Hare ]
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Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:
While I've been told to clear off from this thread some of my post has been discussed a bit so I feel that I ought to just clear up the emphasis that I meant in my point of view.
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the CMSF backstory may be closer to reality than people realise:
U.S. consults Israel over Syria regime change
I should add that whatever you read in middle east media has to be taken with a grain of salt, since information and disinformation are happily mixed in, but if this issue is being discussed in both the Jerusalem Post and the Arab News, it means most countries in the region think it's a serious possibility.
[ October 10, 2005, 03:52 AM: Message edited by: JC_Hare ]
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I agree that, in real life, they would probably ask Israel to stay on the sidelines, but CMSF is a game, I hope the IDF is added in a later module.Originally posted by Sergei:If USA and Arab allies (read: Iraq) were to attack Syria, do you think that White House would even dare to consider bringing up the option of asking Israel to come along? Because there is no freaking way that Israel and, say, Iraq or Jordan would be allies in a war.
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That is a very offensive comment. Equating all arabs as terrorists shows a total lack of knowledge of the region. It is like lumping U.S.A., Canada, U.K., Australia and the I.R.A. together because they all speak english and look the same.Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:WTF would anyone who is not a terrorist actually want to wargame playing militant Arabs against US and their allied Arab Forces anyway?
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc., all have their own diverging cultures, customs, histories.
I personally would have no problem commanding virtual Syrian forces against an invading U.S. force, just like I had no problem commanding virtual Soviet forces against an invading German force. It does not mean I support eithed Assad or Stalin.
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1. What is the rationale behind not having a Syrian campaign. Personally, I would like the option to play both sides.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:From the official announcement:
"The campaign is single player only from the US side. Quick Battles and user made Scenarios (using the Editor) can be played from both sides. Additionally there is an option to play "Blue on Blue" where US forces face off against US forces."
Someone also asked about Red on Red. I don't see why not, so probably that too.
Steve
2. Will it be possible for the user to create additional campaigns for the U.S. side?
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A follow up question, what assumptions are being made about Syrian air defenses? This could have a significant impact on the game.
Since 1965, SAM's have been the crucial component in air defences. In 1973, egyptian SAM's effectively neutralised the IAF which of course led to many tank battles since IDF forces were now the main line of defence.
However in 1991 and 2003, U.S. and allied forces ruled the sky and most Iraqi tanks were destroyed from the air before they even came in contact with coalition ground forces.
In CMSF, if we assume that Syrian air defences are on par with the Iraqis, there will be very few Syrian tanks left for U.S. ground forces to engage, which means most scenarios would be attacks on infantry forces.
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If you look at 1973, the IDF had the most trouble with the egyptian army. The syrians, however, were seen has the most urgent threat and the IDF initially mobilised their forces against Syria. The IDF did beat the egyptians and the syrians decisively, but they suffered significant losses in the process, which was what egypt and syria were shooting for. There is a good overview here, although it deals mostly with the suez front:
"The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory" by Dr. George W. Gawrych
The Iraqi's performance was even worse. They committed a armored brigade of T-55's which were ambushed and destroyed by IDF super shermans at Tel Maschara.
We could be in Syria well before 2007
in Combat Mission Shock Force 1
Posted
reality check: we are talking about a game.
I don't see the relevancy of discussing whether the US should or should not invade Syria. If it does'nt, we are not going to get CM:SF
If president Bush orders an invasion of Syria in 2007, how would the US and allied forces go about it, what should be modeled, what should be left out, that's the only thing that is relevant.
Alot of US officers were against the Iraq invasion (for military reasons) , but once the decision was made, it was Sir!, Yes Sir! , how can we do the best job possible.
It's the same thing here, the decision has been made, Battle.., err the UN is invading Syria, how would they do it, what forces would they use, how would Syria react, that's what we should be discussing.