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So are German forces "better" on average?


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If we look at wartime management as a whole... The Third Reich was vastly inferior to America, the UK, and even the Soviets. The only major adversary they were better at was the Italians, and supposedly they were on the same side :D

At the military leadership level the Germans were 2nd rate by 1944 (I'd argue 1942, but let's just say 1944). No matter how brilliant the minds were at OKW, in the end one lunatic got to decide what to do. "Brilliant" moves like not withdrawing and consolidating exposed positions that eventually lead to millions of irreplaceable casualties and massive losses of material with almost NOTHING to show for it. The list of massive operational blunders that were directly, and indirectly, linked to Hitler is extremely long. Ill advised offensives also cost the German forces dearly without much to show for it except being worse off than when the operation started.

Let's just say Germany's best and brightest leaders didn't try to kill Hitler because they thought he was doing a great job as commander in chief.

Oooo... I could rant on for a long time on this topic, but suffice to say the notion that higher level German leadership was better than Allied is demonstrably false. The Allies weren't perfect (caugh caugh Mark Clark, caugh caugh), but if you tally up the number and costs of really idiotic military decisions I think the Germans come out way ahead in both.

Steve

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You know it really makes you wonder whether a more focused research program in Germany would have produced a few more practical, high reliability weapons in quantity for the Heer. It is fun to speculate for instance, if the G43 semi-auto rifle (or alternative) had seen intensive development and overtaken the old warhorse Mauser bolt-action say in 1941 or 42, what kind of firepower would the typical German squad or platoon have at its disposal then? Quite a lot I would surmise from the lessons of the Garand on the US. Anyway, it has been a fun discussion guys.

Hey, we are down to a month now, right? :D

It is a fun speculation, but then again a higher command that was smart enough to realize that:

1. Running your economy at less-then-wartime production for five years of war is sheer idiocy

2.Being solely interested in expanding their little fiefdoms at the expense of greater good

accomplishes very little

would also be smart enough to not start the war in the first damn place. But I guess when your bureaucracy looks like the something out of the Five Families from The Godfather, you shouldn't expect much.

But yes, it is fun to discuss irregardless.

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Just to throw out a different example - take a look at the US assault on Carentan. Airborne troopers on both sides, Germans defending. The Germans were elite with combat experience, the Americans highly trained and motivated but new to combat. The US prevailed. Granted the 6th FJR fought very hard and had resupply issues, but there will always be mitigating factors for either side. Very high potential for a campaign game there especially with the addition of the 17th SS and 2nd Armored Divisions.

Yes, i too cant wait to see if battles like the one for St. Germain-sur-Seves can be simulated with CMBN !

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Just my two cents worth here. I think we all need to remember that no matter what nation you come from you're just a human. Sure the Wehrmacht produced some stellar men but so did the Russians, the Americans, the British, the Canadians, the Italians... I mean at the individual level there was heroics throughout the war.

But what I try to remember is these men experienced fear, doubt, anger, racism, happiness. All things that are around today, and no matter what flag they were fighting for we need to respect the fact that they spent a good matter of time in mud, rain and snow with bullets flying and friends dieing. I have a good family friend who was a member of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front and he saw not only his friends but just fellow soldiers gunned down all around him. He isn't a super-human German, he is just a broken old man who served his country when it called him and I respect that. Things about inherrent ability being linked to bloodlines or races leads to mistakes such as those Japs can't fly planes or even perform night raids, those squinty eyes arn't any good at night!

*queue effective night ambush on British/Americans in Pacific Theatre*

I do realize that you're argueing about operational doctrine but as a wargamer it's easy to think of the men that fought as just pixels/assets to be allocated around.

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At the lower levels (Division and lower to company level) the Germans were tactical more skilful, there are numerous written accounts about that especially in the year 1944 after Normandy landings. The main tactical advantage they had was tactical initiative, meaning that the commander (company, battalion) was not waiting for further orders from upper command but on his own initiative (the doctrine taught them that) they need to occupy the best defensive or attacking positions even without instruction to do so. The allies lack this initiative (soviets feared for their lives if found disobeying orders, US and British doctrines didn't really encourage this). Also the allies (US, UK) were really afraid of exposing their flanks which the Germans had no trouble doing this, and Germans realized that in Normandy and used it effectively through out the campaing.

So the tactical doctrines were the mayor issue here not man vs man.

br.

Dr.Jones

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Referring to my previous post about flanks. One the main reason for Allied "broad" offensive approach to defeating the Germans was the fear of exposing the flanks, that why Dwight D. Eisenhower enforced this not just because of the political tensions between US and UK. They were really concerned about their flanks on Army level down to battalion level.

br.

Dr.Jones

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There's a non-linear relationship between German manpower and firepower that’s not present for the Americans. If they lose a man, as long as the LMG is in operation, their available f/p stays much the same. If you lose half the men from an American squad, you’ve lost roughly 50% of your f/p.

In a fixed position where you're not lugging around a lot of ammo then the Germans can keep putting a lot of rounds down-range while the units facing them attrite. Great for defending. Of course on the offence where you have to lug all those heavy boxes around you end up with very little ammo depth.

And of course, if the LMG goes down they're lost until it’s re-manned.

They also have short range specialists that can dominate if being closely assaulted – so controlling the range is vital for the Americans. Keep to a range where you can whittle them down before you assault and you can get the advantage. In RL, this must have been almost impossible to do –even if they thought to do it.

There's also the matter of getting men to fire. Although SLM isn’t gospel, being the person in a German squad with the LMG, you'd be expected to fire by all your mates, so probably would.

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It is a fun speculation, but then again a higher command that was smart enough to realize that:

1. Running your economy at less-then-wartime production for five years of war is sheer idiocy

Germany was the country that had the second largest percent of its GNP mobilized for war, for the entire war 1939-1945 (only the Soviet Union had a higher percent of GNP mobilized for war). That Germany mobilized their economy for war in 1943-44 is a myth that is very much debunked by for example Adam Tooze in 'The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy', a very recommended book in my opinion.

You can blame the nazi regime for a LOT of things, but you can't really say that they didn't make an effort in producing weapons of war.

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Germany was the country that had the second largest percent of its GNP mobilized for war, for the entire war 1939-1945 (only the Soviet Union had a higher percent of GNP mobilized for war). That Germany mobilized their economy for war in 1943-44 is a myth that is very much debunked by for example Adam Tooze in 'The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy', a very recommended book in my opinion.

You can blame the nazi regime for a LOT of things, but you can't really say that they didn't make an effort in producing weapons of war.

Concur. The problem isn't that they didn't try; the problem was that it was just beyond their capability to compete with the combined productivity of their enemies. Add to that the inefficiencies introduced by the Nazi habit of empire building and you get an economy that stumbles a lot.

Michael

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At the lower levels (Division and lower to company level) the Germans were tactical more skilful, there are numerous written accounts about that especially in the year 1944 after Normandy landings. The main tactical advantage they had was tactical initiative, meaning that the commander (company, battalion) was not waiting for further orders from upper command but on his own initiative (the doctrine taught them that) they need to occupy the best defensive or attacking positions even without instruction to do so. The allies lack this initiative (soviets feared for their lives if found disobeying orders, US and British doctrines didn't really encourage this). Also the allies (US, UK) were really afraid of exposing their flanks which the Germans had no trouble doing this, and Germans realized that in Normandy and used it effectively through out the campaing.

Sure the German tactical doctrine emphasised quick action with available forces and in many cases against an unprepared foe it worked well but in the main it was a flawed tactic.

Allied action emphasised a considered and deliberate approach which, while not "spectacular" was in the end far more effective. Sure there are numerous examples of German units breaking the line and sweeping on but once the Allies learned not to panic when this happened and , with due regards to flanks, hold firm, the strikes petered out and resulted in heavy casualties. The Falaise pocket was a result of disregard for flanks as was the reduction of the Ardennes salient.

The notion of allied company commanders awaiting orders from on high before occupying defensive positions or staging a quick attack is just silly.

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At the military leadership level the Germans were 2nd rate by 1944 (I'd argue 1942, but let's just say 1944).
The distinction is important, since they pretty much lost in 1943. The later crazy actions can be explained as acts of desperation by someone who wasn't terrilby stable to start with.
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To Magpie,

It is interesting to turn to German intelligence reports of this period such as one from Panzer Lehr which declared that a successful break-in by the enemy was seldom exploited to pursuit. If our own troops were ready near the front for a local counter -attack, the ground was immediately regained.
This quote from Overlord by Max Hastings (Location 2804 of 7724 Kindle), after explaining of rigidity of allied attacks.

The SHAEF appreciation of the Normandy battlefield in April had correctly assessed the bocage as country in which, it will … be most difficult for the enemy to prevent a slow and steady advance by infiltration.20 The Germans were masters of this art, working small parties behind Allied positions and forcing the defenders out by showing that their flanks were turned. Allied infantry seldom employed the technique, and thus denied themselves an important means of progress in close country. Their commanders relied almost invariably upon the setpiece battalion attack, with two companies forward. This tactic was far too rigid and predictable to defeat a determined defence. In a circular to commanding officers late in June, Montgomery made a vain effort to urge units to show more flexibility. He deplored the habit of preparing troops to fight the normal battle. He wrote: This tendency is highly dangerous, as there is no such thing as the normal battle. Leaders at all levels must adapt their actions to the particular problems confronting them. The problem had been succinctly analysed a few weeks earlier by a British corps commander in Italy:

The destruction of the enemy was most easily achieved when we managed to keep him tired and in a state of disorganisation, which resulted in unco-ordinated defence and lack of food, petrol and ammunition. We were undoubtedly too inelastic in our methods when faced with changing conditions. After six weeks of mobile fighting, during which the enemy never launched anything bigger than weak company counter-attacks, we still talked too much about firm bases and exposed flanks.

I woudn't write something without backing. :P

br.

Dr.Jones

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To Magpie,

This quote from Overlord by Max Hastings (Location 2804 of 7724 Kindle), after explaining of rigidity of allied attacks.

I woudn't write something without backing. :P

br.

Dr.Jones

There is unquestionably some truth to this. However you are talking about a US army that was rushing divisions through training and then throwing them right into combat. Even Meindl the II Para Corp commander conceded the Americans "got better" as the summer progressed. To make a statement on German unit capability versus US unit capability, you have to also include what period you are covering as both sides capability changed over time. As regards the statement from Panzer Lehr, you could apply the same to their actions. Hedgerow country made it really difficult to maintain an offensive. Everything became so compartmentalized that unit cohesion was difficult in the extreme to manage. There are plenty of examples of German counterattacks toward the beachheads being diverted when German units flanks were exposed. A lot of IFs for the German army, but the reality is that despite throwing in the cream of the Wehrmacht, they were never able to seriously threaten the allied landings. Those pointing out the Axis would have achieved more without US air and artillery firepower never say well the Germans without the MG 42 and just using Pz IVs versus the US without .... you fight with what you have and your doctrine stresses.

To the question originally posited I would have to agree that factoring in German experience when facing those units that actually deserve it would make sense. But the same would apply to US units. The 90th ID for example IIRC went through quite a bit of transformation during the Normandy campaign. This may be something for scenario creators to factor in when designing for specific units or battles. The units involved would vary in their combat capability depending on the timing of the scenario and the specific unit. The 90th for example might be consider green or inexperienced in June, but regular at least by late July. A German unit that might be considered experienced in June would likely be regarded as fatigued and well understrength by late July.

I think we all get caught up too much in looking at a fixed point in time when the reality was all sides involved were in a state of flux. Part of what will make scenario design interesting is there are so many possibilities depending on what units are being included, when and where.

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When factoring in everything that the CMx2 engine can model I still think that there were no differences between the soldiers when equipment, experience, fitness, supplies and doctrines were scaled off.

When playing CMBN you could, in theory, play the US forces as would German infantry have acted (with fast and low level initiatives on a company and platoon level) with "schwerpunkt" units or objectives set by the player.

One could also play the superior firepower doctrine, base of fire and large components of attached divisional support with German units.

It all comes down to the points and equipment because things like the differences in training and leadership between the Germans and the Allies are simply not modeled in the CMx2 engine.

Trying to model the differences would diminish the efforts and skill of the players themselves and would also create a LESS flexible engine compared to now.

The option to tweak experience and fitness levels as well as providing the Allied forces the superiority in artillery and other supportive elements they in fact had is quite enough for any scenario designer IMO.

edit: final input as a rehashed answer to the OP.

Yes a typical Normandie timeframe German battalion should win most engagements against a typical US battalion given fair conditions/odds. Simply because a veteran was usually a better soldier than a green one. The reverse would also be true, a veteran US serviceman should beat a green German.

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The Germans were masters of this art, working small parties behind Allied positions and forcing the defenders out by showing that their flanks were turned.

Now that's funny. coincidentally, just last night I was in a game where my Paras found German units on their open flanks. So I retired them to safety fifty meters back. I won the battle on points but lost the loction.

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Concur. The problem isn't that they didn't try; the problem was that it was just beyond their capability to compete with the combined productivity of their enemies. Add to that the inefficiencies introduced by the Nazi habit of empire building and you get an economy that stumbles a lot.

Comparing relative investments of GDP doesn't mean a thing when you're nation's existence is at stake. The facts are the facts... German wartime production peaked in 1944 after a massive expansion in 1943. And they were short of material even then. So the notion that the German economy was fully focused on war prior to 1943 is demonstrably false. I mean, if you're running as fast as you can, how can you possibly run 50% faster? Either you're running at top speed or you're not.

The reason the Germans didn't have their wartime economy on full speed ahead early on is for two very well established reasons:

1. The entire German mentality of war was short, decisive campaigns. This goes back to the ashes of WW1. Actually, it goes back MUCH further, but WW1 was the lesson that hammered home Germany's need to not engage in protracted warfare because of it's geographical position and it's shortage of critical war materials.

The German's campaign against Russia was a surprise to pretty much everybody except the top leadership. There was no planning for it to drag out even into 1942, not to mention 1943. Therefore, the economy had no time to gear up for that sort of struggle because there wasn't supposed to be a struggle.

2. It was not lost upon the Third Reich leadership that military reversals, rationing, and casualties meant a weakening of resolve amongst the population. When everything goes great you can get away with a lot of crap, but when things start to go down the tubes people do begin to question. Reading the secret SD reports (from domestic spy operations) clearly shows that the Third Reich leadership was aware they needed to tread carefully. Moving to a full out wartime economy puts a strain on the credibility that everything is going fine.

Sure the German tactical doctrine emphasised quick action with available forces and in many cases against an unprepared foe it worked well but in the main it was a flawed tactic.

Allied action emphasised a considered and deliberate approach which, while not "spectacular" was in the end far more effective.

Indeed. The end result is what is important to keep in mind. The Germans lost all major engagements on the Western Front by any standard you wish to advance. This doesn't mean the Allies didn't pay a high price at times, because they did, but ultimately the Germans came off worse since their losses meant nothing.

The notion of allied company commanders awaiting orders from on high before occupying defensive positions or staging a quick attack is just silly.

Silly indeed :D Just look at Remagen or Patton's move to relieve Bastogne, not to mention the operations after the breakthrough in Normandy. The Allies didn't have a problem with lethargy of leadership. In fact, the case can be made that the Allied leadership had superior flexibility, as expressed on the battlefield, than the Germans did in 1944-45. As the war went on German leaders were told to hold and/or take things that could not be held and/or taken. That's not a sign of good leadership.

To make a statement on German unit capability versus US unit capability, you have to also include what period you are covering as both sides capability changed over time.

Exactly. I can easily find examples in the early Normandy campaign where German performance was abysmal at the tactical level. Horrible. I'm not even talking about the 3rd rate units that were entrusted with securing the French coast, but the supposed 1st rate units that were in the rear of the initial Allied onslaught. And it goes on from there. Anybody who has studied the performance of the 12th SS PzDiv in the Bulge knows what a marginal shell of a unit it became. Not that it's tactical performance in Normandy was all that good. It usually boiled down to stubborn and suicidal defense, which isn't exactly what I think of as good tactical doctrine.

With all this said... this doesn't mean that the Germans were crap and the Allies all kinds of awesome. It just means the age old stereotypes of German superiority and Allied bumbling with bigger guns is still something that needs to be corrected.

Steve

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Comparing relative investments of GDP doesn't mean a thing when you're nation's existence is at stake. The facts are the facts... German wartime production peaked in 1944 after a massive expansion in 1943. And they were short of material even then. So the notion that the German economy was fully focused on war prior to 1943 is demonstrably false. I mean, if you're running as fast as you can, how can you possibly run 50% faster? Either you're running at top speed or you're not.

I'll take 'investment in productive capacity' for 50%, thanks Vanna. :D

The key reason the Germans were able to ramp up their production so spectacularly in 1943/44 was because in the late '30's and early '40's they spent massive sums increasing the productive capacity of a wide range of war-critical (and, yeah, in some cases not so critical) manufacturing facilities.

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To Magpie,

This quote from Overlord by Max Hastings (Location 2804 of 7724 Kindle), after explaining of rigidity of allied attacks.

I woudn't write something without backing. :P

Great quotes, very insightful. I haven't read this book - must pick it up since I've already plowed through my reread of Keegan and some of the old Green Books. After 3 years on the mean streets of Ramadi, I must say I am getting really reenergized about WWII.

And has anyone else noticed that the calibre (scholarliness, grogginess, whatever) of the discussion has really ramped up in the last 3 months (although there was some outstanding discussion on the CMSF boards, don't get me wrong).

I think a lot of the spirit of the old community is Baaaaaaaaaaaaack......:)

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Great quotes, very insightful. I haven't read this book - must pick it up

Be aware that Hasting's book is now over 25 years old. I've had a copy for about that long, and like it well enough, but it is very much a product of it's time. In particular; Hastings genuflects heavily at the shrine of Whermacht supremacy. At the risk of name dropping, John Salt once opined to me that about the best thing to come out of Hastings' "Overlord" was the ire of many veterans, which led directly to some really good books like Blackburn's trilogy on the Canadian artillery.

D'Estes "Decision in Normandy" is about the same vintage, and has many of the same issues. About the only other potted campaign history that I can think of is Beevor's recent tome. I haven't read it, but based on some of the reviews on Amazon I doubt that I ever will. See, for example, Simon Trew's review here.

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Be aware that Hasting's book is now over 25 years old. I've had a copy for about that long, and like it well enough, but it is very much a product of it's time. In particular; Hastings genuflects heavily at the shrine of Whermacht supremacy

I wouldn't say that Hasting is a Wermacht fanboy he just writes the fact which happened during the campaign. Allies were really beaten on the hedges in Normandy they couldn't penetrate the line. At last they were so desperate that they called in the 1000 carpet bombers to break the line, that's real desperation for you. They were stuck in Normandy for more than a month (almost 2).

br.

Dr.Jones

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They were stuck in Normandy for more than a month (almost 2).

True, but during all that time they were steadily expanding the lodgment area and grinding the Germans down. It went slower than had been projected for those two months, but then after the breakout into more open country it speeded up beyond those same projections. And the reason was that the German army in the west had been chewed up and reduced to little more than the skeleton of its former self by that selfsame slow, steady fighting. That meant that there was little left to slow the Allies down save their reduced ability to keep the forward troops supplied.

Michael

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The key reason the Germans were able to ramp up their production so spectacularly in 1943/44 was because in the late '30's and early '40's they spent massive sums increasing the productive capacity of a wide range of war-critical (and, yeah, in some cases not so critical) manufacturing facilities.

Investments? Like taking over Czechoslovakia? :D Seriously, though, one of the big reasons for their increased production is that they were farting around a lot before 1943, not because they lacked the industrial capacity. In fact, they built up new capacity despite entire cities being laid waste by heavy bombers. The thought of what they could have done in 1940 had Hitler decided to get ready for taking on the Soviets before he started instead of after he lost... things would have been quite different, I think.

I wouldn't say that Hasting is a Wermacht fanboy he just writes the fact which happened during the campaign.

Depends on what you consider "facts". If a historian focuses on one set of "facts" to the detriment of another, then the overall picture painted may be distorted even though there is nothing factually incorrect. Omission is it's own form of bias, no matter what the reasons for omissions are.

Max Hastings is what I call an "entertainer historian", like Lucas and others. They get a lot of credit for putting the German side of the war into English, but they generally were more story tellers than ridged historians. "Facts" were mixed with colorful descriptions which set a tone for these works which could definitely be seen as one sided.

Allies were really beaten on the hedges in Normandy they couldn't penetrate the line. At last they were so desperate that they called in the 1000 carpet bombers to break the line, that's real desperation for you. They were stuck in Normandy for more than a month (almost 2).

Germans were stuck in the Bulge and Stalingrad. Difference is that in the end they lost both, and how.

Seriously, I don't understand what the big hang up is with the Allies getting stuck up in the Hedgerow country. Yeah, the Allies had a tough time. Only a completely incompetent defender would have allowed the Allies to move quicker than they did, an the Germans weren't incompetent at the tactical level. However, they couldn't afford the cost for defending the terrain so tenaciously and higher up nobody recognized that Normandy was basically a holding action. They should have been setting up a new defensive line as soon as they realized they couldn't push the Allies into the ocean. But they didn't and therefore within one month the Germans lost France to the Allies, leaving behind a pile of bodies and equipment they could ill afford to lose.

Steve

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