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Defeat at Kasserine--A meaty, groggy Master's thesis


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sand digger - you simply don't know what debate you are jumping into. There is a standing slander campaign against US force planners, McNair especially, alleging that the US had criminally substandard armor equipment throughout the entire war because all of their (and his) ideas about armored warfare were stupid and he botched everything.

McNair developed US TD doctrine based precisely on the German doctrine of PAK fronts, and on US "wargame" testing that confirmed the value of defending AT weapons against tank attacks. Those slandering him pretend that TDs were a hopeless failure because they weren't heavy tanks. They pretend that only having invulnerable front plates on the standard tank in the fleet along with a gun that kills every opponent is acceptable, and pretend that operational outcomes (and losses) turn on the question.

In fact, the American force structure tamed "blitzkrieg" easily, it just had little call to do so because the Germans so rarely had large amounts of armor to throw at them. TDs outscored tanks attacking them and were instrumental in defeating every large scale German armor attack after Kasserine. And tank gun-armor specs are of such little operational importance, that in literally every major case throughout the entire war, the side winning operationally was in the lighter, thinner, and weaker tanks. (France 1941, Russia 1941-42, Russia 1943-45, Italy 1943-5, France 1944-5, etc).

The whole point I am making is that such tank spec details did not matter very much, and doctrine and operational factors did. It mattered that one have sufficient reasonably capable armor in armor-led formations with all arms support, and sound combined arms doctrine. Upgunning was needed to neutralize enemy armor upgrade moves but entirely sufficient to do so.

The US force planners correctly understood all of this before the force even faced the enemy and designed it accordingly. When the men didn't know how to use their weapons they could still stuff things up, and did at Kasserine when first "seeing the elephant". As soon as they learned how to use their weapons they did fine, and the changes in their weapon mix or that of their opponents over time had nothing to do with any of the operational results seen.

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JasonC,

Did I sleep through the lecture? I read Gabel's Seek, Strike and Destroy, and I don't remember reading anything in there on PaK fronts. http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp#papers What I do remember, though, is a McNair developed doctrine of SP TDs chasing down tanks that have broken through, rather than in the manner of hounds running down a fox, backed by towed TDs. The doctrine proved singularly ineffective, as did the initial means for carrying it out. El Guettar debuted the M10, and this was the beginning of relative sanity in that it engaged from carefully chosen defensive ground and didn't go tearing off like some excited terrier spotting a rat. Gabel's own analysis showed that SP TDs (M10, M18, M36) were not only many times more combat effective than towed TDs, but that they were also far more survivable.

You should also understand that the wargames were rigged to prove McNair's doctrine was correct. Long before I joined military aerospace, Dad informed me of this practice, called a directed study. When I asked him about this, Dad said "Son, it's when the study proves that what the admiral or general decided beforehand is right." To see some of this at work, consider the remarkable force mix on Blue's side at the Carolina War Games. (Fair use)

http://www.efour4ever.com/44thdivision/wargames.htm

"The November 1941 Carolina war games primary purpose involved testing a consequential hypothesis:

Mobile antitank gun units, offensively employed, could defeat armor.

The war game pitted a largely infantry force with 4,320 more or less mobile antitank cannon against two armored divisions supported by a motorized infantry division, with 865 tanks and armored scout cars. The decision went to the antitank units."

Under, say, Torch period TO&E, how many divisions would it take to field such an enormous quantity of antitank guns? The 37 mm M3 Wiki provides some useful insight.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/37_mm_Gun_M3

"US Army

Under organization from April 1942, each infantry battalion had an anti-tank platoon with four 37 mm guns (1/4 ton trucks, better known as jeeps, were authorized as prime movers) and each regiment an anti-tank company with twelve (towed by 3/4 ton trucks). Each of the four divisional artillery battalions possessed six anti-tank guns, combat engineering battalion nine pieces (towed by M2 halftracks); in addition, divisional headquarters had four (towed by 3/4 ton trucks) and divisional maintenance company two.[7]

A 37 mm gun on a M5A1 Stuart tank

Although an earlier organization included divisional anti-tank battalion (two companies of 37 mm guns and one company of 75 mm guns), in December 1941 AT battalions were removed from divisional structure and reorganized as independent tank destroyer battalions; their towed guns were replaced with self-propelled ones as soon as the latter became available.[8]"

Taking the divisional structure as triangular, with 3 battalions to the regiment and three regiments to the division, 9 x 4 battalion guns = 36 (+ 3 x 12 guns at regiment AT =36), for a total of 72 in the line units (+6 x 4=24 div arty)=96 (+ 9 in the CE battalion) = 104 (+ 4 in Div HQ) = 108 and (+2 in Div maintenance) = 110 M3 guns per infantry division.

That means it would've required 39.27 1942 pattern IDs to field McNair's antitank gun extravaganza, fighting 2 x ID and 1 x AD. 39:3 = 11:1 odds Blue vs Red. No wonder the doctrine worked!

Nor is this an isolated incident, as seen by this merciless dissection of another exercise with a big time agenda--Millennium Challenge 2002 (Fair use)

http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/01/14/millennium-challenge/

"Gen. William “Buck” Kernan, head of Joint Forces Command, told Pentagon reporters July 18 that Millennium Challenge was nothing less than “the key to military transformation.” Central to the success of the war game, Kernan said, was that the U.S. force (or Blue Force) would be fighting a determined and relatively unconstrained Opposing Force (otherwise known as the OPFOR or Red Force). “This is free play,” he said. “The OPFOR has the ability to win here.”

Sounds good so far…

“Not so,” Van Riper told Army Times. “Instead of a free-play, two-sided game as the Joint Forces commander advertised it was going to be, it simply became a scripted exercise. They had a predetermined end, and they scripted the exercise to that end.” … Exercise officials denied him the opportunity to use his own tactics and ideas against Blue, and on several occasions directed the Opposing Force not to use certain weapons systems against Blue. It even ordered him to reveal the location of Red units, he said

“We were directed … to move air defenses so that the Army and Marine units could successfully land,” he said. “We were simply directed to turn [the air-defense systems] off or move them. … So it was scripted to be whatever the control group wanted it to be.” …

Believe that speaks for itself!

Another good example is the Navy practice of not allowing carriers to be sunk in war games.

To say McNair cooked the war game would be charitable in the extreme, and I believe he was the man who commanded AGF when the troops in the field were screaming for a more powerful, better protected tank, but resisted at every turn.

Regards,

John Kettler

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At a slight tangent-- does the development of the M1 (with invulnerable front plates and heavy-hitting gun) fit into this debate, as seen from the post-war perspective ? I.e. the M1 as the "King Tiger" redux, and designed to prove that specs are the things that matter ?

Just a thought

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jtcm,

The U.S. tried many times to build a winning tank before it began producing the M1, thought to be practically invulnerable as first built, but later discovered to be highly vulnerable to 1960s vintage Russian HEAT, not to mention later Russian DU, leading to the HA models. Once it got such matters sorted out, it had a winner, with, if you will, King Tiger hitting power and protection, coupled with T-34 on steroids flotation and mobility. The M1 was consciously designed as a top of the line tank designed to offset huge OPFOR numerical advantage, capitalizing on far better crew training, better ergonomics, ability to fire as accurately on the move as earlier tanks could while static, dramatically lower acoustic signature (leading to "M1 surprise" when it rolled up on "enemy" who didn't hear it coming), state of the art night/obscured battlefield visionics, powerful gun, top quality FCS, high ROF and superb crew survivability if hit. In short, the M1 was everything a King Tiger might aspire to be--while having no hope whatsoever of achieving those goals!

I think it fair to call the M1 Abrams, at least compared to what preceded it, a super tank. Granted, one doesn't necessarily need a super tank in order to triumph, but in a society like ours which has stupidly bought the myth of bloodless warfare and is therefore highly casualty intolerant, it helps. As the annual NATO Canadian Army Trophy records show, though, putting steel/tungsten/DU on target really comes down to crew quality, cohesion and experience, not having the highest tech tank, as seen in last post here.

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/2-13698.aspx

For a more complete look at the CAT competition, structure and years of telling results, please see the Wiki.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Army_Trophy

Regards,

John Kettler

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jtcm - the US considered the Patton a sufficient upgrade for decades. It was based on the experience with the Pershing in Korea, which showed the power plant was inadequate for a tank in that weight class, and the Patton solved that problem. The M-60 came next and was essentially an upgunning and soft systems upgrade to the Patton design. Thereafter the US focused on soft systems dominance - fire control and sensors - not gun-armor specs.

The Leopard tank was the innovation that prompted the M1. There were intermediate attempts to work with the Germans to produce a replacement for the M-60 that largely just made a more expensive M-60 level tank. They borrowed the gun from the British Centurion - and later upgraded that to the German 120mm from the Leopard II. The armor tech involved (layered ceramic armor etc) was developed by the British in the 1960s. Essentially none of the gun-armor innovations were American or inspired by analysis of American anything. The American design contributions were the huge power plant for very high speed, the advanced fire control (especially later upgrade models with their onboard targeting computers), and the overall systems integration work.

The WW II era slander campaign had nothing to do with it. The most one could say in that respect is that the US abolished the TD force at the end of the war, viewing it as having been a failure, not at its designed AT role (it did that fine) but because that specialized role was viewed as a diversion of resources. The US simply hadn't faced "Blitzkrieg" challenges serious enough for it to matter most of the time (the Bulge is about the only case), and since the TD force spent most of its time on other missions, it was thought better to use weapons designed for those other missions. (ATGMs revived the role of dedicated AT subformations for technical reasons, later).

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To JK - I'm not interested in your reguritating the slanders I am denouncing, and if that is all you are going to do I'm just going to spit and walk. But it will suffice to point out that McNair designed the SP TD force, wanted them SP, that the flocking to the "wound" site worked operationally just fine in every major German armor attack on US forces, that is in no way failed at that task. And bringing up unrelated 2002 tests, WTF? Red herring anyone? Give me a break.

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I don't think I have the military history culture to appreciate exactly what's going on here-- but is the following correct ? There is a conventional view that US failures at Kasserine and general performance in Europe during WWII is due to faulty doctrine (TDs fight and contain tanks, whereas tanks support infantry ? break through ??)-- due to this McNair chap-- and concomitant choices, namely insufficient armour and armament on AFVs. JasonC disputes this, on two grounds: the armour specs were actually fine for Africa and fine in Normandy too, and the doctrine was good.

-Is this right ?

-who's correct ?

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If by "conventional" one means the sort of street corner washboard activists writing tell all slanders of better men than themselves, and being taken up by every ambulance chaser as delicious mud, then yes. The book titles tell the story - "death traps". Men claiming that they had to fight WW II with substandard equipment because REMFs screwed the pooch and everyone died needlessly as a direct result - that sort of thing.

Neatly overlooking that it worked, and won, and the lessons were already there, and the Germans were no different in learning curve etc, and war is bloody any way it is sliced, etc, etc. Then unrelated issues are dragged in endlessly and conflated with their thesis, so any comment about WW II US force planning or doctrine or equipment or upgrades to same turns into "see, I was right, the REMFs were all murdering stupid bastards who knew nothing" blah blah blah.

It is basically a very old crapstorm, that's all.

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JasonC,

Your ability to ignore data which don't fit your preconceived model is truly impressive. You have no comment whatsoever on the bombshell I uncovered regarding the Carolina War Games and how the practice continues these days (Millennium Challenge 2002) other than to call the latter a red herring?

These sorts of things have been going on a long, long time, giving us such marvels as Bradley survivability tests in which the vehicle had water in the fuel tanks and inert ammo loaded (became an HBO movie The Pentagon Wars) and the firepower demonstration in which the entire target array at China Lake was loaded with radio controlled demolitions in case of duds. It was revealed when the overzealous backup man fired the charges before the air delivered ordnance hit the ground! That last is straight from my former boss at Hughes, who was there when it happened.

As a debate tactic, it probably gives you all sorts of warm fuzzies, but it doesn't advance the discussion, nor does summarily dismissing and labeling opposing thoughts as "regurgitating slanders." You flat out refuse to rationally discuss that which doesn't fit your model of how things were, then in an apparent snit say, in essence, that if I persist in this line of discussion, you're going to take your toys and go home. So adult!

As for REMFs screwing things up and getting the grunts killed, I give you Hallahan's Misfire, a book which shows the Army Ordnance Corps has done a superb job of screwing up small arms going back almost two centuries.

http://www.amazon.com/Misfire-William-H-Hallahan/dp/0684193590

Fallows in National Defense chronicles how the Ordnance Corps screwed up the M16 by changing from relatively clean burning stick powder to its preferred ball powder (and cozy relationship with the powder manufacturer), jamming the mechanism with fouling and getting who knows how many GIs killed or wounded. It then iced the cake by failing to supply cleaning kits! By contrast, the Air Force's rifles, running on the original stick powder, performed fabulously well.

Along the same lines, it was a running joke in Armed Forces Journal International that Natick Labs were incapable of developing an effective combat boot, citing a history of embarrassing failures going back to World War II. Nor did it help that the "squared away" types insisted on turning a rough surfaced, therefore nonreflecting, boot into a mirror surfaced, gleaming parade model. That same mentality gave us starched cammies! The load bearing equipment saga is just about as ugly.

You may not WANT to believe such things go on, but the evidence shows they do, in a never ceasing struggle for budget, missions, prestige, span of command, officer slots, etc., with the warrior in the field often an afterthought and the victim.

Regards,

John Kettler

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There is a conventional view that US failures at Kasserine and general performance in Europe during WWII is due to faulty doctrine (TDs fight and contain tanks, whereas tanks support infantry ? break through ??)-- due to this McNair chap...

I don't believe there was anything particularly faulty in the doctrine at the time it was formulated. It just got overtaken by events. Specifically, by 1944 the Germans were by and large no longer able to stage the kind of blitzkrieg armored attacks the TDs were designed to repel. So the TDs often got used as substitute tanks, a role for which they were not terribly well suited.

As for US tanks not being able to go toe to toe one to one with German tanks, this is a subject that has been hashed over many times in these pages. The part of the discussion relevant to your question is that nobody felt that stopping production of the Sherman in favor of a heavier tank was a good idea as that would have meant far fewer tanks in the ETO, which in turn would have left the PBI with much less armored support.

Could the whole issue have been handled more economically in terms of lives, matériel, and effort to win the war? Sure, but that's nearly always true in every area you look at. It's impossible to foresee exactly what course the war is going to go in and prepare for that specific eventuality. So you make your best guess and hope it is close enough.

If you want to look at a really screwed up doctrine, try "the bomber will always get through". But again, the first time those words were uttered they were not at all unreasonable. The doctrine was simply overtaken by events and as a result men died by the thousands. War is hell. It is also the province of chaos.

Michael

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I don't believe there was anything particularly faulty in the doctrine at the time it was formulated. It just got overtaken by events. Specifically, by 1944 the Germans were by and large no longer able to stage the kind of blitzkrieg armored attacks the TDs were designed to repel. So the TDs often got used as substitute tanks, a role for which they were not terribly well suited.

I do not think this is the main reason for the demise of the antitank doctrine. After 1944 it was the Soviets who had the ability to stage massive armored attacks, but still the Americans did not seem to be thrilled with the use of TDs as one relative cheap countermeasure against Soviet armor.

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After 1944 it was the Soviets who had the ability to stage massive armored attacks, but still the Americans did not seem to be thrilled with the use of TDs as one relative cheap countermeasure against Soviet armor.

In the 1950s the American (and by extension, NATO) countermeasure to Soviet tank armies was massive nuclear retaliation. It was after the nuclear standoff got ratcheted up to unthinkable proportions that NATO began thinking about more nuanced responses to possible Soviet aggression on the ground.

Michael

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ME - I cannot agree that the demise of the TD was anything to do with the nuclear threat. It was obvious that TD's were very vulnerable to overhead explosions and with the advent of airburst and massed sudden rocket bombardments their usefulness compared to a tank was considerably less.

And that is ignoring the possibility of NBC and chemical weapons. They simply did not offer enough protection.

Incidentally the oft-quoted mantra that the Sherman was not replaced as it would have interrupted the flow of tanks is interesting as it was upgraded in many ways. Notably the up-gunning was the one that would seem to have had the most potential for improving it's effectiveness.

It seems to me that the US Army [McNair] missed a trick as the history of naval warfare has been of up-gunning and up-armouring and the possibility that this would apply to tanks seems more than likely. Particularly given the knowledge that the PzIV was likely to be improved on - and presumably designed to defeat the current Russian and US guns.

The efffort to up-gun started for the US in late 1943 whereas the British had an order in for 2000 upgunned in October 1943 and the mechanics sorted out.

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In the 1950s the American (and by extension, NATO) countermeasure to Soviet tank armies was massive nuclear retaliation. It was after the nuclear standoff got ratcheted up to unthinkable proportions that NATO began thinking about more nuanced responses to possible Soviet aggression on the ground.

Michael

It will be interesting to see why the American (NATO) thought of the relative free use of nuclear as countermeasure to Soviet massive armor in the 50's?

Consider for example the big disadvantages of that approach like devastation of allied territory in case of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviets in West Germany or taking the huge risk of total anihillation of big European or US cities or even countries later in case of targeting nuclear weapons at the heart of Soviet Union.

Is it possible that this type of choice was forced because they did not see they had an effective conventional response at that time ?

If this is the case, then it seems strange that Americans ignored a supposedly tested ,successful ,cheap and with relative minor political and strategic risks antitank doctrine at a time when they needed the most.

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I see. Used tactically, or with strikes on the URSS proper ?

So far as it has been made public, the proposition offered to the USSR was: "Start anything in Europe and we will bomb you back to the stone age."

Once the Soviets were able to convincingly claim, "Try to bomb us and we will put some major hurt on you too," the game became one of jockeying for relative advantage. "We can perform a first strike on you that will eliminate your retaliatory force before you can use it." "No you won't." "Yes we will." Etc.

It was just a little reminiscent of late 1914 in northern and eastern France when the two armies were seeking a flank between the Channel and the Swiss border that they could turn and not finding it.

Michael

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ME - I cannot agree that the demise of the TD was anything to do with the nuclear threat.

I never claimed that it was. Where did you get that idea? The TD as such was dropped for well documented reasons that have already been mentioned in this thread.

Oddly enough, the idea of a light (i.e., expendable) AT vehicle lingered on and to some extent still does. Whether it was jeeps armed with recoilless rifles, or Bradley Fighting Vehicles armed with TOW-3, there has been a stream of such in the US arsenal. And the Soviets stuck ATMs on anything that could move and carry them.

No, what I said was that the US and its allies realized that they had little hope of being able to match the Soviets land force for land force, especially at any level they could hope to sustain economically and politically. The nuclear umbrella was a relatively—and I stress 'relatively'—cheap answer to the Soviet threat as it was envisioned...as long as the Soviets took it seriously enough not to try to put it to the test.

Michael

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Incidentally the oft-quoted mantra that the Sherman was not replaced as it would have interrupted the flow of tanks is interesting as it was upgraded in many ways.

Why? There is a world of difference in terms of flow between upgrading an existing design and introducing an entirely new design in the production line.

Michael

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German uparmored AFVs 1942 - 90

German uparmored AFVs 1943 - 2550

German uparmored AFVs 1944 - 8250

German uparmored AFVs 1945 - 2340

total - 13230

1944 or later - 10590 or 80% of the total

Period and numbers faced by the US -

Pre 1944 -

Tunisia - a company or less a few times

Sicily - one battalion, 1-2 weeks

Anzio (early 1944) -

Less than 200, a few months

Normandy (mid 1944) -

1000 in theater, most vs. Brits,

~200 US sector for 1 month, ~150 more for Mortain for a week

South France -

50 (Panthers in 11th Panzer)

Lorraine (fall 1944) -

less than 200 for one month

Other westwall (Aachen, Hurtgen, etc) - max 50 at a time, less than 200 overall

Bulge (winter 1944) -

750 for one month

Nordwind -

250 for one month

Other fights occur later, e.g. 100 or so at Remagen.

Overall, 2000-2500 uparmored German AFVs faced by US forces, whole war.

15-20% of the total German heavy fleet, reflecting most forces and time in Russia and west divided with Brits.

If Brits added, they faced 750 or so in Normandy, smaller amounts in Market-Garden, west wall, etc. Might increase the total portion of the fleet faced by the western allies to about 25%, start to finish.

The portion of that portion, faced before the start of calendar 1944, was about 2%.

The portion of that portion, faced before Normandy, was less than 10%.

That is 10% of the 25% that ever faced the west, and that themselves are only 1/4 of the German AFV fleet.

What did the allies field to face those 13230 uparmored German AFVs, 80% of which appear 1944 or later?

Before the end of 1943, the US produced 7500 M10 and M18 tank destroyers. It produced 29000 Shermans before the end of 1943. In 1944, the US produced over 7000 76mm Shermans, 2300 105mm Shermans, and 3000 more TDs with 76mm and 90mm guns. 9000 more upgunned AFVs were built in 1945 before the end of the war - too late to matter given transport times, but hardly evidence of lack of adaptation to the problem, such as it was. There were also 3000 17 pdr AFVs in the British fleet on US chassis, 2/3rds Fireflies and 1/3rd Achilles - including 450 before D-Day and about 800

by the end of the fighting in Normandy.

If one takes the German AFV production before 1944 and apportions a quarter of it to the western allies, that amounts to about 650 uparmored AFVs - and they actually faced considerable less. By the same date, the western Allies had built 7500 upgunned AFVs able to deal with them, or 12 to 1.

If one then adds in the 1944 production and again puts a quarter against the west, uparmored German AFVs to date come to 2700. Allied upgunned AFVs built to date to deal with them come to 22000, or 8 to 1.

In the east, the Russians produced 1700 upgunned AFVs through the end of 1943, leaving out the SP artillery SU-122 (as the western allied numbers above leave out 4000 Priests etc). That means the Germans had parity or slightly better in uparmored AFVs they could send east through the end of 1943, to the upgunned, AFV-mounted answers the Russians had available in that year. Compared to 10 to 1 against them in the west, since the M10 fleet was a full year earlier than the T-34/85 fleet. The Russians produced 17000 upgunned AFVs in 1944, for a cumulative upgunned fleet of 18700 by year end. They faced up to 7700 uparmored German AFVs, or 2.5 to 1.

The Russians were objectively a year later to upgun significantly than the Americans, and since they faced a much larger portion of the German heavy fleet, they had a worse numerical match up of upgunned hitters to uparmored threats than the US did, at any period of the war. The western allies produced more upgunned AFVs in absolute numbers

than the Russians did, by the end of 1944, facing a smaller part of the German heavy fleet. And overall the allies produced 4 upgunned answers to every uparmored German threat, through the end of 1944.

The perception that any allied vehicles were undergunned against the threat reflects cherry picked comparison of the lower half of the allied fleet against the upper third or even quarter, of the German fleet. More than anything else, this simply reflects the far higher allied AFV production in the period 1942 and 1943. Huge fleets of tanks made in those years were not upgunned (yet) because there wasn't any uparmored fleet for them to face (yet).

About 35000 T-34/76s and Sherman 75s were built before the Germans fielded their first Panther. Why is anybody surprised that sometimes the former faced the latter? Do they expect the earlier model tanks to just be thrown away? The Germans fielded 13000 AFVs from mid 1943 to the end of 1944 that could not stop a short 75mm round from

the front at medium range - over half the fleet of that period. The allies produced only 7000 medium tanks that weren't upgunned from the start of 1944 (3500 each of Shermans and T-34/76s). The Allies left off producing non-upgunned tanks well before the Germans stopped producing non-uparmored AFVs.

Which front had 7500 upgunned AFVs already built by the begining of 1944? Answer, the west; the Russians had 1700.

Which came first, the German uparmored threat, 2650 vehicles by the end of 1943, over 3/4 of them sent east, or the 9200 allied upgunned answers? The answers, especially in the form of the M10 tank destroyer. The M10 debuted at El Guttar, 3 1/2 months before the Panther, and there were far more of them, and orders of magnitude more of them than of the handful of early Tigers.

The substance of the complaint comes from a very narrow source. The US (specifically, not Brits) tankers (specifically, not TDs) did not get large numbers of 76mm Shermans until the last quarter of 1944. There were plenty of upgunned hitters in the US fleet mix, far more than uparmored critters for them to hit - but they were US TDs at the time of Normandy, not in the US tanks. The upgunned tanks were made in the course of 1944 and it took time to ship them to the theater. They vastly outnumbered the uparmored critters available to the Germans, and were overall only half the upgunned shooters available to the western allies.

So the US tankers of the Normandy era moaned about how poorly armed they were - while the Brits had answers and faced most of the German heavy armor in theater, and the US had answers in TDs. Answers entirely sufficient to send attempts like the Lehr counterattack in July or the Mortain counterattack in August, packing, with immediate heavy losses.

Ignoring this US TD portion of the upgunned fleet is about as sensible as ignoring long StuGs in the German fleet mix against the Russian T-34s, and pretending that the entire German armor fleet was still in Panzer III longs or worse, after thousands of long 75 vehicles had actually been fielded. There were men in Panzer III *shorts* at Kursk. There were men in 38ts at the time of Uranus. They had something to moan about.

The US upgunning performance is actually superior in timing and scale to any of (1) German upgunning against threats like the Char-B, Matilda, or T-34, (2) later German uparmoring (2) Russian upgunning in response to the previous. It was superior in scale to the Brits, even (and supplied essentially all the chassis the Brits used), the Brits just got theirs to the tanks as opposed to TDs about 3 months sooner (for all of 500 tanks) and sported a better 17 pdr (which was matched once the US TDs got enough APCR, but significantly better at range before that happened. At short hedgerow ranges even US 76mm APC was lethal to the cats, any aspect).

It is all an entirely tendentious read of the relative performance of all the powers. It is typical crank whining, not military planning or analysis.

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I'm now genuinely confused. If you are correct Jason, given the vast superiority of allied artillery, in terms of doctrine, equipment, technology and logistics and the domination of the skies, why did the allies take so long to achieve their objectives? If the Germans were so overmatched, who let the side down?

I like alternatives to the received wisdom but some of your examples raise more questions than they solve, and some of the examples used (Mortain, Six Day War) seem to reinforce the orthodoxy you are challenging. Surely Mortain showed the loss rates to any attacker in close terrain, especially whilst being conducted under the shadow of air superiority. The Israeli Sherman boasted a far more powerful gun and as Egypt only lost 55-58 T-55's I doubt it battled many as most of the Egyptian tank park comprised of obsolete Soviet WWII/post war armour.

As for the 1940 scenarios my knowledge is basic so I will let more knowledgeable voices speak, though I do know an army using carrier pigeons should be at a disadvantage, or was this again false history perpetrated by "The World at War"?

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By Vark

I'm now genuinely confused. If you are correct Jason, given the vast superiority of allied artillery, in terms of doctrine, equipment, technology and logistics and the domination of the skies, why did the allies take so long to achieve their objectives? If the Germans were so overmatched, who let the side down?

What I find interesting is the fact that he uses production figures to show viability of both doctrinal and design features of the Allied armoured forces. I would have thought comparing loss, recovery, repair and replacement rates would have been more appropriate yardsticks.

Then again so far I have not come across any source or research which would have presented Allied armour loss figures and breakdown of them in anything like what you have on the German armour losses which are extensively and exhaustively researched.

I like alternatives to the received wisdom but some of your examples raise more questions than they solve, and some of the examples used (Mortain, Six Day War) seem to reinforce the orthodoxy you are challenging. Surely Mortain showed the loss rates to any attacker in close terrain, especially whilst being conducted under the shadow of air superiority.

As for the 1940 scenarios my knowledge is basic so I will let more knowledgeable voices speak, though I do know an army using carrier pigeons should be at a disadvantage, or was this again false history perpetrated by "The World at War"?

Lets not forget the Winter War where the disparity of forces was so evident and the force mixes so mismathed that any comparsion of forces on paper would have indicated a cake walk for the attacker even against a prepared defender. Yet the Red Army managed to lose during three months fighting in the Karelian Isthmus front 3179 tanks of which 1904 were combat losses, 1275 were mechanical failures. 368 of the losses were total write offs but I am not sure if it contains the vehicles the Finnish forces managed to capture. I would assume according to JasonC's logic the Red Army lost only 368 tanks but the Red Army force strenght reports show the Finnish forces managed to knock out 1904 tanks against a force which had absolute air, manpower, firepower and AFV superiority.

I find it incomprehensible the production figures are available but any kind of loss figures can not be researched from the Western Allied archives when researchers have managed to pull detailed loss figures from the Red Army archives.

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JC taking refuge in the huge figures as the be all and end all of any discussion without considering any what-ifs. I am left wondering what great figures I could get with averaging tank numbers or other statistical ledgerdemain to prove something.

Arguing after the event that the Germans never built lots of 75mm proof tanks so it was reasonable for the Allies not to upgun seems luck rather than judgement. It was a bad decision - but then a scant few years earlier McNair was promoting HMG's and 37mm ATGs as being effective. Surely he realised that these weapons had rapidly been discredited that the same process would repeat!

What gets my goat is that what is important is what is actually fighting has a bearing. For instance if the Allied tanks had been able to kill the Panther etc at range would the Allied advance been faster. A product of morale and the simple math of the Panthers and Tigers dying more quickly. Troops have confidence they have at least 50-50 chance leads to bolder troops.

Conversely the German tanker morale is ****e and they are hustled and attrited quicker. Villers- Bocage and Wittman re-written to German ace dies in forlorn hope rather than UK stuffed easily.

Don't get me wrong I am sure it would be a struggle , and the 75mm was a better HE gun, but overall would the morale effects been more value than increasing Sherman mobility .....

And from the viewpoint of disaffected German Army officers/forces the Hitler wonder weapons and the probable more rapid advance of the Allies might have lead to an earlier Hitler accident.

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By dieseltaylor

JC taking refuge in the huge figures as the be all and end all of any discussion without considering any what-ifs.

To some extent, yes. But for example the US tankers apprehension of their ride at the time is not a what-if.

I am left wondering what great figures I could get with averaging tank numbers or other statistical ledgerdemain to prove something.

Statistics are wonderful. Lie, bigger lie, statistics. ;)

Arguing after the event that the Germans never built lots of 75mm proof tanks so it was reasonable for the Allies not to upgun seems luck rather than judgement.

I'd say it was a judgement call alright. But IMO the call was made based on known attrition rates and available production volume and capacity, not projected German production decisions. Those who made the call made the same call Stalin made: quantity over quality even if it means certain higher loss rates in both men and materiel. This is IMO one of the reasons the sources of actual Allied armour losses have always been vague, usually remarking "high tank losses" without any definitive number. Villers-Bogace seems to be the only engagement where the exact number of lost vehicles is known. But any longer period loss rates are nowhere to be found.

It was a bad decision - but then a scant few years earlier McNair was promoting HMG's and 37mm ATGs as being effective. Surely he realised that these weapons had rapidly been discredited that the same process would repeat!

True to some extent. I have not seen any bad appraisals of Stalins decision to stick to producing T-34/76 over upgunned/improved version earlier than the T-34/85 was historically made available. But his willingness to sacrifice human lives instead of jeopardizing production is selfevident to everybody. To think Western leaders were so callous is just not on.

What gets my goat is that what is important is what is actually fighting has a bearing. For instance if the Allied tanks had been able to kill the Panther etc at range would the Allied advance been faster. A product of morale and the simple math of the Panthers and Tigers dying more quickly. Troops have confidence they have at least 50-50 chance leads to bolder troops.

Conversely the German tanker morale is ****e and they are hustled and attrited quicker. Villers- Bocage and Wittman re-written to German ace dies in forlorn hope rather than UK stuffed easily.

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