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Defeat at Kasserine--A meaty, groggy Master's thesis


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Attention, treadheads!

You'll really want to read this because it's not only meaty but readable and has some great CM level goodies in it, to include an absolutely harrowing fight between a Stuart and a Mark IV Special. Have only skimmed it, but you're going to love it. This, BTW, was the American debut of the Nebelwerfer.

http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:x7sTRR7G7nsJ:www.2ndbn5thmar.com/tank/tirefs/DefeatKasserineCalhoun1988.pdf+nebelwerfer+effectiveness+data&cd=94&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

Regards,

John Kettler

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M3 Stuart vs. Mark IV Special (Panzer IV/F2), the best tank the Germans had until the Tiger 1 arrived.

"The 37-millimeter gun of the little American M3 light tank popped

and snapped like an angry cap pistol. . . . From the partial defilade

of their position on the right flank of the attack, the American

banged away at the German tank. . . . The Jerry seemed annoyed

by these attentions. Questing about with his incredibly long, ball-

mounted, souped-up 75-millimeter rifle, the German commander

soon spotted his heckler. . . . [H]e leisurely commenced closing the

140 yard gap between himself and the light tank. The crew of the

M3 redoubled the serving of their piece. . . . Tracer-tailed armor

piercing bolts streaked out of the American’s muzzle and bounced

like a mashie-shot in a tiled bath from the bard plates of the Mark

IV. . . . In a frenzy of desperation and fading faith in their highly-

touted weapon, the M3 crew pumped more than eighteen rounds at

the Jerry tank while it came in. . . . Popcorn balls thrown by Little

Bo Peep would have been just as effective.1"

Captain Freeland A. Daubin Jr.

What happened?

"As described in this chapter’s epigraph by Captain Freeland Daubin, a tank commander in Company A, the American tankers quickly learned how ineffective their highly touted 37-millimeter cannon was against German armor. Company A boldly raced into the pass to attack the German Mark IV panzers, but within ten minutes, half of Major Siglin’s twelve tanks were destroyed.7 Captain Daubin’s tank was destroyed and his crew killed, but he survived and was later evacuated to a hospital in the rear. In their haste to destroy Company A’s M3 Stuarts, the German force had not noticed Company B. Major Tuck’s Stuarts, firing from their defilade positions, surprised the Germans and took advantage of side and rear shots to rapidly destroy nine of the thirteen panzers. The rest of the German tanks withdrew, but during the ensuing pursuit and mop-up operations Major Siglin was killed by an armor piercing shell that penetrated his tank’s turret.8"

Regards,

John Kettler

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More highlights from a really interesting read

8Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, 191-192. Umpires were told the .50-cal machine gun

would defeat light tanks at 1,000 yards despite the fact that the .50-cal was no longer

considered a real antitank weapon. The 37 millimeter antitank gun was ruled capable of

defeating a light tank at 1,000 yards, and medium tanks at 500 yards, even though

Ordnance insisted the gun was obsolete, and tests showed it was unable to penetrate one

inch of armor at 100 yards. See Gabel, 49. It appears that umpire procedures were

intentionally biased in favor of the doctrinal concept that antitank guns and tank

destroyers, rather than American tanks, would be used to defeat enemy armor

********************************************************

Move your command, i.e., the walking boys, pop guns, Baker’s

outfit and the outfit which is the reverse of Baker’s outfit and the

big fellows to M, which is due north of where you are now, as soon

as possible. Have your boys report to the French gentleman whose

name begins with J at a place which begins with D which is five

grid squares to the left of M.1

MG Lloyd R. Fredendall

********************************************************

I think the best way to describe our operations to date is that they

have violated every recognized principle of war, are in conflict

with all operational and logistic methods laid down in text-books,

and will be condemned, in their entirety, by all Leavenworth and

War College classes for the next twenty-five years.1

LTG Dwight D. Eisenhower

Some of the highlights - the first being McNair fixing the results of the early troop exercises in the US.

The second is how Frendall gave orders - a really bad egg.

A good assessment by Dwight

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dieseltaylor,

Finished reading the thesis last night. Most worthwhile! BTW, Fondouk is the scene of the semihistorical battle Tiger Valley, designed by Richie. Also, ISTR McNair's foot dragging as head of AGF led to the failure to field a tank on par with the Germans, in effect continuing a problem first identified in North Africa. The U.S. combat engineers would seem to not be Conscripts but neither even as good as Green. Likewise, the thesis supports dinging the men on fitness and fatigue levels.

Regards,

John Kettler

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I'm getting sick of the slander nonsense you folks recycle.

Up to the end of 1942, there was no tank the US had met anywhere that was superior to a short 75 Sherman. By the time anything worse was encountered, 12000 Sherman 75s had already been built. By the time anything worse was faced in any numbers (Normandy), the US and UK fielded 3 times as many upgunned hitters (TDs, Fireflies, Sherman 105s, Sherman 76s, etc) as the Germans could send uparmored critters, against them.

They didn't drop everything to get 76mm Shermans after Tunisia because the need was not yet apparent; even doing so would not have given them an all long fleet mix by Normandy because vast numbers of the short 75mm Shermans had already been built by the end of 1942; they got more than enough AT hitters anyway, including the much maligned TDs which did their tank killing job just fine whenever that job was actually needed.

Half the problem in Normandy and after was that even the US 76mm was inadequate at longer ranges than about 500 meters, due to shatter gap, despite having sufficient power to penetrate the armor plates it faced. The solution to that was enough APCR, but nobody knew about shatter gap until after direct experience of the problem in Normandy (and even there, the experience was quite thin because engagement ranges were usually short, and the bulk of the German heavies were in the Brit sector anyway, and they had Fireflies that did not have the problem).

Where are the 5000 articles pretending it was criminal negligance to send men into Russian against T-34s and KVs in 50L42 panzer IIIs? Or to still have two thirds of the fleet in Panzer IVs or StuGs or worse, in 1944? Right, nowhere.

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Oh, and anyone else notice the ridiculous claim that a US 37mm couldn't penetrate even 1 inch of armor at 100 yards? The only 37mm of which that claim can be true is the French short 37mm L21 used on their interwar tanks and the worst part of their 1940 fleet. The US 37mm can penetrate an inch of armor even at 1000 yards and some angle, even with the earliest and worst uncapped ammunition. With the APC actually fielded during the war, it penetrates 61mm at 500 yards, more than enough to KO even a Panzer IV through the turret front. They had trouble only against 70mm front late Panzer IIIs, or the hull fronts of Panzer IVs.

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JasonC,

As GvA shows, there were two different projectiles fielded, of which you've elected to present data only for the better of the two.

http://www.freeweb.hu/gva/weapons/usa_guns2.html

Further, AP M74 doesn't look like it would have much hope of getting through an inch of RHA (25.4 mm) at 1000 yards, let alone face hardened armor. May not be quite as bad as for the 2 pdr case described here, where 60 mm FHA resists as 85 mm of RHA, but Daubin's experience indicates the situation was far less rosy than you paint it to be.

http://www.freeweb.hu/gva/analysis/introduction.html

Likewise, the only success the Americans had in that battle was in attacks from the sides and rear against Panzer IIIs and IVs. Daubin lost his engagement at under 150 meter range.

I agree that the Sherman was an impressive and at the time powerful tank when it first appeared, easily eclipsing the average German tank of the time, but the Mark IV Special was the handwriting on the wall, and not enough people paid attention to the message. By the time the IV/G appeared and the Panther debuted, people should've been fully awake and paying total attention, particularly in light of Jarrett's "save" at Gazala on the AP shell front by reworking captured German 75mm PzGr 39 ammo. This gave the Grant an effective AP projectile at Gazala after the homegrown version proved effectively useless. That this was an ongoing problem was clearly established in U.S. Tests Nos 1-3

here. Call some of the discoveries shocking!

http://web.archive.org/web/20080115205332/http://wargaming.info/armour05.htm

Please see also the letters Ike got from several of his generals detailing deficiencies in American weaponry, as seen by the troops, and the near lynching of the Ordnance officer who had nothing to give but more Shermans when our armor was being butchered in the Roer River campaign because the mud paralyzed our ability to make use of numbers via outflanking.

Regards,

John Kettler

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The Mark IV special wasn't handwriting on anything; it was inferior to the Sherman in every important respect. Less protection, less mobility, and each KOs the other to the same ranges, even once uparmored. The El Alamein era models only had 50mm front and could be KOed at any range by a Sherman 75 if hit. The best one can say for the Panzer IV is the gun was somewhat more accurate at long range.

On US 37mm penetration, no I gave the figures for all 3, of French short 37L21, US 37mm with pure AP rather than APC, and US 37mm with APC, which is what they actually had. And even the worst of the US rounds reliably penetrated an inch of armor at 100 yards, showing the report cited to be about something else - likely the French short 37mm. The US had used French tanks at the close of WW I, and they were a standard before any US tanks were developed. But a US Stuart with 37mm is not going to bounce from an inch of armor at 100 yards, even with the underpowered AP ammo.

They KOed panzers with side shots at combat ranges, yes? Which have 30mm sides, which last I checked was 20% more than the one inch that the report claims they couldn't penetrate at 100 yards. The report is either an error about a much earlier and weaker gun (likely, someone just trying to argue that "37mm caliber" is insufficient, without attention to detail), or it is flat wrong.

As for "losing an engagement at 150 yards" with repeated hits, it means the opponent was a 20+50mm Panzer III, in all likelihood, that kept front aspect throughout. Either that or he managed to miss the turret every single time, which is decidedly unlikely.

There is a reason the Stuart was a *light* tank, and was not the main one in the force any time the Americans were in action. Now in 1941, facing short Panzer IIIs with 50mm armor, no problem, it was a capable tank for the day.

Lessee, was anyone else using tanks at midwar that had only the 60mm penetration power of a Stuart, as the light part of mixed fleets? Hmm, let me recall. T-70s anyone? How about Czech tanks facing the T-34 led Uranus counterattacks with a comparable 37mm? How about the 1/6th of the entire German fleet at Kursk that are still in 1941 era short IIIs and 75L24 short IVs?

As usual, the smears all come from comparing the low end of one side's fleet to the top end of the other guy's fleet, or from mixing dates, or both. Is a short 75 Sherman outclassed by a Panther in 1944 France? Sure. But then there are 3 upgunned Allied AFVs per uparmored German AFV to oppose them. It is a top end to bottom end comparison. Etc.

If there were ever anything new in any of it, it might be sufferable. There isn't. It is the same five slanders recycled forty thousand times.

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Up to the end of 1942, there was no tank the US had met anywhere that was superior to a short 75 Sherman.

Is this the ostrich defense? I personally cannot see it so it does not exist?

Did the Russians advise there Allies of the advent of the Tiger in September 1942 ?

As for repeating the personal recollections of a serving officer I cannot see what is wrong with that. It would be nice to translate proving ground figures to the battlefield and they would always work but is just possible that on rough ground the armour plate was not square on to the cannon? And of course some of the shots may have done some damage but nothing sufficient to give a kill.

And if the thesis author is to be trusted he has quoted Gabel correctly though it id seem a strange claim. Possibly Ordanance were more aware of the general trend to increased armour and larger cannon.

In any event the story does record the M3's being successful and killing several tanks from the side and rear. Of course compared to BF's souped-up 37mm penetration figures ......... there is quite a difference.

Is quite good for penetrations but does not handily give introduction dates.

http://www.tarrif.net/cgi/production/all_penetration_adv.php?op=show_pen&penX=40

BTW Sherman 105mm's to take on Panthers and Tigers - I had not realised this happened - are there any sites to see this?

Also I found this on one site:

In combat the Sherman proved to be inadequately armored, as it was armored to resist the German 37mm anti-tank gun

Is that right?

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In case the moral isn't obvious, the US did not lose the Kasserine fight because they had inferior equipment(though for TDs they had only the purple heart box which certainly was inferior).

The US lost the Kasserine fight because green troops employed abysmal tactics, that threw away first an entire defending infantry regiment through idiotic deployments (infantry on separate hills too far for mutual support and without ranged hitting power), then an entire combat command of very well equipped armor through even more idiotic tactical employment (waltz straight in en masse) - before the Kasserine position itself - then lost the fight at the actual location through poor combined arms and outright panic and morale failure.

The Germans were then stopped as soon as the Americans put together an adequate ridgeline-terrain all-arms position with powerful artillery backing - largely thanks to one artillery general (and no thanks to either the armor commanders present or the hopeless corps commander).

All of it turned on tactical know-how and command preparedness, and essentially none of it on gun-armor specs of rival AFVs. That just went into the excuse factory and came out sausage...

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dt - Tigers were very rare vehicles through the entire war, and especially so in late 1942. They had no operational importance yet. Every previous heavy tank design had been a complete failure operationally - Char Bs, KVs - they were always so rare on the ground and of such poor operational mobility that they played no part in the driving campaigns of the first half of the war. No doubt tactically they were a problem for their opponents. But US planners entirely correctly dismissed heavy tanks as, to date, irrelevant monstrosities. By late war they mattered more, surely. But once upgunning became widespread enough, they lost any decisive edge. Upgunning was the correct answer to heavy tanks. And US TDs were already sufficient for it, by the end of Tunisia. (After the discovery of shatter gap, APCR was wanted too, and obtained).

As for Sherman 105s, they were reported as the most useful weapons in the whole force by US commanders in Normandy and after it into the breakout period. Sure, the higher firepower was valued in a pure infantry killing role, and they were even used indirect in battery as artillery at times. But they simply could do everything a tank was ever asked to do - including kill "cats" using 105mm HEAT. Their overall power and flexibility were the cause of the assessment, "single best weapon we had".

As for how armored the Sherman was, it was sufficiently armored to defeat German long 50mm, which was the main German tank gun at the time it was fielded. It was sufficiently armored to defeat 37mm PAK even from the sides. Once the Germans have upgunned to long 75s for the bulk of their fleet, they were no longer uparmored. But the response was W and W+ models, which defeated 75L48 at long range (beyond about 900 yards). Those modestly uparmored Shermans already had parity or better against Panzer IV longs, and 76mm versions outranged them completely.

The US did not fight the entire war in short 75mm early Shermans, any more than the Germans fought the whole war in Panzer IIIs.

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JasonC,

You seem to have done a Scipio at Zama type sidestep to avoid the contradictory information I just presented to dispute your claims regarding the U.S. 37 mm in combat. Am pretty sure the kills the other Stuart company got in the battle Daubin lost were from ranges on par with his. I own the 1 AD's combat history so will take a gander later and see what's there on this fight. Parts of the book are very groggy, such as the detailed plot of the Tebourba olive grove fight. And, yes, I know that 30 mm is more than an inch! What you didn't note was that the M3 GMCs had nothing but HE at Kasserine; AP shell would've been something altogether more unpleasant. Much better M10 debuted at El Guettar.

Zaloga excerpt on U.S. TD history

http://books.google.com/books?id=sCdlGIbmHjoC&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=m10+td+combat+debut&source=bl&ots=WBdHRx39LU&sig=Y_g64pqxry7er8Ah3i6i2gqJ7rk&hl=en&ei=8dR5S5z-KZH-tQPc-JXLCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CAkQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=m

Knew the Sherman 105 was well liked, but I was unaware it fought successful DF engagements vs. Tiger and Panther.

On balance, you seem to be very heavily emotionally invested in defending the Sherman, throwing up a lot of side issues rather like a squid dumping ink in order to hide, then escape. The U.S. could've fielded a 90 mm gunned tank much earlier, but didn't; it could've had Firefly Shermans, but turned the British down; it could've had a heavy tank, the M6, but didn't do that, either.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M6_heavy_tank

Consequently, we took such heavy losses tanks were sent into battle with inexperienced and even partial crews, resulting in yet more losses. Morale suffered, discipline suffered, and above all, men went to terrible deaths and suffered trauma and injuries that were wholly unnecessary.

Regards,

John Kettler

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JasonC,

Just checked. The Battle History of the 1st Armored division covers the fight in two paragraphs but lacks tactical detail. There are no maps. OTOH, Zaloga and Laurier do on pages 23-25 in the online reader from their Stuart Osprey book. Call the characterization of the 37 mm scathing! Unlike the thesis, the Daubin fight is not truncated here.

http://books.google.com/books?id=AKNgfES1OqkC&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25&dq=happy+valley+tank+fight&source=bl&ots=eurNp6IJYK&sig=tv9rGiDUeAI_lJlFcwa-_l45jLw&hl=en&ei=Jt55S9z3Co38tQPm8unKCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CBUQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=&f=false

From the above, it appears the German force was Mark III Specials and Mark IV Specials, not a short gun in the bunch. Had thought the M3 75 mm GMCs were armed with the French 75, but it turns out they had the relatively anemic 75mm pack howitzer instead, as T30 HMCs.

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TM-9-710-75mm-HMC-T30-1.jpg

Howitzer characteristics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M116_howitzer

This page has some great projectile drawings and cross sections, including the M66 HEAT for the M116. Have not yet been able to determine when this shell became operational.

http://cartridgecollectors.org/introtoartyammo/introtoarty.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

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The US took fewer AFV losses in the entire campaign than the Germans did.

It is a crock of horse excrement. And no I am not invested in defending the Sherman in particular, it is the endless slander of entirely effective forces and capable men that galls. All of them way better than you...

But it is old hat at this point, and I'll let you-all return to your regurgitation festival...

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JasonC,

Which campaign are you referring to, please? North Africa? Normandy? As for losses, losses in what category or categories? Aggregate losses from all causes, losses in combat, losses in tank and SP on like combat? As particular as you are about such issues, I'm surprised you didn't specify.

Having an opinion which doesn't match yours and is supported by evidence taken contemporaneously from the direct participants hardly constitutes slander, and there was no need to go after me directly. When I commented on my perceptions regarding you, I was drawing a conclusion based on your observed behavior. Hardly the same as a direct slam aimed squarely at me!

You seem to be pursuing a dual track debate strategy: sweeping assertions of your correctness, coupled with failure to deal with the numerous issues I've raised. You told me how much better the U.S. 37 mm performed than was stated in the thesis, yet the actual Happy Valley account, with at least 18 rounds fired on the Mark IV Special from the front, at sub 150 meter range, yielded no penetrations and consistent ricochets, as attested in the complete version for which I provided the link. Further, I showed that Zaloga and Laurier have a scathing view of the whole U.S. 37 mm effectiveness issue, based on issues identified a year prior to that clash.

Were heavy tanks war winners in the grand scheme of things? On balance, no. Did they make a big impression on those that ran into them and on those charged with responding to them? Absolutely! Were this not so, we wouldn't still be talking about the "unkillable" KV-1 at Rasseniye, "Tiger terror," Michael Wittman, how Rommel barely held at Arras, a handful of Super Pershings and lots of Stalin tanks. As for the Char B/bis, the Germans caught them flatfooted at Flavion, with tanks all but dry, refueling and with no working radios. They put them in a close range crossfire from swarms of tanks, shelled the fuel trucks from a distance with Panzer IV Ds and sniped them with Pak 36s. Before that, the 1 DCR was bombed repeatedly while stuck in heavy refugee traffic, which is how it came to be so depleted and vulnerable in the first place. But look what happens when the shoe's on the other foot!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Char_B1

"In direct meetings with German tanks the Char B1 usually had the better of it, sometimes spectacularly so as when on 16 May a single tank, Eure, frontally attacked and destroyed thirteen German tanks lying in ambush in Stonne, all of them Panzerkampfwagen IIIs and Panzerkampfwagen IVs, in the course of a few minutes. The tank safely returned despite being hit 140 times. Similarly, in his book Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian relates the following incident, which took place during a tank battle south of Juniville: "While the tank battle was in progress, I attempted, in vain, to destroy a Char B with a captured 47-mm anti-tank gun; all the shells I fired at it simply bounced harmlessly off its thick armor. Our 37-mm and 20-mm guns were equally ineffective against this adversary. As a result, we inevitably suffered sadly heavy casualties"."

Regards,

John Kettler

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I see we can all agree that the thesis does pin the balme correctly with poor command and tactics top of the heap. I do think the the Sherman was a good tank albeit with some problems most of which got sorted.

Now the crux of the matter is was faulty doctrine or what that lead the US to believe that the Germans were unaware of the vulnerability of the MkIV and would not be working on a replacement that would be designed to defeat the US 75mm and the Russian 76.2mm. I know this up-gunning issue has been covered previously so will re-read it : )

Interesting stuff JK on the French. Rather like Alexanders giant armour the effects go beyond the actuality and can be potent.

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What campaign? The whole fricking war, all US involvement.

The Germans conquered France in Panzer IIs. Less than half the tank fleet had even a 37mm gun. The French had the heavies, not the Germans. Guess what difference it made? None. Guderian saves "heavy causalties" but there flat weren't any. The Char-B was a hopeless disaster at the operational level. They could not be maintained, moved, kept supplied, operated en masse, or coordinated. Yes the lesson from enemies fielding such weapons is that early pop-gun armor needed to be upgunned. No the lesson is not to emulate them, especially in the mobility and soft systems department to be sure.

The Grant was basically an improved Char-B. Vastly improved mobility and superior soft systems (crew, roles, visibility, communications, etc). For a short period in mid 1942 in British hands, that made it a successful medium tank.

The KV-1 was far superior to Char-Bs in every respect, and in relative power against the opponents of its era, which was only a year later. It had a far superior gun, turret mounted, and far superior armor protection. Along with better crew roles and significantly better mobility. The Germans faced them with 50L42 Panzer IIIs as the heavier half of their fleet mix.

And do you know what operational consequences the KV had in 1941? Zero again.

The T-34 impressed the Germans more because it had most of the advantages of the KV along with far superior mobility and a light enough weight to use more available routes, and was small enough to be mass produced, at rates far exceeding anything that could be hoped for by heavier tanks. There were also more of them. They checked the Germans on a few occasions, at least once of consequence (outskirts of Tula in October) - but the Germans still defeated them with lopsided exchange ratios in their favor, even in lighter vehicles.

Why? Because tactical gun-armor specs are dominated by operational factors and doctrine, that's why. The Germans saw a need to upgun in response to such critters and did so. But expecting operational consequences from having more heavily armored tanks was an expectation repeatedly falsified by operational experience.

The Germans idea of an adequate tool kit to defeat T-34s in 1942 was PAK 40s and mobile versions of them as Marders, later in the year about 3% of the fleet upgunned to long StuGs and Panzer IV specials, the latter initially with only 50mm armor. Compare what the western allies had in upgunned TDs against the third or less of German armor circa 1944 that would stop a short 75 round.

Were the Germans supposedly criminally negligant in not having Panthers in 1942? Did it matter? Did having 40 Tiger Is at the tail end of that year matter, either? No, no and no. The flow of the operational campaign was dictated by doctrinal and operational factors in the use made of corps and larger mechanized formations. You can cite some operational consequences to relatively poor AT equipment of the Axis minors (though it is overstated, since their 75mm field artillery pieces were their main AT weapon in practice), and to the continued presence of obsolete 37mm armed Czech tanks in 22nd Panzer division that limited its ability to stop 5th Tank Army in Uranus. Though that can be overstated, too - 40% of Russian armor at that era was 20mm T-60s or 45mm T-70s.

What were the supposed operational consequences of western Allies relying on a third of upgunned AFVs to meet the third of uparmored German AFVs available by 1944 in France? At the most, some "stall" in Normandy for a month, especially for the British outside Caen - but that again was mostly caused by doctrine. The Brits had Fireflies and 17 pdr towed ATGs. The Germans had towed 88s, a handful of Tiger Is used well, and enough Panthers to matter. On the US part of the front, on the other hand, they had mostly StuGs and Panzer IVs with no edge over the Americans. When they sent Lehr (already reduced) and counterattacked with it, they lost half its armor in 2 days, with US TDs scoring heavily. When they gathered all available heavies to attack again for Mortain, they again lost heavily and achieved nothing, for operational reasons. Later in Lorraine they were outscored, and threw away whole panzer brigades in a day.

The only even moderate successes German armor had against US opponents were stalemating the Anzio bridgehead for a few months in early 1943 - where the state of the ground mattered more for armor use than its gun-armor specs, and eventually the US broke out with armor anyway, having exploited logistical power and HE arms in the meantime to attrite the Germans - and the Bulge, where the period of success amounted to a single week, relied on local odds achieved by operational surprise and scale, not gun-armor specs, and ended with even losses in armor once the Americans sent balancing forces to the site. They had King Tigers and scads of new Panthers, but it didn't matter. Only half the fleet was that heavy, one, the Americans had plenty of upgunned counters (including 90mm TDs) two, operational factors and odds matters more than gun-armor specs three, and the Americans successfully exploited the terrain and their logistics driven edge in the firepower arms, artillery and air, and German weakness in that respect, made worse by the poor road net and blown bridges etc.

In short, the assessment early in the force planning stage by US planners, that heavy armor was unimportant for operational outcomes, and success instead depended on proper doctrine and balanced all arms forces of general power, was entirely justified by the actual course of the fighting, both the lessons of the early war German successes, and by the later successes of the western Allies. Upgunning was a simple and entirely sufficient answer to heavy armor; the western Allies accomplished it through the TD force, and later the prevalence of improved model Shermans (Brit Fireflies to Easy Eights). Upgunned Shermans remained perfectly capable medium tanks with an entirely successful operational history even in Korea and in Israel hands clear to 1967.

(In 1967 the Israeli tank battalions were equipped with Centurion - 7 battalions and the best of the fleet, 2 battalions of M-48 "Pattons", 3 battalions of light but upgunned French AMX-13, and 7 battalions of upgunned Shermans. They faced hordes of heavier T-55s - and some M-48s - and defeated them handily. Again, doctrine and operational factors dominate the outcome).

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JasonC,

I think you are decidedly overstating your argument against the French, the B-1 bis and highly recommend you read Mosier's The Blitzkrieg Myth to get an up-to-date historical perspective. The book is a stunning revisit of "what we thought we knew" from the perspective of what we know know and what really happened--without all the period hype and finger pointing. The shattering Blitzkrieg of yore basically falls apart in the harsh light of history. For example, the Poles, even though they dispersed their air force and didn't commit to all out air battle on Day One, destroyed 40% of the Luftwaffe's frontline combat strength. Likewise, most of the standard accounts fail to even mention the meatgrinder that was the Battle of the Bzura. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bzura

The Dutch gutted the Ju-52 fleet, thanks largely to modern, well operated antiaircraft defenses. See Mosier for details. Here's a view of the invasion of Holland you don't see in the standard accounts. Site's first rate and extensive.

http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=the-typicals-of-the-dutch-five-days-war

Air campaign analysis (Fair use)

http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=the-airforce-4

"The majority of the 525 planes that were damaged or destroyed during the May War, over and in Holland, were Ju-52. Estimates say that between 275 and 350 of these planes were destroyed or heavily damaged and another batch damaged within repair range. German historian Werner Haupt states in 'Sieg ohne Lorbeer' that 280 Ju-52 had been lost on the 10th alone. That figure may be slightly over the top, but was concluded from KGzbV sources and should therefore be considered rather accurate. The majority had not been shot down by AAA or opposing air-planes, but suffered from emergency landings, bombing raids on conquered AFB's, artillery-shelling, strafing or demolition by Dutch infantry. Also, especially on AFB Valkenburg, about 35 Ju-52 had just suffered bad damages to the undercarriages, sometimes followed by additional damage from skidding after the gear had given in. That had been caused by the swampy top-soil at Valkenburg, causing the heavy Ju-52's to sink away.

Of the battle planes that had been lost - about 120 in total - the far majority actually crashed after air battles or AAA impact. These were - with a few exceptions - all total write offs. The same applied to recce and seaplanes that had been lost.

It is very hard to give accurate figures for the actual losses occurred due to Dutch or Allied doing rather than faulty landings after return missions or the trapped Ju-52 fleet at Valkenburg AFB. Certain is that the Dutch had scored 38 confirmed air victories. Allied planes contributed to at least 20 confirmed air kills over Dutch soil in the measured period 10-17 May 1940. Although it is certain that many dozens of German planes were downed by AAA or other ground fire, any guess would be a wild guess. It is impossible to follow the claims made by the ground-air defences, for the claimed every plane with a plume on its tail, even when it was not seen crashing and notwithstanding four, five or six other outfits taking an aim at the same target. Therefore we shall not provide a figure.

The massive loss of transport planes was the only loss that was truly felt by the Germans. They had had about 800 Ju-52 planes when the war actually broke out in 1939 and by June 1940 only a quarter was still more or less operation. By the time - exactly one year later - that the operation in Crete was on and the good old Ju was in full focus again, the losses suffered in the two years before had barely been compensated. Crete yet again demanded a high toll of these slow but essential airplanes. Again a good year later the Ju-52 had a vital role in the air-bridge to Stalingrad. The previous losses in the war were by then the most hard felt. The transport fleet had not been expanded - mainly due to all the loses during the campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium and Crete - but the German controlled part of the world was larger than ever."

Much the same can be written of the French. Contrary to what we both read growing up, the French put up quite a fight and did a lot of damage. In the Gembloux Gap, the French triumphed, basically wrecking a Panzer Division. The French on the scene commander wanted to continue to advance, but French High Command under Marshal Gamelin failed its morale check and ordered a retreat. This set the stage for the disaster to follow. Another story that needs real telling is this one:

Battle of Stonne

Here's the story of that little known but epic battle. It is highly detailed, gives extensive OOBs, what was lost and when, and the second thread shows period pics of tanks lost there from both sides. With the forces they had, the French forced the withdrawal of 10 PD and IR GD from the battle. Note , too, that the redoubtable LT Billote in Char B1 bis Eure killed off a force whose tanks were only German MBTs (Panzer IIIs and IVs, not Is and IIs). As Macksey details in his book Tank vs. Tank, the French radios were Morse only, not AM voice like the Germans had. (Fair use)

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=45336

"On May 17, elements of the 2.ID (mot) cover the retreat of the "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment and 10.PzD. They are replaced by the 16.ID, 24.ID and 26.ID of the VI.AK."

So, the not having any operational impact (per you) French forced the retreat of nearly a division equivalent, which was replaced by no less than three divisions. IR GD was bled white at Stonne.

"Stonne saw very hard combats and some German officers mentioned Stonne beside Stalingrad and Monte Cassino amongst the battles they will never forget.

In two days (May 15-16), the "Grossdeutschland" regiment alone will loose 103 KIAs, 442 WIAs and 25 MIAs (570 men). For the whole campaign the "Grossdeutschland" regiment had 278 KIAs and 830 WIAs (1,108 losses). Therefore the regiment sustained 51% of its losses of May-June 1940 in only 2 days in Stonne. Then of course we would have to count all the equipment losses. I can only give details for the 14th AT company of the "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment: 13 KIAs, 65 WIAs, 12 vehicles destroyed and 6 AT guns destroyed (50% of the AT guns of the company).

On May 15-16, the 10.PzD will definitely loose about 25 tanks and the French will loose several 33 tanks. These wrecks will remain on the battlefield. What can also be said from German sources in that later, on June 5, before the battle south of Amiens, the 10.PzD is reduced to 180 tanks [85 "missing" tanks].

Other examples of known losses can be given for the later stages of the battle in the Mont Dieu area. During May 23-24, the German 24.ID sustained 1,490 losses (347 KIAs, 1,086 WIAs and 57 MIAs) in the area of Tannay [left French flank]. During May 17-25, the I/79.IR sustained 191 losses (41 KIAs, 144 WIAs and 6 MIAs) in the area of the Mont Damion [right French flank].

Between May 15 and May 25, the French infantry lost also many men. For example the I/67e RI had 362 KIAs and a company of the 51e RI finished the battle with only 5 sergeants and 30 soldiers left !"

Pics and more material here

http://www.wehrmacht-awards.com/forums/showthread.php?t=191256&highlight=french

Regards,

John Kettler

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Xactly, he is revisionist crap, and argues against straw men to silly conclusions. If anyone thought that the Germans won by having tanks when the Germans didn't have any, it might be news to them, but nobody serious does.

As for citing transport plane losses, it is irrelevant - the claim was that heavy tanks did not cause very high losses as Guderian claimed. The best performances the French achieved were by gun fronts, or the general attrition caused by large formations with Somua mediums and the closest they got to all arms formations (the light mech). And those still lost frontal engagements. They also had no operational result, because the Germans only needed to break through in 2 places in strength and shuttle the motorized portion of their army behind those holes, for the entire French plan and army to come apart.

The Germans succeeded in France through a completely superior operational plan, completely superior operational execution, and complete ascendency in tactical coordination of combined arms. If you survey not 2-3 cherry picked outliers, but every reported tank vs. tank engagement, what you find is the German outperformance is heavily correlated with scale and becomes massive once it rises to battalion or beyond. (That is, platoon vs. platoon fights have even, scattered outcomes; company fights have a German edge in losses inflicted vs. received, and battalion or bigger are devasting blowouts pretty much across the board). This reflects a complete lack of battlefield coordination even within the tank arm, on the French side, above about company scale, and as for all arms coordination, it is non existent. While every German weapon contributes meaningfully, etc.

To Lose a Battle by Horne remains a vastly superior source to Mosier.

The same thing occurs in the east in 1941. You can try to cite a few days of check to AG South near the border, when the reality is giant Russian mech formations evaporating on a time scale of a week. You can try to cite T-34 panic on the road to Tula, when the reality is massive pockets of millions of men over and over, created by forces outnumbered 3 to 1, driving Panzer III shorts. Mosier trying to downplay the significant of operational skill in the employment of combined arms mech formations against such results, is just hopeless. The least informed journalist level account is less misleading; at least those don't miss the single most important driving force in the campaigns, as he willfully does.

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Cuirassier,

Am still reading the Battle of France section, so am unable to comment. Mind, I don't think he gets everything right, as seen in his risible understatement of the KV-1's armor protection, a boner magnified by his having access to Milsom's Soviet Tanks 1917-1970, where all he had to do was look it up in the Appendices. Before that, I took exception to a statement he made about American tank design.

JasonC,

Your second sentence is incomprehensible. I cited transport plane losses and other things to illustrate the yawning chasm between what we were taught and what actually happened, nor does the argument depend on Mosier per se, as seen in a variety of items I presented. I haven't read in detail about the Battle of France in decades, and I confess my memory of Horne's book is dim at best. The way I see it, Flavion was a debacle, but Stonne was a major rebuff of the German drive in that sector. I don't know how you can make such sweeping pronouncements regarding German armored success in most of the tactical engagements fought during the Battle of France. Certainly, I don't have the accounts or the breakdowns handy. Maybe you've steeped yourself in them the way you did with the Russian ops?

In tracking down some of the info, I came across a new to me operational dissection of the Battle of France by Bundeswehr officer and military historian Oberst Karl-Heinz Freiser and military writer John Greenwood, in a work called The Blitzkrieg Legend. Have you read it, and if so, what did you think of it? From reading the reviews, it appears that the Germans were expecting a long, grueling attritional slog to victory, if one was obtainable, in France, but instead invented a winning formula which brought them quick victory. I think their operational scheme was greatly aided by Gamelin, who was so profoundly disconnected (no radio or telephone, dealt with subordinates only via aide to aide conversations or messengers) that he made Fredendall bunkered 200 miles from Kasserine look like Patton and Zhukov combined as a real hands-on commander!

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1591142946/ref=cm_rdp_product

I take your point about cherry picking engagements, but it's clear to me that the French heavies weren't just Stuka fodder or meat on the table at Flavion and did a fair amount of damage, as evidenced by Stonne, where Billote did a Wittmann on the German column long before Wittmann was anybody of note. Repulsing a PD and IR GD is nontrivial where I come from, as is forcing the committal of three IDs in order to take the position.

None of this is to claim the French had their act together when it came to effective combined arms, and Mosier blisters their misuse of airpower, but I think it only fair to note that it wasn't as bad as the way we learned it and saw it portrayed on "The World at War." The Germans paid a stiff tab for their victory, but the way we learned about The Battle of France, you'd hardly know it, given the portrayal of the French as cowardly, outnumbered, outmaneuvered and outfought. On balance, I'd say the Char B1 bis did way better in its baptism of fire than did the Tiger 1 when it debuted at Leningrad.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Re second sentence read "heavy" ahead of German tanks, sorry for the confusion caused by the dropped word.

As for what "we" were taught, I wasn't taught any such thing, and all Mosier does is pound strawmen. Reread Horne if you want to comment on what counts as a history of this campaign. As for how I can make sweeping pronouncements on German vs. French armor engagements, I surveyed every tank engagement reported in daily combat logs from both sides. I'm not making it up, I know what the relation was between scale of a fight and the typical loss outcome. I don't rely on journalists for my understanding of the average combat effectiveness of weapon systems.

No, the French tanks didn't do a fair amount of damage, the Germans didn't suffer a fair amount of damage in the entire campaign from start to finish. And the French were indeed cowardly, outmaneuvered and outfought. Nobody ever pretended they were outnumbered.

There were some conservative elements in the German high command who expected a limited offensive and an attritionist slog, which it was prudent to be prepared for regardless. But Rundstadt and Manstein made the plan that played the French like a fiddle, and Guderian and Rommel rammed it home. And how much did the number of French tanks or their armor thickness matter to that outcome?

Not one iota. Which was the point of citing it in the first place.

Similarly at Kasserine, the first US command command that rolled out to meet the Germans had a full TOE complement of decidedly capable Sherman tanks, not 37mm popguns or obsolete Grants. And it got its ass handed to it in a matter of hours. Why? Dumb tactical use. They drove straight at unscouted German positions thinking they were riding to the rescue of 2 beleagered US infantry battalions like John Wayne, discovered high velocity AP shell the hard way, lost practically the entire command, and ran away dismounted. Well before the named pass. When they did stop them later, the weapon mix available wasn't any better, but they stood on a ridge with massed registered artillery behind them, and fired entire corps shoots at well spotted advancing Germans, instead of the other way around. Result victory.

And the amount that the difference between a Panzer IV long and a Sherman played in that, either part, was exactly nil.

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JasonC,

Sweeping pronouncements absent context. One thing. Sweeping pronouncements underpinned by in-depth research. Something else. Color me impressed on your Battle of France delvings! I take it from your nonreply you haven't read the Blitzkrieg Legend. As for Horne, he's on my list, but I'm surprised there's nothing more recent from the French side of things. Am well aware the Americans did everything wrong in their initial attack on Kasserine and got butchered on the approaches as a result.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Heard of anti tank guns JasonC? In your rewrite of history the German ones apparently don't exist as a threat to American tanks. And if you had the faintest idea of German tactical doctrine pior to the US entering the war you would know that the aim was to entice enemy tanks into range of said AT guns, not to engage in tank -v- tank battle at all.

After El Alamein the Germans never recovered in North Africa, their performance generally deteriorated significantly.

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After El Alamein the Germans never recovered in North Africa, their performance generally deteriorated significantly.

Rommel's retreat from el Alamein to Tunisia has been described as the most brilliant performance of his career. Considering the limitations his soldiers were operating under, theirs wasn't too shabby either.

True, the Germans were generally in retreat from then on, but they did score some tactical and operational successes now and then. And that was so not only in NA.

Michael

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