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WWII Speculations Thread


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About the weather Snowstorm thats most likley true.Look how big Russia is and the different climates people have to deal with.The Russians knew how to deal with the extreme cold better than anyone.It still doesnt take a genius to figure that summer clothes and the wrong kind of machine lubricants just aint gonna cut it at-30 with that lovely Siberian wind blowing.

If the first German built tanks had wider tracks and had Diesel engines(I know the engines were needed for their Uboats)that also would have had an effect on the Eastern front battles.All these little things add up.

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As far as the weather affecting both sides, that may be true, but it appeared to me the Russians were much more able to deal with the winter weather than the Germans. I have yet to see any documentation anywhere (and I've read several dozen books on the Eastern Front) that says otherwise. If there is, I would welcome the proof of this.

About the weather Snowstorm thats most likley true.Look how big Russia is and the different climates people have to deal with.The Russians knew how to deal with the extreme cold better than anyone.It still doesnt take a genius to figure that summer clothes and the wrong kind of machine lubricants just aint gonna cut it at-30 with that lovely Siberian wind blowing.

The real drop in temperature around Moscow came in december. By then the wehrmacht had already wore itself out. About middle of november many german generals wanted to halt the operation, basically beacause even if the outnumbered the red army, the enemy still had two well built defensive lines left and could defend in depth. Further more the wehrmacht was overextended and lacked the strength to push on. The problem with logistics meant that clothing was held back to prioritize fuel and ammunition, but that had more an effect when the weather got colder.

So when december came the wehrmacht had gone as far as it could and now faced serious problem with materials and men. Red army counterattacked on december 5th. Average temperatures in the region was around -5 degrees celsius in november and -12 in december.

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Logistic problems:

As far as i remember the Wehrmacht DID have had winter cloth for their soldiers in stock, but wasn't able to bring them to the eastern front lines due to limited transport capacity (rail tracks had to be repaired AND changed in track gauge, no highways or big streets but mostly and to bad dirt strips in russia etc.).

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A few things I was fuzzy on are beginning to make more sense now, particularly with regard to that first German winter in Russia. There's a famous quote where, when asked if it was time to bring winter clothing and equipment to the front lines in Russia Hitler said, "No, they won't be needed." That was in early September. The remark is always cited as proof that Hitler was planning on supplying his armies out of the major cities, including Leningrad and Moscow, before the weather became too severe. The problem is it doesn't reflect any change in attitude for October, November and December, as the weather situation worsened. It makes sense now that, as the armies moved farther east, supplies needed to be prioritized with fuel and ammunition being placed above winter clothing.

In 1811, Napoleon originally planned on making Smolensk the end of the 1812 campaign so he could solidify his supply line before advancing to Moscow, and then, if necessary, to St Petersburg (Leningrad) presumably to finish things. Like Hitler, and the Swedish Charles a century earlier, it never occurred to him that the Russians would simply cede space and keep fighting till the invader reached the end of his tether: Charles at Plutowa, Napoleon and Hitler at Moscow. The odd part is Napoleon said he wouldn't repeat the mistakes of Charles, and Hitler claimed he wouldn't repeat either the mistakes of Napoleon (overextending his supply line) or of the Kaiser (fighting a two front war), but both of them followed paths they knew to be overly risky.

Limited objectives for the first year would have been best for both; Napoleon in staying with his original plan, and Hitler following either the all-out North to South campaign SeaMonkey and myself discussed earlier, or one of three limited objectives for the first year, say stopping the advance on a Riga-Smolensk-Kiev-Odessa line before the rough winter set in that first year, solidifying the tracks behind their lines and being fully prepared to resume the offensive more strongly, and much earlier, in the Spring of 1942, rather than summer.

But the more I read about the historical situation the more I'm convinced that (1) Germany had no right to expect the initial success it achieved; if Stalin had allowed his generals to prepare the frontline armies they would never have collapsed so badly (2) Germany entered the campaign, as some of his generals later wrote, with too little of everything they needed, including aircraft and troops; either Hitler was taking on more than he could reasonably expect to handle, or he needed to allow the USSR another year's preparation time so he could also have that same extra time to prepare his invasion. (2) That historically Hitler's best, perhaps only, chance was to go for the quick kill. To follow the North to South plan we were discussing, taking Leningrad and then Moscow combined with a non-racist policy toward the Russian people that Arado and several of us, Kuni-Snowstorm-BrotherX-myself, were talking about, gaining full support as a liberator while undermining Stalin's regime, instead of strengthening it with his senseless persecutions.

Great points brought up by BrotherRambo, I like the way you got the Barbarossa discussion back in relation with the Mediteranean. And, of course, there was also the increasing bombing campaign from Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the United States preparing to get involved with Operation Torch, though the Germans had no idea that would even be possible! -- Adding all of that to the war with Russia and by early 1942 it already seems Germany was fighting too many enemies and could no longer hope for a clear victory on any of its fronts.

As always it would be great to actually have options of this sort in a game. There would need to be some advantage, most likely additional initial plunder at the expense of ill will and increased partisan activity, in doing things the fascist way, as opposed to the friendly policy which would forego plunder in exchange for the benefits just mentioned.

-- * In an earlier post something was said about Rommel getting an additional two panzer divisions at El Alamain. I think this, paradoxically, would have made things even more difficult for him. The more troops he had, particularly mechanized, the more supplies he'd have needed. It wasn't just a question of troops and supplies being lost at sea because Maltal hadn't been taken out, it was a matter of everything then needing to moved east 1500 miles all the way from Tripoli (not the badly damaged port of Tobruck, or Benghazi) by truck across an open desert road. There was no way to prevent the RAF from decimating those supply and reinforcement columns because during the course of the campaign the Axis went from barely having air parity to the Allies having total control of the air. I think El Alamain was a fatal trap. Auchinleck realized that and began preparing the position even while he was being driven out of Cyrainica. The 8th army wasn't routed, as Rommel assumed, it conducted a hasty, but well ordered withdrawal to prepared positions at the desert's narrowest point north to south, with the Mediteranean on one flank, and the Qattarra Depression on the other and outflanking made impossible. I think the only Axis chance of winning North Africa was to simultaneously win in the Middle East, as discussed earlier, by having supported in force the Iraqii attempt to drive the British out of their country, and join the Axis.

Paulus, before being sent to command the 6th Army, understood all of that and put it in his report to the general staff, where he should have remained; he was an excellent staff officer but never groomed for a field command. I think it would have been better if Rommel had been placed in command of either 6th Army, or an army group when Army Group South was subdivided (another mistake but unavoidable if a drive on the Caucasus was to be made in 42) with a more defensively oriented general (such as von Arnim) being placed in command of the Afrika Korps, which would have remained in Libya, making Tobruk its new base of operations whose only objective was to keep the British from moving out of Egypt.

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Imho the biggest overall factor in the Axis demise was overall population.

Germany had about 78 million in 1938

Japan had about 72 million

Italy had about 44 million

U.S.A. had about 129 million

U.S.S.R. had about 194 million

U.K.(doesnot include Canadas 11 million)47 million

U.S.S.R.alone had about the same amount of people as the main Axis countries.Once the Axis failed to K.O.England and the U.S.S.R.they had no hope.

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With regards to the Mideast question of the Axis closing the Suez, eastern Med area, what JJ said is exactly right. One of the greatest shortcomings was the unavailability of maritime ports for off loading supplies which hampered both sides when extending their advances.

I've often thought that the alternative would have been the advance through Syria and Palestine, essentially back-dooring the Suez. With Turkey's help that strategy would have been even easier, but still if Crete, Cyprus and Rhodes could have been enhanced bases coupled with the Italian fleet for securring the logistical cord then who knows?

This may be a viable strategy to follow when Global comes out, I for one will try it.

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Arado's point is one I agree with and alluded to earlier: population (and the resources) of the Allied countries were ultimately one of the chief reasons(and in my opinion, THE chief reason) the Axis could not achieve a lasting victory, regardless of military tactics (or lack thereof in some cases).

In the game, you have a good idea, JerseyJohn. Suppose this for an event decision for Axis:

plunder= MPPs but increasing partisan attacks, or

no plunder= no MPPS, but gain of an occasional AXIS partisan or occasional creation ie. regular Axis unit such as Ukrainian Army or Army Corp.

Sea Monkey's Medit. strategy sounds interesting but I would like to see what ultimate changes were made to the Medit. portion of Global Map in the new game

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One more thing about the failed Axis attmept in Africa would be the effect Ultra had.It not only told the Brits.when most convoys were leaving Italy it also told them what they were transporting.It made a huge difference in the sinking of Axis fuel tankers.It also allowed the Brits.to target only the important convoys.It also told alot about how heavy the escort would be so the Brits.knew what to expect and to decide if the convoy was worth the risk.This alone imho was one of the biggest reasons why the Axis couldnt move into Egypt.

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Imho the biggest overall factor in the Axis demise was overall population.

Germany had about 78 million in 1938

Japan had about 72 million

Italy had about 44 million

U.S.A. had about 129 million

U.S.S.R. had about 194 million

U.K.(doesnot include Canadas 11 million)47 million

U.S.S.R.alone had about the same amount of people as the main Axis countries.Once the Axis failed to K.O.England and the U.S.S.R.they had no hope.

Sounds so good, still so wrong.

If this logic would be correct, Israel would have had never any chance against her arab neighbors, not in 1949, not in 1956, not, not, ...

Or think about the spanish conqistadors in middle and south america.

Numbers are good, but not nescessarely descisive.

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XW,

Point well taken. However, I think both Arado and I went by the assumption "all things being equal". In other words, assuming most countries had roughly more or less similar and reasonable general levels of technology and development. Clearly if one has a very superior level of technology and development one can overcome the population numbers significantly, at least up to a point.

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I think Arado got a point with size of poulation which is basically the same fact that Blashy unsuccessfully tried to make concerning war materials. Quality is a clear advantage but in a long war both sides adopt and improve and resources and production matters. This is something that is really important to remember when discussing world war 2, because the axis could afford less errors than the allies.

That is also why I think the history of especially the soviet-german conflict lacks, it always comes down to what if germans had winter clothes, what if Hitler had taken Moscow first, what if stalingrad would have fell etc. Not only does it not take into account the opponent may react to different decision, it also shift focus from "the big picture". The truth is the russians made a lot more mistakes and maybe the wehrmacht was not so near winning the campaign at all.

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Paulus, before being sent to command the 6th Army, understood all of that and put it in his report to the general staff, where he should have remained; he was an excellent staff officer but never groomed for a field command. I think it would have been better if Rommel had been placed in command of either 6th Army, or an army group when Army Group South was subdivided (another mistake but unavoidable if a drive on the Caucasus was to be made in 42) with a more defensively oriented general (such as von Arnim) being placed in command of the Afrika Korps, which would have remained in Libya, making Tobruk its new base of operations whose only objective was to keep the British from moving out of Egypt.

I'm sure Paulus handled the 6th Army well when it was on the march, but as a desk-general inside Stalingrad it's quite clear he quickly lost control over the situation. Chuikov, the typical soviet commander, a brawler, had more success in street fighting, relying on leading from the front and adopting to the situation more easily.

I'm not sure Rommel would have been a good army, or armygroup commander elsewhere than North Africa. He was above all an extremly good dividional commander. And he was a GAMBLER, always tending to take risks and look for opportunities, almost neglecting logistics I have to say. He was the same in the italian campaign in world war one when he helped defeat the italians at caporetto. That might work well to some degree but it's far from the methodical and flexible approach performed by generals like Model, Kesselring, Manstein, Heinrici. I think El Alamein is a good example of how a methodical approach by Montgomery could stall Rommel. Too often Montgomery is accused of not pursuing and attacking enough, but he stuck to his gameplan and did what had to be done to stop Rommel. Firstly he exhausted the africa korps, then he attacked and over-extended the italians and german forces. Now that was actually a terrific job by Montgomery and knowing of operation torch all that it took to win africa.

So to sum it up, I have a hard time seeing Rommel succesfully eject Zhukov's defence at Leningrad or Chuikov in Stalingrad. Can you?

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Limited objectives for the first year would have been best for both; Napoleon in staying with his original plan, and Hitler following either the all-out North to South campaign SeaMonkey and myself discussed earlier, or one of three limited objectives for the first year, say stopping the advance on a Riga-Smolensk-Kiev-Odessa line before the rough winter set in that first year, solidifying the tracks behind their lines and being fully prepared to resume the offensive more strongly, and much earlier, in the Spring of 1942, rather than summer.

Well I'm not so sure about this. A long war would have meant increased time of the red army to recover which would eventually tip the advantage over to the russians. Barbarossa tried to destroy the red army at the borders but it failed and the soviet union quickly massmobilized up to 20 reserve armies in 1941. After 1941 with the war of attrition the german chance in real life was all over. The decisive blow could have happened at Stalingrad or somewhere else - remember that the russians launched the bigger Rzhev offensive around Moscow eg operation Mars, at the same time as the Stalingrad counteroffensive so the russians had built up a superiority in forces in little over a year.

But we will never know for sure. One thing that I found interesting which emphazises the Moscow or Leningrad first strategy, is the neglected fact, that a speedy capture of those would not only sever soviet communication - it would also have restricted evacuation of industry eastward.

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Does this thread not bring back what was the best in our earlier SC forum years? Got to love it!

To address the population comparison in light of a short conflict, 2 years at the most, for no one can doubt that the weight of the Allies will eventually overcome the Axis, you must examine the human psyche. Think about how easily human perspective is manipulated, there were and are people on the opposite ends of the spectrum, philosophically, idealistically, and their interpretation of "reality". Compare them to a flock of sheep, sheople with the overwhelming position of numbers, but they can be misguided, only takes a few wolves to change their outlook on survival. What the wolves have to focus on is taking out the sheepdogs, for if they are successful the masses' leanings can be changed. The numbers game(population) is really about the amount of sheepdogs and the sheperds who direct them. The sheople's will is easily broken when not protected.

Interesting that the north to south Barbarossa campaign may have met with some success and I agree the main battle may have occurred in Stalingrad even with this alternative pursual. As difficult as the Volga may have been to cross, the primary error by the Germans was getting caught up in the urban fight. Obviously the Wehrmacht violated their primary strategy of bypassing large urban areas and focus on cutting them off. Of course as we know, Stalingrad turned out to be the struggle of two leaders' will, Hitler vs Stalin.

Kuni, I seem to remember reading, not professing them to be totally accurate, that the actual migration of industry to the Urals was not that significant in the early war effort and that it was a couple of years before those relocations actually made a contribution. If so, all the more reason to vanquish the Soviet Union by the end of 42 or at least render them so weak as to not be a continued apparent threat.

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Kuniworth is right in that the Germans could not win a prolonged slugging match.Hitlers only hope in Russia was to take the position of coming to ''liberate''the Russians

Talking about the German mistakes,What if Stalin didnt purge most of his officer cadre?

What if he didnt stand and fight on the Polish border but pulled back.

What if all Russian tanks had radios instead of those flags the tankers used to communicate with.

The Western Allies:

What if the French massed their tanks instead of spreading them out.The French heavy tanks would massacre any German tank of the time

What if Canada had listened to the British and had the 2000 plus fully trained fighter pilots ready when war broke out(Canada was asked to start the training program in 1938)I see a different result,especially if they were available for the Battle of Britian.

Yes the Axis made some REAL dumb mistakes but so did we and if neither side made any big mistakes it would all come down to overall numbers and overall industrial might and technology(especially Ultra,Magic).Allies win everytime,especially since we had the Atomic Bomb.

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Kuni, I seem to remember reading, not professing them to be totally accurate, that the actual migration of industry to the Urals was not that significant in the early war effort and that it was a couple of years before those relocations actually made a contribution. If so, all the more reason to vanquish the Soviet Union by the end of 42 or at least render them so weak as to not be a continued apparent threat.

Yes you are correct, the red army fought the whole of 1941 with practically what they had already produced and the reconstruction of industry in the urals took over a year. So time was not on Germany's side.

Yes the Axis made some REAL dumb mistakes but so did we and if neither side made any big mistakes it would all come down to overall numbers and overall industrial might and technology(especially Ultra,Magic).Allies win everytime,especially since we had the Atomic Bomb.

To follow up my reasoning in the ansewer to Seamonkey's quote above. Yes you are right in long war Arado. In a short war though you can overcome lack of production and resources.

That is how we got blitzkrieg in the first place. It was not an german adoption to what they thought was the "best approach" to land warfare, but it fitted their STRATEGICAL plan to conduct conflicts. The high command knew that on the strategic scale Germany could only survive if conflicts were short, to overcome lack of oil, materials and resources. So that's how blitzkrieg on an operational level was developed, to coordinate with strategical level. Blitzkrieg is thus a result of strategical planning, Guderians ideas would never have gotten so much attention if the plan on strategical level would have been different. And that also explain why blitzkrieg was developed in Germany and not britain or USSR or France although many countries knew of the benefits of tanks from world war one.

If you look at Britain, the military strategy of that country differed completly. Safe on it's island the british high command aimed to take the fight to the germans, and went out to find influences. They got it from italian airware strategist Guilio Douhet who argued for an indirect apporach with bombing of the enemy's infrastructure. That's why in the beginning of the war UK had a very strong long range strategic bombing fleet and a small home army.

THe strategical level strategy sets the scene for what kind of operational conduct that is performed.

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Does this thread not bring back what was the best in our earlier SC forum years? Got to love it! ...

By Jove, I thought it reminded me of something! :D

... To address the population comparison in light of a short conflict, 2 years at the most, for no one can doubt that the weight of the Allies will eventually overcome the Axis, you must examine the human psyche. Think about how easily human perspective is manipulated, there were and are people on the opposite ends of the spectrum, philosophically, idealistically, and their interpretation of "reality". Compare them to a flock of sheep, sheople with the overwhelming position of numbers, but they can be misguided, only takes a few wolves to change their outlook on survival. What the wolves have to focus on is taking out the sheepdogs, for if they are successful the masses' leanings can be changed. The numbers game(population) is really about the amount of sheepdogs and the sheperds who direct them. The sheople's will is easily broken when not protected.

Interesting that the north to south Barbarossa campaign may have met with some success and I agree the main battle may have occurred in Stalingrad even with this alternative pursual. As difficult as the Volga may have been to cross, the primary error by the Germans was getting caught up in the urban fight. Obviously the Wehrmacht violated their primary strategy of bypassing large urban areas and focus on cutting them off. Of course as we know, Stalingrad turned out to be the struggle of two leaders' will, Hitler vs Stalin.

Kuni, I seem to remember reading, not professing them to be totally accurate, that the actual migration of industry to the Urals was not that significant in the early war effort and that it was a couple of years before those relocations actually made a contribution. If so, all the more reason to vanquish the Soviet Union by the end of 42 or at least render them so weak as to not be a continued apparent threat.

Yes, there's almost no doubt the great deciding battle would have taken place at Stalingrad. But the thing is, it would have been fought on different footing if the Germans had already taken Leningrad and Moscow and been able to, as you said, made the approach from both sides of the rivers Don and Volga. As we've been saying, the main German chance, regardless of whether Germany swung the Russian population over to their side (which would probably have decided things in itself) is that Germany had to defeat the USSR as quickly as possible, with as few losses as possible since only Russia gained in a war of attrition. But the way Hitler did things the whole war in the east became a bloodbath. Once Germany began fighting the historical Stalingrad in late 42, resorting to costly street fighting instead of maneuver, and Kursk in the summer of 43, again with very costly close combat, she was doomed. It was the equivalent of Grant fighting his way to Richmond almost unconcerned about casualties since he could afford them while for the Confederacy every man was irreplaceable. Same with Germany. After Stalingrad Germany was never able to catch up with its losses; and after Kursk the struggle became hopeless.

Kuni, Rommel has never been a general I'd go to extremes trying to defend. In large part he was a creation of Nazi propaganda, the swashbuckling cavalier outwitting his enemy at every turn, the common man who, through hard work, courage and devotion overcame class obstacles to become a fieldmarshal without a von in his name.

The problem was he was never trained for upper echelon command. He wasn't even trained to lead a panzer division, he was an infantryman who, between the wars, became commander of Hitler's bodyguard. No preparation at all for the tasks assigned to him starting in 1940. As commander of the Ghost Panzer Division he seemed to always be in the thick of the action and often in places particularly fatal for the ever more disorganized British and French. I remember reading a book in the very early 60s (I was in 8th grade) that was published in Britain in 1941, just before Rommel became famous in North Africa. The Six Week's War, about the 1940 French campaign. The author kept referring to "The German Rommel" to distinguish him from the Polish general with the same last name.

Even at that time the allies regarded him as a great general, it must have been even moreso in Germany where he was being made a hero of the common man. But the flip side began being told many years later, that as a panzer divison commander he often made unwise decisions which, if they turned out right seemed brilliant, but if they turned out wrong would have been disasterous. It also came out that, as he later did with the Afrika Korps, he wore out men and equipment for no apparent reason, losing much more of both than should have been necessary to achieve the aims he'd been given. His disregard for logistics didn't come back to haunt him at the time, but he certainly didn't care much about keeping in contact with supply depots.

If he was promoted again, and there was no reason to do so right away, it should have been to lead a panzer corps, placed on a short tether to a more experienced higher general. Instead he was sent to North Africa where, luckily, the British had just withdrawn troops for Greece and also obligingly lost their best tank general, O'Connor, to an Axis patrol --Rommel himself should have been captured on more than one occasion, the closest being when he wandered through a British field hospital shaking everyone's hand in one end and out the other, back to his captured British vehicle, where he just rode off, the Brits on guard thinking he was part of their Polish unit. :D

Anyway, in North Africa he benefitted from numerous British errors, many of them the same kind they themselves had taken advantage of against the Italians a year earlier. In his first offensive he ran through hundreds of miles, besieged Tobruck, and then had no idea how to actually take the place. In frustration he simply threw newly arriving German units at it in peacemeal attacks that did nothing but give him a high casualty rate. A short time later he was forced to give back everything he'd gained, except his growing reputation, falling back to his starting point in Tripolitania.

Regrouped, resupplied and reinforced he attacked again and achieved similar results, this time able to show his tactical brilliance to its best effect (again at great risks that didn't come back to burn him), taking a weakened Tobruck and, in the process, seizing enough oil and captured supplies and equipment to make a drive into Egypt appear the next logical step, especially with Malta, though not captured, at least battered into temporary ineffectiveness. There would have been a good chance of succeeding in getting to the Suez if he'd actually broken the 8th Army, or routed it, instead of just giving it a bloody nose and sending it back to prepared defenses. Here too he thought he could defeat again before it got there, but he couldn't and, in any case, the fortified positions were being manned by new arrivals, so the 8th Army became more powerful in withdrawing, while the Germans and Italians became weaker even as their supply lines stretched to the limit, and beyond. Rommel, meanwhile, showed his near contempt for logistics by having a major in charge of his supply operations.

This is pretty much the point where I was talking about Germany following the report turned in by Paulus, holding Cyrainica and switching over to a containment strategy in North Africa.

Rommel had just been promoted to Fieldmarshal. From the point of view of Nazi propaganda he couldn't be left in a defensive front, they needed more photos of Rommel leading an army from the turret of a tank, or his converted radio vehicle command car. So, there were only two choices: allow him the drive on Alexandria he was so certain would succeed, or give him a new command on a front where he could be at the head of an offensive. That would have been the Ukraine, at the head of Sixth Army.

Of course there were better choices, but there also much better choices than Paulus, who had no training at all for a field command, and no experience beyond the peacetime regimental level.

I don't agree that Paulus, once he started the drive on Stalingrad, proved to be a capable army commander. He moved too slowly, allowed defending Soviet troops to get away and take up defensive positions in Stalingrad while his own panzers were far off waiting for the nonmechanized infantry to catch up to them. I'm sure Rommel would have handled that differently. He demonstrated in North Africa that he'd become an expert in the kind of slash and flank tactis that would have bagged slow infantry columns and made it possible to occupy Stalingrad in force before it could be fortified by retreating troops who, by all rights, should have been captured before making it to the Volga. From that point I don't believe he'd have handled the main battle as Paulus did, I can't see him slavishly obeying every command from Berlin, and I definitely can't see him staying there even as the Soviet armies were crossing his flanks. He withdrew against Hitler's orders at El Alamain and, if he'd have been commanding at Stalingrad, he'd have done the same.

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That's a very good point JJ, even if, and it is highly doubtful as you state, Rommel would've got caught up in a Stalingrad battle he would have had enough recognition to know when to retreat regardless of the Hitler directive.

I read these posts and the question beckons, how much time preceding the historical beginnings of WW2(Sept 1, 1939) would be necessary for the SC players to conclude their diplomatic and strategical aspirations and take their alliance into the "what if" conductance of the alternative WW2 scenario? One year, two? How much time to lay the groundwork for the things like the Z plan; how much time to change historical tactical/strategical doctrines like blitzkrieg? How much time does it take to interject a rift in the French-British alliance, to conclude a German/USSR pact of armed collusion, etc?

Obviously the USA involvement contains the trump card of the conflict, what are the viable alternatives for USA contributions, sans Pearl Harbor type of attacks? What can really bring the USA in and can it be isolated to a particular theater?

So many questions, so many outcomes for "The Brave New World".

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Thank you, SeaMonkey, appreciated. :cool:

To offer opinions in a roundabout way:

Despite having made that SC-1 Z-Plan Alternative scenario, I don't believe there's much chance of doing it in peace time. The naval part of it was mainly fantasy, though several 16" guns were made, presumbably for the Hindenburg class BBs, but I think it more likely they'd have wound up on Bismark and Tirpitz, with their 15" guns being moved to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. If not, then Hitler would have been making pretty much the same error the Kaiser made of creating a surface fleet to rival Britain at the expense of his army. Bismark and Tirpitz each took the resources of a full panzer division: how many BBs should Germany have built when each of them was going to mean not having a panzer division? They were a land power with land objectives. So I think the only likelihood of the naval Z-plan seeing the light of day was only after Germany conquered or controled nearly all of Europe east to the Urals, and had gotten peace from Britain without having drawn the U. S. into the war. At that point it would have been time for Germany to establish its presence in the Atlantic with several super battleships and five or six fleet carriers -- which would have also meant the establishment of a naval air arm (having the Luftwaffe commanding the aircraft would have been ludicrous) from scratch. In which case it would have needed Japanese advisers for both ship design and flight/tactical doctrine.

The army and air force Z-plans stood a better chance of being carried out, and I believe if a general war hadn't come about through the Poland invasion this would have been the next area Germany would have gone into. They already had a flying prototype of a jet fighter in March 1939 that was set aside for Hitler's war plans (not to surface again till it was desperately needed, and even then it was corrupted as a ground attack plane, which it was not suited for).

Regarding diplomacy, I think the main scenario should start in late 1938 with Germany not having taken, with Hungary, Poland and Rumania also grabbing chunks of, the remainder of Czechoslovakia. This can be called The Good Faith scenario, where Chamberlain is not made to look foolish over Munich and Germany has options in its future course involving Poland. Perhaps a secret deal with the USSR in which Russia applies massive pressure, then invades the eastern part of the country, and Germany enters with the pretense of being its savior. There would need to be a mechanism in the scenario editor for having multiple reactions to this sort of thing. In the sequence just mentioned I can't see either Britain or France going to war over Poland, which they have no committments with, unless it's to dow on the USSR; and then how do they react to Germany crossing the Polish frontier afterwards on the premise of creating a buffer zone in the east?

So, it's mainly up to Hubert in the creation of an extremely versatile scenario editor, one in which the player/creator would be able to do anything from the historical situation to totally a-historical ideas like making Germany and Britain allies -- as I said, this would be very a-historical, but an option I think would be necessary to make truly interesting scenarios. Which also means, of course, that Italy could be set up as a western ally, and the USSR as part of the Axis. The premise would be things such as going back, for example, and saying Britain and France do not follow the U. S. lead in condemning Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-36. Going back to the early '30s would be very interesting too, but as Snowstorm pointed out earlier, most sane men would not have followed the course Hitler chose in the summer/fall of 1939, but then those same sane men would not have absorbed Austria or Czhechoslovakia earlier, so that's a trade-off.

To me the United States should have a very, very slow trigger taking it out of neutrality. As was the case historically I don't believe anything short of an attack on US territory would have led to a US declaration of war. We need to remember that prior to Pearl Harbor a U. S. gunboat was deliberately attacked and sunk by the Japanese in China, without any appreciable result, and two U. S. destroyers were sunk by U-boats while escorting ships on convoy runs and, once again, there was no public outcry to enter the war. American sentiment was, instead, that the United States Navy should not have been running its warships in war zones.

Snowstorm Sorry I took so long to reply to your earlier point about plunder options in Russia. I think the USSR would need to be laid out as numerous nations under the same system. As Germany conquers different areas it should have the plunder option in each of them individually: Belorussia; Ukraine; Crimea; Caucasus etc, and liberated countries such as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The better they're treated the more they'll give in return in the form of troops and resources along with the absense of partisan activity. Going for the brutal plunder option would yield a full year's total production from that territory, but would result in total partisan participation and reduced production and troop reinforcement later on. I'd go for three settings: Harsh, Partial, Friendly (no plunder other than military salvage) and Semi-Autonomy, which would give the region its own government and make it an Axis minor ally.

-- An option would be to choose an historical setting to simulate the degree of oppression carried out historically, ranging from light in places like Denmark and the Channel Islands, to draconian in places like Poland and the Ukraine with countries like France falling somewhere in the middle.

Regarding Populations: Both the German and Japanese governments operated on the basis of their own people being a master race.

For the Japanese it meant regarding subject peoples like the Koreans, Formosians (Taiwanese), Manchurians, Chinese, Phillipinos and Indonesians as various levels of lesser beings who could be dominated and controled by comparatively small numbers of Japanese second and third rate garrisons.

With Germany, Hitler felt the British provided proof of this in India, where a very small number of Englishmen controled hundreds of millions of native peoples who he regarded as a mix of marginal humans. In the Nazi view the same system would work in Europe, with its extreme model being set up in post invasion Russia, where demobilized German soldiers would be placed in charge of large tracts of land with hundreds of Slavs serving them. He drew as his examples the Ancient Roman system of making ex-legionaires manor lords and, more recently, America's 19th century southern plantations.

Blatant racism, and what we today would consider mind boggling theories of different kinds of humans -- and these views were still commonplace in the United States and other countries, even if not part of the official culture (in the U. S. look back at the way blacks were treated in the 1930s, and earlier, with that system only showing cracks in the mid-40s, and directly because of WWII; during which all of the military branches practiced segration!). So, when we talk about populations it isn't the same as the western view of populations 70 years ago. I remember being told at school (though not in texts but often by teachers) in the 1950s that our only serious enemy was Russia, because the Chinese were "backwards."

In game terms I don't think populations would be equal. The most industrialized nations had much better educated citizens than those being exploited by them. I'll stop at that point because I don't want to seem like a racist, I'm not, but I think we need to consider various nations at the time operated on significantly different levels of development.

With Britain and France there was the paradox of having huge colonial populations giving them a very great war potential. But the flip side was the more those colonial populations contributed to the effort the closer they came to independence. The British knew that very well, and also that the next major war would cause the end of the Empire. Except Winston Churchill, of course. As WWII wound down he campaigned for the preservation of the empire even if it meant fighting all over the world. And he was promptly, and rightly, voted out of office. It's unfortunate France didn't enter the postwar period with a similar realization regarding its own colonies.

-- Among westernized nations, I think, initially at least, levels of war preparedness has to be a major consideration. In 1938, for instance, the United States was totally unprepared for a war of any sort, where Germany and Japan were well along in their own preparations. That would need to be taken into consideration when talking about industrial potential and numbers of citizens.

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.Allies win everytime, especially since we had the Atomic Bomb.

Well, i would love to use your crystal ball, where can someone get another piece of such unbelievable witchcraft?

Sorry arado234, but i disagree.

And when it come to the Atomic Bomb, than the only sure thing we know is the the americans were ruthless enough to use it while Hitler didn't use "his Atomic Bomb", which could have been the chemical weapons like nerve agents like Tabun, Sarin or Soman.

Think about it, it would have been possible to use these nerve agents.

German Subs were patrolling the western american ports, german test flights made it to the US western coast and back.

You need not much imagination to see that it could have been possible to shell cities like New York with nerve agents, or to bomb them with experimantal long range bombers or to send some long range V2.

Same goes for every european city.

The thing is that Hitler didn't used these weapons of mass destructions while Truman did.

I say: lucky for all of us.

But your conclusion (see above) is terrible wrong when you get your self-assurance only from the fact that the USA had the Atomic Bomb while the Axis didn't.

And numbers are absolutly overrated as well.

Even a succesful war of attrition has first to be won at the home front.

If the USA had suffered losses like the USSR, what do you think would have happened? No one can be certain about these things, maybe a truce might have become an option with the isolationist gaining the upper hand again.

Roossevelt became president because he promised to keep the USA out of the war. He didn't, and IF he had lost millions of young men, what do you think would have happened at the next election when there would have been some kind of negotiable peace treaty in sight?

If i mention the Vietnam war, than this should be explanation enough, shouldn't it?

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Xwormwood imho the Americans did the RIGHT thing by using the Atomic bomb.Look how many Japanese were being killed in the B29 firebombing attacks.If the war had kept going untill either every Japanese city was obliterated and the Allies had to actually invade mainland Japan the OVERALL cost in lives would have been WAY higher.So by using the Atomic bombs it actually saved lives in the longrun.How do you thinkthe Americans would have viewed their President if they found out after a costly invasion of Japan that they had a super weapon that would have ended the war WITHOUT the loss of anymore American lives?

Human nature being what it is imho if those Atom bombs hadnt been used they may verywell have been used in the Korean war when both sides had them.This would have been a disaster.Once the world saw what these bombs were capable of im sure it had a huge influence on why they were never used again.In this case seeing is believing.Same a chemical weapons.

As far as Hitler not using chemical weapons just ask the 6 million plus concentration camp inmates about how they felt about your statement about the Germans not using chemical weapons.I dont mean anything bad when I make this statement

Xwormwood do you actually expect me to believe that if Hitler had developed the Atomic Bomb he wouldnt have used it.You know as well as I do that he would have.Ill bet his first target would have been London.Remember we also had Chemical weapons which would have been used on Germany.

As far as America suffering the Millions of casualties go how would that ever be possible?They werent next to any of the Axis powers.If America had been where Russia is(thats the only way it could happen)then and with the U.S.industrial capabilties they have and the fact they wouldnt have shot most of their officers Germany would have been wiped out if they tried anything so Hitler never would have been in the position to do what he did.

As far as Vietnam goes that was just a policing action gone bad(im kidding).I dont know much about that war so I cant comment but you are right in that Americans back home had had enough.The big differnce between Vietnam and WW2 is the Axis powers were a threat to the whole world and couldnt be allowed to win(yes I do realise that the world still isnt the greatest place at times)Vietnam was no threat to America so (im guessing)one of the main reasons it happened was to help stop the spread of communism?

You are right Xwormwood it is lucky for us all that a chemical war didnt start.

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Xwormwood imho the Americans did the RIGHT thing by using the Atomic bomb.Look how many Japanese were being killed in the B29 firebombing attacks.If the war had kept going untill either every Japanese city was obliterated and the Allies had to actually invade mainland Japan the OVERALL cost in lives would have been WAY higher.So by using the Atomic bombs it actually saved lives in the longrun.How do you thinkthe Americans would have viewed their President if they found out after a costly invasion of Japan that they had a super weapon that would have ended the war WITHOUT the loss of anymore American lives?

I can understand the reasoning, of course.

Even though you could use the same words to explain why it might have been a good idea if Nazi Germany would have used its superior chemical weapons, like dropping them over every major english city, saving millions of german lives through a following armistice with the UK.

And the Germans found out after the war that Hitler didn't used the chemicals weapons, and well, good for us, as the world would have hated us even more if we did used them. I presume that the american people might have thought so as well IF the Army had to invade Japan, loosing several hundred thousand men.

Don't tell me that it is nescessary to kill non-combatants to win a war.

This behaviour is always a war crime, even though you won't be charged if you WIN this war, as history has proven.

Human nature being what it is imho if those Atom bombs hadnt been used they may verywell have been used in the Korean war when both sides had them.This would have been a disaster.Once the world saw what these bombs were capable of im sure it had a huge influence on why they were never used again.In this case seeing is believing.Same a chemical weapons.

True, but what does this prove? That you use all your horrible weapons as long as you are the only one who actualy can use them, and you stop as soon as your opponent has the same weapon?

As far as Hitler not using chemical weapons just ask the 6 million plus concentration camp inmates about how they felt about your statement about the Germans not using chemical weapons.I dont mean anything bad when I make this statement

I know, and so do i (not meaning anything bad when arguing here).

Yes, the Germans murdered, created hell on earth.

But still Hitler didn't allowed the military use of them. My point was, that the explanation "the A-Bomb solves it all" is not correct.

What do you think would Hitler have ordered the day after the A-Bomb hit Hamburg or Berlin? And what if Hitler hat resigned and a Nazi murderer with no trench war horror from WW1 would have given the orders? What IF Germany would have used it superior chemical weapons?

It is in no SC game, and i don't need it in the game, still it would be needed to create all the "what ifs", and in my opinion it proves that your argument about "the Atomic-Bomb, our failsafe", is somewhat weak, as there would have been a counter, and this long, long before the Atomic-Bomb was ready.

Xwormwood do you actually expect me to believe that if Hitler had developed the Atomic Bomb he wouldnt have used it.You know as well as I do that he would have.Ill bet his first target would have been London.Remember we also had Chemical weapons which would have been used on Germany.

Problem is, that the German chemical weapons were far more dangerous / advanced than the Allied ones. Hitler would have (in my opinion as well) used the Atomic Bomb, of course. He used the V-weapons and everything else, too. Except the chemical weapons. Historians believe that this has something to do with his personal trench warfare experience in WW1 and the believe, that the Allied had the same potent weapon as well (which they didn't). Again, i just brought this whole point only to show you that your Atomic Bomb argument stands on wooden feet.

As far as America suffering the Millions of casualties go how would that ever be possible?They werent next to any of the Axis powers.If America had been where Russia is(thats the only way it could happen)then and with the U.S.industrial capabilties they have and the fact they wouldnt have shot most of their officers Germany would have been wiped out if they tried anything so Hitler never would have been in the position to do what he did.

As i already said: what if Hitler decided to use the chemical weapons, and what if he had used them against large military or civilian targets.

What if the panzer reserves would have beend freed to be use in the beginning of D-Day, bringing the whole fight a possible new outcome, what if Midway went terrible wrong, cutting down the american abilities to do anything big in the pacific for a year while letting the japanese have their elite carrier force for one more year etc. etc. etc.

Military history shows us many, many incidents where one simple, stupid mistake or even simply bad weather decided the fate of a battle and / or an entire war.

As far as Vietnam goes that was just a policing action gone bad(im kidding).I dont know much about that war so I cant comment but you are right in that Americans back home had had enough.The big differnce between Vietnam and WW2 is the Axis powers were a threat to the whole world and couldnt be allowed to win(yes I do realise that the world still isnt the greatest place at times)Vietnam was no threat to America so (im guessing)one of the main reasons it happened was to help stop the spread of communism?

You are right Xwormwood it is lucky for us all that a chemical war didnt start.

At least the 3rd Reich (and obviously many other bad countries) believed that the democracies were soft and couldn't stand much losses.

If i look on todays Germany, where we have a huge discussion about when and how fast we can pull our 4000 troops out of Afghanistan, and what it is what we do there (god forbids that someone dares to call it a war, don't use this dirty word), than i would have to agree, sad but true.

What if Germany had created a pre-European Union under german dominance, giving Vichy France completly control over France, same maybe with the Benelux, Denmark and Norway. Do you really believe that the USA would have demanded unconditional surrender and would have fought all the way to free Poland and some other eastern european countries?

I at least have some heavy doubts about it.

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Xwormwood there were no non-combatants in WW2.Whats the difference if you kill the soldiers waging the battle or destroy his means to wage war in the first place(kill all the''non-combatants by bombing the factories what produce the weapons in the first place killing the people who work there)?By bombing civilian targets it forced Germany to divert lots of man power''combatants''plus many 100s of A.A.guns(especially the 88s)that would have been used in a combat role.Remember you fight to win.People are people.Just because a person doesnt wear a uniform it doesnt make their life any more important than someone who does?

You just proved my point about W.M.D.s.You said one of the reasons Hitler didnt use his chemical weapons was because he thought we had them and he had experienced a chemical attack.In other words he didnt use them because he feared a similar if not worse attack from the Allies not because he thought it was wrong.He probably would have used them if he figured we didnt have any just like he would have used an Atomic bomb if he figured we didnt have any and some (alot)of people would have agreed with him.Especially if Germany had won.You are so right in that the victors write History and yes they get it wrong alot of the time.

You may be right in that the Americans used the Atomic bomb against a country with no means to retaliate but could still inflict terrible human loss.Xwormwood imho those Atomic bombs DID save many ''non-combatants''by ending the war much earlier and sparing Japan the future of more fire bombings and an invasion which would have killed LOTS of people.

Your last comment is absolutley correct in that is exactly what Hitler should have done.I agree totally in that the Americans maynot have wanted to fight a war to the end to free these occupied countries.Look how we sold out Poland and the Balkans at the end of WW2.All that happened is we replaced one evil tyrant for another.

Xwormwood even though we dont agree on alot said here I do like getting a German point of view.It has opened my eyes.

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I'm wondering JJ, what if Hitler had not pushed those early Allied buttons, or perhaps a different sequence unfolded. Starting in 1936, let's assume Germany reoccupies the Rhineland, not much abrasion ensued from that act. Now further along Germany doesn't engage in Austrian or Czechoslovakian enticements and largely sets her sights on Poland.

Why Poland, what better way to get to the USSR? Germany uses her diplomatic cards for getting the Allies to accept the appeasement of Polish occupation. Just like Sudentenland was the jump off for the Czech grab, the Danzig Corridor provides the same opportunity to get the rest of Poland. Now Hitler is free to follow his apirations of subduing the USSR without French or British hostilities threatening his western borders.

So this WW2 "what if" starts with Barbarossa.

Or...let's say Global begins sometime in early 37 with decision events. If you're playing as Axis and your intentions are to compete with the western democracies and leave USSR alone or to invite them as a co-belligerent then you may have to answer the question of building a certain class of naval vessels at the price of MPP deductions over a period of time or accept one less Panzer Group in your build Q. Maybe you decide to trade a few corps for subs, or an army for a cruiser, an airgroup for a carrier, you get my drift, now we're talking a Z plan.;)

Anyway, you see the possibilities of making diplomatic and strategic decisions before the hostilities commence, molding your alliance into whatever endeavor you wish to pursue. This is truly how to explore some rather unusual occurrences for the WW2 "what if" developments.

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