How to attack like a Soviet Rifle Corps in 1944

[Grisha]

tero,

Glantz has Soviet casualties for the Yassy-Kishinev Offensive as a whole in When Titans Clashed.

PERSONNEL LOSSES

Strength: 1,314,200

Killed or Missing: 13,197

Wounded: 53,933

Total: 67,130

MATERIÉL LOSSES

Tanks and SP Guns: 75

Artillery: 108

Aircraft: 111

Hope it helps. The time period is 20-29 Aug. 44.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Mike:

We tend to think of Russians as using crude tactics and strategy, whereas they are as clever as anyone else.

What made them so different was their willingness, or better preparedness to take the casualties.

I don't know that the individual soldiers are better prepared to be casualties - but yes, the high commands have often seemed to see soldiers as a resource to be used.

Those that thought about it a bit more tended to do better - Suvarov, Brusilov.......

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

tero, no data on the Soviet casualties unfortunately.

Would be nice though to know how they fared in the breakthrough phase.

I have been thinking about the positioning of the guns, and it may have been a conscious design decision, to ensure that should the front on the flanks of the strongpoint be ruptured, it would still have artillery to control the breakthrough sectors and to defend themselves.

Concur. They clearly did not think about the eventuality the breakthrough attack would fall there. The kind of set up they chose was designed to deal with a local (spoling) attack.

Which may not have been the case had the guns been further back. Leontina was prepared for a perimeter defense.

Seems so. "Not a step back" spirit shining through ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Glantz has Soviet casualties for the Yassy-Kishinev Offensive as a whole in When Titans Clashed.... Hope it helps. The time period is 20-29 Aug. 44.

Helps out some. Only WTC is unabridged Soviet data through and through so the figures are not as reliable as the ones in Glantz's later works.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Mike:

I don't know that the individual soldiers are better prepared to be casualties

Well, a dug in Red Army unit with a deglared mission and some leadership was a bitch to uproot because they would not surrender. Seems this is dependant on the sector and time period though.

The spearhead of the attacks really leaned on the barrage.

Those that thought about it a bit more tended to do better - Suvarov, Brusilov.......

Which of them was the one who actually took Berlin ?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Mike:

I don't know that the individual soldiers are better prepared to be casualties

Well, a dug in Red Army unit with a deglared mission and some leadership was a bitch to uproot because they would not surrender. Seems this is dependant on the sector and time period though.

The spearhead of the attacks really leaned on the barrage.

Those that thought about it a bit more tended to do better - Suvarov, Brusilov.......

Which of them was the one who actually took Berlin ?

Konew, but Shukow got all the glory Konew is very magnanimous in his memoirs though, and manages to (barely) conceal the seething rage that he and Rybalko must have felt when the new line dividing 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was drawn south of the city centre by Stalin. 'The telephone conversation I had with Rybalko about this was less than pleasant [unerfreulich].' He then goes on dressing it up nicely.

Regarding the willingness to take casualties. According to Raus 'Panzers on the eastern front', the first encounter with snipers tied to trees was in June 1941. He professes disbelief that a soldier would do this, because there was no way to be taken POW. Interestingly, his feelings mirror those of British soldiers regarding snipers in Normandy.

[Grisha]

Konew, but Shukow got all the glory Konew is very magnanimous in his memoirs though, and manages to (barely) conceal the seething rage that he and Rybalko must have felt when the new line dividing 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was drawn south of the city centre by Stalin. 'The telephone conversation I had with Rybalko about this was less than pleasant [unerfreulich].' He then goes on dressing it up nicely.

Andreas, you actually spoke with Rybalko, commander of 3rd Guards Tank Army??? Wow. If you have any other stories to pass on, please do Incidently, Rybalko's tank army figures prominently in that Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception I linked in the Soviet Rifle Corps Attacks thread.

Regarding Konev-Zhukov, Glantz has said that Konev was indeed enraged at Zhukov, but the Berlin demarcation was only the icing on the cake. During operation Mars Glantz felt that Konev may have been made the scapegoat for its failure by/for Zhukov. Also, during the actual approach of Berlin, Konev's forces were taking artillery from Zhukov's forces. Pretty sad too when you realize that it was probably Zhukov who saved Konev's life in 1941.

[Grisha]

tero said:

Helps out some. Only WTC is unabridged Soviet data through and through so the figures are not as reliable as the ones in Glantz's later works.

I've posted what Kirosheev has on the Yassy-Kishinev operation at the map site of same [click here]. The data is split up between the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts as well as breaking down the the units involved.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Konew, but Shukow got all the glory

So did they "think about it a bit more" ? Or did they break the eggs as necessary ?

Regarding the willingness to take casualties. According to Raus 'Panzers on the eastern front', the first encounter with snipers tied to trees was in June 1941. He professes disbelief that a soldier would do this, because there was no way to be taken POW. Interestingly, his feelings mirror those of British soldiers regarding snipers in Normandy.

Even more interestingly this same theme was echoed in the Kukuska (Finnish snipers in the tree tops during Winter War) fable which still circulates in the Russian sources. I have never seen anything that would suggest any Finns would have sacrificed himself in this kind of manner.

Did he actually encounter one or is he just telling the story as he heard it ?

[TSword]

tero,

You're arguing concerning the term "auftauchen" is most probably wrong. It just means that they came into sight.

If i have an apointment with somebody for instance, i can refer to his appearance with the term "auftauchen", if i use "streetlanguange".

Greets

Daniel

[Tero]

Originally posted by TSword:

tero,

You're arguing concerning the term "auftauchen" is most probably wrong. It just means that they came into sight.

If i have an apointment with somebody for instance, i can refer to his appearance with the term "auftauchen", if i use "streetlanguange".

I just wonder about that "come into sight by surprise" bit.

My knowledge of the practises of the Red Army in situations like this predisposes me to think they might have burrowed down and dug trenches towards the Germans lines and used them to get the edge over the defenders who were under heavy artillery barrage.

Also, was it German SOP to clear fire lanes and vegetation from in front of their positions to facilitate spotting ?

The kind of terrain this fight was fought over would have required some LOS obstruction be left in place to mask the defensive positions.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Andreas, you actually spoke with Rybalko, commander of 3rd Guards Tank Army??? Wow. If you have any other stories to pass on, please do Incidently, Rybalko's tank army figures prominently in that Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception I linked in the Soviet Rifle Corps Attacks thread.

Grisha, he is one of my mates and is over here regularly, to chat about how crap the Wehrmacht was.

Seriously though, good job on the loss figures, very low considering what the offensive achieved, and I am reasonably convinced it was not a 1:4 exchange either Still have to find the time to read that leavenworth paper

That kife-saving story I am not aware of, can you elaborate?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:

Even more interestingly this same theme was echoed in the Kukuska (Finnish snipers in the tree tops during Winter War) fable which still circulates in the Russian sources. I have never seen anything that would suggest any Finns would have sacrificed himself in this kind of manner.

Did he actually encounter one or is he just telling the story as he heard it ?

tero, finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess.

As long as the snipers fired during the height of the battle, they remained unnoticed. It was not until they continued firing after the noise had died away that they were discovered and brought down by machine-gun fire. The last of them tried vainly to flee. Immediately recognized in the open terrain, they were killed by the fire of the nearest machine gun before they were able to reach the cover of the forest. Snipers in the trees of a forest were no novelty for the troops, but here for the first time they had been found in fruit trees in the open terrain where no one expected them. Though doomed, they had executed their mission. They had carried it out regardless of the fact that their lives were being forfeited. That was the new experience in the surprise attack at Paislinis.

P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002.

[JasonC]

On Russian unit strengths, my impression is that at the start of major offensives 2/3rds to 4/5ths of TOE is the right range (~400 per battalion, or 40-50 tanks per "brigade"), while late in a major operation more like 1/3 to 1/5 is the right range (100-200 per battalion, or 10-20 tanks per "brigade"). I am speaking of infantry and tank strengths, compared to unit designations. On the German (and minor axis) side, the usual case is 1/3 to 1/2 of nominal TOE, with only reserve formations at 2/3rds and above.

This is part of the explanation for the force to space figures. The other part is the depth of the attack. The descriptions already given speak of the deployment of the divisions and regiments, but the 2-1 deployment scheme repeats at the lower echelons as well. That is, on the corps frontage 2 divisions are up and 1 is back. 5 out of 6 of the regiments in the up divisions are up, while 1 is back, so with the reserve divison the regiments are 5 up, 4 back.

Then of those 5 regiments, you'd expect 10 battalions to have front line assigned. 20 companies. Each company, at the start of a major offensive, probably around the strength of 2 full platoons, plus some supporting weapons, engineers, etc. Thus 40 full strength platoon equivalents in the first wave. Which puts each one on a frontage of 100m. That is a dense attack certainly, but perfectly believable for the built-up start of a major offensive on the most concentrated sector.

Remember also that this is wooded terrain for the most part. In CM terms, perhaps 2/3rds rural heavy vegetation, with 1/3rd farmland moderate vegetation or so. They say the road network was poor and that there were few villages in the sector. Marshland, water barriers, and deeper forest (which go together because people can't make much use of low lying, wet ground and so leave it forested) would be the main channelers and obstacles.

Then you have to realize how the depth would function. The better performing portions of the first wave would continue on. Places where they got hung up, the next echelon higher would put in an additional wave just as dense as the first, over that portion of the frontage, "shooting the bolt" of that echelon of reserve. There could be such waves at battalion, regiment, division, and corps level if necessary, so a given position might have to fight off 5 such waves in succession.

Picture platoons on 100m each in woods, side by side, with another such wave following about 500m behind (but veering to cover only half the frontage, where the first gets held up), and supporting heavy weapons - mortars, HMGs, light cannon - in between the waves.

The defending axis forces have elements of 4 divisions. But divisions "in name only", meaning step reduced. And in such terrain, that would mean a thin outpost line and main positions half a kilometer to a kilometer back, as local strongpoints from platoon sized up to reduced battalion sized, each with all around defense.

The "Russians appearing" comment and the flamethrowers are due to the terrain. LOS is limited over large portions of it. The Russians are leading with small detachments of FTs and SMGs to overpower listening posts in the woods. The idea being to blind portions of the defense and cut a way in. With the main body of mixed rifle and SMG platoons following behind, meant to deal with strongpoints and MLR positions behind the outposts. Where they hit air, they bypass or help hit a nearby strongpoint from 2-3 sides. Following waves lap around the positions still holding out.

The Germans are using their artillery and heavy weapons (mortars etc) in strongpoints close to the MLR for several reasons. One, they aren't as reduced as front line infantry strength, and their defensive power and manpower are needed to flesh out the defense. Two, the defense is thin enough in that kind of terrain that the Russians are going to get through somewhere regardless, so a linear infantry defense far ahead of the guns is impractical. The guns get infantry defense by being located right with the MLR infantry in its strongpoints. Three, each strongpoint needs the ability to reach out and influence the battles around it, cover the ground between, etc. With the infantry odds so long against them, infantry counterattacks are not a practical way of doing that. Sending one platoon off into the wide woods crawling with Russians is just a death sentence, so they send fire missions instead (exploiting the high Russian target density, etc).

The drawback to that deployment of the guns is that they are closer to the front and thus vunerable to counterbattery fires. The Russian guns would be pretty far forward to reach through the whole German defended zone, since this was a major set piece attack.

The Germans evidently preferred to risk KO by such fires than to risk overrun in the rear by bypassing Russian infantry, probably because they were hoping for poorer Russian infantry-artillery cooperation - and for their positions being unlocated in the forests. Which it seems the Russians did not suffer from as much as the Germans hoped, had IDed enough gun positions beforehand for the initial barrage to seriously mess them up, etc.

The German strongpoint mentioned was obviously a regimental KG strongpoint, based around its attached artillery battalion - 12x105mm - and reserve infantry battalion. Which would have its own battalion mortars. The 37 guns mentioned as captured, and "including 7 assault guns", were probably the artillery battalion's 12 105s, regimental infantry guns (6-8) and mortars (6-12 81mm per battalion), and whatever Pz Jgrs were attached to that KG (sounds like the remaining strength of a StuG or Marder company).

You'd have to imagine the other two battalions in the KG out in front of that strongpoint, and probably somewhat to either side, as the screen. Lower in strength than the reserve strongpoint, and spread over 4-6 positions and a dozen or so listening posts, in two "belts". The idea being for the listening posts to detect incoming attacks and gauge their strength and direction, then fall back to the up-battalion fighting positions. The massed guns in the KG strongpoint then allocate fires to break up the attacks ahead of them in sequence. The assault guns and an alert company back in the reserve position are standing by to counterattack to reestablish the line here or there as needed. That would be the plan.

But the reality of the execution would be, the guns get suppressed by counterbattery, the OP-LPs get overrun. Confused fighting at the forward strongpoints, some holding up the first wave but inundated by the second or third. They don't do any better because the artillery they counted on does not come down in support of them. Large portions of the Russian first wave, passing between the forward positions, reach the reserve KG position around the guns, and lap around it. As their supporting waves come up, they attack, and the defenders have lost too many of their guns already to hold out well. Thus the large bag of guns at that one location, and the German description of mere holdouts here and there by nightfall and basically destroyed.

That is how I would flesh out the higher level narrative and raw recounting of engaged units you so typically get from Russian staff study sources. I hope it is interesting.

[Grisha]

I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds.

What is more they anticipated the German reactions and used that to work in their favour.

[Paul Lakowski]

As I recall , Glantz reports that priority was give to fire support weapons at the expence of line troops or 'trench strenght'. This was a diliberate policy to increase the ratio of Arty, mortars ATGs per soldier as a means of more effectively dealing with german attacks.

If the division staffing was 7000, then full fire support weapons and two platoons per line company max! Even they would be a reduced strenght.

1:50,000 scale maps are available in the UBC map library here in Vancouver [b.C.], so terrain detail is not a problem for those who live in the Seattle area ....come to think of it I have some of these maps photo copied!

In the Book "OStFront", the Pz Divisions are reported to field only ~ 20 tanks and face 100-300 SOviet tanks/SP at a time so 10:1 sounds about right.

[ August 03, 2002, 05:52 AM: Message edited by: Paul Lakowski ]

[Andreas]

Paul, hi. I realised I did not put info about the probable strength of 13. PD up here after I read your post.

Strength return from 1st August 1944 (numbers in brackets are TO&E)

</font>

• Armour
  Panzer III 5 (10)</font>
• Panzer IV 36 (81)</font>
• Panzer V Panther 0 (79)</font>
• SPW, AC, FOO Tanks 75 (264)</font>
• SP AT 17 (31)
  Artillery</font>
• Hummel 7 (8)</font>
• Wespe 16 (16)</font>
• towed 41 (43)</font>
• towed heavy AT 41 (71)</font>
• MG 690 (1,104)
  
  Vehicles</font>
• Trucks 697 (1,637)</font>
• small vehicles 240 (677)
  </font>

A statement in the history of 13. PD is that 'the defensive attributes of the position were good, because higher ground on the western side of the Dnjestr offered good observation into the rear of the enemy'. They did however have serious problems with Malaria and fevers, caused by Mosquitoes in the swamp.

Edited to correct list.

[ August 04, 2002, 03:07 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by Andreas:

[QB]Paul, hi. I realised I did not put info about the probable strength of 13. PD up here after I read your post.

Strength return from 1st August 1944 (numbers in brackets are TO&E)

</font>

• Panzer III 5 (10)</font>
• Panzer IV 36 (81)</font>
• Panzer V Panther 0 (79)</font>
• SPW, AC, FOO Tanks 75 (264)</font>
• SP AT 17 (31)
  Artillery</font>
• Hummel 7 (8)</font>
• Wespe 16 (16)</font>
• towed 41 (43)</font>
• towed heavy AT 41 (71)</font>
• MG 69 (1,104)
  Vehicles</font>
• Trucks 697 (1,637)</font>
• small vehicles 240 (677)
  </font>

QB]

I like these figures they look similar to figures for the 1SS Pz Div in 1943....It seems that the division had anywhere from 180-230 tanks and Assault guns. However at no time during that year where they able to field more than half that number . Often only 70-80 tanks were available for offensive opps and after several weeks this was down to ~ 30-40 operational tanks.

To me, the Germans should have invested more in ARV and repair crews so they could rely on more than 1/4 to 1/2 of there tank force being operational!

[Munter]

Tero,

"auftauchen" is virtually the same expression as "dyka upp" in Swedish, i.e. "ilmestyä" in our beautifully concise mothertongue.

M

[Tero]

Originally posted by Munter:

"auftauchen" is virtually the same expression as "dyka upp" in Swedish, i.e. "ilmestyä" in our beautifully concise mothertongue.

IMO you should translate it as "sukeltaa esiin" instead of "ilmestyä". Translated like that the connotation is more evident.

From L. Jäntti "Kannaksen suurtaisteluissa kesällä 1944" written in 1955 p 51: major Tirronen, the arty commander of 10D in the IVAK sector where the breakthrough happened June 10th, inspected the positions May 13th and discovered the Soviet troops had started digging assault trenches already in May 11th. These trenches ran all the way up to Finnish obstacles, as near as 70 meters from the defensive positions.

(Ohohoh... reading on it says the Finnish High Command was aware of the Normandy Invasion and the co-ordinaton between the Soviets and the Western Allies already in May. VERY interesting......)

The 10D frontage was 12-15 km's.

The Soviets had 300-400 tubes per kilometer in the sector. They fired 50 000-60 000 rounds in June 9th alone. The barrage on the 10th was even heavier. The Finnish arty had 5 tubes per km and they fired approx. 9 000 rounds that day.

The Soviet fire preparations: up to 1000 aircrafts at and up to 15 km's behind the front lines. Apparently the artillery concentrated on pulverizing the front lines.

The breakthrough made by the XXX GAC (45th GD, 63rd GD, Guards Armoured Brigade, three Guards Armoured Breakthrough Regiments and 64th GD in the second echelon) in the 10th extended up to 15km's behind the front line and was approx. 20 km's wide.

JR1, JR58 and ErP 20 casualties on June 9th-10th were 159 KIA, 619 WIA and 647 MIA (later found to have been killed). 172 men were returned in the POW exchange. JR1, which was took the worst beating, lost all in all 872 men, 396 of them WIA. Of the 350 horses the regiment had they lost approx. 200.

The arty of 10D suffered in those two days 104 casualties, 16 of them KIA. 68 guns were lost to the enemy, most of them abandoned for lack of tractors and horses.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess.

As long as the snipers fired during the height of the battle, they remained unnoticed. It was not until they continued firing after the noise had died away that they were discovered and brought down by machine-gun fire. The last of them tried vainly to flee. Immediately recognized in the open terrain, they were killed by the fire of the nearest machine gun before they were able to reach the cover of the forest. Snipers in the trees of a forest were no novelty for the troops, but here for the first time they had been found in fruit trees in the open terrain where no one expected them. Though doomed, they had executed their mission. They had carried it out regardless of the fact that their lives were being forfeited. That was the new experience in the surprise attack at Paislinis.

P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002.

That is pretty conclusive.

But the way I read it they snipers were not tied to the trees. They were IN the trees but at least this quote does not clearly indicate they were actually TIED to the trees.

Or if so then the marker in CMBB for running sniper would have to be a running tree...

[ August 05, 2002, 05:41 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Andreas]

Time to BUMP this baby, seeing some of the morosity posted in John's Kursk thread...

[Redwolf]

Bump

[PeterNZer]

Late bumpage, interesting thread.

In Band of Brothers book it's interesting that on the attack on the 105s on d-day the soldiers now joke about how gung-ho they were as a couple of them climbed trees to shoot down on the 105 gun defenders, they said that within a few months they couldn't believe how crazy and new-guy-ish they had acted.